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IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE 
UNDERSTANDING,  ETHICS  { 
AND  CORRESPONDENCE 


BENEDICT  DE  SPINOZA 


I 


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TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  LATIN  BY 

R.  H.  M.  EL  WES 

WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 

FRANK  SEWALL,  A.  M. 


i 


«MTIIIHT,  1*01, 

BY 

M.  WALTER  DUNNE, 


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INTRODUCTION 


In  the  wave  of  philosophical  inquiry  which  swept  over 
Europe  in  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century  and 
is  regarded  as  the  beginning  of  a new,  scientific  age 
of  the  world,  there  were  two  controlling,  but  divergent 
forces,  those  namely  representecTby  Bacon  and  Descartes, 
the*  first  the  founder  of  the  experimental  and  the  latter 
the  idealistic  or  dogmatic  method  of  philosophizing.  From 
the  former  we  may  trace  a continuous  influence  through 
Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume  down  to  Mill,  Spencer,  Darwin, 
and  Huxley:  from  the  latter  the  development  of  the 
modern  idealism  represented  by  Kant,  Fichte,  Hegel, 
Schopenhauer,  and  Lotze. 

A potent  factor  in  the  latter  development  was  the 
philosophy  of  Spinoza  (1632-1677)  which  had  its  roots  in 
both  Bacon  (1561-1626)  his  immediate  predecessor  and 
Descartes  his  contemporary  (1596-1650)  and,  leaving  its 
immediate  impress  on  Leibnitz  his  successor  (1646-1716) 
even  to-day  is  traceable  in  schools  of  thought  of  widening 
influence.  From  Bacon  he  conceived  the  idea  of  a novum 
organum  or  new  method  of  learning  which  should  be 
applicable  to  the  laws  of  human  conduct  as  well  as  to 
the  processes  of  nature.  Inspired  by  the  love  of  Des- 
cartes’ mathematics  he  resolved  to  construct,  after  the 
plan  of  h geometrical  science,  a complete  system  of  the 
knowledge  of  God,  of  the  universe  and  of  man.  Human 
nature,  he  says,  obeys  fixed  laws  no  less  than~do  the 
figures  of  Geometry.  <(  I will  therefore  write  about 
human  beings  as  though  I were  concerned  with  lines  and 
planes  and  solids.®  And  hence  it  is  that  we  have  in 
Spinoza’s  (<  Ethics  ® a treatise  consisting  of  Axioms,  Propo- 
sitions, and  Demonstrations  like  the  Geometry  of  Euclid 

(V) 

1.09953. 


VI 


SPINOZA 


It  is  this  combination  in  Spinoza  of  the  severe  posi- 
tivism  of  the  empiricists  with  a deep  subjectivity  and 
an  enthusiasm  of  piety  belonging  to  only  a most  reli- 
gious nature,  that  gives  him  a unique  and  leading 
place  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  Willing  to  regard  the 
universe,  including  man,  as  a system  of  pure  mechanics, 
his  contention  is  that  the  mechanics  itself  is  spiritual 
and  all  is  divine.  Together  with  this  profoundly  spirit- 
ual motive  in  his  thinking  must  be  reckoned  also  his 
bold  and  heroic  contest  for  the  freedom  of  philosophizing, 
if  we  would  account  for  the  growing  admiration  and  love 
which,  two  centuries  after  his  death,  make  his  influence 
more  potent  than  during  his  lifetime.  His  voluntary 
martyrdom  in  the  cause  of  free  thought  was  exhib^ed 
not  only  in  the  persecution  and  obloquy  which  he  suf- 
fered from  his  own  kin  in  his  excommunication  from  the 
Synagogue  in  his  twenty-fourth  year,  and  in  his  later 
condemnation  by  Christian  authorities  of  Church  and 
State,  but  equally  in  his  refusing,  in  the  day  of  his  later 
prosperity  and  growing  renown,  the  tempting  offers  of 
royal  and  university  honors  and  emoluments,  lest  his 
freedom  of  teaching  should  thereby  be  hampered.  More 
singular  than  all  is  the  distinction  which  Spinoza  enjoys 
of  being  a Pantheist  whose  religion  is  so  devout,  hum- 
ble, and  full  of  love  as  to  be  an  inspiring  example  to 
many  sects  of  orthodox  believers,  and  of  being  a Monist 
whose  One  is  not  nature  but  God. 

Born  in  Amsterdam  in  the  year  1632  of  Jewish  parents 
who  were  refugees  from  the  Spanish  persecution,  Baruch 
Despinoza  grew  up  to  become  aware  of  the  conflict  of 
the  narrow  and  rigid  rules  of  the  synagogue  with  the  free 
Latin  culture  around  him.  At  the  same  time  he  was 
stirred  by  the  monotheistic  instincts  of  his  Semitic  nature 
to  revolt  against  all  forms  of  dualism  and  idolatry.  His 
reverence  for  the  Scriptures  led  him  to  rebuke  the 
Phariseeism  that  would  kill  the  spirit  in  dogmatic  ad- 
herence to  the  literal  meaning  of  the  law.  More  and 
more  restless  under  the  irksome  formalism  of  the  syna- 
gogue he  at  last  declared  his  open  revolt,  which  not  even 
bribes  nor  the  threats  of  disinheritance  by  his  parents, 


INTRODUCTION 


vii 

afterwards  fulfilled,  availed  to  prevent;  and  with  awful 
maledictions  he  was  excommunicated  for  his  (( frightful 
heresies.®  These  consisted  mainly  in  a critique  of  the 
Holy  Scriptures  very  much  in  the  line  of  the  Higher 
Criticism  of  Christian  Scholars  of  to-day,  but  conducted 
in  a more  devout  and  even  in  a more  rational  spirit 
than  that  which  characterizes  much  of  what  now  passes 
as  quite  orthodox.  With  his  Judaism  he  renounced  his 
name,  Baruch,  and  assumed  the  Latin  equivalent  in  call- 
ing himself  Benedictus  de  Spinoza.  Although  entering 
practically  into  the  ranks  of  Christian  philosophers,  he 
never  received  Christian  baptism,  and  the  elements  of 
mysticism  and  suggestions  here  and  there  in  his  system 
of  the  <(  Talmud  ® and  the  (<  Cabbala,  ® with  glimpses  of  the 
neo- Platonism  of  Philo  and  Plotinus  make  us  aware  of  an 
attitude  of  thought  and  reflection  distinctly  different 
from  that  of  his  Christian  contemporaries. 

Practically  banished  from  Amsterdam,  where  he  was 
even  threatened  with  assassination,  Spinoza  lived  in 
several  obscure  villages  and  towns  of  Holland  in  scholarly 
retirement,  enjoying  the  fellowship  of  a few  devoted 
friends  and  disciples  until  his  final  settlement  in  The 
Hague  in  1671,  in  which  city  he  died  in  1677.  The 
publication  of  his  (<  Theological  Political  Treatise  ® in  which 
he  pleads  for  freedom  of  thought  both  in  civil  and 
religious  matters  as  essential  to  the  well  being  of  both 
the  Church  and  State,  brought  him  into  such  disfavor 
with  the  authorities, — it  being  placed  in  the  Index  by 
Rome  and  its  publication  forbidden  by  the  States  Gen- 
eral,— that  the  book  could  only  be  circulated  under  a 
false  title  and  many  of  his  friends  assumed  an  attitude 
of  cold  reserve  or  open  criticism.  Among  these  was  the 
English  Scholar,  Oldenburg,  the  first  Secretary  of  the 
Royal  Society  of  England,  who  nevertheless  continued 
in  correspondence  with  him  and,  being  a friend  of  Robert 
Boyle,  the  chemist,  kept  Spinoza  informed  of  the  progress 
of  science  in  England.  Meanwhile  in  The  Hague,  sup- 
porting himself  in  the  humble  vocation  of  a grinder 
of  lenses  and  living  in  the  greatest  simplicity  in  the 
family  of  a poor  painter,  Van  der  Spijk,  Spinoza  wa? 


SPINOZA 


viii 

constructing  and  revising  the  work  with  which  his 
fame  is  chiefly  associated  but  which  was  not  published 
until  immediately  after  his  death,  the  « Ethics. ® 

Spinoza’s  earliest  work  was  his  <(  Principles  of  the  Car- 
tesian Philosophy  together  with  Cogitata  Metaphisica,  * pub- 
lished at  Amsterdam  in  1663.  It  at  once  established  his 
reputation  as  a master  of  Cartesianism,  without  winning 
his  own  indorsement,  and  its  preparation  and  dictation 
to  his  youthful  pupil  Albert  Burgh  did  not  interfere  with 
his  maturing  at  the  same  time  his  own  independent  sys- 
tem of  philosophy  which  was,  for  a time,  to  bring  him 
into  a very  different  repute.  This  embraced  first  his 
celebrated  (<  Tractatus  Theologico- Politicus ,®  which,  besides 
setting  forth  the  claim  for  free  criticism  of  affairs  both 
civil  and  religious,  is  largely  a study  of  the  Old  Testa- 
ment with  the  effort  to  show  that  the  end  of  religion  is 
not  to  inculcate  truths  but  obedience : that  the  Scriptures 
are  not  scientific  but  ethical  in  their  nature  and  author- 
ity; that  Christ  is  superior  to  Moses  in  that  the  latter 
was  taught  by  exterior  vision,  the  former  by  intuitive 
consciousness,  showing  that  in  Christ  the  Divine  Wisdom 
had  taken  on  human  nature.  This  much  abused  treatise 
was  published  in  Hamburg  in  1670.  It  bore  the  motto: 
1 John:  IV:  13.  (<  Hereby  know  we  that  we  dwell  in 

him  and  he  in  us  because  he  hath  given  us  of  his 
spirit. ® The  book  being  interdicted  was  printed  with 
false  titles  once  in  Leyden  and  twice  in  Amsterdam  in 
1673. 

The  <(  Ethics,  ® although  begun  probably  before  1661,  was 
not  printed  until  after  the  author’s  death  in  1677,  and 
then  in  a volume  entitled  <(  Opera  PosthumaP  These  em- 
braced besides  the  <(  Ethics  * other  treatises  written  about 
the  same  time.  They  were  the  (<  Treatise  on  the  Improve- 
ment of  the  Understanding®  embracing  the  method  intro- 
duced in  the  <(  Ethics  ® ; and  the  (<  Tractatus  Politicus  ® in 
which  the  absolutism  of  Hobbe’s  <(  Theory  of  Government  ® 
is  criticised ; also  some  <(  Letters  from  Learned  Men  ® and 
the  author’s  replies  and  a (<  Compendium  of  Hebrew 
Grammar.  ® (<  A Treatise  on  God,  on  Man  and  His  Hap- 

piness ® with  notes  on  the  <(  Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus  * 


INTRODUCTION 


IX 


was  quite  recently  discovered  and  published  in  1852  at 
Halle:  also  a «Tract  on  the  Rainbow,"  Spinoza’s  sole 
scientific  treatise,  with  a « Collection  of  Letters " and  a 
« Biography " was  published  in  Amsterdam  in  1862. 

The  « Ethics  " proper  is  entitled : « Ethica : ordine  geome- 

trice demonstrata , et  in  quinque  partes  distincta , in  quibus 
agitur ; I.  de  Deo ; II.  de  natura  et  origine  mentis ; III. 
de  natura  et  origine  affectuum ; IV.  de  servitute  humana 
seu  de  affectuum  viribus ; V.  de  potentia  intellectus  seu  de 
libettate  humana ." 

The  treatment  is  mathematical  proceeding  as  in  Euclid 
from  Definitions  and  Axioms  to  Propositions  deduced 
therefrom.  Thus  Part  First  embraces  the  Definitions: 
I.  Cause  sui;  II.  the  Finite;  III.  Substance;  IV.  At- 
tribute; V.  Modes;  VI.  God;  VII.  Freedom;  and  VIII. 
Eternity.  Then  follow  the  Axioms,  and  Propositions,  and 
Corollaries. 

It  will  be  seen  that  although  entitled  « Ethics"  the  trea- 
tise covers  the  whole  range  of  metaphysics,  theology,  and 
epistemology,  and  yet  that  the  ethics  forms  the  culmina- 
tion of  the  whole  system,  inasmuch  as  it  looks  to  estab- 
lishing a clear  demonstrable  nexus  between  God  and  the 
human  conduct.  From  the  ontological  proof,  if  proof  at 
all  it  can  be  called,  of  the  existence  of  God  from  his 
nature,  or  from  his  being  of  « such  an  essence  as  can  only 
be  conceived  of  as  existing, " and  thus  from  God’s  being  and 
existence  as  necessary,  he  derives  all  the  laws  of  existence, 
of  creation,  of  nature,  and  of  man’s  conduct  as  fixed  in 
an  eternal  necessity.  But  God’s  necessity  must  at  the 
same  time  be  perfect  freedom,  since  it  cannot  be  con- 
strained by  any  things  except  itself,  inasmuch  as  there  can 
be  no  « other  " to  the  One  absolute  substance.  The  only 
« other  " to  the  One  self-existent  and  self-caused  substance 
must  be  that  of  the  finite  « affections  " and  « modes  " of 
the  infinite  attributes  possessed  by  the  One  substance. 
These  attributes  are  summed  up  in  the  two  universal 
ones,  Extension  and  Thought,  which  are  not,  as  in  Des- 
cartes, two  subordinated  or  created  substances,  but  are 
merely  two  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  only  substance. 
So  that  God  as  the  one  substance  is  at  once  all  extended 


4- 


X 


SPINOZA 


body  and  all  thought.  Particular  things  having  a limited 
or  finite  existence,  whether  in  thought  or  extension,  are 
but  modes  or  affections  of  one  or  the  other  of  these  chief 
attributes.  Their  life  or  being  is  distinguished  from  the 
life  of  God  as  "being  in  alio ” as  distinguished  from 
"being  in  se*  But  the  " being  in  alio  ” is  subject  to  limi- 
tations and  restrictions  from  other  " being  in  alio  ” ; it  is 
thereby  subject  to  passion,  to  feeling,  to  desire,  to  will, 
to  emotions  of  pleasure,  appetite,  want,  and  pain.  Its 
desire  is  to  complete  its  being.  The  sense  of  this  com- 
pletion is  joy;  the  sense  of  its  absence  is  sadness.  These 
emotions,  joy  and  sadness,  will  and  appetite,  are  all 
called  "affections  of  thought,”  but  of  the  thought  as 
natura  natur ata,  or  the  created  "mode,”  and  not  of  the 
thought  in  God,  or  natura  naturans.  With  this  limitation 
of  the  affections  as  of  "being  in  alio*  or  subject  to  im- 
perfection and  constraint,  comes  also,  and,  indeed,  as  its 
cause,  ignorance  or  the  lack  of  the  adequate  or  perfect 
knowledge.  It  is  this  lack  of  the  perfect  knowledge  of 
the  whole  which  causes  these  affections  and  passions  to 
wear  in  man’s  temporal  experience  the  appearance  of 
what  is  evil.  This  delusion  of  evil  is  the  bondage  of 
passion  or  of  the  affections,  the  servitus  humana,  treated 
of  in  Part  IV.,  in  which  division  of  the  work,  the  ethics 
truly  begins.  From  this  bondage  there  is  liberation  and 
redemption  only  through  the  more  and  more  perfect 
knowledge  of  God  with  the  consequent  vision  of  all  things 
sub  specie  ceternitatis,  or  in  their  relation  to  the  divine 
perfection.  This  satisfaction  in  the  relations  of  the  lim- 
ited " being  in  alio  ” amounts  to  an  extension  or  completion 
of  life,  and  is  termed  joy;  and  the  experience  of  this  joy 
with  the  knowledge  of  its  source,  or  of  the  completeness 
of  life  in  the  divine,  is  love. 

The  highest  attainment  of  the  human  mind  is  the  "in- 
tellectual love  of  God,”  which  is  the  contemplation  of  the 
divine  perfection  in  which  all  the  seeming  limitations 
and  imperfections  of  the  finite  are  lost  in  the  harmonious 
unity  of  the  infinitely  many  in  the  One.  This  knowledge 
is  itself  virtue  since  to  know  a thing  to  be  good  is  to 
love  it,  and  only  that  can  be  seen  to  be  good  which  is  a 


INTRODUCTION 


xi 


part  of  the  common  or  universal  good.  In  this  (<  intel- 
lectual love,  * or  the  love  of  knowing  the  good,  even  God 
may  be  said  to  love  himself  in  loving  mankind ; and  man 
in  the  same  love  rejoices  in  virtue  <(  not  because  it  en- 
ables him  to  govern  his  lusts;  but  because  he  does  rejoice 
in  it,  therefore  to  govern  his  lusts  is  possible."  The 
mortal  part  of  man  is  the  affections  and  modes  of 
his  <( being  in  alio*  including  the  imagination  and  the 
memory  of  his  earthly  mind.  The  immortal  part  is  that 
idea  which  expresses  the  essence  of  the  body  under  the 
idea  of  eternity,  or  as  God  sees  it,  and  which  therefore 
can  never  perish  but  survives  death,  although  it  passes 
from  all  the  limitations  and  consequent  emotions  and 
memory  of  a temporal  world. 

The  later  critics  found  Spinoza’s  logic  to  be  far  from 
irrefutable,  and  the  ordinary  reader  will  not  fail  to  detect 
instances  of  his  reasoning  in  a circle  where  he  seems  to 
be  convinced  that  he  is  offering  an  infallible  demonstra- 
tion. Skepticism  will  find  it  easy  to  challenge  even  his 
first  certainty  and  to  agree  with  Voltaire’s  verdict: 

<(  Vous  ites  tres  confus  Baruch  Spinoza:  mais  etes  vous 
aussi  dangereux  qu  'on  le  dit  ? Je  souhais  que  non:  et  ma 
raison  c'est  que  vous  etes  confus , que  vous  avez  ecrit  en 
mauvais  latin , et  qu'il  n'y  a pas  dix  per sonnes  in  Europe 
qui  vous  lisent  d'un  bout  a I' autre  quoique  on  vous  ait 
traduit  en  francais* 

The,  in  one  aspect,  sublime  idea  of  the  ® intellectual 
love  of  God  " may  in  another  aspect  be  interpreted  as 
only  an  expression  of  an  infinite  self-love  on  the  part  of 
deity  contemplating  with  delight  his  own  perfection  and 
granting  this  contemplative  joy  only  to  those  finite  crea- 
tures who  cast  themselves  into  the  abyss  of  his  infinity 
at  the  sacrifice  of  their  own  individuality.  On  the  other 
hand  when  viewed  in  his  relation  to  his  time  and  to  the 
traditions,  religious  and  philosophical,  with  which  the 
aspirations  of  his  youthful  and  generous  nature  had  to 
contend,  coupled  with  the  gentle  and  self-sacrificing  traits 
exhibited  in  his  conduct  with  friends  and  foes  and  his 
heroic  contention  for  the  freedom  of  thought  and  belief, 
the  contribution  of  Spinoza  to  the  humanizing  influence 


xii 


SPINOZA 


of  philosophy  cannot  be  denied,  nor  the  existence  in  his 
theory  of  truth  germs  of  vast  significance. 

It  is  not  strange  that  the  epithet  attached  to  Spinoza 
by  Novalis  — <(  the  God-intoxicated,  * should  have  come  to 
be  held  the  most  truly  descriptive  of  this  philosopher 
who  found  in  his  Euclidian  demonstrations  a vision  of 
God  as  real  as  that  accorded  to  the  ecstasy  of  the  medi- 
daeval  saints;  or  that  Hegel  should  say  that,  better  than 
to  call  him  an  atheist  were  it  to  call  him  an  acosmist,  as 
one  who  in  his  vision  of  that  which  is  the  union  of  the 
world  and  God  loses  all  sight  of  the  world  in  the  fuller 
vision  of  God. 


CONTENTS 


FAGB 

ON  THE  IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING  . r 

Of  the  ordinary  objects  of  men’s  desires i 

Of  the  true  and  final  good 4 

Certain  rules  of  life 5 

Of  the  four  modes  of  perception 6 

Of  the  best  mode  of  perception 8 

Of  the  instruments  of  the  intellect,  or  true  ideas  . . . . io 

Answers  to  objections 13 

First  part  of  method.  Distinction  of  true  ideas  from  fictitious 

ideas 15 

And  from  false  ideas 22 

Of  doubt  ...  26 

Of  memory  and  forgetfulness 28 

Mental  hindrances  from  words — and  from  the  popular  confu- 
sion of  ready  imagination  with  distinct  understanding  . 29,  30 

Second  part  of  method.  Its  object,  the  acquisition  of  clear  and 

distinct  ideas 31 

Its  means,  good  definitions.  Conditions  of  definition  ...  32 

How  to  define  the  understanding 36 

THE  ETHICS 39 

Part  I.  Concerning  God 39 

Definitions  39 

Axioms 40 

Prop.  I.  Substance  is  by  nature  prior  to  its  modifications  . 40 

Prop.  II.  Two  substances,  whose  attributes  are  different, 

have  nothing  in  common 40 

Prop  III.  Things,  which  have  nothing  in  common,  cannot 

be  one  the  cause  of  the  other 41 

Prop.  IV.  Two  or  more  distinct  things  are  distinguished 
one  from  the  other  either  by  the  difference  of  the  attri- 
butes of  the  substance,  or  by  the  differences  of  their  modi- 
fications   41 

Prop.  V.  There  cannot  exist  in  the  universe  two  or  more 
substances  having  the  same  nature  or  attribute  ...  41 

Prop.  VI.  One  substance  cannot  be  produced  by  another 

substance 

(xiii) 


41 


XIV 


SPINOZA 


PAOB 

THE  ETHICS  — Continued. 

PartI.  Concerning  God — Continued. 

Prop.  VII.  Existence  belongs  to  the  nature  of  substance  . 42 

Prop.  VIII.  Every  substance  is  necessarily  infinite  . . 42 

Prop.  IX.  The  more  reality  or  being  a thing  has,  the  greater 

the  number  of  its  attributes 45 

Prop.  X.  Each  particular  attribute  of  the  one  substance 

must  be  conceived  through  itself 45 

Prop.  XI.  God,  or  substance  consisting  of  infinite  attributes, 
of  which  each  expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essentiality, 

necessarily  exists 45 

Prop.  XII.  No  attribute  of  substance  can  be  conceived,  from 
which  it  would  follow  that  substance  can  be  divided  . . 48 

Prop.  XIII.  Substance  absolutely  infinite  is  indivisible  , 48 

Prop.  XIV.  Besides  God  no  substance  can  be  granted  or 

conceived 49 

Prop.  XV.  Whatsoever  is,  is  in  God,  and  without  God  noth- 
ing can  be,  or  be  conceived  ........  49 

Prop.  XVI.  From  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature  must 
follow  an  infinite  number  of  things  in  infinite  ways — that  is, 
all  things  which  fall  within  the  sphere  of  infinite  intellect  53 
Prop.  XVII.  God  acts  solely  by  the  laws  of  his  own  nature, 

and  is  not  constrained  by  anyone 54 

Prop.  XVIII.  God  is  the  indwelling  and  not  the  transient 

cause  of  all  things 57 

Prop.  XIX.  God  and  all  the  attributes  of  God  are  eternal  57 
Prop.  XX.  The  existence  of  God  and  his  essence  are  one 

and  the  same 58 

Prop.  XXI.  All  things,  which  follow  from  the  absolute  na- 
ture of  any  attribute  of  God,  must  always  exist  and  be  in- 
finite, or,  in  other  words,  are  eternal  and  infinite  through 

the  said  attribute  ....  58 

Prop.  XXII.  Whatever  follows  from  any  attribute  of  God, 
in  so  far  as  it  is  modified  by  a modification,  which  exists 
necessarily  and  as  infinite  through  the  said  attribute, 
must  also  exist  necessarily  and  as  infinite  ....  60 

Prop.  XXIII.  Every  mode,  which  exists  both  necessarily 
and  as  infinite,  must  necessarily  follow  either  from  the 
absolute  nature  of  some  attribute  of  God,  or  from  an  at- 
tribute modified  by  a modification,  which  exists  neces- 
sarily and  as  infinite 60 

Prop.  XXIV.  The  essence  of  things  produced  by  God  does 

not  involve  existence  60 

Prop.  XXV.  God  is  the  efficient  cause  not  only  of  the  exist- 
ence of  things,  but  also  of  their  essence 61 

Prop.  XXVI.  A thing,  which  is  conditioned  to  act  in  a par- 
ticular manner,  has  necessarily  been  thus  conditioned 


CONTENTS 


xv 


PAGE 


THE  ETHICS — Continued. 

Part  I.  Concerning  God  — Continued. 

by  God ; and  that  which  has  not  been  conditioned  by  God 

cannot  condition  itself  to  act 61 

Prop.  XXVII.  A thing,  which  has  been  conditioned  by  God 
to  act  in  a particular  way,  cannot  render  itself  uncondi- 
tioned   62 


Prop.  XXVIII.  Every  individual  thing,  or  everything  which 
is  finite  and  has  a conditioned  existence,  cannot  exist  or 
be  conditioned  to  act,  unless  it  be  conditioned  for  exist- 
ence and  action  by  a cause  other  than  itself,  which  also  is 
finite  and  has  a conditioned  existence ; and  likewise  this 
cause  cannot  in  its  turn  exist  or  be  conditioned  to  act,  un- 
less it  be  conditioned  for  existence  and  action  by  another 
cause,  which  also  is  finite  and  has  a conditioned  existence, 

and  so  on  to  infinity 62 

Prop.  XXIX.  Nothing  in  the  universe  is  contingent,  but  all 
things  are  conditioned  to  exist  and  operate  in  a particular 
manner  by  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature  ...  63 

Prop.  XXX.  Intellect,  in  function  finite,  or  in  function  in- 
finite, must  comprehend  the  attributes  of  God  and  the 

modifications  of  God,  and  nothing  else 64 

Prop.  XXXI.  The  intellect  in  function,  whether  finite  or  in- 
finite, as  will,  desire,  love,  etc.,  should  be  referred  to  pas- 
sive nature,  and  not  to  active  nature 64 

Prop.  XXXII.  Will  cannot  be  called  a free  cause,  but  only  a 

necessary  cause 65 

Prop.  XXXIII.  Things  could  not  have  been  brought  into 
being  by  God  in  any  manner  or  in  any  order  different 

from  that  which  has  in  fact  obtained 66 

Prop.  XXXIV.  God’s  power  is  identical  with  his  essence  . 70 

Prop.  XXXV.  Whatsoever  we  conceive  to  be  in  the  power 

of  God,  necessarily  exists 70 

Prop.  XXXVI.  There  is  no  cause  from  whose  nature  some 

effect  does  not  follow 70 

Appendix 70 

Part  II.  Of  the  Nature  and  Origin  of  the  Mind  . 78 

Preface 78 

Definitions 78 

Axioms 79 

Prop.  I.  Thought  is  an  attribute  of  God,  or  God  is  a think- 
ing thing 79 

Prop.  II.  Extension  is  an  attribute  of  God,  or  God  is  an  ex- 
tended thing 


80 


XVI 


SPINOZA 


PA.es 

THE  ETHICS  — Continued. 

Part  II.  Of  the  Nature  and  Origin  of  the  Mind  — Continued. 
Prop.  Ill  In  God  there  is  necessarily  the  idea,  not  only  of 
his  essence,  but  also  of  all  things  which  necessarily  follow 


from  his  essence 80 

Prop.  IV.  The  idea  of  God,  from  which  an  infinite  number 
of  things  follow  in  infinite  ways,  can  only  be  one  . . 81 


Prop.  V.  The  actual  being  of  ideas  owns  God  as  its  cause, 
only  in  so  far  as  he  is  considered  as  a thinking  thing,  not 
in  so  far  as  he  is  unfolded  in  any  other  attribute ; that  is, 
the  ideas  both  of  the  attributes  of  God  and  of  particular 
things  do  not  own  as  their  efficient  cause  their  objects,  or 
the  things  perceived,  but  God  himself,  in  so  far  as  he  is  a 

thinking  thing . 81 

Prop.  VI.  The  modes  of  any  given  attribute  are  caused  by 
God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  considered  through  the  attribute  of 
which  they  are  modes,  and  not  in  so  far  as  he  is  considered 

through  any  other  attribute  . 82 

Prop.  VII.  The  order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same 

as  the  order  and  connection  of  things 82 

Prop.  VIII.  The  ideas  of  particular  things,  or  of  modes, 
that  do  not  exist,  must  be  comprehended  in  the  infinite 
idea  of  God,  in  the  same  way  as  the  formal  essences  of 
particular  things  or  modes  are  contained  in  the  attributes 

of  God 83 

Prop.  IX.  The  idea  of  an  individual  thing  actually  exist- 
ing is  caused  by  God,  not  in  so  far  as  he  is  infinite,  but  in 
so  far  as  he  is  considered  as  affected  by  another  idea  of  a 
thing  actually  existing,  of  which  he  is  the  cause,  in  so  far 


as  he  is  affected  by  a third  idea,  and  so  on  to  infinity  . 84 

Prop.  X.  The  being  of  substance  does  not  appertain  to  the 
essence  of  man  — in  other  words,  substance  does  not  con- 
stitute the  actual  being  of  man 85 

Prop.  XI.  The  first  element,  which  constitutes  the  actual 
being  of  the  human  mind,  is  the  idea  of  some  particular 
thing  actually  existing 87 


Prop.  XII.  Whatsoever  comes  to  pass  in  the  object  of  the 
idea,  which  constitutes  the  human  mind,  must  be  per- 
ceived by  the  human  mind,  or  there  will  necessarily  be 
an  idea  in  the  human  mind  of  the  said  occurrence.  That 
is,  if  the  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind 
be  a body,  nothing  can  take  place  in  that  body  without 

being  perceived  by  the  mind 88 

Prop.  XIII.  The  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human 
mind  is  the  body,  in  other  words  a certain  mode  of  exten- 
sion which  actually  exists,  and  nothing  else  ....  88 


CONTENTS 


xvu 


PAGE 

THE  ETHICS  — Continued. 

Part  II.  Of  the  Nature  and  Origin  of  the  Mind — Continued. 
Digression  on  the  nature  of  bodies  — Axioms  I.,  II.  Lem- 
mas I. — III 9° 


Axioms  I.,  II 

Definition  — Axiom  III. — Lemmas  IV.,  V 

Lemmas  VI.,  VII 

Postulates 

Prop.  XIV.  The  human  mind  is  capable  of  perceiving  a 
great  number  of  things,  and  is  so,  in  proportion  as  its 
body  is  capable  of  receiving  a great  number  of  impres- 
sions   

Prop.  XV.  The  idea,  which  constitutes  the  actual  being  of 
the  human  mind,  is  not  simple,  but  compounded  of  a great 

number  of  ideas 

Prop.  XVI.  The  idea  of  every  mode,  in  which  the  human 
body  is  affected  by  external  bodies,  must  involve  the  na- 
ture of  the  human  body,  and  also  the  nature  of  the  exter- 
nal body 

Prop.  XVII.  If  the  human  body  is  affected  in  a manner 
which  involves  the  nature  of  any  external  body,  the  hu- 
man mind  will  regard  the  said  external  body  as  actually 
existing,  or  as  present  to  itself,  until  the  human  body  be 
affected  in  such  a way  as  to  exclude  the  existence  of  the 

said  external  body 

Prop.  XVIII.  If  the  human  body  has  once  been  affected  by 
two  or  more  bodies  at  the  same  time,  when  the  mind 
afterward  imagines  any  of  them,  it  will  straightway 

remember  the  others  also 

Prop.  XIX.  The  human  mind  has  no  knowledge  of  the  body, 
and  does  not  know  it  to  exist,  save  through  the  ideas  of 
the  modifications,  whereby  the  body  is  affected 
Prop.  XX.  The  idea  or  knowledge  of  the  human  mind  is 
also  in  God,  following  in  God  in  the  same  manner,  and 
being  referred  to  God  in  the  same  manner,  as  the  idea 

or  knowledge  of  the  human  body 

Prop.  XXI.  This  idea  of  the  mind  is  united  to  the  mind, 
in  the  same  way  as  the  mind  is  united  to  the  body  . 
Prop.  XXII.  The  human  mind  perceives  not  only  the  modi- 
fications of  the  body,  but  also  the  ideas  of  such  modifi- 
cations   

Prop.  XXIII.  The  mind  does  not  know  itself,  except  in  so 
far  as  it  perceives  the  ideas  of  the  modifications  of  the 

body 

Prop.  XXIV.  The  human  mind  does  not  involve  an  ade- 
quate knowledge  of  the  parts  composing  the  human  body 


91 

92 

93 

94 


94 

94 


95 


95 


97 

99 


99 

100 


100 


101 

101 


SPINOZA 


xviii 

PAGE 

THE  ETHICS  — Continued. 

Part  II.  Of  the  Nature  and  Origin  of  the  Mind  — Continued. 
Prop.  XXV.  The  idea  of  each  modification  of  the  human 
body  does  not  involve  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the 

external  body 102 

Prop.  XXVI.  The  human  mind  does  not  perceive  any  ex- 
ternal body  as  actually  existing,  except  through  the  ideas 

of  the  modifications  of  its  own  body 102 

Prop.  XXVII.  The  idea  of  each  modification  of  the  human 
body  does  not  involve  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the 

human  body  itself 103 

Prop.  XXVIII.  The  ideas  of  the  modifications  of  the 
human  body,  in  so  far  as  they  have  reference  only  to 
the  human  mind,  are  not  clear  and  distinct,  but  confused  103 
Prop.  XXIX.  The  idea  of  the  idea  of  each  modification  of 
the  human  body  does  not  involve  an  adequate  knowl- 


edge of  the  human  mind 104 

Prop.  XXX.  We  can  only  have  a very  inadequate  knowl- 
edge of  the  duration  of  our  body 104 

Prop.  XXXI.  We  can  only  have  a very  inadequate  knowl- 
edge of  the  duration  of  particular  things  external  to 

ourselves 105 

Prop.  XXXII.  All  ideas,  in  so  far  as  they  are  referred  to 

God,  are  true 105 

Prop.  XXXIII.  There  is  nothing  positive  in  ideas,  which 

causes  them  to  be  called  false 106 

Prop.  XXXIV.  Every  idea,  which  in  us  is  absolute  or  ade- 
quate and  perfect,  is  true 106 

Prop.  XXXV.  Falsity  consists  in  the  privation  of  knowl- 
edge, which  inadequate,  fragmentary,  or  confused  ideas 

involve 106 

Prop.  XXXVI.  Inadequate  or  confused  ideas  follow  by  the 
same  necessity  as  adequate  or  clear  and  distinct  ideas  . 107 

Prop.  XXXVII.  That  which  is  common  to  all,  and  is 
equally  in  a part  and  in  the  whole,  does  not  constitute 

the  essence  of  any  particular  thing 107 

Prop.  XXXVIII.  Those  things,  which  are  common  to  all, 
and  are  equally  in  a part  and  in  the  whole,  cannot  be 

conceived  except  adequately 107 

Prop.  XXXIX.  That,  which  is  common  to  and  a property 
of  the  human  body  and  such  other  bodies  as  are  wont 


to  affect  the  human  body,  and  which  is  present  equally 
in  each  part  of  either  or  in  the  whole,  will  be  represented 

by  an  adequate  idea  in  the  mind 108 

Prop.  XL.  Whatsoever  ideas  in  the  mind  follow  from  ideas, 
which  are  therein  adequate,  are  also  themselves  adequate  109 


CONTENTS 


xix 


PAGE 

THE  ETHICS  — Continued. 

Part  II  Of  the  Nature  and  Origin  of  the  Mind — Continued. 
Prop.  XLI.  Opinion  is  the  only  source  of  falsity,  reason 

and  intuition  are  necessarily  true 112 

Prop.  XLII.  Reason  and  intuition,  not  opinion,  teach  us  to 

distinguish  the  true  from  the  false  112 

Prop.  XLlir.  He  who  has  a true  idea,  simultaneously 
knows  that  he  has  a true  idea,  and  cannot  doubt  of  the 

truth  of  the  thing  perceived 112 

Prop.  XLIV.  It  is  not  in  the  nature  of  reason  to  regard 

things  as  contingent,  but  as  necessary 114 

Prop  XLV.  Every  idea  of  every  body,  or  of  every  particu- 
lar  thing  actually  existing,  necessarily  involves  the  eter- 

nal  and  infinite  essence  of  God 115 

' Prop.  XLVI.  The  knowledge  of  the  eternal  and  infinite 
essence  of  God,  which  every  idea  involves,  is  adequate 

and  perfect 116 

Prop.  XLVII.  The  human  mind  has  an  adequate  knowl- 
edge of  the  eternal  and  infinite  essence  of  God  . 

Prop.  XLVIII.  In  the  mind  there  is  no  absolute  or  free 
will ; but  the  mind  is  determined  to  wish  this  or  that  by 
a cause,  which  has  also  been  determined  by  another 
cause,  and  this  last  by  another  cause,  and  so  on  to  infinity 
Prop.  XLIX.  There  is  in  the  mind  no  volition,  or  affirma- 
tion and  negation,  save  that  which  an  idea,  inasmuch  as 
it  is  an  idea,  involves 119 


J 

V ' 


116 


ri8 


Part  III.  On  the  Origin  and  Nature  of  the  Emotions  . 127 

Definitions 128 

Postulates 


Prop.  I.  Our  mind  is  in  certain  cases  active,  and  in  cer- 
tain cases  passive.  In  so  far  as  it  has  adequate  ideas,  it 
is  necessarily  active ; and  in  so  far  as  it  has  inadequate 

ideas,  it  is  necessarily  passive 129 

Prop.  II.  Body  cannot  determine  mind  to  think,  neither 
can  mind  determine  body  to  motion  or  rest,  or  any  state 

different  from  these,  if  such  there  be 130 

Prop.  III.  The  activities  of  the  mind  arise  solely  from  ade- 
quate ideas;  the  passive  states  of  the  mind  depend 

solely  on  inadequate  ideas 134 

Prop.  IV.  Nothing  can  be  destroyed,  except  by  a cause 

external  to  itself 135 

Prop.  V.  Things  are  naturally  contrary,  that  is,  cannot 
exist  in  the  same  object,  in  so  far  as  one  is  capable  of 

destroying  the  other 135 

Prop.  VI.  Everything  in  so  far  as  it  is  in  itself,  endeavors 
to  persist  in  its  own  being 


135 


XX 


SPINOZA 


PAGE 

THE  ETHICS  — Continued. 

Part  III.  Origin  and  Nature  of  the  Emotions — Continued. 

Prop.  VII.  The  endeavor,  wherewith  everything  endeavors 
to  persist  in  its  own  being  is  nothing  else  but  the  actual 

essence  of  the  thing  in  question 136 

Prop.  VIII.  The  endeavor,  whereby  a thing  endeavors  to 
persist  in  its  being,  involves  no  finite  time,  but  an  in- 
definite time  . . 136 

Prop.  IX.  The  mind,  both  in  so  far  as  it  has  clear  and 
distinct  ideas,  and  also  in  so  far  as  it  has  confused 
ideas,  endeavors  to  persist  in  its  being  for  an  indefinite 
period,  and  of  this  endeavor  it  is  conscious  . . . 136 

Prop.  X.  An  idea,  which  excludes  the  existence  of  our 
body  cannot  be  postulated  in  our  mind,  but  is  contrary 

thereto 137 

Prop.  XI.  Whatsoever  increases  or  diminishes,  helps  or 
hinders  the  power  of  activity  in  our  body,  the  idea 
thereof  increases  or  diminishes,  helps  or  hinders  the 


power  of  thought  in  our  mind 137 

Prop.  XII.  The  mind,  as  far  as  it  can,  endeavors  to  con- 
ceive those  things,  which  increase  or  help  the  power  of 
activity  in  the  body . 139 


Prop.  XIII.  When  the  mind  conceives  things  which  di- 
minish or  hinder  the  body’s  power  of  activity,  it  en- 
deavors, as  far  as  possible,  to  remember  things,  which 
exclude  the  existence  of  the  first-named  things  . . . 139 

Prop.  XIV.  If  the  mind  has  once  been  affected  by  two 
emotions  at  the  same  time,  it  will,  whenever  it  is 
afterward  affected  by  one  of  the  two,  be  also  affected 


by  the  other 14b 

Prop.  XV.  Anything  can,  accidentally,  be  the  cause  of 
pleasure,  pain,  or  desire 140 


Prop.  XVI.  Simply  from  the  fact  that  we  conceive  that 
a given  object  has  some  point  of  resemblance  with  an- 
other object,  which  is  wont  to  affect  the  mind  pleasur- 
ably or  painfully,  although  the  point  of  resemblance 
be  not  the  efficient  cause  of  the  said  emotions,  we  shall 
still  regard  the  first-named  object  with  love  or  hate  . 141 

Prop.  XVII.  If  we  conceive  that  a thing,  which  is  wont 
to  affect  us  painfully,  has  any  point  of  resemblance  with 
another  thing,  which  is  wont  to  affect  us  with  an  equally 
strong  emotion  of  pleasure,  we  shall  hate  the  first-named 
thing,  and  at  the  same  time  we  shall  love  it  . . . 14a 

Prop.  XVIII.  A man  is  as  much  affected  pleasurably  or 
painfully  by  the  image  of  a thing  past  or  future,  as  by 
the  image  of  a thing  present 143 


CONTENTS 


xxi 


THE  ETHICS — Continued. 

Part  III.  Origin  and  Nature  of  the  Emotions  — Continued. 
Prop.  XIX.  He  who  conceives  that  the  object  of  his  love 
is  destroyed  will  feel  pain;  if  he  conceives  that  it 
is  preserved,  he  will  feel  pleasure  .... 

Prop.  XX.  He  who  conceives  that  the  object  of  his  hate 

is  destroyed  will  feel  pleasure 

Prop.  XXI.  He  who  conceives  that  the  object  of  his  love 
is  affected  pleasurably  or  painfully  will  himself  be 
affected  pleasurably  or  painfully;  and  the  one  or  the 
other  emotion  will  be  greater  or  less  in  the  lover,  ac- 
cording as  it  is  greater  or  less  in  the  thing  loved 
Prop.  XXII.  If  we  conceive  that  anything  pleasurably 
affects  some  object  of  our  love,  we  shall  be  affected 
with  love  toward  that  thing.  Contrariwise,  if  we  con- 
ceive that  it  affects  an  object  of  our  love  painfully,  we 
shall  be  affected  with  hatred  toward  it  ... 
Prop.  XXIII.  He  who  conceives  that  an  object  of  his 
hatred  is  painfully  affected  will  feel  pleasure.  Con- 
trariwise, if  he  think  that  the  said  object  is  pleasurably 
affected,  he  will  feel  pain.  Each  of  these  emotions  will 
be  greater  or  less,  according  as  its  contrary  is  greater 

or  less  in  the  object  of  hatred 

Prop.  XXIV.  If  we  conceive  that  anyone  pleasurably 
affects  an  object  of  our  hate,  we  shall  feel  hatred 
toward  him  also.  If  we  conceive  that  he  painfully  affects 
the  said  object,  we  shall  feel  love  toward  him 
Prop.  XXV.  We  endeavor  to  affirm,  concerning  ourselves 
and  concerning  what  we  love,  everything  that  we  con- 
ceive to  affect  pleasurably  ourselves  or  the  loved  object. 
Contrariwise,  we  endeavor  to  negative  everything, 
which  we  conceive  to  affect  painfully  ourselves  or  the 

loved  object 

Prop.  XXVI.  We  endeavor  to  affirm,  concerning  that 
which  we  hate,  everything  which  we  conceive  to  affect 
it  painfully;  and  contrariwise,  we  endeavor  to  deny 
concerning  it  everything  which  we  conceive  to  affect 

it  pleasurably 

Prop.  XXVII.  By  the  very  fact  that  we  conceive  a thing, 
which  is  like  ourselves,  and  which  we  have  not  regarded 
with  any  emotion,  to  be  affected  with  any  emotion,  we 
are  ourselves  affected  with  a like  emotion  .... 
Prop.  XXVIII.  We  endeavor  to  bring  about  whatsoever 
we  conceive  to  conduce  to  pleasure;  but  we  endeavor 
to  remove  or  destroy  whatsoever  we  oonceive  to  be 
truly  repugnant  thereto,  or  to  conduce  to  pain  . 


PAG» 

144 

144 

145 

145 

146 

147 

147 

147 

148 
149 


xxii 


SPINOZA 


FAGB 

THE  ETHICS — Continued. 

Part  III.  Origin  and  Nature  of  the  Emotions — Continued. 

Prop.  XXIX.  We  shall  also  endeavor  to  do  whatsoever  we 
conceive  men  to  regard  with  pleasure,  and  contrari- 
wise we  shall  shrink  from  doing  that  which  we  conceive 

men  to  shrink  from 150 

Prop.  XXX.  If  anyone  has  done  something  which  he  con- 
ceives as  affecting  other  men  pleasurably,  he  will  be 
affected  by  pleasure,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  him- 
self as  a cause ; in  other  words,  he  will  regard  himself 
with  pleasure.  On  the  other  hand,  if  he  has  done  any- 
thing which  he  regards  as  affecting  others  painfully, 

he  will  regard  himself  with  pain 150 

Prop.  XXXI.  If  we  conceive  that  anyone  loves,  desires, 
or  hates  anything  which  we  love,  desire,  or  hate,  we 
shall  thereupon  regard  the  thing  in  question  with  more 
steadfast  love,  etc.  On  the  contrary,  if  we  think  that 
anyone  shrinks  from  something  that  we  love,  we  shall 

undergo  vacillation  of  soul 151 

Prop.  XXXII.  If  we  conceive  that  anyone  takes  delight 
in  something,  which  only  one  person  can  possess,  we 
shall  endeavor  to  bring  it  about,  that  the  man  in  ques- 
tion shall  not  gain  possession  thereof 152 

Prop.  XXXIII.  When  we  love  a thing  similar  to  ourselves, 
we  endeavor,  as  far  as  we  can,  to  bring  it  about  that 

it  should  love  us  in  return 153 

Prop.  XXXIV.  The  greater  the  emotion  with  which  we 
conceive  a loved  object  to  be  affected  toward  us,  the 

greater  will  be  our  complacency 153 

Prop.  XXXV.  If  anyone  conceives  that  an  object  of  his 
love  joins  itself  to  another  with  closer  bonds  of  friend- 
ship than  he  himself  has  attained  to,  he  will  be  affected 
with  hatred  toward  the  loved  object  and  with  envy 

toward  his  rival 154 

Prop.  XXXVI.  He  who  remembers  a thing,  in  which  he 
has  once  taken  delight,  desires  to  possess  it  under  the 
same  circumstances  as  when  he  first  took  delight  therein  155 
Prop.  XXXVII.  Desire  arising  through  pain  or  pleasure, 
hatred  or  love,  is  greater  in  proportion  as  the  emotion 

is  greater  . 155 

Prop.  XXXVIII.  If  a man  has  begun  to  hate  an  object  of 
his  love,  so  that  love  is  thoroughly  destroyed,  he  will, 
causes  being  equal,  regard  it  with  more  hatred  than  if 
he  had  never  loved  it,  and  his  hatred  will  be  in  propor- 
tion to  the  strength  of  his  former  love 156 


CONTENTS 


xxiii 

PAGE 

THE  ETHICS  — Continued. 

Part  III.  Origin  and  Nature  of  the  Emotions — Continued. 

Prop.  XXXIX.  He  who  hates  anyone  will  endeavor  to  do 
him  an  injury,  unless  he  fears  that  a greater  injury  will 
thereby  accrue  to  himself;  on  the  other  hand,  he 
who  loves  anyone  will,  by  the  same  law,  seek  to  benefit 

him 157 

Prop.  XL.  He  who  conceives  himself  to  be  hated  by  an- 
other, and  believes  that  he  has  given  him  no  cause  for 

hatred,  will  hate  that  other  in  return 158 

Prop.  XLI.  If  anyone  conceives  that  he  is  loved  by  an- 
other, and  believes  that  he  has  given  no  cause  for  such 

love,  he  will  love  that  other  in  return 159 

Prop.  XLII.  He  who  has  conferred  a benefit  on  anyone 
from  motives  of  love  or  honor  will  feel  pain,  if  he  sees 
that  the  benefit  is  received  without  gratitude  . . . .159 

Prop.  XLIII.  Hatred  is  increased  by  being  reciprocated, 
and  can  on  the  other  hand  be  destroyed  by  love  . . . 160 

Prop.  XLIV.  Hatred  which  is  completely  vanquished  by 
love  passes  into  love;  and  love  is  thereupon  greater 

than  if  hatred  had  not  preceded  it 160 

Prop.  XLV.  If  a man  conceives  that  anyone  similar  to 
himself  hates  anything  also  similar  to  himself,  which  he 

loves,  he  will  hate  that  person 161 

Prop.  XLVI.  If  a man  has  been  affected  pleasurably  or 
painfully  by  anyone  of  a class  or  nation  different  from 
his  own,  and  if  the  pleasure  or  pain  has  been  accom- 
panied by  the  idea  of  the  said  stranger  as  cause,  under 
the  general  category  of  the  class  or  nation,  the  man  will 
feel  love  or  hatred  not  only  to  the  individual  stranger, 
but  also  to  the  whole  class  or  nation,  whereto  he  belongs  161 
Prop.  XLV  1 1.  Joy  arising  from  the  fact  that  anything  we 
hate  is  destroyed  or  suffers  other  injury,  is  never  unac- 
companied by  a certain  pain  in  us 161 

Prop.  XLVIII.  Love  or  hatred  toward,  for  instance,  Peter 
is  destroyed,  if  the  pleasure  involved  in  the  former,  or  the 
pain  involved  in  the  latter  emotion,  be  associated  with 
the  idea  of  another  cause ; and  will  be  diminished  in  pro- 
portion as  we  conceive  Peter  not  to  have  been  the  sole 

cause  of  either  emotion 162 

Prop.  XLIX.  Love  or  hatred  toward  a thing,  which  we 
conceive  to  be  free,  must,  other  conditions  being  similar, 
be  greater  than  if  it  were  felt  toward  a thing  acting  by 


necessity  163 

Prop.  L.  Anything  whatever  can  be,  accidentally,  a cause 
of  hope  or  fear  ' . , , 163 


XXIV 


SPINOZA 


PASS 

THE  ETHICS  — Continued. 

Part  III.  Origin  and  Nature  of  the  Emotions  — Continued. 

Prop.  LI.  Different  men  may  be  differently  affected  by  the 
same  object,  and  the  same  man  may  be  differently  af- 
fected at  different  times  by  the  same  object  ....  164 

Prop.  LII.  An  object,  which  we  have  formerly  seen  in 
conjunction  with  others,  and  do  not  conceive  to  have 
any  property  that  is  not  common  to  many,  will  not  be 
regarded  by  us  for  so  long  as  an  object  which  we  con- 
ceive to  have  some  property  peculiar  to  itself  ....  165 

Prop.  LIII.  When  the  mind  regards  itself  and  its  own 
power  of  activity,  it  feels  pleasure ; and  that  pleasure  is 
greater  in  proportion  to  the  distinctness  wherewith  it 
. conceives  itself  and  its  own  power  of  activity  . . . 167 

Prop.  LIV.  The  mind  endeavors  to  conceive  only  such 

things  as  assert  its  power  of  activity 167 

Prop.  LV.  When  the  mind  contemplates  its  own  weakness, 

it  feels  pain  thereat 167 

Prop.  LVI.  There  are  as  many  kinds  of  pleasure,  of  pain, 
of  desire,  and  of  every  emotion  compounded  of  these, 
such  as  vacillations  of  spirit,  or  derived  from  these,  such 
as  love,  hatred,  hope,  fear,  etc.,  as  there  are  kinds  of 

objects,  whereby  we  are  affected 169 

Prop.  LVII.  Any  emotion  of  a given  individual  differs 
from  the  emotion  of  another  individual  only  in  so  far  as 
the  essence  of  the  one  individual  differs  from  the  essence 

of  the  other 171 

Prop.  LVIII.  Besides  pleasure  and  desire,  which  are  pas- 
sivities or  passions,  there  are  other  emotions  derived 
from  pleasure  and  desire,  which  are  attributable  to  us, 

in  so  far  as  we  are  active 173 

Prop.  LIX.  Among  all  the  emotions  attributable  to  the 
mind  as  active,  there  are  none  which  cannot  be  referred 

to  pleasure  or  pain 173 

Definitions  of  the  Emotions 175 

General  Definition  of  the  Emotions 187 


Part  IV.  Of  Human  Bondage  or  the  Strength  of  the 

Emotions 

Preface 

Definitions 

Axiom 

Prop.  I.  No  positive  quality  possessed  by  a false  idea  is 
removed  by  the  presence  of  what  is  true  in  virtue  of  its 
being  true 


189 

189 

19a 

194 


194 


CONTENTS 


XXV 


PAGE 

THE  ETHICS  — Continued. 

^Part  IV.  Of  Human  Bondage — Continued. 

Prop.  II.  We  are  only  passive  in  so  far  as  we  are  a part  of 
Nature,  which  cannot  be  conceived  by  itself  without 

other  parts 195 

Prop.  III.  The  force  whereby  a man  persists  in  existing 
is  limited,  and  is  infinitely  surpassed  by  the  power  of 

external  causes 195 

Prop.  IV.  It  is  impossible  that  man  should  not  be  a 
part  of  Nature,  or  that  he  should  be  capable  of  un- 
dergoing no  changes,  save  such  as  can  be  under- 
stood through  his  nature  only  as  their  adequate 

cause  195 

Prop.  V.  The  power  and  increase  of  every  passion,  and 
its  persistence  in  existing,  are  not  defined  by  the  power, 
whereby  we  ourselves  endeavor  to  persist  in  existing, 
but  by  the  power  of  an  external  cause  compared  with 

our  own 196 

Prop.  VI.  The  force  of  any  passion  or  emotion  can  over- 
come the  rest  of  a man’s  activities  or  power,  so  that 
the  emotion  becomes  obstinately  fixed  to  him  . . . 197 

Prop.  VII.  An  emotion  can  only  be  controlled  or  de- 
stroyed by  another  emotion  contrary  thereto,  and  with 

more  power  for  controlling  emotion 197 

Prop.  VIII.  The  knowledge  of  good  and  evil  is  nothing 
else  but  the  emotions  of  pleasure  or  pain,  in  so  far  as 

we  are  conscious  thereof 198 

Prop.  IX.  An  emotion,  whereof  we  conceive  the  cause  to 
be  with  us  at  the  present  time,  is  stronger  than  if  we 
did  not  conceive  the  cause  to  be  with  us  ...  198 

Prop.  X.  Toward  something  future,  which  we  conceive 
as  close  at  hand,  we  are  affected  more  intensely  than 
if  we  conceive  that  its  time  for  existence  is  separated 
from  the  present  by  a longer  interval ; so  too  by  the  re- 
membrance of  what  we  conceive  to  have  not  long 
passed  away  we  are  affected  more  intensely  than  if 
we  conceive  that  it  has  long  passed  away  . . . .199 

Prop.  XI.  An  emotion  toward  that  which  we  conceive 
as  necessary  is,  when  other  conditions  are  equal,  more 
intense  than  an  emotion  toward  that  which  is  possible, 

or  contingent,  or  non-necessary 200 

Prop.  XII.  An  emotion  toward  a thing,  which  we  know 
not  to  exist  at  the  present  time,  and  which  we  con- 
ceive is  possible,  is  more  intense,  other  things 
being  equal,  than  an  emotion  toward  a thing  contin- 
gent   200 


XXvl 


SPINOZA 


PAGE 

THE  ETHICS  — Continued. 

Part  IV.  Of  Human  Bondage  — Continued. 

Prop.  XIII.  Emotion  toward  a thing  contingent,  which 
we  know  not  to  exist  in  the  present,  is,  other  conditions 
being  equal,  fainter  than  an  emotion  toward  a thing  past  . 201 

Prop.  XIV.  A true  knowledge  of  good  and  evil  cannot 
check  any  emotion  by  virtue  of  being  true,  but  only  in 
so  far  as  it  is  considered  as  an  emotion  ....  201 

Prop.  XV.  Desire  arising  from  the  knowledge  of  good 
and  evil  can  be  quenched  or  checked  by  many  other  de- 
sires arising  from  the  emotions,  whereby  we  are  assailed  201 
Prop.  XVI.  Desire  arising  from  the  knowledge  of  good 
and  evil,  in  so  far  as  such  knowledge  regards  what  is 
future,  may  be  more  easily  controlled  or  quenched 
than  the  desire  for  what  is  agreeable  at  the  present 

moment . . 202 

Prop.  XVII  Desire  arising  from  the  true  knowledge  of  good 
and  evil,  in  so  far  as  such  knowledge  is  concerned  with 
what  is  contingent,  can  be  controlled  far  more  easily  still, 
than  desire  for  things  that  are  at  present  ....  202 

Prop.  XVIII.  Desire  arising  from  pleasure  is,  other  things 
being  equal,  stronger  than  desire  arising  from  pain  . . 203 

Prop.  XIX.  Every  man,  by  the  laws  of  his  nature,  necessa- 
rily desires  or  shrinks  from  that  which  he  deems  to  be 

good  or  bad 205 

Prop.  XX.  The  more  every  man  endeavors  and  is  able  to 
seek  what  is  useful  to  him,  in  other  words  to  preserve  his 
own  being,  the  more  is  he  endowed  with  virtue ; on  the 
contrary,  in  proportion  as  a man  neglects  to  seek  what  is 
useful  to  him,  that  is,  to  preserve  his  own  being,  he  is 

wanting  in  power 205 

Prop.  XXI.  No  one  can  rightly  desire  to  be  blessed,  to  act 
rightly,  and  to  live  rightly,  without  at  the  same  time  wish- 
ing to  be,  to  act,  and  to  live,  in  other  words,  to  actually 


exist 206 

Prop.  XXII.  No  virtue  can  be  conceived  as  prior  to  this  en- 
deavor to  preserve  one’s  own  being 206 


Prop.  XXIII.  Man,  in  so  far  as  he  is  determined  to  a partic- 
ular action  because  he  has  inadequate  ideas,  cannot  be  ab- 
solutely said  to  act  in  obedience  to  virtue ; he  can  only  be 
so  described,  in  so  far  as  he  is  determined  for  the  action, 

because  he  understands 207 

Prop.  XXIV.  To  act  absolutely  in  obedience  to  virtue  is  in 
us  the  same  thing  as  to  act,  to  live,  or  to  preserve  one’s 
being  (these  three  terms  are  identical  in  meaning)  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  dictate  of  reason  on  the  basis  of  seeking 
what  is  useful  to  oneself 207 


CONTENTS 


xxvii 


PASS 

THE  ETHICS — Continued. 

Part  IV.  Of  Human  Bondage  — Continued. 

Prop.  XXV.  No  one  wishes  to  preserve  his  being  for  the  sake 

of  anything  else 207 

Prop.  XXVI.  Whatsoever  we  endeavor  in  obedience  to  rea- 
son is  nothing  further  than  to  understand ; neither  does  the 
mind,  in  so  far  as  it  makes  use  of  reason,  judge  anything 
to  be  useful  to  it,  save  such  things  as  are  conducive  to  un- 
derstanding   308 

Prop.  XXVII.  We  know  nothing  to  be  certainly  good  or  evil, 
save  such  things  as  really  conduce  to  understanding,  or 
such  as  are  able  to  hinder  us  from  understanding  . . 208 

Prop.  XXVIII.  The  mind’s  highest  good  is  the  knowledge  of 
God,  and  the  mind’s  highest  virtue  is  to  know  God  . . 209 

Prop.  XXIX.  No  individual  thing,  which  is  entirely  different 
from  our  own  nature,  can  help  or  check  our  power  of  ac- 
tivity, and  absolutely  nothing  can  do  us  good  or  harm,  un- 
less it  has  something  in  common  with  our  nature  . . 209 

Prop.  XXX.  A thing  cannot  be  bad  for  us  through  the  qual- 
ity which  it  has  in  common  with  our  nature,  but  it  is  bad 
for  us,  in  so  far  as  it  is  contrary  to  our  nature  . . . 210 

Prop.  XXXI.  In  so  far  as  a thing  is  in  harmony  with  our 

nature,  it  is  necessarily  good 210 

Prop.  XXXII.  In  so  far  as  men  are  a prey  to  passion,  they 
cannot  in  that  respect,  be  said  to  be  naturally  in  harmony  21 1 
Prop.  XXXIII.  Men  can  differ  in  nature,  in  so  far  as  they 
are  assailed  by  those  emotions,  which  are  passions  or 
passive  states ; and  to  this  extent  one  and  the  same  man 

is  variable  and  inconstant 211 

Prop.  XXXIV.  In  so  far  as  men  are  assailed  by  emotions 
which  are  passions,  they  can  be  contrary  one  to  another  21 1 
Prop.  XXXV.  In  so  far  only  as  men  live  in  obedience  to 
reason,  do  they  always  necessarily  agree  in  nature  . . 213 

Prop.  XXXVI.  The  highest  good  of  those  who  follow  virtue  is 
common  to  all,  and  therefore  all  can  equally  rejoice  therein  214 
Prop.  XXXVII.  The  good,  which  every  man  who  follows 
after  virtue  desires  for  himself,  he  will  also  desire  for 
other  men,  and  so  much  the  more,  in  proportion  as  he  has 

a greater  knowledge  of  God 215 

Prop.  XXXVIII.  Whatsoever  disposes  the  human  body,  so 
as  to  render  it  capable  of  being  affected  in  an  increased 
number  of  ways,  or  of  affecting  external  bodies  in  an 
increased  number  of  ways,  is  useful  to  man ; and  is  so  in 
proportion  as  the  body  is  thereby  rendered  more  capable 
of  being  affected  or  of  affecting  other  bodies  in  an  in- 
creased number  of  ways ; contrariwise,  whatsoever  renders 
the  body  less  capable  in  this  respect  is  hurtful  to  man  , 219 


xxviii 


SPINOZA 


PAQB 

THE  ETHICS — Continued. 

Part  IV.  Of  Human  Bondage — Continued. 

Prop.  XXXIX.  Whatsoever  brings  about  the  preservation  of 
the  proportion  of  motion  and  rest,  which  the  parts  of  the 
human  body  mutually  possess,  is  good;  contrariwise, 
whatsoever  causes  a change  in  such  proportion  is  bad  . 2x9 

Prop.  XL.  Whatsoever  conduces  to  man’s  social  life,  or 
causes  men  to  live  together  in  harmony,  is  useful,  whereas 
whatsoever  brings  discord  into  a State  is  bad  . . . 221 

Prop.  XLI.  Pleasure  in  itself  is  not  bad  but  good ; contrari- 
wise, pain  in  itself  is  bad 221 

Prop.  XLII.  Mirth  cannot  be  excessive,  but  is  always  good; 

contrariwise.  Melancholy  is  always  bad 221 

Prop.  XLIII.  Stimulation  may  be  excessive  and  bad ; on  the 
other  hand  grief  may  be  good,  in  so  far  as  stimulation  or 

pleasure  is  bad 221 

Prop.  XLIV.  Love  and  desire  may  be  excessive  . . , 222 

Prop.  XLV.  Hatred  can  never  be  good 223 

Prop.  XLVI.  He,  who  lives  under  the  guidance  of  reason, 
endeavors,  as  far  as  possible,  to  render  back  love,  or 
kindness,  for  other  men’s  hatred,  anger,  contempt,  etc., 

toward  him  ....  224 

Prop.  XLVII.  Emotions  of  hope  and  fear  cannot  be  in  them- 
selves good 225 

Prop.  XLVIII.  The  emotions  of  over-esteem  and  disparage- 
ment are  always  bad 225 

Prop.  XLIX.  Over-esteem  is  apt  to  render  its  object  proud  225 
Prop.  L.  Pity,  in  a man  who  lives  under  the  guidance  of 

reason  is  in  itself  bad  and  useless 225 

Prop.  LI.  Approval  is  not  repugnant  to  reason,  but  can 

agree  therewith  and  arise  therefrom 226 

Prop.  LII.  Self-approval  may  arise  from  reason,  and  that 

which  arises  from  reason  is  the  highest  possible  . . 227 

Prop.  LIII.  Humility  is  not  a virtue,  or  does  not  arise 

from  reason ....  227 

Prop.  LIV.  Repentance  is  not  a virtue,  or  does  not  arise 
from  reason,  but  he  who  repents  of  an  action  is  doubly 

wretched  or  infirm  ....  228 

Prop.  LV.  Extreme  pride  or  dejection  indicates  extreme 

ignorance  of  self ...  228 

Prop.  LVI.  Extreme  pride  or  dejection  indicates  extreme 

infirmity  of  spirit 228 

Prop.  LVI I.  The  proud  man  delights  in  the  company  of 
flatterers  and  parasites,  but  hates  the  company  of  the 

high-minded 229 

Prop.  LVIII.  Honor  (gloria)  is  not  repugnant  to  reason, 
but  may  arise  therefrom 230 


CONTENTS 


xxix 


THE  ETHICS — Continued. 

Part  IV.  Of  Human  Bondage — Continued. 

Prop.  LIX.  To  all  the  actions,  whereto  we  are  determined 
by  emotions,  wherein  the  mind  is  passive,  we  can  be 

determined  without  emotion  by  reason 231 

Prop.  LX.  Desire  arising  from  a pleasure  or  pain,  that  is, 
not  attributable  to  the  whole  body,  but  only  to  one  or 
certain  parts  thereof,  is  without  utility  in  respect  to 


man  as  a whole 233 

Prop.  LXI.  Desire  which  springs  from  reason  cannot  be 

excessive 233 


Prop.  LXII.  In  so  far  as  the  mind  conceives  a thing 


under  the  dictate  of  reason,  it  is  affected  equally, 
whether  the  idea  be  of  a thing  present,  past,  or  future  234 
Prop.  LXIII.  He  who  is  lead  by  fear,  and  does  good  in 

order  to  escape  evil,  is  not  led  by  reason  . . . .235 

Prop.  LX1V.  The  knowledge  of  evil  is  an  inadequate 

knowledge 236 

Prop.  LXV.  Under  the  guidance  of  reason  we  should  pur- 
sue the  greater  of  two  goods  and  the  lesser  of  two  evils  236 
Prop.  LXVI.  We  may,  under  the  guidance  of  reason, 


seek  a greater  good  in  the  future  in  preference  to  a 
lesser  good  in  the  present,  and  we  may  seek  a lesser 
evil  in  the  present  in  preference  to  a greater  evil  in 


the  future 236 

Prop.  LXVII.  A free  man  thinks  of  nothing  less  than  of 
death;  and  his  wisdom  is  a meditation  not  of  death, 

but  of  life ....  237 

Prop.  LXVIII.  If  men  were  born  free,  they  would,  so 
long  as  they  remained  free,  form  no  conception  of  good 

or  evil 237 

Prop.  LXIX.  The  virtue  of  a free  man  is  seen  to  be  as 
great,  when  it  declines  dangers,  as  when  it  overcomes 

them 239 

Prop.  LXX.  The  free  man,  who  lives  among  the  igno- 


rant, strives,  as  far  as  he  can,  to  avoid  receiving 

favors  from  them 239 

Prop.  LXXI.  Only  free  men  are  thoroughly  grateful, 

one  to  another 240 

Prop.  LXXII.  The  free  man  never  acts  fraudulently,  but 

always  in  good  faith ...  240 

Prop.  LXXIII.  The  man  who  is  guided  by  reason  is  more 
free  in  a State,  where  he  lives  under  a general  system 
of  law,  than  in  solitude,  where  he  is  independent  . 240 

Appendix  on  the  Right  Way  of  Life 241 


XXX 


SPINOZA 


THE  ETHICS  — Continued. 

Part  V.  On  the  Power  of  the  Understanding,  or  of 

Human  Freedom 

Preface 

Axioms 

Prop.  I.  Even  as  thoughts  and  the  ideas  of  things  are  ar- 
ranged and  associated  in  the  mind,  so  are  the  modifi- 
cations of  the  body,  or  the  images  of  things  precisely  in 
the  same  way  arranged  and  associated  in  the  body 
Prop.  II.  If  we  remove  a disturbance  of  the  spirit,  or 
emotion,  from  the  thought  of  an  external  cause,  and 
unite  it  to  other  thoughts,  then  will  the  love  or  hatred 
toward  that  external  cause,  and  also  the  vacillations 
of  spirit,  which  arise  from  these  emotions  be  destroyed  . 
Prop.  III.  An  emotion,  which  is  a passion,  ceases  to  be 
a passion  as  soon  as  we  form  a clear  and  distinct  idea 

thereof 

Prop.  IV.  There  is  no  modification  of  the  body  whereof 
we  cannot  form  some  clear  and  distinct  conception 
Prop.  V.  An  emotion  toward  a thing  which  we  conceive 
simply,  and  not  as  necessary,  or  as  contingent,  or  as 
possible,  is,  other  conditions  being  equal,  greater  than 

any  other  emotion 

Prop.  VI.  The  mind  has  greater  power  over  the  emo- 
tions, and  is  less  subject  thereto,  in  so  far  as  it  under- 
stands all  things  as  necessary 

Prop.  VII.  Emotions,  which  are  aroused  or  spring  from 
reason,  if  we  take  account  of  time,  are  stronger  than 
those,  which  are  attributable  to  particular  objects,  that 

we  regard  as  absent 

Prop.  VIII.  An  emotion  is  stronger  in  proportion  to  the 
number  of  simultaneous  concurrent  causes  whereby  it 

is  aroused 

Prop.  IX.  An  emotion,  which  is  attributable  to  many  and 
diverse  causes,  which  the  mind  regards  as  simultaneous 
with  the  emotion  itself,  is  less  hurtful,  and  we  are  less 
subject  thereto,  and  less  affected  toward  each  of  its 
causes,  than  if  it  were  a different  and  equally  powerful 
emotion,  attributable  to  fewer  causes  or  to  a single  cause 
Prop.  X.  So  long  as  we  are  not  assailed  by  emotions 
contrary  to  our  nature,  we  have  the  power  of  arranging 
and  associating  the  modifications  of  our  body  according 

to  the  intellectual  order 

Prop.  XI.  In  proportion  as  a mental  image  is  referred  to 
more  objects,  so  is  it  more  frequent,  or  more  often  vivid, 
and  affects  the  mind  more 


PAGE 

250 

250 

253 

253 

254 

254 

254 

256 

256 

257 

258 

258 

258 


261 


CONTENTS 


XXXI 


PAGE 

THE  ETHICS  — Continued. 

Part  V.  On  the  Power  of  the  Understanding — Continued. 

Prop.  XII.  The  mental  images  of  things  are  more  easily 
associated  with  the  images  referred  to  things  which  we 
clearly  and  distinctly  understand  than  with  others  . . 261 

Prop.  XIII  A mental  image  is  more  often  vivid,  in  pro- 
portion as  h is  associated  with  a greater  number  of  other 

images 261 

Prop.  XIV,  The  mind  can  bring  it  about,  that  all  bodily 
modifications  or  images  of  things  may  be  referred  to 

the  idea  of  God  . 262 

Prop.  XV.  He  who  clearly  and  distinctly  understands 
himself  and  his  emotions,  loves  God,  and  so  much  the 
more  in  proportion  as  he  more  understands  himself  and 

his  emotions 262 

Prop.  XVI.  This  love  toward  God  must  hold  the  chief 

place  in  the  mind  . 262 

Prop.  XVII.  God  is  without  passions,  neither  is  he  affected 

by  any  emotion  of  pleasure  or  pain 262 

Prop.  XVIII.  No  one  can  hate  God 262 

Prop.  XIX.  He  who  loves  God  cannot  endeavor  that 

God  should  love  him  in  return 263 

Prop.  XX.  This  love  toward  God  cannot  be  stained  by 
the  emotion  of  envy  or  jealousy;  contrariwise,  it  is  the 
more  fostered,  in  proportion  as  we  conceive  a greater 
number  of  men  to  be  joined  to  God  by  the  same  bond 

of  love 263 

Prop.  XXI.  The  mind  can  only  imagine  anything,  or  re- 
member what  is  past,  while  the  body  endures  . . 265 

Prop.  XXII.  Nevertheless  in  God  there  is  necessarily  an 
idea,  which  expresses  the  essence  of  this  or  that  human 

body  under  the  form  of  eternity 266 

Prop.  XXIII.  The  human  mind  cannot  be  absolutely 
destroyed  with  the  body,  but  there  remains  of  it  some- 
thing which  is  eternal  266 

Prop.  XXIV.  The  more  we  understand  particular  things, 

the  more  do  we  understand  God 267 

Prop.  XXV.  The  highest  endeavor  of  the  mind,  and  the 
highest  virtue,  is  to  understand  things  by  intuition  . . 267 

Prop.  XXVI.  In  proportion  as  the  mind  is  more  capable  of 
understanding  things  by  intuition,  it  desires  more  so  to 

derstand  things 267 

Prop.  XXVII.  From  intuition  arises  the  highest  possible 

mental  acquiescence 268 

Prop.  XXVIII.  The  endeavor  or  desire  to  know  things  by 
intuition  cannot  arise  from  opinion,  but  from  reason  . 268 


xxxii 


SPINOZA 


THE  ETHICS — Continued. 

Part  V.  On  the  Power  of  the  Understanding  — Continued. 
Prop.  XXIX.  Whatsoever  the  mind  understands  under  the 
form  of  eternity,  it  does  not  understand  by  virtue  of  con- 
ceiving the  present  actual  existence  of  the  body,  but 
by  virtue  of  conceiving  the  essence  of  the  body  under 

the  form  of  eternity 

Prop.  XXX.  Our  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  knows  itself  and  the 
body  under  the  form  of  eternity,  has  to  that  extent  neces- 
sarily a knowledge  of  God,  and  knows  that  it  is  in  God, 

and  is  conceived  through  God 

Prop.  XXXI.  Intuition  depends  on  the  mind,  as  its  formal 
cause,  in  so  far  as  the  mind  itself  is  eternal 
Prop.  XXXII.  Whatsoever  we  understand  by  intuition,  we 
take  delight  in,  and  our  delight  is  accompanied  by  the 

idea  of  God  as  cause 

Prop.  XXXIII.  The  intellectual  love  of  God,  which  arises 

from  intuition,  is  eternal 

Prop.  XXXIV.  The  mind  is,  only  while  the  body  endures, 
subject  to  those  emotions  which  are  attributable  to  passions 
Prop.  XXXV.  God  loves  himself  with  an  infinite  intellec- 
tual love 

Prop.  XXXVI.  The  intellectual  love  of  the  mind  toward 
God  is  that  very  love  of  God,  whereby  God  loves  himself, 
not  in  so  far  as  he  is  infinite,  but  in  so  far  as  he  can  be 
explained  through  the  essence  of  the  human  mind  re- 
garded under  the  form  of  eternity ; in  other  words,  the 
intellectual  love  of  the  mind  toward  God  is  part  of  the 
infinite  love,  wherewith  God  loves  himself 
Prop.  XXXVII.  There  is  nothing  in  nature,  which  is  con- 
trary to  this  intellectual  love,  or  which  can  take  it  away  . 

— Prop.  XXXVIII.  In  proportion  as  the  mind  understands 
more  things  by  reason  and  intuition,  it  is  less  subject 
to  those  emotions  which  are  evil,  and  stands  in  less  fear 

of  death  ....  

Prop.  XXXIX.  He  who  possesses  a body  capable  of  the 
greatest  number  of  activities  possesses  a soul  whereof 

the  greatest  part  is  eternal 

Prop.  XL.  In  proportion  as  each  thing  possesses  more  of 
perfection,  so  is  it  more  active,  and  less  passive;  and, 
vice  versa , in  proportion  as  it  is  more  active,  so  is  it 

more  perfect 

Prop.  XLI.  Even  if  we  did  not  know  that  our  mind  is 
eternal,  we  should  still  consider  as  of  primary  importance 
piety  and  religion,  and  generally  all  things,  which  in 
Part  IV.  we  showed  to  be  attributable  to  courage  and 
high-mindedness 


PAG* 


268 

269 

269 

270 

271 
271 
271 


272 

273 

273 

274 

275 

276 


CONTENTS 


xxxiii 

PAQB 

THE  ETHICS  — Continued. 

Part  V.  On  the  Power  of  the  Understanding — Continued. 

Prop.  XLII.  Blessedness  is  not  the  reward  of  virtue,  but 
virtue  itself ; neither  do  we  rejoice  therein,  because  we 
control  our  lusts,  but,  contrariwise,  because  we  rejoice 
therein,  we  are  able  to  control  our  lusts  . . . 277 

SPINOZA’S  CORRESPONDENCE  (ABRIDGED)  . . .279 

Letters  I. — XXV. a.  (1661-1676).  Between  Spinoza  and 

Henry  Oldenburg 279 

Letters  XXVI. — XXVIII.  Between  Spinoza  and  Simon  de 

Vries 314 

Letters  XXIX.,  XXIX.  a.  (1663).  From  Spinoza  to  Lewis 

Meyer 321 

Letter  XXX.  (1664).  From  Spinoza  to  Peter  Balling  . . 329 

Letters  XXXI. — XXXVIII.  (1664-65 ).  Between  Spinoza  and 

William  Blyenbergh 335 

Letters  XXXIX. — XLI.  (1666).  From  Spinoza  to  Christian 

Huyghens,  on  the  unity  of  God 336 

Letters  XLI.a.,  XLII.  (1665-66).  From  Spinoza  to  a cor- 
respondent probably  identified  with  John  Bresser  . . 364 

Letter  XLIII.  (1666).  Spinoza  to  I.  v.  M.  on  a problem 
connected  with  games  of  chance  (omitted). 

Letters  XLIV. — XLVI.  (on  scientific  subjects,  and  omitted), 
and  Letter  XLVII.  (1667-71).  From  Spinoza  to  a cor- 
respondent probably  identified  with  Jarig  Jellis  . . . 368 

Letter  XLVIII.  (1671).  From  Lambert  de  Velthuysen  to 
Isaac  Orobio  against  Tractatus  Theologico  - Politicus 
(omitted). 

Letter  XLIX.  (1671).  Spinoza’s  answer  to  XLVIII.,  ad- 
dressed to  Isaac  Orobio 369 

Letter  L.  (1674).  From  Spinoza  to  Jarig  Jellis,  on  Hobbes, 

etc 374 

Letters  LI.,  LII.  (1671).  Between  Spinoza  and  Leibnitz  . 376 

Letters  LIIL,  LIV.  (1673).  Between  Spinoza  and  Fabritius  379 
Letters  LV. — LX.  (1674).  Between  Spinoza  and  Hugo 

Boxel  on  Ghosts 381 

Letters  LXI. — LXXII.  (1674-76).  Between  Spinoza,  E.  W. 

von  Tschirnhausen  and  G.  H.  Schaller 395 

Letters  LXXIII.,  LXXIV.  (1675).  Between  Spinoza  and 

Albert  Burgh  416 

Letter  LXXV.  (1675  ?)  From  Spinoza  to  Lambert  de  Vel- 
thuysen   . 426 


ON  THE  IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDER- 
STANDING. 


After  experience  had  taught  me  that  all  the  usual  sur- 
roundings of  social  life  are  vain  and  futile;  seeing  that 
none  of  the  objects  of  my  fears  contained  in  themselves 
anything  either  good  or  bad,  except  in  so  far  as  the  mind 
is  affected  by  them,  I finally  resolved  to  inquire  whether 
there  might  be  some  real  good  having  power  to  com- 
municate itself,  which  would  affect  the  mind  singly,  to 
the  exclusion  of  all  else;  whether,  in  fact,  there  might 
be  anything  of  which  the  discovery  and  attainment  would 
enable  me  to  enjoy  continuous,  supreme,  and  unending 
happiness.  I say  <(  I finally  resolved,  ® for  at  first  sight 
it  seemed' unwise  willingly  "tcTlose  hold  on  what  was  sure 
for  the  sake  of  something  then  uncertain.  I could  see 
the  benefits  which  are  acquired  through  fame  and  riches, 
and  that  I should  be  obliged  to  abandon  the  quest  of 
such  objects,  if  I seriously  devoted  myself  to  the  search 
for  something  different  and  new.  I perceived  that  if 
true  happiness  chanced  to  be  placed  in  the  former  I 
should  necessarily  miss  it;  while  if,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  were  not  so  placed,  and  I gave  them  my  whole  atten- 
tion, I should  equally  fail. 

I therefore  debated  whether  it  would  not  be  possible 
to  arrive  at  the  new  principle,  or  at  any  rate  at  a cer- 
tainty concerning  its  existence,  without  changing  the 
conduct  and  usual  plan  of  my  life;  with  this  end  in  view 
I made  many  efforts,  but  in  vain.  For  the  ordinary  sur- 
roundings of  life  which  are  esteemed  by~men~  ( as  their 
actions  testify")" :o  be  the  highest  good,  may  be  classed 
under  the  three  heads  — Riches"  Fame,  and  the  Pleasures 
of  Sense:  with  these  three  the  mind  is  so  absorbed  that 
it  has  little  power  to  reflect  on  any  different  good.  By 

~ (i) 


2 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


sensual  pleasure  the  mind  is  enthralled  to  the  extent  of 
quiescence,  as  if  the  supreme  good  were  actually  attained, 
so  that  it  is  quite  incapable  of  thinking  of  any  other  ob- 
ject; when  such  pleasure  has  been  gratified  it  is  followed 
by  extreme  melancholy,  whereby  the  mind,  though  not 
enthralled,  is  disturbed  and  dulled. 

The  pursuit  of  honors  and  riches  is  likewise  very 
absorbing,  especially  if  such  objects  be  sought  simply 
for  their  own  sake,  inasmuch  as  they  are  then  supposed 
to  constitute  the  highest  good.  In  the  case  of  fame  the 
mind  is  still  more  absorbed,  for  fame  is  conceived  as 
always  good  for  its  own  sake,  and  as  the  ultimate  end 
to  which  all  actions  are  directed.  Further,  the  attain- 
ment of  riches  and  fame  is  not  followed  as  in  the  case 
of  sensual  pleasures  by  repentance,  but,  the  more  we 
acquire,  the....  greater  is  our  delight,  and,  consequently, 
the  more  we  are  incited  to  increase  both  the  one  and 
the  other;  on  the  other  hand,  if  our  hopes  happen  to  be 
frustrated  we  are  plunged  Into  the  deepest  sadness. 
Fame  has  the  further  drawback  that  it  compels  its 
votaries  to  order  their  lives  according  to  the  opinions, of 
their  fellow-men,  shunning  what  they  usually  shun,  and 
seeking  what  they  usually  seek. 

When  I saw  that  all  these  ordinary  objects  of  desire 
would  be  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a search  for  something 
different  and  new  — nay,  that  they  were  so  opposed 
thereto,  that  either  they  or  it  would  have  to  be  aban- 
doned, I was  forced  to  inquire  which  would  prove  the 
most  useful  to  me:  for,  as  I say,  I seemed  to  be  will- 
ingly losing  hold  on  a sure  good  for  the  sake  of 
something  uncertain.  However,  after  I had  reflected  on 
the  matter,  1^  came  jn  the  first  place  to  the  conclusion 
that  by  abandoning  the  ordinary  objects  of  pursuit,  and 
betaking  myself  to  a new  quest,  I should  be  leaving  a 
good,  uncertain  by  reason  of  its  own  nature,  as  may  be 
"gathered  from  what  has  been  said,  for  the  sake  of  a good 
not  uncertain  in  Its  nature  (for  I sought  for  a fixed 
good),  but  only  in  the  possibility  of  its  attainment. 

Further  reflection  convinced  me,  that  if  I could  really 
get  to  the  root  of  the  matter,  I should  be  leaving  certain 


SPINOZA 


3 


evils  for  a certam  good,  I thus  perceived  that  I was  in 
a state  of  great  peril,  and  I compelled  myself  to  seek 
with  all  my  strength  for  a remedy,  however  uncertain  it 
might  be ; as  a sick  man  struggling  with  a deadly  disease, 
when  he  sees  that  death  will  surely  be  upon  him  unless 
a remedy  be  found,  is  compelled  to  seek  such  a remedy 
with  all  his  strength,  inasmuch  as  his  whole  hope  lies 
therein.  All  the  objects  pursued  by  the  multitude,  not 
only  bring  no  remedy  that  tends  to  preserve  our  being, 
but  even  act  as  hindrances,  causing  the  death  not  seldom 
of  those  who  possess  them,  and  always  of  those  who  are 
possessed  by  them.  There  are  many  examples  of  men 
who  have  suffered  persecution  even  to  death  for  the  sake 
of  their  riches,  and  of  men  who  in  pursuit  of  wealth  have 
exposed  themselves  to  so  many  dangers,  that  they  have 
paid  away  their  life  as  a penalty  for  their  folly.  Exam- 
ples are  no  less  numerous  of  men,  who  have  endured  the 
utmost  wretchedness  for  the  sake  of  gaining  or  preserving 
their  reputation.  Lastly,  there  are  innumerable  cases 
of  men,  who  have  hastened  their  death  through  over- 
indulgence  in  sensual  pleasure.  All  these  evils  seem  to 
have  arisen  from  the  fact,  that  ^happiness  or  unhappiness  ^ 
is  made  wholly  to  depend  on  the  quality  of  the  object 
which  we  love.  When  a thing  is  not  loved,  no  quarrels 
will  arise  concerning  it  — no  sadness  will  be  felt  if  it 
perishes — no  envy  if  it  is  possessed  by  another — no 
fear  no  hatred,  in  short  no  disturbances  of  the  mind. 

AU  these  arise  from  the  love  of  what  is  perishable,  such 
as  the  objects  already  mentioned.  But  love  toward  a^ 
thing  eternal  and  infinite  feeds  the  mind  wholly  with  joy, 
and  is  itself  unmingled  with  any  sadness,  wherefore  it  is 
greatly  to  be  desired  and  sought  for  with  all  our  strength. 

Yet  it  was  not  at  fandom  that  I used  the  words,  (<  If  I 
could  go  to  the  root  of  the  matter,”  for,  though  what  I 
have  urged  was  perfectly  clear  to  my  mind,  I could  not 
forthwith  lay  aside  all  love  of  riches,  sensual  enjoyment, 
and  fame.  One  thing  was  evident,  namely,  that  while 
my  mind  was  employed  with  these  thoughts  it  turned 
away  from  its  former  objects  of  desire,  and  seriously  con- 
sidered the  search  for  a new  principle ; this  state  of 


4 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


things  was  a great  comfort  to  me,  for  I perceived  that 
the  evils  were  not  such  as  to  resist  all  remedies. 
Although  these  intervals  were  at  first  rare,  and  of  very 
short  duration,  yet  afterward,  as  the  true  good  became 
more  and  more  discernible  to  me,  they  became  more  fre- 
quent and  more  lasting;  especially  after  I had  recognized 
that  the  acquisition  of  wealth,  sensual  pleastfre,  or  fame, 
is  only  a Tiindrance,  so  long  as  they  are  sought  as  ends 
not  as  means;  if  they  be  sought  as  means  they  will  be 
under  restraint,  and,  far  from  being  hindrances,  will 
further  not  a little  the  end  for  which  they  are  sought,  as 
I will  show  in  due  time. 

I will  here  only  briefly  state  what  I mean  by  true 
good,  and  also  what  is  the  nature  of  the  highest  good. 
In  order  that  this  may  be  rightly  understood,  we  must 
bear  in  mind  that  the  terms  good  and  evil  are  only  ap- 
plied relatively,  so  that  the  same  thing  may  be  called 
both  good  and  bad,  according  to  the  relations  in  view, 
in  the  same  way  as  it  may  be  called  perfect  or  imperfect. 
Nothing  regarded  in  its  own  nature  can  be  called  perfect 
or  imperfect;  especially  when  we  are  aware  that  jail 
things  which  come  to  pass,  come  to  pass  according  to  the 
eternal  order'and  fixed  laws  of  nature.  However,  human 
weakness  cannot  attain  to  this  order  in  its  own  thoughts, 
but  meanwhile  man  conceives  a human  character  much 
more  stable  than  his  own,  and  sees  that  there  is  no 
reason  why  he  should  not  himself  acquire  such  a char- 
acter. Thus  he  is  led  to  seek  for  means  which  will  bring 
him  to  this  pitch  of  perfection,  and  calls  everything 
which  will  serve  as  such  means  a true  good.  The  chief 
good  is  that  he  should  arrive,  together  with  other  individ- 
uals if  possible,  at  the  possession  of  the  aforesaid  char- 
acter.  What  that  character  is  we  shall  show  in  due  time, 
namely,  that  Tt  Ts‘  the  knowledge  of  the  union  existing 
between  the  mind  and  the  whole  of  nature.  This,  then, 
is  the  end  for  which  I strive,  to  attain  to  such  a char- 
acter myself,  and  to  endeavor  that  many  should  attain  to 
it  with  me.  In  other  words,  it  is  part  of  my  happiness 
to  lend  a helping  hand,  that  many  others  may  understand 
even  as  I do,  so  that  their  understanding  and  desire  may 


SPINOZA 


5 


entirely  agree  with  my  own.  In  order  to  bring  this  about, 
it  is  necessary  to  understand  as  much  of  nature  as  will 
enable  us  to  attain  to  the  aforesaid  character,  and  also 
to  form  a social  order  such  as  is  most  conducive  to  the 
attainment  of  this  character  by  the  greatest  number  with 
the  least  difficulty  and  danger.  We  must  seek  the  assist- 
ance of  Moral  Philosophy  * and  the  Theory  of  Education ; 
further,  as  health  is  no  insignificant  means  for  at- 
taining our  end,  we  must  also  include  the  whole  science 
of  Medicine,  and,  as  many  difficult  things  are  by  con- 
trivance rendered  easy,  and  we  can  in  this  way  gain 
much  time  and  convenience,  the  science  of  Mechanics 
must  in  no  way  be  despised.  But,  before  all  things,  a -fc 
means  must  be  devised  for  improving  the  understanding 
and  purifying  it,  as  far  as  may  be  at  the  outset,  so  that 
it  may  apprehend  things  without  error,  and  in  the  best 
possible  way. 

Thus  it  is  apparent  to  every  one  that  I wish  to  direct 
all  sciences  to  one  end  and  aim,  so  that  we  may  attain 
to  the' supreme  human  perfection  which,  we  have  named; 
and,  therefore,  whatsoever  in  the  sciences  does  not  serve 
to  promote  our  object  jvill  have  to  be  rejected  as  useless. 

To  sum  up  the  matter  in  a word,  all  our  actions  and 
thoughts  must  be  directed  to  this  one  end.  Yet,  as  it  is 
necessary  that  while  we  are  endeavoring  to  attain  our 
purpose,  and  bring  the  understanding  into  the  right  path, 
we  should  carry  on  our  life,  we  are  compelled  first  of  all 
to  lay  down  certain  rules  of  life  as  provisionally  good, 
to  wit,  the  following: 

n7  ~To  speaFTh  “ a manner  intelligible  to  the  multitude, 
and  to  comply  with  every  general  custom  that  does  not 
hinder  the  attainment  of  our  purpose.  For  we  can  gain 
from  the  multitude  no  small  advantages,  provided  that 
we  strive  to  accommodate  ourselves  to  its  understanding 
as  far  as  possible:  moreover,  we  shall  in  this  way  gain 
a friendly  audience  for  the  reception  of  the  truth. 


II./  To  indulge  ourselves  with  pleasures  only  in  so  far 
as  they  are  necessary  for  preserving  health. 

* I do  no  more  here  than  enumerate  the  sciences  necessary  for  our 
purpose ; I lay  no  stress  on  their  order. 


6 


IMPROVEMENT  OP  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


i III.  i Lastly,  to  endeavor  to  obtain  only  sufficient  money 
or  ’other  commodities  to  enable  us  to  preserve  our  life  and 
health,  and  to  follow  such  general  customs  as  are  con- 
sistent with  our  purpose. 

Having  laid  down  these  preliminary  rules,  I will  betake 
myself  to  the  first  and  most  important  task,  namely,  the 
amendment  of  the  understanding,  and  the  rendering  it 
capable  of  understanding  things  in  the  manner  necessary 
for  attaining  our  end. 

In  order  to  bring  this  about,  the  natural  order  demands 
that  I should  ..here  recapitulate  all  the  modes  of  perception, 
which  I have  hitherto  employed  for  affirming  or  denying 
anything  with’  certainty,  so  that  I may  choose  the  best, 
and  at  the  same  time  begin  to  know  my  own  powers  and 
the  nature  which  I wish  to  perfect. 

Reflection  shows  thatjall  modes  of  perception  or  knowl- 
edge may  be  reduced  to  four: 

( L Perception  arising  from  hearsay  or  from  some  sign 
which  everyone  may  name  as  he  pleases. 

(n,  Perception  arising  from  mere  experience — that  is, 
from  experience  not  yet  classified  by  the  intellect,  and 
only  so  called  because  the  given  event  has  happened  to 
take  place,  and  we  have  no  contradictory  fact  to  set 
against  it,  so  that  it  therefore  remains  unassailed  in  our 


mind. 

■ 

^IIL/  Perception  arising  when  the  essence  of  one  thing 
is  inferred  from  another  thing,  but  not  adequately;  this 
comes  when  from  some  effect  we  gather  its  cause,  or  when 
it  is  inferred  from  some  general  proposition  that  some 
property  is  always  present. 

v IV.  Lastly,  there  is  the  perception  arising  when  a thing 
is  perceived  solely  through  its  essence,  or  through  the 
knowledge  of  its  proximate  cause. 

All  these  kinds  of  perception  I will  illustrate  by  examples. 
By  hearsay  I know  the  day  of  my  birth,  my  parentage, 
and  other  matters  about  which  I have  never  felt  any 
doubt.  By  mere  experience  I know  that  I shall  die, 
for  this  I can  affirm  from  having  seen  that  others  like 
toyself  have  died,  though  all  did  not  live  for  the  same 
period,  or  die  by  the  same  disease.  I know  by  mere 


SPINOZA 


7 


experience  that  oil  has  the  property  of  feeding  fire,  and 
water  of  extinguishing  it.  In  the  same  way  I know  that 
a dog  is  a barking  animal,  man  a rational  animal,  and  in 
fact  nearly  all  the  practical  knowledge  of  life. 

We  deduce  one  thing  from  another  as  follows:  when  we 
clearly  perceive  that  we  feel  a certain  body  and  no  other, 
we  thence  clearly  infer  that  the  mind  is  united  to  the 
body,  and  that  their  union  is  the  cause  of  the  given  sen- 
sation; but  we  cannot  thence  absolutely  understand  the 
nature  of  the  sensation  and  the  union.  Or,  after  I have 
become  acquainted  with  the  nature  of  vision,  and  know 
that  it  has  the  property  of  making  one  and  the  same  thing 
appear  smaller  when  far  off  than  when  near,  I can  infer 
that  the  sun  is  larger  than  it  appears,  and  can  draw  other 
conclusions  of  the  same  kind. 

Lastly,  a thing  may  be  perceived  solely  through  its 
essence ; when,  from  the  fact  of  knowing  something,  I know 
what  it  is  to  know  that  thing,  or  when,  from  knowing 
the  essence  of  the  mind,  I know  that  it  is  united  to  the 
body.  By  the  same  kind  of  knowledge  we  know  that  two 
and  three  make  five,  or  that  two  lines  each  parallel  to  a 
third,  are  parallel  to  one  another,  etc.  The  things  which 
I have  been  able  to  know  by  this  kind  of  knowledge  are 
as  yet  very  few. 

In  order  that  the  whole  matter  may  be  put  in  a clearer 
light,  I will  make  use  of  a . single  illustration  as  follows : 
Three  numbers  are  given  — it  is  required  to  find  a fourth, 
which  shall  be  to  the  third  as  the  second  is  to  the  first. 
Tradesmen  will  at  once  tell  us  that  they  know  what  is 
required  to  find  the  fourth  number,  for  they  have  not  yet 
forgotten  the  rule  which  was  given  to  them  arbitrarily 
without  proof  by  their  masters ; others  construct  a universal 
axiom  from  their  experience  with  simple  numbers,  where 
the  fourth  number  is  self-evident,  as  in  the  case  of  2,  4,  3,  6; 
here  it  is  evident  that  if  the  second  number  be  multi- 
plied by  the  third,  and  the  product  divided  by  the  first, 
the  quotient  is  6 ; when  they  see  that  by  this  process  the 
number  is  produced  which  they  knew  beforehand  to  be 
the  proportional,  they  infer  that  the  process  always  hold* 
good  for  finding  a fourth  number  proportional.  Mathe- 


8 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


maticians,  however,  know  by  the  proof  of  the  nineteenth 
proposition  of  the  seventh  book  of  Euclid,  what  numbers 
are  proportionals,  namely,  from  the  nature  and  property 
of  proportion  it  follows  that  the  product  of  the  first  and 
fourth  will  be  equal  to  the  product  of  the  second  and 
third:  still  they  do  not  see  the  adequate  proportionality 
of  the  given  numbers  or,  if  they  do  see  it,  they  see  it  not 
by  virtue  of  Euclid’s  proposition,  but  intuitively,  without 
going  through  any  process. 

In  order  that  from  these  modes  of  perception  the  best 
may  be  selected,  it  is  well  that  we  should  briefly  enu- 
merate the  means  necessary  for  attaining  our  end. 

I.  To  have  an  exact  knowledge  of  our  nature  which 
we  desire  to  perfect,  and  to  know  as  much  as  is  needful 
of  nature  in  general. 

II.  To  collect  in  this  way  the  differences,  the  agree- 
ments, and  the  oppositions  of  things. 

III.  To  learn  thus  exactly  how  far  they  can  or  cannot 
be  modified. 

IV.  To  compare  this  result  with  the  nature  and  power 
of  man.  We  shall  thus  discern  the  highest  degree  of 
perfection  to  which  man  is  capable  of  attaining.  We 
shall  then  be  in  a position  to  see  which  mode  of  percep- 
tion we  ought  to  choose. 

As  to  the  first  mode,  it  is  evident  that  from  hearsay 
our  knowledge  must  always  be  uncertain,_and,  moreover, 
can  give  us  no  insight  into  the  essence  of  a thing,  as  is 
manifest  in  our  illustration;  now  one  can  only  arrive  at 
knowledge  of  a thing  through  knowledge  of  its  essence, 
as  will  hereafter  appear.  We  may,  therefore,  clearly  con- 
clude that  the  certainty  arising  from  hearsay  cannot  be 
scientific  in  its  character.  For  simple  hearsay  cannot 
affect  anyone  whose  understanding  does  not,  so  to  speak, 
meet  it  half  way. 

The  second  mode  of  perception*  cannot  be  said  to  give 
us  the  idea  of  the  proportion  of  which  we  are  in  search. 
Moreover  its  results  are  very  uncertain  and  indefinite,  for 

*1  shall  here  treat  a little  more  in  detail  of  experience,  and  shall 
examine  the  method  adopted  by  the  Empirics,  and  by  recent  philoso- 
phers. 


SPINOZA 


9 


we  shall  never  discover  anything  in  natural  phenomena 
by  its  means,  except  accidental  properties,  which  are  never 
clearly  understood,  unless  the  essence  of  the  things  in 
question  be  known  first.  Wherefore  this  mode  also  must 
be  rejected. 

Of  the  third  mode  of  perception  we  may  say  in  a man- 
ner that  it  gives  us  the  idea  of  the  thing  sought,  and  that 
it  enables  us  to  draw  conclusions  without  risk  of  error; 
yet  it  is  not  by  itself  sufficient  to  put  us  in  possession  of 
the  perfection  we  aim  at. 

The  fourth  mode  alone  apprehends  the  adequate  es- 
sence of  a thing  without  danger  of  error.  This  mode, 
therefore,  must  be  the  one  which  we  chiefly  employ.  How, 
then,  should  we  avail  ourselves  of  it  so  as  to  gain  the 
fourth  kind  of  knowledge  with  the  least  delay  concerning 
things  previously  unknown  ? I will  proceed  to  explain. 

Now  that  we  know  what  kind  of  knowledge  is  necessary  W'* 
for  us,  we  must  indicate  the  way  and  the  method  whereby 
we  may  gain  the  said  knowledge  concerning  the  things 
needful  to  be  known.  In  order  to  accomplish  this,  we 
must  first  take  care  not  to  commit  ourselves  to  a search, 
going  back  to  infinity  — that  is,  in  order  to  discover  the 
best  method  for  finding  out  the  truth,  there  is  no  need  of 
another  method  to  discover  such  method;  nor  of  a third 
method  for  discovering  the  second,  and  so  on  to  infinity. 

By  such  proceedings,  we  should  never  arrive  at  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  truth,  or,  indeed,  at  any  knowledge  at  all. 

The  matter  stands  on  the  same  footing  as  the  making  of 
material  tools,  which  might  be  argued  about  in  a similar 
way.  For,  in  order  to  work  iron,  a hammer  is  needed,  and 
the  hammer  cannot  be  forthcoming  unless  it  has  been 
made ; but,  in  order  to  make  it,  there  was  need  of  another 
hammer  and  other  tools,  and  so  on  to  infinity.  We  might 
thus  vainly  endeavor  to  prove  that  men  have  no  power  of 
working  iron.  But  as  men  at  first  made  use  of  the  instru- 
ments supplied  by  nature  to  accomplish  very  easy  pieces  of 
workmanship,  laboriously  and  imperfectly,  and  then,  when 
these  were  finished,  wrought  other  things  more  difficult 
with  less  labor  and  greater  perfection;  and  so  gradually 
mounted  from  the  simplest  operations  to  the  making  of 


ty?C  jLvIftfiUsrrtf/t  J'L.  crjf  *cn~tc£/cc  / / tn.  .&MJ&  y&cfcjZjZ-' 

10  IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 

tools,  and  from  the  making  of  tools  to  the  making  of 
more  complex  tools,  and  fresh  feats  of  workmanship,  till 
they  arrived  at  making,  with  small  expenditure  of  labor, 
the  vast  number  of  complicated  mechanisms  which  they 
now  possess.  So,  in  like  manner,  the  intellect,  by  its  na- 
tive strength,*  makes  for  itself  intellectual  instruments, 
whereby  it  acquires  strength  for  performing  other  intel- 
lectual operations,  and  from  these  operations  gets  again 
fresh  instruments,  or  the  power  of  pushing  its  investiga- 
tions further,  and  thus  gradually  proceeds  till  it  reaches 
the  summit  of  wisdom. 

That  this  is  the  path  pursued  by  the  understanding  may 
be  readily  seen,  when  we  understand  the  nature  of  the 
method  for  finding  out  the  truth,  and  of  the  natural  in- 
struments so  necessary  for  the  construction  of  more  com- 
plex instruments,  and  for  the  progress  of  investigation.  I 
thus  proceed  with  my  demonstration. 

A true  idea  (for  we  possess  a true  idea)  is  something 
different  from  its  correlate  ( ideatum ) ; thus  a circle  is 
different  from  the  idea  of  a circle.  The  idea  of  a circle 
is  not  something  having  a circumference  and  a centre, 
as  a circle  has ; nor  is  the  idea  of  a body  that  body  itself. 
Now,  as  it  is  something  different  from  its  correlate,  it  is 
capable  of  being  understood  through  itself ; in  other 
words,  the  idea,  in  so  far  as  its  actual  essence  ( essentia 
formalis ) is  concerned,  may  be  the  subject  of  another 
subjective  essence  ( essentia  objectiva).  And,  again,  this 
second  subjective  essence  will,  regarded  in  itself,  be 
something  real,  and  capable  of  being  understood ; and  so 
on,  indefinitely.  For  instance,  the  man  Peter  is  some- 
thing real;  the  true  idea  of  Peter  is  the  reality  of  Peter 
represented  subjectively,  and  is  in  itself  something  real, 
and  quite  distinct  from  the  actual  Peter.  Now,  as  this 
true  idea  of  Peter  is  in  itself  something  real,  and  has 
its  own  individual  existence,  it  will  also  be  capable  of 
being  understood  — that  is,  of  being  the  subject  of 
another  idea,  which  will  contain  by  representation 
( objective ) all  that  the  idea  of  Peter  contains  actually 

* By  native  strength,  I mean  that  bestowed  on  us  by  external  causes, 
fes  I shall  afterwards  explain  in  my  philosophy. 


SPINOZA 


ii 


(for malit er}.  And,  again,  this  idea  of  the  idea  of  Peter 
has  its  own  individuality,  which  may  become  the  subject 
of  yet  another  idea;  and  so  on,  indefinitely.  This  every 
one  may  make  trial  of  for  himself,  by  reflecting  that 
he  knows  what  Peter  is,  and  also  knows  that  he 
knows,  and  further  knows  that  he  knows  that  he  knows, 
etc.  Hence  it  is  plain  that,  in  order  to  understand  the 
actual  Peter,  it  is  not  necessary  first  to  understand  the 
idea  of  Peter,  and  still  less  the  idea  of  the  idea  of  Peter. 
This  is  the  same  as  saying  that,  in  order  to  know,  there 
is  no  need  to  know  that  we  know,  much  less  to  know 
that  we  know  that  we  know.  This  is  no  more  necessary 
than  to  know  the  nature  of  a circle  before  knowing  the 
nature  of  a triangle.  But,  with  these  ideas,  the  contrary 
is  the  case:  for,  in  order  to  know  that  I know,  I must 
first  know.  Hence  it  is  clear  that  certainty  is  nothing 
else  than  the  subjective  essence  of  a thing:  in  other 
words,  the  mode  in  which  we  perceive  an  actual  reality 
is  certainty.  Further,  it  is  also  evident  that,  for  the  cer- 
titude of  truth,  no  further  sign  is  necessary  beyond  the 
possession  of  a true  idea:  for,  as  I have  shown,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  know  that  we  know  that  we  know.  Hence, 
again,  it  is  clear  that  no  one  can  know  the  nature  of  the 
highest  certainty,  unless  he  possesses  an  adequate  idea, 
or  the  subjective  essence  of  a thing:  for  certainty  is 
identical  with  such  subjective  essence.  Thus,  as  the 
truth  needs  no  sign  — it  being  sufficient  to  possess  the 
subjective  essence  of  things,  or,  in  other  words,  the  ideas 
of  them,  in  order  that  all  doubts  may  be  removed  — it 
follows  that  the  true  method  does  not  consist  in  seeking 
for  the  signs  of  truth  after  the  acquisition  of  the  idea, 
but  that  the  true  method  teaches  us  the  order  in  which 
we  should  seek  forjtruth  itself,  or  the  sutrjectiye  essences 
of  things,  or  ideas,  for  all  these  expressions  are  synony- 
mous. Again,  method  must  necessarily  be  concerned 
with  reasoning  or  understanding  — I mean,  method  is  not 
identical  with  reasoning  in  the  search  for  causes,  still 
less  is  it  the  comprehension  of  the  causes  of  things : it  is 
the  discernment  of  a true  idea,  by  distinguishing  it  from 
other  perceptions  and  by  investigating  its  nature  in  order 


12 


IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


that  we  may  thus  know  our  power  of  understanding,  and 
may  so  train  our  mind  that  it  may,  by  a given  standard, 
comprehend  whatsoever  is  intelligible,  by  laying  down 
certain  rules  as  aids,  and  by  avoiding  useless  mental 
exertion. 

Whence  we  may  gather  that  method  is  nothing  else  than 
reflective  knowledge,  or  the  idea  of  an  idea;  and  that  as 
there  can  be  no  idea  of  an  idea — unless  an  idea  exists 
previously, — there  can  be  no  method  without  a pre-existent 
idea.  Therefore,  that  will  be  a good  method  which  shows 
us  how  the  mind  should  be  directed,  according  to  the 
standard  of  the  given  true  idea. 

Again,  seeing  that  the  ratio  existing  between  two  ideas 
is  the  same  as  the  ratio  between  the  actual  realities  cor- 
responding to  those  ideas,  it  follows  that  the  reflective 
knowledge  which  has  for  its  object  the  most  perfect  being 
is  more  excellent  than  reflective  knowledge  concerning 
other  objects  — in  other  words,  that  method  will  be  most 
perfect  which  affords  the  standard  of  the  given  idea  of 
the  most  perfect  being  whereby  we  may  direct  our  mind. 
We  thus  easily  understand  how,  in  proportion  as  it  acquires 
new  ideas,  the  mind  simultaneously  acquires  fresh  instru- 
ments for  pursuing  its  inquiries  further.  For  we  may 
gather  from  what  has  been  said,  that  a true  idea  must 
necessarily  first  of  all  exist  in  us  as  a natural  instrument ; 
and  that  when  this  idea  is  apprehended  by  the  mind,  it 
enables  us  to  understand  the  difference  existing  between 
itself  and  all  other  perceptions.  In  this,  one  part  of  the 
method  consists. 

«.  Now  it  is  clear  that  the  mind  apprehends  itself  better  in 
proportion  as  it  understands  a greater  number  of  natural 
objects;  it  follows,  therefore,  that  this  portion  of  the 
method  will  be  more  perfect  in  proportion  as  the  mind 
attains  to  the  comprehension  of  a greater  number  of  ob- 
jects, and  that  it  will  be  absolutely  perfect  when  the  mind 
gains  a knowledge  of  the  absolutely  perfect  being  or 
becomes  conscious  thereof.  Again,  the  more  things  the 
mind  knows,  the  better  does  it  understand  its  own  strength 
and  the  order  of  nature ; by  increased  self-knowledge  it  can 
direct  itself  more  easily,  and  lay  down  rules  for  its  own 


SPINOZA  13 

guidance;  and,  by  increased  knowledge  of  nature,  it  can 
more  easily  avoid  what  is  useless. 

And  this  is  the  sum  total  of  method,  as  we  have  already 
stated.  We  may  add  that  the  idea  in  the  world  of  thought 
is  in  the  same  case  as  its  correlate  in  the  world  of  real- 
ity. If,  therefore,  there  be  anything  in  nature  which  is 
without  connection  with  any  other  thing,  and  if  we  assign 
to  it  a subjective  essence,  which  would  in  every  way  cor- 
respond to  the  objective  reality,  the  subjective  essence 
would  have  no  connection  with  any  other  ideas  — in  other 
words,  we  could  not  draw  any  conclusion  with  regard  to 
it.  On  the  other  hand,  those  things  which  are  connected 
with  others  — as  all  things  that  exist  in  nature  — will  be 
understood  by  the  mind,  and  their  subjective  essences 
will  maintain  the  same  mutual  relations  as  their  objective 
realities  — that  is  to  say,  we  shall  infer  from  these  ideas 
other  ideas,  which  will  in  turn  be  connected  with  others, 
and  thus  our  instruments  for  proceeding  with  our  investi- 
gation will  increase.  This  is  what  we  are  endeavoring  to 
prove.  Further,  from  what  has  just  been  said  — namely, 
that  an  idea  must,  in  all  respects,  correspond  to  its  cor- 
relate in  the  world  of  reality  — it  is  evident  that,  in  order 
to  reproduce  in  every  respect  the  faithful  image  of  nature, 
our  mind  must  deduce  all  its  ideas  from  the  idea  which 
represents  the  origin  and  source  of  the  whole  of  nature, 
so  that  it  may  itself  become  the  source  of  other  ideas. 

It  may,  perhaps,  provoke  astonishment  that,  after 
having  said  that  the  good  method  is  that  which  teaches 
us  to  direct  our  mind  according  to  the  standard  of  the 
given  true  idea,  we  should  prove  our  point  by  reasoning, 
which  would  seem  to  indicate  that  it  is  not  self-evident. 
We  may,  therefore,  be  questioned  as  to  the  validity  of 
our  reasoning.  If  our  reasoning  be  sound,  we  must  take 
as  a starting  point  a true  idea.  Now,  to  be  certain  that 
our  starting  point  is  really  a true  idea,  we  need  a proof. 
This  first  course  of  reasoning  must  be  supported  by  a 
second,  the  second  by  a third,  and  so  on  to  infinity.  To 
this  I make  answer  that,  if  by  some  happy  chance  any- 
one had  adopted  this  method  in  his  investigations  of 
nature  — that  is,  if  he  had  acquired  new  ideas  in  the 


i4  IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


proper  order,  according  to  the  standard  of  the  original 
true  idea,  he  would  never  have  doubted  of  the  truth  of 
his  knowledge,  inasmuch  as  truth,  as  we  have  shown, 
makes  itself  manifest,  and  all  things  would  flow,  as  it 
were,  spontaneously  toward  him.  But  as  this  never,  or 
rarely,  happens,  I have  been  forced  so  to  arrange  my 
proceedings,  that  we  may  acquire  by  reflection  and  fore- 
thought what  we  cannot  acquire  by  chance,  and  that  it 
may  at  the  same  time  appear  that,  for  proving  the  truth, 
and  for  valid  reasoning,  we  need  no  other  means  than 
the  truth  and  valid  reasoning  themselves:  for  by  valid 
reasoning  I have  established  valid  reasoning,  and,  in  like 
measure,  I seek  still  to  establish  it.  Moreover,  this  is 
the  order  of  thinking  adopted  by  men  in  their  inward 
meditations.  The  reasons  for  its  rare  employment  in 
investigations  of  nature  are  to  be  found  in  current  mis- 
conceptions, whereof  we  shall  examine  the  causes  here- 
after in  our  philosophy.  Moreover,  it  demands,  as  we 
shall  show,  a keen  and  accurate  discernment.  Lastly,  it 
is  hindered  by  the  conditions  of  human  life,  which  are, 
as  we  have  already  pointed  out,  extremely  changeable. 
There  are  also  other  obstacles,  which  we  will  not  here 
inquire  into. 

If  any  one  asks  why  I have  not  at  the  starting  point 
set  forth  all  the  truths  of  nature  in  their  due  order, 
inasmuch  as  truth  is  self-evident,  I reply  by  warning 
him  not  to  reject  as  false  any  paradoxes  he  may  find 
here,  but  to  take  the  trouble  to  reflect  on  the  chain 
of  reasoning  by  which  they  are  supported;  he  will  then 
be  no  longer  in  doubt  that  we  have  attained  to  the  truth. 
This  is  why  I have  begun  as  above. 

If  there  yet  remains  some  sceptic,  who  doubts  of  our 
primary  truth,  and  of  all  deductions  we  make,  taking 
such  truth  as  our  standard,  he  must  either  be  arguing 
in  bad  faith,  or  we  must  confess  that  there  are  men 
in  complete  mental  blindness  either  innate  or  due  to 
misconceptions  — that  is,  to  some  external  influence. 

Such  persons  are  not  conscious  of  themselves.  If  they 
affirm  or  doubt  anything,  they  know  not  that  they  affirm 
or  doubt ; they  say  that  they  know  nothing,  and  they  say 


j/iasd'  ■/  ^Lt/e*z<Z^ 

SPINOZA  15 


that  they  are  ignorant  of  ^Uffe  very  fact  of  their  knowing 
nothing.  Even  this  they  do  not  affirm  absolutely,  they  are 
afraid  of  confessing  that  they  exist,  so  long  as  they 
know  nothing;  in  fact,  they  ought  to  remain  dumb,  for 
fear  of  haply  supposing  something  which  should  smack 
of  truth.  Lastly,  with  such  persons,  one  should  not 
speak  of  sciences;  for,  in  what  relates  to  life  and  con- 
duct, they  are  compelled  by  necessity  to  suppose  that 
they  exist,  and  seek  their  own  advantage,  and  often 
affirm  and  deny,  even  with  an  oath.  If  they  deny,  grant, 
or  gainsay,  they  know  not  that  they  deny,  grant,  or  gain- 
say, so  that  they  ought  to  be  regarded  as  automata, 
utterly  devoid  of  intelligence. 

Let  us  now  return  to  our  proposition.  Up  to  the  pres- 
ent we  have,  first,  defined  the  end  to  which  we  desire 
to  direct  all  our  thoughts;  secondly,  we  have  determined 
the  mode  of  perception  best  adapted  to  aid  us  in  attain- 
ing our  perfection;  thirdly,  we  have  discovered  the  way 
which  our  mind  should  take,  in  order  to  make  a good 
beginning  — namely,  that  it  should  use  every  true  idea 
as  a standard  in  pursuing  its  inquiries  according  to  fixed 
rules.  Now,  in  order  that  it  may  thus  proceed,  our 
method  must  furnish  us,  first,  with  a means  of  distin- 
guishing a true  idea  from  all  other  perceptions,  and 
enabling  the  mind  to  avoid  the  latter;  secondly,  with 
rules  for  perceiving  unknown  things  according  to  the 
standard  of  the  true  idea;  thirdly,  with  an  order  which 
enables  us  to  avoid  useless  labor.  When  we  became  ac- 
quainted with  this  method,  we  saw  that,  fourthly,  it  / s 
would  be  perfect  when  we  had  attained  to  the  idea  of 
the  absolutely  perfect  Being.  This  is  an  observation 
which  should  be  made  at  the  outset,  in  order  that  we  may 
arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  such  a being  more  quickly. 

Let  us  then  make  a beginning  with  the  first  part  of 
the  method,  which  is,  as  we  have  said,  to  distinguish 
and  separate  the  true  idea  from  other  perceptions,  and 
to  keep  the  mind  from  confusing  with  true  ideas  those 
which  are  false,  fictitious,  and  doubtful.  I intend  to 
dwell  on  this  point  at  length,  partly  to  keep  a distinction 
so  necessary  before  the  reader’s  mind,  and  also  because 


i6  IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


there  are  some  who  doubt  of  true  ideas,  through  not  having 
attended  to  the  distinction  between  a true  perception  and 
all  others.  Such  persons  are  like  men  who,  while  they 
are  awake,  doubt  not  that  they  are  awake,  but  after- 
ward  in  a dream,  as  often  happens,  thinking  that  they 
are  surely  awake,  and  then  finding  that  they  were  in 
error,  become  doubtful  even  of  being  awake.  This  state 
of  mind  arises  through  neglect  of  the  distinction  between 
sleeping  and  waking. 

Meanwhile,  I give  warning  that  I shall  not  here  give  the 
essence  of  every  perception,  and  explain  it  through  its 
proximate  cause.  Such  work  lies  in  the  province  of 
philosophy.  I shall  confine  myself  to  what  concerns 
method  — that  is,  to  the  character  of  fictitious,  false,  and 
doubtful  perception,  and  the  means  of  freeing  ourselves 
therefrom.  Let  us  then  first  inquire  into  the  nature  of  a 
fictitious  idea. 

Every  perception  has  for  its  object  either  a thing  con- 
sidered as  existing,  or  solely  the  essence  of  a thing. 
Now  “fiction®  is  chiefly  occupied  with  things  considered 
as  existing.  I will,  therefore,  consider  these  first  — I 
mean  cases  where  only  the  existence  of  an  object  is 
feigned,  and  the  thing  thus  feigned  is  understood,  or 
assumed  to  be  understood.  For  instance,  I feign  that 
Peter,  whom  I know  to  have  gone  home,  is  gone  to  see 
me,  or  something  of  that  kind.  With  what  is  such  an 
idea  concerned  ? It  is  concerned  with  things  possible, 
and  not  with  things  necessary  or  impossible.  I call  a 
^ thing  impossible,  when  its  existence  would  imply  a con- 
tradiction; necessary,  when  its  non-existence  would  imply 
a contradiction;  possible,  when  neither  its  existence  nor 
its  non-existence  imply  a contradiction,  but  when  the 
necessity  or  impossibility  of  its  nature  depends  on  causes 
• unknown  to  us,  while  we  feign  that  it  exists.  If  the 
necessity  or  impossibility  of  its  existence  depending  on 
external  causes  were  known  to  us,  we  could  not  form 
any  fictitious  hypothesis  about  it;  whence  it  follows  that 
if  there  be  a God  or  omniscient  Being,  such  an  one 
cannot  form  fictitious  hypotheses.  For,  as  regards  our- 
selves, when  I know  that  I exist,  I cannot  hypothesize 


SPINOZA 


17 


that  I exist  or  do  not  exist,  any  more  than  I can  hy- 
pothesize an  elephant  that  can  go  through  the  eye  of  a 
needle;  nor  when  I know  the  nature  of  God,  can  I hy- 
pothesize that  he  exists  or  does  not  exist.  The  same 
thing  must  be  said  of  the  Chimaera,  whereof  the  nature 
implies  a contradiction.  From  these  considerations,  it  is 
plain,  as  I have  already  stated,  that  fiction  cannot  be  con- 
cerned with  eternal  truths. 

But  before  proceeding  further,  I must  remark,  in  pass- 
ing, that  the  difference  between  the  essence  of  one  thing 
and  the  essence  of  another  thing  is  the  same  as  that 
which  exists  between  the  reality  or  existence  of  one  thing 
and  the  reality  or  existence  of  another;  therefore,  if  we 
wished  to  conceive  the  existence,  for  example,  of  Adam, 
simply  by  means  of  existence  in  general,  it  would  be  the 
same  as  if,  in  order  to  conceive  his  existence,  we  went 
back  to  the  nature  of  being,  so  as  to  define  Adam  as  a 
being.  Thus,  the  more  existence  is  conceived  generally, 
the  more  is  it  conceived  confusedly,  and  the  more  easily 
can  it  be  ascribed  to  a given  object.  Contrariwise,  the 
more  it  is  conceived  particularly,  the  more  is  it  under- 
stood clearly,  and  the  less  liable  is  it  to  be  ascribed, 
through  negligence  of  Nature’s  order,  to  anything  save 
its  proper  object.  This  is  worthy  of  remark. 

We  now  proceed  to  consider  those  cases  which  are  Z & 
commonly  called  fictions,  though  we  clearly  understand 
that  the  thing  is  not  as  we  imagine  it.  For  instance, 

I know  that  the  earth  is  round,  but  nothing  prevents  my 
telling  people  that  it  is  a hemisphere,  and  that  it  is  like 
a half  apple  carved  in  relief  on  a dish;  or,  that  the  sun 
moves  round  the  earth,  and  so  on.  However,  examina- 
tion will  show  us  that  there  is  nothing  here  inconsistent 
with  what  has  been  said,  provided  we  first  admit  that 
we  may  have  made  mistakes,  and  be  now  conscious  of 
them;  and,  further,  that  we  can  hypothesize,  or  at  least 
suppose,  that  others  are  under  the  same  mistake  as  our- 
selves, or  can,  like  us,  fall  under  it.  We  can,  I repeat, 
thus  hypothesize  so  long  as  we  see  no  impossibility. 

Thus,  when  I tell  anyone  that  the  earth  is  not  round,  etc., 

I merely  recall  the  error  which  I perhaps  made  myself, 

2 


1 8 IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


or  which  I might  have  fallen  into,  and  afterward  I 
hypothesize  that  the  person  to  whom  I tell  it  is  still,  or 
may  still  fall  under  the  same  mistake.  This  I say,  I can 
feign  so  long  as  I do  not  perceive  any  impossibility  or 
necessity;  if  I truly  understood  either  one  or  the  other 
I should  not  be  able  to  feign,  and  I should  be  reduced 
to  saying  that  I had  made  the  attempt. 

It  remains  for  us  to  consider  hypotheses  made  in  prob- 
lems, which  sometimes  involve  impossibilities.  For  in- 
stance, when  we  say — let  us  assume  that  this  burning  candle 
is  not  burning,  or,  let  us  assume  that  it  burns  in  some  im- 
aginary space,  or  where  there  are  no  physical  objects. 
Such  assumptions  are  freely  made,  though  the  last  is 
clearly  seen  to  be  impossible.  But,  though  this  be  so, 
there  is  no  fiction  in  the  case.  For,  in  the  first  case,  I 
have  merely  recalled  to  memory  another  candle  not  burn- 
ing, or  conceived  the  candle  before  me  as  without  a flame, 
and  then  I understand  as  applying  to  the  latter,  leaving 
its  flame  out  of  the  question,  all  that  I think  of  the  former. 
In  the  second  case,  I have  merely  to  abstract  my  thoughts 
from  the  objects  surrounding  the  candle,  for  the  mind  to 
devote  itself  to  the  contemplation  of  the  candle  singly 
looked  at  in  itself  only;  I can  then  draw  the  conclusion 
that  the  candle  contains  in  itself  no  cause  for  its  own 
destruction,  so  that  if  there  were  no  physical  objects  the 
candle,  and  even  the  flame,  would  remain  unchangeable, 
and  so  on.  Thus  there  is  here  no  fiction,  but  true  and 
bare  assertions. 

Let  us  now  pass  on  to  the  fictions  concerned  with  es- 
sences only,  or  with  some  reality  or  existence  simultane- 
ously. Of  these  we  must  specially  observe  that  in 
proportion  as  the  mind’s  understanding  is  smaller,  and  its 
experience  multiplex,  so  will  its  power  of  coining  fictions 
be  larger,  whereas,  as  its  understanding  increases,  its 
capacity  for  entertaining  fictitious  ideas  becomes  less. 
For  instance,  in  the  same  way  as  we  are  unable,  while 
we  are  thinking,  to  feign  that  we  are  thinking  or  not 
thinking,  so,  also,  when  we  know  the  nature  of  body  we 
cannot  imagine  an  infinite  fly;  or,  when  we  know  the  na- 
ture of  the  soul,  we  cannot  imagine  it  as  square,  though 


SPINOZA 


19 


anything  may  be  expressed  verbally.  But,  as  we  said 
above,  the  less  men  know  of  nature  the  more  easily  can 
they  coin  fictitious  ideas,  such  as  trees  speaking,  men  in- 
stantly changed  into  stones,  or  into  fountains,  ghosts  ap- 
pearing in  mirrors,  something  issuing  from  nothing,  even 
gods  changed  into  beasts  and  men,  and  infinite  other  ab- 
surdities of  the  same  kind. 

Some  persons  think,  perhaps,  that  fiction  is  limited  by 
fiction,  and  not  by  understanding;  in  other  words,  after 
I have  formed  some  fictitious  idea,  and  have  affirmed  of 
my  own  free  will  that  it  exists  under  a certain  form  in 
nature,  I am  thereby  precluded  from  thinking  of  it  under 
any  other  form.  For  instance,  when  I have  feigned  (to 
repeat  their  argument)  that  the  nature  of  body  is  of  a 
certain  kind,  and  have  of  my  own  free  will  desired  to 
convince  myself  that  it  actually  exists  under  this  form,  I 
am  no  longer  able  to  hypothesize  that  a fly,  for  example, 
is  infinite ; so,  when  I have  hypothesized  the  essence  of 
the  soul,  I am  not  able  to  think  of  it  as  square,  etc.  But 
these  arguments  demand  further  inquiry.  First,  their 
upholders  must  either  grant  or  deny  that  we  can  under- 
stand anything.  If  they  grant  it,  then  necessarily  the 
same  must  be  said  of  understanding  as  is  said  of  fiction. 
If  they  deny  it,  let  us,  who  know  that  we  do  know  some- 
thing, see  what  they  mean.  They  assert  that  the  soul  can 
be  conscious  of,  and  perceive  in  a variety  of  ways,  not 
itself  nor  things  which  exist,  but  only  things  which  are 
neither  in  itself  nor  anywhere  else,  in  other  words,  that 
the  soul  can,  by  its  unaided  power,  create  sensations  or 
ideas  unconnected  with  things.  In  fact,  they  regard  the 
soul  as  a sort  of  god.  Further,  they  assert  that  we  or  our 
soul  have  such  freedom  that  we  can  constrain  ourselves,  or 
our  soul,  or  even  our  soul’s  freedom.  For,  after  it  has 
formed  a fictitious  idea,  and  has  given  its  assent  thereto,  it 
cannot  think  or  feign  it  in  any  other  manner,  but  is  con- 
strained by  the  first  fictitious  idea  to  keep  all  its  other 
thoughts  in  harmony  therewith.  Our  opponents  are  thus 
driven  to  admit,  in  support  of  their  fiction,  the  absurdities 
which  I have  just  enumerated;  and  which  are  not  worthy 
of  rational  refutation. 


20  IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


While  leaving  such  persons  in  their  error,  we  will  take 
care  to  derive  from  our  argument  with  them  a truth 
serviceable  for  our  purpose,  namely,  that  the  mind,  in 
paying  attention  to  a thing  hypothetical  or  false,  so  as 
to  meditate  upon  it  and  understand  it,  and  derive  the 
proper  conclusions  in  due  order  therefrom,  will  readily 
discover  its  falsity;  and  if  the  thing  hypothetical  be  in 
its  nature  true,  and  the  mind  pays  attention  to  it,  so  as 
to  understand  it,  and  deduce  the  truths  which  are  deriv- 
able from  it,  the  mind  will  proceed  with  an  uninter- 
rupted series  of  apt  conclusions ; in  the  same  way  as  it  would 
at  once  discover  (as  we  showed  just  now)  the  absurdity 
of  a false  hypothesis,  and  of  the  conclusions  drawn 
from  it. 

We  need,  therefore,  be  in  no  fear  of  forming  hypoth- 
eses, so  long  as  we  have  a clear  and  distinct  perception  ‘ 
of  what  is  involved.  For,  if  we  were  to  assert,  haply, 
that  men  are  suddenly  turned  into  beasts,  the  statement 
would  be  extremely  general,  so  general  that  there  would 
be  no  conception,  that  is,  no  idea  or  connection  of  sub- 
ject and  predicate,  in  our  mind.  If  there  were  such  a 
conception  we  should  at  the  same  time  be  aware  of  the 
means  and  the  causes  whereby  the  event  took  place. 
Moreover,  we  pay  no  attention  to  the  nature  of  the  sub- 
ject and  the  predicate.  Now,  if  the  first  idea  be  not  fic- 
titious, and  if  all  the  other  ideas  be  deduced  therefrom, 
our  hurry  to  form  fictitious  ideas  will  gradually  subside. 
Further,  as  a fictitious  idea  cannot  be  clear  and  distinct, 
but  is  necessarily  confused,  and  as  all  confusion  arises 
from  the  fact  that  the  mind  has  only  partial  knowledge 
of  a thing  either  simple  or  complex,  and  does  not  dis- 
tinguish between  the  known  and  the  unknown,  and,  again, 
that  it  directs  its  attention  promiscuously  to  all  parts  of 
an  object  at  once  without  making  distinctions,  it  follows, 
first,  that  if  the  idea  be  of  something  very  simple,  it 
must  necessarily  be  clear  and  distinct.  For  a very  simple 
object  cannot  be  known  in  part,  it  must  either  be  known 
altogether  or  not  at  all.  Secondly,  it  follows  that  if  a 
complex  object  be  divided  by  thought  into  a number  of 
simple  component  parts,  and  if  each  part  be  regarded 


SPINOZA 


21 


separately,  all  confusion  will  disappear.  Thirdly,  it  fol- 
lows that  fiction  cannot  be  simple,  but  is  made  up  of  the 
blending  of  several  confused  ideas  of  diverse  objects  or 
actions  existent  in  nature,  or  rather  is  composed  of  at- 
tention* directed  to  all  such  ideas  at  once,  and  unac- 
companied by  any  mental  assent. 

Now  a fiction  that  was  simple  would  be  clear  and  dis- 
tinct, and  therefore  true,  also  a fiction  composed  only  of 
distinct  ideas  would  be  clear  and  distinct,  and  therefore 
true.  For  instance,  when  we  know  the  nature  of  the 
circle  and  the  square,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  blend 
together  these  two  figures,  and  to  hypothesize  a square 
circle,  any  more  than  a square  soul,  or  things  of  that 
kind.  Let  us  shortly  come  to  our  conclusion,  and  again 
repeat  that  we  need  have  no  fear  of  confusing  with  true 
i ideas  that  which  is  only  a fiction.  As  for  the  first  sort 
of  fiction  of  which  we  have  already  spoken,  when  a 
thing  is  clearly  conceived,  we  saw  that  if  the  existence 
of  that  thing  is  in  itself  an  eternal  truth,  fiction  can 
have  no  part  in  it;  but  if  the  existence  of  the  thing 
conceived  be  not  an  eternal  truth,  we  have  only  to  be 
careful  that  such  existence  be  compared  to  the  thing’s 
essence,  and  to  consider  the  order  of  nature.  As  for  the 
second  sort  of  fiction,  which  we  stated  to  be  the  result 
of  simultaneously  directing  the  attention,  ( without  the 
assent  of  the  intellect, /to  different  confused  ideas  repre- 
senting different  things  and  actions  existing  in  nature, 
we  have  seen  that  an  absolutely  simple  thing  connot  be 
feigned,  but  must  be  understood,  and  that  a complex 
thing  is  in  the  same  case  if  we  regard  separately  the 
simple  parts  whereof  it  is  composed;  we  shall  not  even 
be  able  to  hypothesize  any  untrue  action  concerning 
such  objects,  for  we  shall  be  obliged  to  consider  at 
the  same  time  the  causes  and  the  manner  of  such  action. 

* Observe  that  fiction  regarded  in  itself,  differs  only  from  dreams  in 
that  in  the  latter  we  do  not  perceive  the  external  causes  which  we  per- 
ceive through  the  senses  while  awake.  It  has  hence  been  inferred  that 
representations  occurring  in  sleep  have  no  connection  with  objects 
external  to  us.  We  shall  presently  see  that  error  is  the  dreaming  of  a 
waking  man ; if  it  reaches  a certain  pitch  it  becomes  delirium. 


22 


* . . ^&/ccz&/ 

IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


These  matters  being  thus  understood,  let  us  pass  on 
to  consider  the  false  idea,  observing  the  objects  with 
which  it  is  concerned,  and  the  means  of  guarding  our- 
selves from  falling  into  false  perceptions.  Neither  of 
these  tasks  will  present  much  difficulty,  after  our  inquiry 
concerning  fictitious  ideas.  The  false  idea  only  differs 
from  the  fictitious  idea  in  the  fact  of  implying  a mental 
assent  — that  is  as  we  have  already  remarked,  while  the 
representations  are  occurring,  there  are  no  causes  present 
to  us,  wherefrom,  as  in  fiction,  we  can  conclude  that  such 
representations  do  not  arise  from  external  objects,  in  fact 
it  is  much  the  same  as  dreaming  with  our  eyes  open,  or 
while  awake.  Thus  a false  idea  is  concerned  with  (or  to 
speak  more  correctlyj^httributable  to  the  existence  of  a 
thing  whereof  the  essence  is  known,  or  the  essence  itself, 
in  the  same  way  as  a fictitious  idea.  If  attributable  to 
the  existence  of  the  thing,  it  is  corrected  in  the  same 
way  as  a fictitious  idea  under  similar  circumstances If 
attributable  to  the  essence,  it  is  likewise  corrected  in  the 
same  way  as  a fictitious  idea.  For  if  the  nature  of  the 
thing  known  implies  necessary  existence,  we  cannot  possi- 
bly be  in  error  with  regard  to  its  existence;  but  if  the 
nature  of  the  thing  be  not  an  eternal  truth,  like  its  essence, 
but  contrariwise,  the  necessity  or  impossibility  of  its 
existence  depends  on  external  causes,  then  we  must  follow 
the  same  course  as  we  adopted  in  the  case  of  fiction,  for 
it  is  corrected  in  the  same  manner.  As  for  false  ideas 
concerned  with  essences,  or  even  with  actions,  such  per- 
ceptions are  necessarily  always  confused,  being  com- 
pounded of  different  confused  perceptions  of  things 
existing  in  nature,  as,  for  instance,  when  men  are  per- 
suaded that  deities  are  present  in  woods,  in  statues,  in 
brute  beasts,  and  the  like ; that  there  are  bodies  which,  by 
their  composition  alone,  give  rise  to  intellect ; that  corpses 
reason,  walk  about  and  speak ; that  God  is  deceived,  and 
so  on.  But  ideas  which  are  clear  and  distinct  can  never 
be  false:  for  ideas  of  things  clearly  and  distinctly  con- 
ceived are  either  very  simple  themselves,  or  are  com- 
pounded from  very  simple  ideas  — that  is,  are  deduced 
therefrom.  The  impossibility  of  a very  simple  idea  being 


SPINOZA 


23 


false  is  evident  to  every  one  who  understands  the  nature 
of  truth  or  understanding  and  of  falsehood. 

As  regards  that  which  constitutes  the  reality  of  truth,  ^ 4 
it  is  certain  that  a true  idea  is  distinguished  from  a false  \ 
one,  not  so  much  by  its  extrinsic  object  as  by  its  intrinsic  | 
nature.  If  an  architect  conceives  a building  properly 
constructed,  though  such  a building  may  never  have  ex- 
isted, and  may  never  exist,  nevertheless  the  idea  is  true; 
and  the  idea  remains  the  same,  whether  it  be  put  into 
execution  or  not.  On  the  other  hand,  if  any  one  asserts, 
for  instance,  that  Peter  exists,  without  knowing  whether 
Peter  really  exists  or  not,  the  assertion,  as  far  as  its  as- 
serter  is  concerned,  is  false,  or  not  true,  even  though  Peter 
actually  does  exist.  The  assertion  that  Peter  exists  is 
true  only  with  regard  to  him  who  knows  for  certain  that 
Peter  does  exist.  Whence  it  follows  that  there  is  in  ideas 
something  real,  whereby  the  true  are  distinguished  from 
the  false.  This  reality  must  be  inquired  into,  if  we  are 
to  find  the  best  standard  of  truth  (we  have  said  that  we 
ought  to  determine  our  thoughts  by  the  given  standard 
of  a true  idea,  and  that  method  is  reflective  knowledge), 
and  to  know  the  properties  of  our  understanding.  Neither 
must  we  say  that  the  difference  between  true  and  false 
arises  from  the  fact  that  true  knowledge  consists  in  know- 
ing things  through  their  primary  causes,  wherein  it  is 
totally  different  from  false  knowledge,  as  I have  just  ex- 
plained it:  for  thought  is  said  to  be  true,  if  it  involves 
subjectively  the  essence  of  any  principle  which  has  no 
cause,  and  is  known  through  itself  and  in  itself.  Where- 
fore the  reality  (forma)  of  true  thought  must  exTsf  in 
the  thought  itself,  without  reference  to  other  thoughts; 
it  does  not  acknowledge  the  object  as  its  cause,  but  must 
depend  on  the  actual  power  and  nature  of  the  under- 
standing. For,  if  we  suppose  that  the  understanding  has 
perceived  some  new  entity  which  has  never  existed,  as 
some  conceive  the  understanding  of  God  before  He  cre- 
ated things  (a  perception  which  certainly  could  not  arise 
from  any  object),  and  has  legitimately  deduced  other 
thoughts  from  the  said  perception,  all  such  thoughts 
would  be  true,  without  being  determined  by  any 


24  IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


external  object;  they  would  depend  solely  on  the  power 
and  nature  of  the  understanding.  Thus,  that  which  con- 
stitutes the  reality  of  a true  thought  must  be  sought 
in  the  thought  itself  and  deduced  from  the  nature  of 
the  understanding.  In  order  to  pursue  our  investiga- 
tion, let  us  confront  ourselves  with  some  true  idea,  whose 
object  we  know  for  certain  to  be  dependent  on  our 
power  of  thinking,  and  to  have  nothing  corresponding  to 
it  in  nature.  With  an  idea  of  this  kind  before  us,  we 
shall,  as  appears  from  what  has  just  been  said,  be  more 
easily  able  to  carry  on  the  research  we  have  in  view. 
For  instance,  in  order  to  form  the  conception  of  a sphere, 
I invent  a cause  at  my  pleasure — namely,  a semicircle 
revolving  round  its  centre,  and  thus  producing  a sphere. 
This  is  indisputably  a true  idea;  and,  although  we  know 
that  no  sphere  in  nature  has  ever  actually  been  so  formed, 
the  perception  remains  true,  and  is  the  easiest  manner 
of  conceiving  a sphere.  We  must  observe  that  this  per- 
ception asserts  the  rotation  of  a semicircle  — which  asser- 
tion would  be  false,  if  it  were  not  associated  with  the 
conception  of  a sphere,  or  of  a cause  determining  a mo- 
tion of  the  kind,  or  absolutely,  if  the  assertion  were  iso- 
lated. The  mind  would  then  only  tend  to  the  affirma- 
tion of  the  sole  motion  of  a semicircle  which  is  not  con- 
tained in  the  conception  of  a semicircle,  and  does  not  arise 
from  the  conception  of  any  cause  capable  of  producing 
such  motion. 

Thus  falsity  consists  only  in  this,  that  something  is 
affirmed  of  a thing,  which  is  not  contained  in  the  con- 
ception we  have  formed  of  that  thing,  as  motion  or  rest 
of  a semicircle.  Whence  it  follows  that  simple  ideas  can- 
not be  other  than  true  — e.  g.,  the  simple  idea  of  a semi- 
circle, of  motion,  of  rest,  of  quantity,  etc. 

Whatsoever  affirmation  such  ideas  contain  is  equal  to 
the  concept  formed,  and  does  not  extend  further.  Where- 
fore we  may  form  as  many  simple  ideas  as  we  please, 
without  any  fear  of  error.  It  only  remains  for  us  to 
inquire  by  what  power  our  mind  can  form  true  ideas, 
and  how  far  such  power  extends.  It  is  certain  that  such 
power  cannot  extend  itself  infinitely.  For  when  we  affirm 


SPINOZA 


25 


somewhat  of  a thing,  which  is  not  contained  in  the  con- 
cept we  have  formed  of  that  thing,  such  an  affirmation 
shows  a defect  of  our  perception,  or  that  we  have  formed 
fragmentary  or  mutilated  ideas.  Thus  we  have  seen  that 
v the  motion  of  a semicircle  is  false  when  it  is  isolated  in 
the  mind,  but  true  when  it  is  associated  with  the  concept 
of  a sphere,  or  of  some  cause  determining  such  a motion. 
But  if  it  be  the  nature  of  a thinking  being,  as  seems, 
prima  facie , to  be  the  case,  to  form  true  or  adequate 
thoughts,  it  is  plain  that  inadequate  ideas  arise  in  us 
only  because  we  are  parts  of  a thinking  being,  whose 
thoughts  — some  in  their  entirety,  others  in  fragments 
only  — constitute  our  mind. 

But  there  is  another  point  to  be  considered,  which  was 
not  worth  raising  in  the  case  of  fiction,  but  which  gives 
rise  to  complete  deception  — namely,  that  certain  things 
presented  to  the  imagination  also  exist  in  the  under- 
standing— in  other  words,  are  conceived  clearly  and  dis- 
tinctly. Hence,  so  long  as  we  do  not  separate  that 
which  is  distinct  from  that  which  is  confused,  certainty, 
or  the  true  idea,  becomes  mixed  with  indistinct  ideas. 
For  instance,  certain  Stoics  heard,  perhaps,  the  term 
"soul,®  and  also  that  the  soul  is  immortal,  yet  imagined 
it  only  confusedly;  they  imagined,  also,  and  understood 
that  very  subtle  bodies  penetrate  all  others,  and  are 
penetrated  by  none.  By.  combining  these  ideas,  and 
being  at  the  same  time  certain  of  the  truth  of  the  axiom, 
they  forthwith  became  convinced  that  the  mind  consists 
of  very  subtle  bodies;  that  these  very  subtle  bodies  can- 
not be  divided,  etc.  But  we  are  freed  from  mistakes  of 
this  kind,  so  long  as  we  endeavor  to  examine  all  our 
perceptions  by  the  standard  of  the  given  true  idea.  We 
must  take  care,  as  has  been  said,  to  separate  such  per- 
ceptions from  all  those  which  arise  from  hearsay  or 
unclassified  experience. 

Moreover,  such  mistakes  arise  from  things  being  con- 
ceived too  much  in  the  abstract;  for  it  is  sufficiently 
self-evident  that  what  I conceive  as  in  its  true  object  I 
cannot  apply  to  anything  else.  Lastly,  they  arise  from  a 
want  of  understanding  of  the  primary  elements  of  nature 


26  IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 

as  a whole;  whence  we  proceed  without  due  order,  and 
confound  nature  with  abstract  rules,  which,  although 
they  be  true  enough  in  their  sphere,  yet,  when  misapplied, 
confound  themselves,  and  pervert  the  order  of  nature. 
However,  if  we  proceed  with  as  little  abstraction  as  pos- 
sible, and  begin  from  primary  elements  — that  is,  from 
the  source  and  origin  of  nature,  as  far  back  as  we  can 
reach, — we  need  not  fear  any  deceptions  of  this  kind.  As 
far  as  the  knowledge  of  the  origin  of  nature  is  concerned, 
there  is  no  danger  of  our  confounding  it  with  abstrac- 
tions. For  when  a thing  is  conceived  in  the  abstract,  as 
are  all  universal  notions,  the  said  universal  notions  are 
always  more  extensive  in  the  mind  than  the  number  of 
individuals  forming  their  contents  really  existing  in 
nature. 

Again,  there  are  many  things  in  nature,  the  difference 
between  which  is  so  slight  as  to  be  hardly  perceptible  to 
the  understanding ; so  that  it  may  readily  happen  that  such 
things  are  confounded  together,  if  they  be  conceived  ab- 
stractedly. But  since  the  first  principle  of  nature  cannot 
(as  we  shall  see  hereafter)  be  conceived  abstractedly  or 
universally,  and  cannot  extend  further  in  the  understand- 
ing than  it  does  in  reality,  and  has  no  likeness  to  mutable 
things,  no  confusion  need  be  feared  in  respect  to  the  idea 
of  it,  provided  (as  before  shown)  that  we  possess  a standard 
of  truth.  This  is,  in  fact,  a being  single  and  infinite ; in 
other  words,  it  is  the  sum  total  of  being,  beyond  which 
there  is  no  being  found. 

Thus  far  we  have  treated  of  the  false  idea.  We  have 
now  to  investigate  the  doubtful  idea — that  is,  to  inquire 
what  can  cause  us  to  doubt,  and  how  doubt  may  be  re- 
moved. I speak  of  real  doubt  existing  in  the  mind,  not 
of  such  doubt  as  we  see  exemplified  when  a man  says  that 
he  doubts,  though  his  mind  does  not  really  hesitate.  The 
cure  of  the  latter  does  not  fall  within  the  province  of 
method,  it  belongs  rather  to  inquiries  concerning  obstinacy 
and  its  cure.  Real  doubt  is  never  produced  in  the  mind 
by  the  thing  doubted  of.  In  other  words,  if  there  were 
only  one  idea  in  the  mind,  whether  that  idea  were  true  or 
false,  there  would  be  no  doubt  of  certainty  present,  only  a 


SPINOZA 


27 


certain  sensation.  For  an  idea  is  in  itself  nothing  else 
than  a certain  sensation;  but  doubt  will  arise  through 
another  idea,  not  clear  and  distinct  enough  for  us  to  be 
able  to  draw  any  certain  conclusion  with  regard  to  the 
matter  under  consideration ; that  is,  the  idea  which  causes 
us  to  doubt  is  not  clear  and  distinct.  To  take  an  example. 
Supposing  that  a man  has  never  reflected,  taught  by  ex. 
perience,  or  by  any  other  means,  that  our  senses  sometimes 
deceive  us,  he  will  never  doubt  whether  the  sun  be  greater 
or  less  than  it  appears.  Thus  rustics  are  generally  aston- 
ished when  they  hear  that  the  sun  is  much  larger  than 
the  earth.  But  from  reflection  on  the  deceitfulness  of  the 
senses  * doubt  arises,  and  if,  after  doubting,  we  acquire 
a true  knowledge  of  the  senses,  and  how  things  at  a dis- 
tance are  represented  through  their  instrumentality,  doubt 
is  again  removed.  Hence  we  cannot  cast  doubt  on  true 
ideas  by  the  supposition  that  there  is  a deceitful  Deity, 
who  leads  us  astray  even  in  what  is  most  certain.  We  can 
only  hold  such  an  hypothesis  so  long  as  we  have  no  clear 
and  distinct  idea  — in  other  words,  until  we  reflect  on  the 
knowledge  which  we  have  of  the  first  principle  of  all 
things,  and  find  that  which  teaches  us  that  God  is  not  a 
deceiver,  and  until  we  know  this  with  the  same  certainty 
as  we  know  from  reflecting  on  the  nature  of  a triangle 
that  its  three  angles  are  equal  to  two  right  angles.  But 
if  we  have  a knowledge  of  God  equal  to  that  which  we 
have  of  a triangle,  all  doubt  is  removed.  In  the  same 
way  as  we  can  arrive  at  the  said  knowledge  of  a triangle, ~ 
though  not  absolutely  sure  that  there  is  not  some  arch- 
deceiver leading  us  astray,  so  can  we  come  to  a like  knowl- 
edge of  God  under  the  like  condition,  and  when  we  have 
attained  to  it,  it  is  sufficient,  as  I said  before,  to  remove 
every  doubt  which  we  can  possess  concerning  clear  and 
distinct  ideas.  Thus,  if  a man  proceeded  with  our  inves- 
tigations in  due  order,  inquiring  first  into  those  things 
which  should  first  be  inquired  into,  never  passing  over  a 
link  in  the  chain  of  association,  and  with  knowledge  how 
to  define  his  questions  before  seeking  to  answer  them,  he 

* That  is,  it  is  known  that  the  senses  sometimes  deceive  us.  But  it 
is  only  known  confusedly,  for  it  is  not  known  how  they  deceive  us. 


28  IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


will  never  have  any  ideas  save  such  as  are  very  certain, 
or,  in  other  words,  clear  and  distinct;  for  doubt  is  only 
a suspension  of  the  spirit  concerning'  some  affirmation  or 
negation  which  it  would  pronounce  upon  unhesitatingly  if  it 
were  not  in  ignorance  of  something,  without  which  the 
knowledge  of  the  matter  in  hand  must  needs  be  imperfect. 
We  may,  therefore,  conclude  that  doubt  always  proceeds 
from  want  of  due  order  in  investigation. 

These  are  the  points  I promised  to  discuss  in  this  first 
part  of  my  treatise  on  method.  However,  in  order  not 
to  omit  anything  which  can  conduce  to  the  knowledge 
of  the  understanding  and  its  faculties,  I will  add  a few 
words  on  the  subject  of  memory  and  forgetfulness. 

The  point  most  worthy  of  attention  is,  that  memory 
is  strengthened  both  with  and  without  the  aid  of  the 
understanding.  For  the  more  intelligible  a thing  is,  the 
more  easily  it  is  remembered,  and  the  less  intelligible 
it  is,  the  more  easily  do  we  forget  it.  For  instance,  a 
number  of  unconnected  words  is  much  more  difficult  to 
remember  than  the  same  number  in  the  form  of  a nar- 
ration. The  memory  is  also  strengthened  without  the 
aid  of  the  understanding  by  means  of  the  power  where- 
with the  imagination  or  the  sense  called  common  is  af- 
fected by  some  particular  physical  object.  I say 
particular,  for  the  imagination  is  only  affected  by  par- 
ticular objects.  If  we  read,  for  instance,  a single 
romantic  comedy,  we  shall  remember  it  very  well,  so 
long  as  we  do  not  read  many  others  of  the  same  kind, 
for  it  will  reign  alone  in  the  memory.  If,  however,  we 
read  several  others  of  the  same  kind,  we  shall  think  of 
them  altogether,  and  easily  confuse  one  with  another. 
I say,  also  physical.  For  the  imagination  is  only 
affected  by  physical  objects.  As,  then,  the  memory  is 
strengthened  both  with  and  without  the  aid  of  the  un- 
derstanding, we  may  conclude  that  it  is  different  from 
the  understanding,  and  that  in  the  matter  considered  in 
itself  there  is  neither  memory  nor  forgetfulness.  What, 
then,  is  memory  ? It  is  nothing  else  than  the  actual 
sensation  of  impressions  on  the  brain,  accompanied  with 
the  thought  of  a definite  duration  of  the  sensation.  This 


^ -^SlsGSTVC  ; -£,^zz- 

SPINOZA  29 

is  also  shown  by  reminiscence.  For  then  we  think  of 
the  sensation,  but  without  the  notion  of  continuous  dura- 
tion; thus  the  idea  of  that  sensation  is  not  the  actual 
duration  of  the  sensation  or  actual  memory.  Whether 
ideas  are  or  are  not  subject  to  corruption  will  be  seen 
in  my  philosophy.  If  this  seems  too  absurd  to  any  one, 
it  will  be  sufficient  for  our  purpose,  if  he  reflect  on  the 
fact  that  a thing  is  more  easily  remembered  in  propor- 
tion to  its  singularity,  as  appears  from  the  example  of 
the  comedy  just  cited.  Further,  a thing  is  remembered 
more  easily  in  proportion  to  its  intelligibility;  therefore 
we  cannot  help  remembering  that  which  is  extremely 
singular  and  sufficiently  intelligible. 

Thus,  then,  we  have  distinguished  between  a true  idea 
and  other  perceptions,  and  shown  that  ideas  fictitious, 
false,  and  the  rest,  originate  in  the  imagination  — that  is, 
in  certain  sensations  fortuitous  (so  to  speak)  and  dis- 
connected, arising  not  from  the  power  of  the  mind,  but 
from  external  causes,  according  as  the  body,  sleeping  or 
waking,  receives  various  motions. 

But  one  may  take  any  view  one  likes  of  the  imagin- 
ation so  long  as  one  acknowledges  that  it  is  different  from 
the  understanding,  and  that  the  soul  is  passive  with  regard 
to  it.  The  view  taken  is  immaterial,  if  we  know  that  the 
imagination  is  something  indefinite,  with  regard  to  which 
the  soul  is  passive,  and  that  we  can  by  some  means  or 
other  free  ourselves  therefrom  with  the  help  of  the  under- 
standing. Let  no  one  then  be  astonished  that  before  prov- 
ing the  existence  of  body,  and  other  necessary  things,  I 
speak  of  imagination  of  body,  and  of  its  composition. 
The  view  taken  is,  I repeat,  immaterial,  so  long  as  we 
know  that  imagination  is  something  indefinite,  etc.  As 
regards  a true  idea,  we  have  shown  that  it  is  simple  or 
compounded  of  simple  ideas ; that  it  shows  how  and  why 
something  is  or  has  been  made;  and  that  its  subjective 
effects  in  the  soul  correspond  to  the  actual  reality  of  its 
object.  This  conclusion  is  identical  with  the  saying  of 
the  ancients,  that  true  science  proceeds  from  cause  to 
effect ; though  the  ancients,  so  far  as  I know,  never  formed 
the  conception  put  forward  here  that  the  soul  acts  accord- 


30  IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


ing  to  fixed  laws;  and  is,  as  it  were,  an  immaterial  auto- 
maton. Hence,  as  far  as  is  possible  at  the  outset,  we  have 
acquired  a knowledge  of  our  understanding,  and  such  a 
standard  of  a true  idea  that  we  need  no  longer  fear  con- 
founding truth  with  falsehood  and  fiction.  Neither  shall 
we  wonder  why  we  understand  some  things  which  in 
nowise  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  imagination,  while 
other  things  are  in  the  imagination  but  wholly  opposed 
to  the  understanding,  or  others,  again,  which  agree  there- 
with. We  now  know  that  the  operations,  whereby  the 
effects  of  imagination  are  produced,  take  place  under  other 
laws  quite  different  from  the  laws  of  the  understanding, 
and  that  the  mind  is  entirely  passive  with  regard  to  them. 
Whence  we  may  also  see  how  easily  men  may  fall  into 
grave  errors  through  not  distinguishing  accurately  between 
the  imagination  and  the  understanding;  such  as  believ- 
ing that  extension  must  be  localized,  that  it  must  be 
finite,  that  its  parts  are  really  distinct  one  from  the  other, 
that  it  is  the  primary  and  single  foundation  of  all  things, 
that  it  occupies  more  space  at  one  time  than  at  another, 
and  other  similar  doctrines,  all  entirely  opposed  to  truth, 
as  we  shall  duly  show. 

Again,  since  words  are  a part  of  the  imagination  — 
that  is,  since  we  form  many  conceptions  in  accordance 
with  confused  arrangements  of  words  in  the  memory,  de- 
pendent on  particular  bodily  conditions  — there  is  no 
doubt  that  words  may,  equally  with  the  imagination,  be 
the  cause  of  many  and  great  errors,  unless  we  keep 
strictly  on  our  guard.  Moreover,  words  are  formed  ac- 
cording to  popular  fancy  and  intelligence,  and  are,  there- 
fore, signs  of  things  as  existing  in  the  imagination,  not 
as  existing  in  the  understanding.  This  is  evident  from 
the  fact  that  to  all  such  things  as  exist  only  in  the  un- 
derstanding, not  in  the  imagination,  negative  names  are 
often  given,  such  as  incorporeal,  infinite,  etc.  So,  also, 
many  conceptions  really  affirmative  are  expressed  nega- 
tively, and  vice  versd,  such  as  uncreate,  independent,  infi- 
nite, immortal,  etc. , inasmuch  as  their  contraries  are  much 
more  easily  imagined,  and,  therefore,  occurred  first  to 
men,  and  usurped  positive  names.  Many  things  we 


SPINOZA 


'^c  >-*r 


affirm  and  deny,  because  the  nature  of  words  allows  us 
to  do  so,  though  the  nature  of  things  does  not.  While 
we  remain  unaware  of  this  fact,  we  may  easily  mistake 
falsehood  for  truth. 

Let  us  also  beware  of  another  great  cause  of  confusion, 
which  prevents  the  understanding  from  reflecting  on 
itself.  Sometimes,  while  making  no  distinction  between 
the  imagination  and  the  intellect,  we  think  that  what  we 
more  readily  imagine  is  clearer  to  us ; and  also  we  think 
that  what  we  imagine  we  understand.  Thus,  we  put  first 
that  which  should  be  last;  the  true  order  of  progression 
is  reversed,  and  no  legitimate  conclusion  is  drawn. 

Now,  in  order  at  length  to  pass  on  to  the  second  part 
of  this  method,  I shall  first  set  forth  the  object  aimed  at, 
and  next  the  means  for  its  attainment.  The  object  aimed 
at  is  the  acquisition  of  clear  and  distinct  ideas,  such  as 
are  produced  by  the  pure  intellect,  and  not  by  chance 
physical  motions.  In  order  that  all  ideas  may  be  reduced 
to  unity,  we  shall  endeavor  so  to  associate  and  arrange 
them  that  our  mind  may,  as  far  as  possible,  reflect  sub- 
jectively the  reality  of  nature,  both  as  a whole  and  as 
parts. 

As  for  the  first  point,  it  is  necessary  ( as  we  have  said ) 
for  our  purpose  that  everything  should  be  conceived, 
either  solely  through  its  essence,  or  through  its  proxi- 
mate cause.  If  the  thing  be  self-existent,  or  as  is  com- 
monly said,  the  cause  of  itself,  it  must  be  understood 
through  its  essence  only;  if  it  be  not  self-existent,  but 
requires  a cause  for  its  existence,  it  must  be  understood 
through  its  proximate  cause.  For,  in  reality,  the  knowl- 
edge of  an  effect  is  nothing  else  than  the  acquisition  of 
more  perfect  knowledge  of  its  cause.  Therefore,  we  may 
never,  while  we  are  concerned  with  inquiries  into  actual 
things,  draw  any  conclusions  from  abstractions;  we  shall 
be  extremely  careful  not  to  confound  that  which  is  only 
in  the  understanding  with  that  which  is  in  the  thing 
itself.  The  best  basis  for  drawing  a conclusion  will  be 
either  some  particular  affirmative  essence,  or  a true  and 
legitimate  definition.  For  the  understanding  can  not 
descend  from  universal  axioms  by  themselves  to  particu- 


32  IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 

lar  things,  since  axioms  are  of  infinite  extent,  and  do  not 
determine  the  understanding  to  contemplate  one  particu- 
lar thing  more  than  another.  Thus  the  true  method  of 
discovery  is  to  form  thoughts  from  some  given  definition. 
This  process  will  be  the  more  fruitful  and  easy  in  pro- 
portion as  the  thing  given  be  better  defined.  Wherefore, 
the  cardinal  point  of  all  this  second  part  of  method  con- 
sists in  the  knowledge  of  the  conditions  of  good  defini- 
tion, and  the  means  of  finding  them.  I will  first  treat  of 
the  conditions  of  definition. 

A definition,  if  it  is  to  be  called  perfect,  must  explain 
the  inmost  essence  of  a thing,  and  must  take  care  not  to 
substitute  for  this  any  of  its  properties.  In  order  to 
illustrate  my  meaning,  without  taking  an  example  which 
would  seem  to  show  a desire  to  expose  other  people’s 
errors,  I will  choose  the  case  of  something  abstract,  the 
definition  of  which  is  of  little  moment.  Such  is  a circle. 
If  a circle  be  defined  as  a figure,  such  that  all  straight 
lines  drawn  from  the  center  to  the  circumference  are 
equal,  every  one  can  see  that  such  a definition  does  not 
in  the  least  explain  the  essence  of  a circle,  but  solely  one 
of  its  properties.  Though,  as  I have  said,  this  is  of  no 
importance  in  the  case  of  figures  and  other  abstractions, 
it  is  of  great  importance  in  the  case  of  physical  beings 
and  realities:  for  the  properties  of  things  are  not  under- 
stood so  long  as  their  essences  are  unknown.  If  the 
latter  be  passed  over,  there  is  necessarily  a perversion 
of  the  succession  of  ideas  which  should  reflect  the  succes- 
sion of  nature,  and  we  go  far  astray  from  our  object. 

In  order  to  be  free  from  this  fault,  the  following  rules 
should  be  observed  in  definition: 

I.  If  the  thing  in  question  be  created,  the  definition 
must  (as  we  have  said)  comprehend  the  proximate  cause. 
For  instance,  a circle  should,  according  to  this  rule,  be  de- 
fined as  follows:  the  figure  described  by  any  line  whereof 
one  end  is  fixed  and  the  other  free.  This  definition  clearly 
comprehends  the  proximate  cause. 

II.  A conception  or  definition  of  a thing  should  be  such 
that  all  the  properties  of  that  thing,  in  so  far  as  it  is  con- 
sidered by  itself,  and  not  in  conjunction  with  other  things, 


SPINOZA 


33 


can  be  deduced  from  it,  as  may  be  seen  in  the  definition 
given  of  a circle : for  from  that  it  clearly  follows  that  all 
straight  lines  drawn  from  the  center  to  the  circumference 
are  equal.  That  this  is  a necessary  characteristic  of  a 
definition  is  so  clear  to  any  one,  who  reflects  on  the  matter, 
that  there  is  no  need  to  spend  time  in  proving  it,  or  in 
showing  that,  owing  to  this  second  condition,  every  defini- 
tion should  be  affirmative.  I speak  of  intellectual  affirma- 
tion, giving  little  thought  to  verbal  affirmations  which, 
owing  to  the  poverty  of  the  language,  must  sometimes, 
perhaps,  be  expressed  negatively,  though  the  idea  con- 
tained is  affirmative. 

The  rules  for  the  definition  of  an  uncreated  thing  are  as 
follows : 

I.  The  exclusion  of  all  idea  of  cause — that  is,  the  thing 
must  not  need  explanation  by  anything  outside  itself. 

II.  When  the  definition  of  the  thing  has  been  given, 
there  must  be  no  room  for  doubt  as  to  whether  the  thing 
exists  or  not. 

III.  It  must  contain,  as  far  as  the  mind  is  concerned, 
no  substantives  which  could  be  put  into  an  adjectival 
form;  in  other  words,  the  object  defined  must  not  be  ex- 
plained through  abstractions. 

IV.  Lastly,  though  this  is  not  absolutely  necessary,  it 
should  be  possible  to  deduce  from  the  definition  all  the 
properties  of  the  thing  defined. 

All  these  rules  become  obvious  to  any  one  giving  strict 
attention  to  the  matter. 

I have  also  stated  that  the  best  basis  for  drawing  a con- 
clusion is  a particular  affirmative  essence.  The  more 
specialized  the  idea  is,  the  more  is  it  distinct,  and  there- 
fore clear.  Wherefore  a knowledge  of  particular  things 
should  be  sought  for  as  diligently  as  possible. 

As  regards  the  order  of  our  perceptions,  and  the  man-  '"j 
ner  in  which  they  should  be  arranged  and  united,  it  is 
necessary  that  as  soon  as  is  possible  and  rational,  we  '- 
should  inquire  whether  there  be  any  being  (and,  if  so, 
what  being)  that  is  the  cause  of  all  things,  so  that  its 
essence,  represented  in  thought,  may  be  the  cause  of  all 
our  ideas,  and  then  our  mind  will  to  the  utmost  possible 
3 


34  IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


extent  reflect  nature.  For  it  will  possess,  subjectively, 
nature’s  essence,  order,  and  union.  Thus  we  can  see 
that  it  is  before  all  things  necessary  for  us  to  deduce  all 
our  ideas  from  physical  things  — that  is,  from  real  enti- 
ties, proceeding,  as  far  as  may  be,  according  to  the  series 
of  causes,  from  one  real  entity  to  another  real  entity, 
never  passing  to  universals  and  abstractions,  either  for 
the  purpose  of  deducing  some  real  entity  from  them,  or 
deducing  them  from  some  real  entity.  Either  of  these 
processes  interrupts  the  true  progress  of  the  understand- 
ing. But  it  must  be  observed  that,  by  the  series  of 
causes  and  real  entities,  I do  not  here  mean  the  series 
of  particular  and  mutable  things,  but  only  the  series  of 
fixed  and  eternal  things.  It  would  be  impossible  for 
human  infirmity  to  follow  up  the  series  of  particular 
mutable  things,  both  on  account  of  their  multitude,  sur- 
passing all  calculation,  and  on  account  of  the  infinitely 
diverse  circumstances  surrounding  one  and  the  same  thing, 
any  one  of  which  may  be  the  cause  for  its  existence  or 
non-existence.  Indeed,  their  existence  has  no  connection 
with  their  essence,  or  (as  we  have  said  already)  is  not 
an  eternal  truth.  Neither  is  there  any  need  that  we 
should  understand  their  series,  for  the  essences  of  particu- 
lar mutable  things  are  not  to  be  gathered  from  their 
series  or  order  of  existence,  which  would  furnish  us  with 
nothing  beyond  their  extrinsic  denominations,  their  rela- 
tions, or,  at  most,  their  circumstances,  all  of  which  are 
very  different  from  their  inmost  essence.  This  inmost 
essence  must  be  sought  solely  from  fixed  and  eternal 
things,  and  from  the  laws,  inscribed  (so  to  speak)  in 
those  things  as  in  their  true  codes,  according  to  which 
all  particular  things  take  place  and  are  arranged;  nay, 
these  mutable  particular  things  depend  so  intimately  and 
essentially  (so  to  phrase  it)  upon  the  fixed  things,  that 
they  cannot  either  be  or  be  conceived  without  them. 

Whence  these  fixed  and  eternal  things,  though  they  are 
themselves  particular,  will  nevertheless,  owing  to  their 
presence  and  power  everywhere,  be  to  us  as  universals, 
or  genera  of  definitions  of  particular  mutable  things,  and 
as  the  proximate  causes  of  all  things. 


SPINOZA 


35 


But,  though  this  be  so,  there  seems  to  be  no  small  diffi- 
culty in  arriving  at  the  knowledge  of  these  particular 
things,  for  to  conceive  them  all  at  once  would  far  surpass 
the  powers  of  the  human  understanding.  The  arrange- 
ment whereby  one  thing  is  understood  before  another,  as 
we  have  stated,  should  not  be  sought  from  their  series  of 
existence,  nor  from  eternal  things.  For  the  latter  are  all 
by  nature  simultaneous.  Other  aids  are  therefore  needed 
besides  those  employed  for  understanding  eternal  things 
and  their  laws;  however,  this  is  not  the  place  to  recount 
such  aids,  nor  is  there  any  need  to  do  so,  until  we  have 
acquired  a sufficient  knowledge  of  eternal  things  and  their 
infallible  laws,  and  until  the  nature  of  our  senses  has 
become  plain  to  us. 

Before  betaking  ourselves  to  seek  knowledge  of  partic- 
ular things,  it  will  be  seasonable  to  speak  of  such  aids, 
as  all  tend  to  teach  us  the  mode  of  employing  our  senses, 
and  to  make  certain  experiments  under  fixed  rules  and 
arrangement  which  may  suffice  to  determine  the  object 
of  our  inquiry,  so  that  we  may  therefrom  infer  what  laws 
of  eternal  things  it  has  been  produced  under,  and  may 
gain  an  insight  into  its  inmost  nature,  as  I will  duly 
show.  Here,  to  return  to  my  purpose,  I will  only  en- 
deavor to  set  forth  what  seems  necessary  for  enabling  us 
to  attain  to  knowledge  of  eternal  things,  and  to  define 
them  under  the  conditions  laid  down  above. 

With  this  end,  we  must  bear  in  mind  what  has  already 
been  stated,  namely,  that  when  the  mind  devotes  itself  to 
any  thought,  so  as  to  examine  it  and  to  deduce  there- 
from in  due  order  all  the  legitimate  conclusions  possible, 
any  falsehood  which  may  lurk  in  the  thought  will  be 
detected ; but  if  the  thought  be  true,  the  mind  will  readily 
proceed  without  interruption  to  deduce  truths  from  it. 
This,  I say,  is  necessary  for  our  purpose,  for  our 
thoughts  may  be  brought  to  a close  by  the  absence  of  a 
foundation.  If,  therefore,  we  wish  to  investigate  the  first 
thing  of  all,  it  will  be  necessary  to  supply  some  foun- 
dation which  may  direct  our  thoughts  thither.  Further, 
since  method  is  reflective  knowledge,  the  foundation 
which  must  direct  our  thoughts  can  be  nothing  else  than 


36  IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 

the  knowledge  of  that  which  constitutes  the  reality  of 
truth,  and  the  knowledge  of  the  understanding,  its  prop- 
erties, and  powers.  When  this  has  been  acquired  we 
shall  possess  a foundation  wherefrom  we  can  deduce  our 
thoughts,  and  a path  whereby  the  intellect,  according  to 
its  capacity,  may  attain  the  knowledge  of  eternal  things, 
allowance  being  made  for  the  extent  of  the  intellectual 
powers. 

If,  as  I stated  in  the  first  part,  it  belongs  to  the  nature 
of  thought  to  form  true  ideas,  we  must  here  inquire  what 
is  meant  by  the  faculties  and  power  of  the  understand- 
ing. The  chief  part  of  our  method  is  to  understand  as  well 
as  possible  the  powers  of  the  intellect,  and  its  nature; 
we  are,  therefore,  compelled  (by  the  considerations  ad- 
vanced in  the  second  part  of  the  method)  necessarily  to 
draw  these  conclusions  from  the  definition  itself  of 
thought  and  understanding.  But,  so  far,  we  have  not 
got  any  rules  for  finding  definitions,  and,  as  we  cannot 
set  forth  such  rules  without  a previous  knowledge  of 
nature,  that  is  without  a definition  of  the  understanding 
and  its  power,  it  follows  either  that  the  definition  of  the 
understanding  must  be  clear  in  itself,  or  that  we  can 
understand  nothing.  Nevertheless  this  definition  is  not 
absolutely  clear  in  itself;  however,  since  its  properties, 
like  all  things  that  we  possess  through  the  understanding, 
cannot  be  known  clearly  and  distinctly,  unless  its  nature 
be  known  previously,  the  definition  of  the  understanding 
makes  itself  manifest,  if  we  pay  attention  to  its  proper- 
ties, which  we  know  clearly  and  distinctly.  Let  us,  then 
enumerate  here  the  properties  of  the  understanding,  let 
us  examine  them,  and  begin  by  discussing  the  instru- 
ments for  research  which  we  find  innate  in  us. 

The  properties  of  the  understanding  which  I have  chiefly 
remarked,  and  which  I clearly  understand,  are  the  fol- 
lowing : — 

I.  It  involves  certainty — in  other  words,  it  knows  that 
a thing  exists  in  reality  as  it  is  reflected  subjectively. 

II.  That  it  perceives  certain  things,  or  forms  some  ideas 
absolutely,  some  ideas  from  others.  Thus  it  forms  the 
idea  of  quantity  absolutely,  without  reference  to  any  other 


SPINOZA 


37 


thoughts;  but  ideas  of  motion  it  only  forms  after  taking 
into  consideration  the  idea  of  quantity. 

III.  Those  ideas  which  the  understanding  forms  abso- 
lutely express  infinity ; determinate  ideas  are  derived  from 
other  ideas.  Thus  in  the  idea  of  quantity,  perceived  by 
means  of  a cause,  the  quantity  is  determined,  as  when  a 
body  is  perceived  to  be  formed  by  the  motion  of  a plane, 
a plane  by  the  motion  of  a line,  or,  again,  a line  by  the 
motion  of  a point.  All  these  are  perceptions  which  do 
not  serve  toward  understanding  quantity,  but  only  to- 
ward determining  it.  This  is  proved  by  the  fact  that 
we  conceive  them  as  formed  as  it  were  by  motion,  yet 
this  motion  is  not  perceived  unless  the  quantity  be  per- 
ceived also ; we  can  even  prolong  the  motion  so  as  to  form 
an  infinite  line,  which  we  certainly  could  not  do  unless 
we  had  an  idea  of  infinite  quantity. 

IV.  The  understanding  forms  positive  ideas  before 
forming  negative  ideas. 

V.  It  perceives  things  not  so  much  under  the  condition 
of  duration  as  under__a  certain  form  of  eternity,  and  in 
an  infinite  number ; or  rather  in  perceiving  things  it  does 
not  consider  either  their  number  or  duration,  whereas, 
in  imagining  them,  it  perceives  them  in  a determi- 
nate number,  duration,  and  quantity. 

VI.  The  ideas  which  we  form  as  clear  and  distinct,  seem 
so  to  follow  from  the  sole  necessity  of  our  nature, 
that  they  appear  to  depend  absolutely  on  our  sole  power; 
with  confused  ideas  the  contrary  is  the  case.  They  are 
often  formed  against  our  will. 

VII.  The  mind  can  determine  in  many  ways  the  ideas 
of  things,  which  the  understanding  forms  from  other 
ideas : thus,  for  instance,  in  order  to  define  the  plane  of  an 
ellipse,  it  supposes  a point  adhering  to  a cord  to  be  moved 
round  two  centres,  or,  again,  it  conceives  an  infinity  of 
points,  always  in  the  same  fixed  relation  to  a given  straight 
line,  or  a cone  cut  in  an  oblique  plane,  so  that  the  angle  of 
inclination  is  greater  than  the  angle  of  the  vertex  of  the 
cone,  or  in  an  infinity  of  other  ways. 

VIII.  The  more  ideas  express  perfection  of  any  object, 
the  more  perfect  are  they  themselves;  for  we  do  not 


38  IMPROVEMENT  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING 


admire  the  architect  who  has  planned  a chapel  so  much  as 
the  architect  who  has  planned  a splendid  temple. 

I do  not  stop  to  consider  the  rest  of  what  is  referred  to 
thought,  such  as  love,  joy,  etc.  They  are  nothing  to  our 
present  purpose,  and  cannot  even  be  conceived  unless  the 
understanding  be  perceived  previously.  When  perception 
is  removed,  all  these  go  with  it. 

False  and  fictitious  ideas  have  nothing  positive  about 
them  (as  we  have  abundantly  shown)  which  causes  them 
to  be  called  false  or  fictitious ; they  are  only  considered  as 
such  through  the  defectiveness  of  knowledge.  Therefore, 
false  and  fictitious  ideas  as  such  can  teach  us  nothing  con- 
cerning the  essence  of  thought ; this  must  be  sought  from 
the  positive  properties  just  enumerated ; in  other  words, 
we  must  lay  down  some  common  basis  from  which  these 
properties  necessarily  follow,  so  that  when  this  is  given, 
the  properties  are  necessarily  given  also,  and  when  it  is 
removed,  they  too  vanish  with  it. 

[The  rest  of  the  treatise  is  wanting. ] 


THE  ETHICS. 


PART  I.  CONCERNING  GOD. 

Definitions. 

I.  By  that  which  is  self-caused,  I mean  that  of  which 
the  essence  involves  existence,  or  that  of  which  the  nature 
is  only  conceivable  as  existent. 

II.  A thing  is  called  finite  after  its  kind,  when  it 
can  be  limited  by  another  thing  of  the  same  nature; 
for  instance,  a body  is  called  finite  because  we  always 
conceive  another  greater  body.  So,  also,  a thought  is  lim-  ? 
ited  by  another  thought,  but  a body  is  not  limited  by 
thought,  nor  a thought  by  body. 

III.  By  substance,  I mean  that  which  is  in  itself,  and  is 
conceived  through  itself;  in  other  words,  that  of  which  ? 
a conception  can  be  formed  independently  of  any  other 
conception. 

IV.  By  attribute,  I mean  that  which  the  intellect  per-  f ■, 

1 ceives  as  constituting  the  essence  of  substance.  -~ 

" V.  By  mode,  I mean  the  modifications  * of  substance,  or 
that  which  exists  in,  and  is  conceived  through,  something 
other  than  itself. 

VI.  By  God,  I mean  a being  absolutely  infinite  — that 
is,  a substance  consisting  in  infinite  attributes,  of  which 
each  expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essentiality. 

Explanation.  — I say  absolutely  infinite,  not  infinite  after 
its  kind:  for,  of  a thing  infinite  only  after  its  kind,  in- 
finite attributes  may  be  denied;  but  that  which  is  abso- 
lutely infinite,  contains  in  its  essence  whatever  expresses 
reality,  and  involves  no  negation. 

VII.  That  thing  is  called  free,  which  exists  solely  Jiy 
the  necessity  of  its  own  nature,  and  of  which  the  action 

* (< Affectiones .» 


(39) 


40 


THE  ETHICS 


is  determined  by  itself  alone.  On  the  other  hand,  that 
thing  is  necessary,  or  rather  constrained,  which  is  deter- 
mined by  something  external  to  itself  to  a fixed  and 
definite  method  of  existence  or  action. 

VIII.  By  eternity,  I mean  existence  itself,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  conceived  necessarily  to  follow  solely  from  the 
definition  of  that  which  is  eternal. 

Explanation. — Existence  of  this  kind  is  conceived  as 
an  eternal  truth,  like  the  essence  of  a thing,  and,  there- 
fore, cannot  be  explained  by  means  of  continuance  or 
time,  though  continuance  may  be  conceived  without  a 
beginning  or  end. 

Axioms. 

I.  Everything  which  exists,  exists  either  in  itself  or  in 
something  else. 

II.  That  which  cannot  be  conceived  through  anything 
else  must  be  conceived  through  itself. 

III.  From  a given  definite  cause  an  effect  necessarily 
follows;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  if  no  definite  cause  be 
granted,  it  is  impossible  that  an  effect  can  follow. 

IV.  The  knowledge  of  an  effect  depends  on  and  involves 
the  knowledge  of  a cause. 

V.  Things  which  have  nothing  in  common  cannot  be 
understood,  the  one  by  means  of  the  other;  the  concep- 
tion of  one  does  not  involve  the  conception  of  the  other. 

VI.  A true  idea  must  correspond  with  its  ideate  or 
object. 

VII.  If  a thing  can  be  conceived  as  non-existing,  its 
essence  does  not  involve  existence. 

Propositions. 

Prop.  I.  Substance  is  by  nature  prior  to  its  modifications. 

Proof. — This  is  clear  from  Def.  iii.  and  v. 

Prop.  II.  Two  substances,  whose  attributes  are  dif- 
ferent, have  nothing  in  common. 

Proof.  — Also  evident  from  Def.  iii.  For  each  must  exist 
in  itself,  and  be  conceived  through  itself ; in  other  words, 
the  conception  of  one  does  not  imply  the  conception  of 
the  other. 


CONCERNING  GOD 


4i 


Prop.  III.  Things  which  have  nothing  in  common  can-  _ 
not  be  one  the  cause  of  the  other. 

Proof. — If  they  have  nothing  in  common,  it  follows  that 
one  cannot  be  apprehended  by  means  of  the  other  (Ax.  v.), 
and,  therefore,  one  cannot  be  the  cause  of  the  other 
(Ax.  iv.).  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  IV.  Two  or  more  distinct  things  are  distinguished 
one  from  the  other  either  by  the  difference  of  the  attri- 
butes of  the  substances,  or  by  the  difference  of  their 
modifications. 

Proof . — Everything  which  exists,  exists  either  in  itself 
or  in  something  else  (Ax.  i.), — that  is  (by  Def.  iii.  and  v.), 
nothing  is  granted  in  addition  to  the  understanding,  except 
substance  and  its  modifications.  Nothing  is,  therefore, 
given  besides  the  understanding,  by  which  several  things  7 
may  be  distinguished  one  from  the  other,  except  the  sjih-  ' 
stances,  or,  in  other  words  (see  Ax.  iv.),  their  attributes 
and  modifications.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  V.  There  cannot  exist  in  the  universe  two  or  more 
substances  having  the  same  nature  or  attribute. 

Proof. — If  several  distinct  substances  be  granted,  they 
must  be  distinguished  one  from  the  other,  either  by  the 
difference  of  their  attributes,  or  by  the  difference  of  their 
modifications  (Prop.  iv.).  If  only  by  the  difference  of 
their  attributes,  it  will  be  granted  that  there  cannot  be 
more  than  one  with  an  identical  attribute.  If  by  the 
difference  of  their  modifications  — as  substance  is  naturally 
prior  to  its  modifications  (Prop,  i.), — it  follows  that  set- 
ting the  modifications  aside,  and  considering  substance  in 
itself,  that  is  truly  (Def.  iii.  and  vi.),  there  cannot  be 
conceived  one  substance  different  from  another, — that  is 
(by  Prop,  iv.),  there  cannot  be  granted  several  substances, 
but  one  substance  only.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  VI.  One  substance  cannot  be  produced  by  another 
substance^ 

Proof. — It  is  impossible  that  there  should  be  in  the 
universe  two  substances  with  an  identical  attribute,  i.  e. , 
which  have  anything  common  to  them  both  (Prop,  ii.), 
and,  therefore  (Prop,  iii.),  one  cannot  be  the  cause  of 
another,  neither  can  one  be  produced  by  the  other.  Q.  E.  D. 


42 


THE  ETHICS 


Corollary. — Hence  it  follows  that  a substance  cannot  be 
produced  by  anything  external  to  itself.  For  in  the  uni- 
verse nothing  is  granted,  save  substances  and  their  modi- 
fications (as  appears  from  Ax.  i.  and  Def.  iii.  and  v.). 
Now  (by  the  last  Prop.)  substance  cannot  be  produced 
by  another  substance,  therefore  it  cannot  be  produced  by 
anything  external  itself.  Q.E.D.  This  is  shown  still 
more  readily  by  the  absurdity  of  the  contradictory.  For, 
if  substance  be  produced  by  an  external  cause,  the 
knowledge  of  it  would  depend  on  the  knowledge  of  its 
cause  (Ax.  iv.),  and  (by  Def.  iii.)  it  would  itself  not  be 
substance. 

Prop.  VII.  Existence  belongs  to  the  nature  of  sub- 
stance. 

Proof. — Substance  cannot  be  produced  by  anything  ex- 
ternal (Corollary,  Prop,  vi.),  it  must,  therefore,  be  its  own 
cause  — that  is,  its  essence  necessarily  involves  existence, 
or  existence  belongs  to  its  nature. 

Prop.  VIII.  Every,  substance  is  necessarily  infinite. 

Proof. — There  can  be  only  one  substance  with  an  identi- 
cal attribute,  and  existence  follows  from  its  nature  (Prop, 
vii.);  its  nature,  therefore,  involves  existence,  either  as 
finite  or  infinite.  It  does  not  exist  as  finite,  for  (by 
Def.  ii.)  it  would  then  be  limited  by  something  else  of 
the  same  kind,  which  would  also  necessarily  exist  (Prop, 
vii.);  and  there  would  be  two  substances  with  an  identi- 
cal attribute,  which  is  absurd  (Prop.  v.).  It  therefore 
exists  as  infinite.  Q.E.D. 

Note  i. — As  finite  existence  involves  a partial  negation, 
and  infinite  existence  is  the  absolute  affirmation  of  the 
given  nature,  it  follows  (solely  from  Prop,  vii.)  that  every 
substance  is  necessarily  infinite. 

Note  II.  — No  doubt  it  will  be  difficult  for  those  who 
think  about  things  loosely,  and  have  not  been  accus- 
tomed to  know  them  by  their  primary  causes,  to  com- 
prehend the  demonstrations  of  Prop,  vii.:  for  such 

persons  make  no  distinction  between  the  modifications  of 
substances  and  the  substances  themselves,  and  are  ignor- 
ant of  the  manner  in  which  things  are  produced;  hence 
they  attribute  to  substances  the  beginning  which  they 


CONCERNING  GOD 


43 


observe  in  natural  objects.  Those  who  are  ignorant  of 
true  causes,  make  complete  confusion — think  that  trees 
might  talk  just  as  well  as  men  — that  men  might  be 
formed  from  stones  as  well  as  from  seed;  and  imagine 
that  any  form  might  be  changed  into  any  other.  So, 
also,  those  who  confuse  the  two  natures,  divine  and 
human,  readily  attribute  human  passions  to  the  deity, 
especially  so  long  as  they  do  not  know  how  passions 
originate  in  the  mind.  But,  if  people  would  consider 
the  nature  of  substance,  they  would  have  no  doubt 
about  the  truth  of  Prop.  vii.  In  fact,  this  proposition 
would  be  a universal  axiom,  and  accounted  a truism. 
For,  by  substance,  would  be  understood  that  which  is  in 
itself,  and  is  conceived  through  itself  — that  is,  some- 
thing of  which  the  conception  requires  not  the  concep- 
tion of  anything  else ; whereas  modifications  exist  in 
something  external  to  themselves,  and  a conception  of 
them  is  formed  by  means  of  a conception  of  the  thing 
in  which  they  exist.  Therefore,  we  may  have  true  ideas 
of  non-existent  modifications;  for,  although  they  may 
have  no  actual  existence  apart  from  the  conceiving 
intellect,  yet  their  essence  is  so  involved  in  something 
external  to  themselves  that  they  may  through  it  be 
conceived.  Whereas  the  only  truth  substances  can  have, 
external  to  the  intellect,  must  consist  in  their  existence, 
because  they  are  conceived  through  themselves.  There- 
fore, for  a person  to  say  that  he  has  a clear  and  dis- 
tinct— that  is,  a true  — idea  of  a substance,  but  that  he 
is  not  sure  whether  such  substance  exists,  would  be  the 
same  as  if  he  said  that  he  had  a true  idea,  but  was  not 
sure  whether  or  no  it  was  false  (a  little  consideration 
will  make  this  plain) ; or  if  any  one  affirmed  that  substance 
is  created,  it  would  be  the  same  as  saying  that  a false 
idea  was  true  — in  short,  the  height  of  absurdity.  It 
must,  then,  necessarily  be  admitted  that  the  existence 
of  substance  as  its  essence  is  an  eternal  truth.  And  we 
can  hence  conclude  by  another  process  of  reasoning  — 
that  there  is  but  one  such  substance.  I think  that  this 
may  profitably  be  done  at  once ; . and,  in  order  to  proceed 
regularly  with  the  demonstration, , we  must  premise ; 


4 tfjM 
7 


1 


44 


THE  ETHICS 


i.  The  true  definition  of  a thing  neither  involves  nor 
. expresses  anything  beyond  the  nature  of  the  thing  defined. 
From  this  it  follows  that  — 

a.  No  definition  implies  or  expresses  a certain  number 
of  individuals,  inasmuch  as  it  expresses  nothing  beyond' 
the  nature  of  the  thing  defined.  For  instance,  the  defi- 
nition of  a triangle  expresses  nothing  beyond  the  actual 
nature  of  a triangle : it  does  not  imply  any  fixed  number 
of  triangles. 

3.  There  is  necessarily  for  each  individual  existent 
thing  a cause  why  it  should  exist. 

4.  This  cause  of  existence  must  either  be  contained  in 
the  nature  and  definition  of  the  thing  defined,  or  must 
be  postulated  apart  from  such  definition. 

It  therefore  follows  that,  if  a given  number  of  indi- 
vidual things  exist  in  nature,  there  must  be  some  cause 
for  the  existence  of  exactly  that  number,  neither  more 
nor  less.  For  example,  if  twenty  men  exist  in  the  uni- 
verse (for  simplicity’s  sake,  I will  suppose  them  existing 
simultaneously,  and  to  have  had  no  predecessors),  and 
we  want  to  account  for  the  existence  of  these  twenty 
men,  it  will  not  be  enough  to  show  the  cause  of  human 
existence  in  general;  we  must  also  show  why  there  are 
exactly  twenty  men,  neither  more  nor  less:  for  a cause 
must  be  assigned  for  the  existence  of  each  individual. 
Now  this  cause  cannot  be  contained  in  the  actual  nature 
of  man,  for  the  true  definition  of  man  does  not  involve 
any  consideration  of  the  number  twenty.  Consequently, 
the  cause  for  the  existence  of  these  twenty  men,  and, 
consequently,  of  each  of  them,  must  necessarily  be  sought 
externally  to  each  individual.  Hence  we  may  lay  down 
\ the  absolute  rule,  that  everything  which  may  consist  of 
^several  individuals  must  have  an  external  cause.  And, 

\ as  it  has  been  shown  already  that  existence  appertains 
^ to  the  nature  of  substance,  existence  must  necessarily  be 
included  in  its  definition;  and  from  its  definition  alone 
existence  must  be  deducible.  But  from  its  definition  ( as 
we  have  shown,  Notes  ii. , iii.),  we  cannot  infer  the  ex- 
istence of  several  substances;  therefore  it  follows  that 
there  is  only  one  substance  of  the  same  nature.  Q.  E.  D. 


CONCERNING  GOD 


45 


¥ 


Prop.  IX.  The  more  reality  or  being  a thing  has  the 
greater  the  number  of  its  attributes  (Def.  iv.). 

Prop.  X.  Each  particular  attribute  of  the  one 'substance 
must  be  conceived  through  itself. 

Proof. — An  attribute  is  that  which  the  intellect  perceives 
of  substance,  as  constituting  its  essence  (Def.  iv.),  and, 
therefore,  must  be  conceived  through  itself  (Def.  iii.). 
Q.E.D. 

Note. — It  is  thus  evident  that,  though  two  attributes  are, 
in  fact,  conceived  as  distinct  — that  is,  one  without  the  help 
of  the  other  — yet  we  cannot,  therefore,  conclude  that  they 
constitute  two  entities,  or  two  different  substances.  For 
it  is  the  nature  of  substance  that  each  of  its  attributes  is 
conceived  through  itself,  inasmuch  as  all  the  attributes  it 
has  have  always  existed  simultaneously  in  it,  and  none 
could  be  produced  by  any  other;  but  each  expresses  the 
reality  or  being  of  substance.  It  is,  then,  far  from  an 
absurdity  to  ascribe  several  attributes  to  one  substance: 
for  nothing  in  nature  is  more  clear  than  that  each  and 
every  entity  must  be  conceived  under  some  attribute,  and 
that  its  reality  or  being  is  in  proportion  to  the  number 
of  its  attributes  expressing  necessity  or  eternity  and  infin- 
ity. Consequently  it  is  abundantly  clear,  that  an  absolutely 
infinite  being  must  necessarily  be  defined  as  consisting  in 
infinite  attributes  each  of  which  expresses  a certain  eternal 
and  infinite  essence. 

. If  any  one  now  ask,  by  what  sign  shall  he  be  able  to 
distinguish  different  substances,  let  him  read  the  follow- 
ing propositions,  which  show  that  there  is  but  one  sub- 
stance in  the  universe,  and  that  it  is  absolutely  infinite, 
wherefore  such  a sign  would  be  sought  for  in  vain. 

Prop.  XI.  God,  or  substance,  consisting  of  infinite  attri- 
butes,  of  which  each  expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essen- 
tiality, necessarily  exists. 

/ Proof. — If  this  be  denied,  conceive,  if  possible,  that  God 
\ does  not  exist:  then  his  essence  does  not  involve  exist- 
\ ence.  But  this  (by  Prop,  vii.)  is  absurd.  Therefore  God 
/ necessarily  exists. 

Another  proof. — Of  everything  whatsoever  a cause  or 
reason  must  be  assigned,  either  for  its  existence,  or  for  its 


•s/oZ 


v 


46 


THE  ETHICS 


non-existence  — e.  g. , if  a triangle  exist,  a reason  or  cause 
must  be  granted  for  its  existence;  if,  on  the  contrary,  it 
does  not  exist,  a cause  must  also  be  granted,  which  pre- 
vents it  from  existing,  or  annuls  its  existence.  This 
reason  or  cause  must  either  be  contained  in  the  nature 
of  the  thing  in  question,  or  be  external  to  it.  For  in- 
stance, the  reason  for  the  non-existence  of  a square 
circle  is  indicated  in  its  nature,  namely,  because  it  would 
involve  a contradiction.  On  the  other  hand,  the  existence 
of  substance  follows  also  solely  from  its  nature,  inasmuch 
as  its  nature  involves  existence.  (See  Prop.  vii. ) 

But  the  reason  for  the  existence  of  a triangle  or  a circle 
does  not  follow  from  the  nature  of  those  figures,  but  from 
the  order  of  universal  nature  in  extension.  From  the 
latter  it  must  follow,  either  that  a triangle  necessarily 
exists,  or  that  it  is  impossible  that  it  should  exist.  So 
much  is  self-evident.  It  follows  therefrom  that  a thing 
necessarily  exists,  if  no  cause  or  reason  be  granted  which 
prevents  its  existence. 

If,  then,  no  cause  or  reason  can  be  given,  which  pre- 
vents the  existence  of  God,  or  which  destroys  his  exist- 
ence, we  must  certainly  conclude  that  he  necessarily  does 
exist.  If  such  a reason  or  cause  should  be  given,  it  must 
either  be  drawn  from  the  very  nature  of  God,  or  be 
external  to  him  — that  is,  drawn  from  another  substance 
of  another  nature.  For  if  it  were  of  the  same  nature, 
God,  by  that  very  fact,  would  be  admitted  to  exist.  But 
substance  of  another  nature  could  have  nothing  in  com- 
mon with  God  (by  Prop,  ii.),  and  therefore  would  be 
unable  either  to  cause  or  to  destroy  his  existence. 

As,  then,  a reason  or  cause  which  would  annul  the 
divine  existence  cannot  be  drawn  from  anything  external 
to  the  divine  nature,  such  cause  must,  perforce,  if  God 
does  not  exist,  be  drawn  from  God’s  own  nature,  which 
would  involve  a contradiction.  To  make  such  an  affirma- 
tion about  a being  absolutely  infinite  and  supremely  per- 
fect, is  absurd;  therefore,  neither  in  the  nature  of  God, 
nor  externally  to  his  nature,  can  a cause  or  reason  be 
assigned  which  would  annul  his  existence.  Therefore, 
God  necessarily  exists.  Q.  E.D. 


CONCERNING  GOD 


47 


Another  proof. — The  potentiality  of  non-existence  is 
a negation  of  power,  and  contrariwise  the  potentiality  of 
existence  is  a power,  as  is  obvious.  If,  then,  that  which 
necessarily  exists  is  nothing  but  finite  beings,  such  finite 
beings  are  more  powerful  than  a being  absolutely  infinite, 
which  is  obviously  absurd ; therefore,  either  nothing  exists, 
or  else  a being  absolutely  infinite  necessarily  exists  also. 
Now  we  exist  either  in  ourselves,  or  in  something  else 
which  necessarily  exists  (see  Ax.  i.  and  Prop,  vii.) 
Therefore  a being  absolutely  infinite — in  other  words, 
God  (Def.  vi.) — necessarily  exists.  Q.E.D. 

Note.  — In  this  last  proof,  I have  purposely  shown  God’s 
existence  h posteriori , so  that  the  proof  might  be  more 
easily  followed,  not  because,  from  the  same  premises, 
God’s  existence  does  not  follow  h priori.  For,  as  the 
potentiality  of  existence  is  a power,  it  follows  that,  in 
proportion  as  reality  increases  in  the  nature  of  a thing, 
so  also  will  it  increase  its  strength  for  existence.  There- 
fore a being  absolutely  infinite,  such  as  God,  has  from 
himself  an  absolutely  infinite  power  of  existence,  and  hence 
he  does  absolutely  exist.  Perhaps  there  will  be  many 
who  will  be  unable  to  see  the  force  of  this  proof,  inas- 
much as  they  are  accustomed  only  to  consider  those 
things  which  flow  from  external  causes.  Of  such  things, 
they  see  that  those  which  quickly  come  to  pass  — that  is, 
quickly  come  into  existence  — quickly  also  disappear; 
whereas  they  regard  as  more  difficult  of  accomplishment 
— that  is,  not  so  easily  brought  into  existence  — those 
things  which  they  conceive  as  more  complicated. 

However,  to  do  away  with  this  misconception,  I need 
not  here  show  the  measure  of  truth  in  the  proverb, 
<(  What  comes  quickly,  goes  quickly, w nor  discuss  whether, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  universal  nature,  all  things 
are  equally  easy,  or  otherwise:  I need  only  remark,  that 
I am  not  here  speaking  of  things,  which  come  to  pass 
through  causes  external  to  themselves,  but  only  of 
substances  which  (by  Prop,  vi.)  cannot  be  produced  by 
any  external  cause.  Things  which  are  produced  by 


external  causes,  whether  they  consist  of  many  parts  or 
few,  owe  whatsoever  perfection  or  reality  they  possess 


48 


THE  ETHICS 


solely  to  the  efficacy  of  their  external  cause,  and  there- 
fore their  existence  arises  solely  from  the  perfection  of 
their  external  cause,  not  from  their  own.  Contrariwise, 
whatsoever  perfection  is  possessed  by  substance  is  due 
to  no  external  cause ; wherefore  the  existence  of  substance 
must  arise  solely  from  its  own  nature,  which  is  nothing 
else  but  its  essence.  Thus,  the  perfection  of  a thing 
does  not  annul  its  existence,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
asserts  it.  Imperfection,  on  the  other  hand,  does  annul 
it;  therefore  we  cannot  be  more  certain  of  the  existence 
of  anything,  than  of  the  existence  of  a being  absolutely 
infinite  or  perfect  — that  is,  of  God.  For  inasmuch  as 
his  essence  excludes  all  imperfection,  and  involves 
absolute  perfection,  all  cause  for  doubt  concerning  his 
existence  is  done  away,  and  the  utmost  certainty  on  the 
question  is  given.  This,  I think,  will  be  evident  to 
every  moderately  attentive  reader. 

Prop.  XII.  No  attribute  of  substance  can  be  conceived 
from  which  it  would  follow  that  substance  can  be  di- 
vided. 

Proof. — The  parts  into  which  substance  as  thus  con- 
ceived would  be  divided,  either  will  retain  the  nature  of 
substance,  or  they  will  not.  If  the  former,  then  (by 
Prop,  viii.)  each  part  will  necessarily  be  infinite,  and  (by 
Prop,  vi.)  self-caused,  and  (by  Prop,  v.)  will  perforce 
consist  of  a different  attribute,  so  that,  in  that  case,  sev- 
eral substances  could  be  formed  out  of  one  substance, 
which  (by  Prop,  vi.)  is  absurd.  Moreover,  the  parts  (by 
Prop,  ii.)  would  have  nothing  in  common  with  their 
whole,  and  the  whole  (by  Def.  iv.  and  Prop,  x.)  could 
both  exist  and  be  conceived  without  its  parts,  which 
everyone  will  admit  to  be  absurd.  If  we  adopt  the  sec- 
ond alternative — namely,  that  the  parts  will  not  retain 
the  nature  of  substance  — then,  if  the  whole  substance 
were  divided  into  equal  parts,  it  would  lose  the  nature  of 
substance,  and  would  cease  to  exist,  which  (by  Prop,  vii.) 
is  absurd. 

Prop.  XIII.  Substance  absolutely  infinite  is  indivisible. 

Proof. — If  it  could  be  divided,  the  parts  into  which  it 
was  divided  would  either  retain  the  nature  of  absolutely 


CONCERNING  GOD 


49 


Infinite  substance,  or  they  would  not.  If  the  former,  we 
should  have  several  substances  of  the  same  nature,  which 
(by  Prop,  v.)  is  absurd.  If  the  latter,  then  (by  Prop, 
vii.)  substance  absolutely  infinite  could  cease  to  exist, 
which  (by  Prop,  xi.)  is  also  absurd. 

Corollary. — It  follows  that  no  substance,  and  conse- 
quently  no  extended  substance,  in  so  far  as  it  is  sub-  _ 
stance,  is  divisible! 

Note. — The  indivisibility  of  substance  may  be  more 
easily  understood  as  follows.  The  nature  of  substance 
can  only  be  conceived  as  infinite,  and  by  a part  of  sub- 
stance, nothing  else  can  be  understood  than'  finite 
substance,  which  (by  Prop,  viii.)  involves  a manifest  contra- 
diction. 

Prop.  XIV.  Besides  God  no  substance  can  be  granted 
or  conceived. 

Proof. — As  God  is  a being  absolutely  infinite,  of  whom 
no  attribute  that  expresses  the  essence  of  substance  can 
be  denied  (by  Def.  vi.),  and  he  necessarily  exists  (by 
Prop,  xi.);  if  any  substance  besides  God  were  granted 
it  would  have  to  be  explained  by  some  attribute  of  God, 
and  thus  two  substances  with  the  same  attribute  would 
exist,  which  (by  Prop,  v.)  is  absurd;  therefore,  besides 
God  no  substance  can  be  granted,  or  consequently,  be 
conceived.  If  it  could  be  conceived,  it  would  necessarily 
have  to  be  conceived  as  existent;  but  this  (by  the  first 
part  of  this  proof)  is  absurd.  Therefore,  besides  God  no 
substance  can  be  granted  or  conceived.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary  I. — Clearly,  therefore:  i.  God  is  one,  that  is 

(by  Def.  vi.)  only  one  substance  can  be  granted  in  the 
universe,  and  that  substance  is  absolutely  infinite,  as  we 
have  already  indicated  (in  the  note  to  Prop.  x.). 

Corollary  II. — It  follows : 2.  That  extension  and  thought 
are  either  attributes  of  God  or  (by  Ax.  i.)  accidents  ( affec- 
tiones) of  the  attributes  of  God. 

Prop.  XV.  Whatsoever  is.  is  in  God,  and  without  God  1 
nothing  can  be,  or  be  conceived.  . 

Proof. — Besides  God,  no  substance  is  granted  or  can 
be  conceived  (by  Prop,  xiv.),  that  is  (by  Def.  iii.)  nothing 
which  is  in  itself  and  is  conceived  through  itself.  But 


50 


THE  ETHICS 


modes  (by  Def.  v.)  can  neither  be,  nor  be  conceived 
without  substance;  wherefore  they  can  only  be  in  the 
divine  nature,  and  can  only  through  it  be  conceived. 
But  substances  and  modes  form  the  sum  total  of  exist- 
ence (by  Ax.  i.),  therefore,  without  God  nothing  can  be, 
or  be  conceived.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — Some  assert  that  God,  like  a man,  consists  of 
body  and  mind,  and  is  susceptible  of  passions.  How  far 
such  persons  have  strayed  from  the  truth  is  sufficiently 
evident  from  what  has  been  said.  But  these  I pass  over. 
For  all  who  have  in  anywise  reflected  on  the  divine 
nature  deny  that  God  has  a body.  Of  this  they  find 
excellent  proof  in  the  fact  that  we  understand  by  body 
a definite  quantity,  so  long,  so  broad,  so  deep,  bounded 
by  a certain  shape,  and  it  is  the  height  of  absurdity  to 
predicate  such  a thing  of  God,  a being  absolutely  infinite. 
But  meanwhile  by  the  other  reasons  with  which  they  try 
to  prove  their  point,  they  show  that  they  think  corporeal 
or  extended  substance  wholly  apart  from  the  divine 
nature,  and  say  it  was  created  by  God.  Wherefrom  the 
divine  nature  can  have  been  created,  they  are  wholly 
ignorant;  thus  they  clearly  show,  that  they  do  not  know 
the  meaning  of  their  own  words.  I myself  have  proved 
sufficiently  clearly,  at  any  rate  in  my  own  judgment 
(Coroll.  Prop,  vi.,  and  Note  2,  Prop,  viii.),  that  no  sub- 
stance can  be  produced  or  created  by  anything  other 
than  itself.  Further,  I showed  (in  Prop,  xiv.),  that  be- 
sides God  no  substance  can  be  granted  or  conceived. 
Hence  we  drew  the  conclusion  that  extended  substance 
is  one  of  the  infinite  attributes  of  God.  However,  in 
order  to  explain  more  fully,  I will  refute  the  arguments 
of  my  adversaries,  which  all  start  from  the  following 
points : — 

Extended  substance,  in  so  far  as  it  is  substance,  con- 
sists, as  they  think,  in  parts,  wherefore  they  deny  that  it 
I can  be  infinite,  or,  consequently,  that  it  can  appertain  to 
God.  This  they  illustrate  with  many  examples,  of  which 
I will  take  one  or  two.  If  extended  substance,  they  say, 
is  infinite,  let  it  be  conceived  to  be  divided  into  two 
parts:  each  part  will  then  be  either  finite  or  infinite.  If 


CONCERNING  GOD 


Si 

the  former,  then  infinite  substance  is  composed  of  two 
finite  parts,  which  is  absurd.  If  the  latter,  then  one 
infinite  will  be  twice  as  large  as  another  infinite,  which 
is  also  absurd. 

Further,  if  an  infinite  line  be  measured  out  in  foot 
lengths,  it  will  consist  of  an  infinite  number  of  such 
parts;  it  would  equally  consist  of  an  infinite  number  of 
parts,  if  each  part  measured  only  an  inch:  therefore,  one 
infinity  would  be  twelve  times  as  great  as  the  other. 

Lastly,  if  from  a single  point  there  be  conceived  to  be 
drawn  two  diverging  lines  which  at  first  are  at  a definite 
distance  apart,  but  are  produced  to  infinity,  it  is  certain 
that  the  distance  between  the  two  lines  will  be  continu- 
ally increased,  until  at  longth  it  changes  from  definite  to 
indefinable.  As  these  absurdities  follow,  it  is  said,  from 
considering  quantity  as  infinite,  the  conclusion  is  drawn, 
that  extended  substance  must  necessarily  be  finite,  and, 
consequently,  cannot  appertain  to  the  nature  of  God. 

The  second  argument  is  also  drawn  from  God’s  supreme 
perfection.  God,  it  is  said,  inasmuch  as  he  is  a supremely 
perfect  being,  cannot  be  passive ; but  extended  substance, 
in  so  far  as  it  is  divisible,  is  passive.  It  follows,  there- 
fore, that  extended  substance  does  not  appertain  to  the 
essence  of  God. 

Such  are  the  arguments  I find  on  the  subject  in  writers, 
who  by  them  try  to  prove  that  extended  substance  is 
unworthy  of  the  divine  nature,  and  cannot  possibly  ap- 
pertain thereto.  However,  I think  an  attentive  reader 
will  see  that  I have  already  answered  their  propositions; 
for  all  their  arguments  are  founded  on  the  hypothesis 
that  extended  substance  is  composed  of  parts,  and  such 
a hypothesis  I have  shown  (Prop,  xii.,  and  Coroll.  Prop, 
xiii.)  to  be  absurd.  Moreover,  any  one  who  reflects  will 
see  that  all  these  absurdities  (if  absurdities  they  be, 
which  I am  not  now  discussing),  from  which  it  is  sought 
to  extract  the  conclusion  that  extended  substance  is  finite, 
do  not  at  all  follow  from  the  notion  of  an  infinite  quantity, 
but  merely  from  the  notion  that  an  infinite  quantity 
is  measureable,  and  composed  of  finite  parts;  therefore, 
the  only  fair  conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  that  infinite 


52 


THE  ETHICS 


quantity  is  not  measureable,  and  cannot  be  composed  of 
finite  parts.  This  is  exactly  what  we  have  already 
proved  (in  Prop.  xii.).  Wherefore  the  weapon  which 
they  aimed  at  us  has  in  reality  recoiled  upon  themselves. 
If,  from  this  absurdity  of  theirs,  they  persist  in  drawing 
the  conclusion  that  extended  substance  must  be  finite,  they 
will  in  good  sooth  be  acting  like  a man  who  asserts  that 
circles  have  the  properties  of  squares,  and,  finding  him- 
self thereby  landed  in  absurdities,  proceeds  to  deny  that 
circles  have  any  centre,  from  which  all  lines  drawn  to 
the  circumference  are  equal.  For,  taking  extended  sub- 
stance, which  can  only  be  conceived  as  infinite,  one,  and 
indivisible  (Props,  viii.,  v.,  xii.)  they  assert,  in  order  to 
prove  that  it  is  finite,  that  it  is  composed  of  finite  parts, 
and  that  it  can  be  multiplied  and  divided. 

So,  also,  others,  after  asserting  that  a line  is  composed 
of  points,  can  produce  many  arguments  to  prove  that  a 
line  cannot  be  infinitely  divided.  Assuredly  it  is  not  less 
absurd  to  assert  that  extended  substance  is  made  up  of 
bodies  or  parts,  than  it  would  be  to  assert  that  a solid 
is  made  up  of  surfaces,  a surface  of  lines,  and  a line  of 
points.  This  must  be  admitted  by  all  who  know  clear 
reason  to  be  infallible,  and  most  of  all  by  those  who  deny 
the  possibility  of  a vacuum.  For  if  extended  substance 
could  be  so  divided  that  its  parts  were  really  separate, 
why  should  not  one  part  admit  of  being  destroyed,  the 
others  remaining  joined  together  as  before  ? And  why 
should  all  be  so  fitted  into  one  another  as  to  leave  no 
vacuum  ? Surely  in  the  case  of  things,  which  are  really 
distinct  one  from  the  other,  one  can  exist  without  the 
other,  and  can  remain  in  its  original  condition.  As 
then,  there  does  not  exist  a vacuum  in  nature  (of  which 
anon),  but  all  parts  are  bound  to  come  together  to  pre- 
vent it,  it  follows  from  this  also  that  the  parts  cannot 
be  really  distinguished,  and  that  extended  substance  in 
so  far  as  it  is  substance  cannot  be  divided. 

If  any  one  asks  me  the  further  question,  Why  are  we 
naturally  so  prone  to  divide  quantity  ? I answer,  that 
quantity  is  conceived  by  us  in  two  ways ; in  the  abstract 
and  superficially,  as  we  imagine  it;  or  as  substance,  as 


CONCERNING  GOD 


53 


we  conceive  it  solely  by  the  intellect.  If,  then,  we 
regard  quantity  as  it  is  represented  in  our  imagination, 
which  we  often  and  more  easily  do,  we  shall  find  that  it 
is  finite,  divisible,  and  compounded  of  parts;  but  if  we 
regard  it  as  it  is  represented  in  our  intellect,  and  con- 
ceive it  as  substance,  which  it  is  very  difficult  to  do,  we 
shall  then,  as  I have  sufficiently  proved,  find  that  it  is 
infinite,  one,  and  indivisible.  This  will  be  plain  enough 
to  all,  who  make  a distinction  between  the  intellect  and 
the  imagination,  especially  if  it  be  remembered,  that 
matter  is  everywhere  the  same,  that  its  parts  are  not 
distinguishable,  except  in  so  far  as  we  conceive  matter 
as  diversely  modified,  whence  its  parts  are  distinguished, 
not  really,  but  modally.  For  instance,  water,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  water,  we  conceive  to  be  divided,  and  its  parts 
to  be  separated  one  from  the  other;  but  not  in  so  far  as 
it  is  extended  substance;  from  this  point  of  view  it  is 
neither  separated  nor  divisible.  Further,  water,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  water,  is  produced  and  corrupted;  but,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  substance,  it  is  neither  produced  nor 
corrupted. 

I think  I have  now  answered  the  second  argument;  it 
is,  in  fact,  founded  on  the  same  assumption  as  the  first  — 
namely,  that  matter,  in  so  far  as  it  is  substance,  is 
divisible,  and  composed  of  parts.  Even  if  it  were  so,  I 
do  not  know  why  it  should  be  considered  unworthy  of 
the  divine  nature,  inasmuch  as  besides  God  (by  Prop,  xiv.) 
no  substance  can  be  granted,  wherefrom  it  could  receive 
its  modifications.  All  things,  I repeat,  are  in  God,  and 
all  things  which  come  to  pass,  come  to  pass  solely 
through  the  laws  of  the  infinite  nature  of  God,  and  fol- 
low (as  I will  shortly  show)  from  the  necessity  of  his 
essence.  Wherefore  it  can  in  nowise  be  said,  that  God 
is  passive  in  respect  to  anything  other  than  himself,  or 
that  extended  substance  is  unworthy  of  the  Divine  nature, 
even  if  it  be  supposed  divisible,  so  long  as  it  is  granted 
to  be  infinite  and  eternal.  But  enough  of  this  for  the 
present. 

Prop.  XVI.  From  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature 
must  follow  an  infinite  number  of  things  in  infinite  ways— 


54 


THE  ETHICS 


tjiat  is,  all  things  which  can  fall  within  the  sphere  of  in- 
finite intellect. 

£ 

Proof.  — This  proposition  will  be  clear  to  everyone,  who 
remembers  that  from  the  given  definition  of  any  thing 
the  intellect  infers  several  properties,  which  really  neces- 
sarily follow  therefrom  (that  is,  from  the  actual  essence 
of  the  thing  defined) ; and  it  infers  more  properties  in 
proportion  as  the  definition  of  the  thing  expresses  more 
reality,  that  is,  in  proportion  as  the  essence  of  the  thing 
defined  involves  more  reality.  Now,  as  the  divine  nature 
has  absolutely  infinite  attributes  (by  Def.  vi.),  of  which 
each  expresses  infinite  essence  after  its  kind,  it  follows 
that  from  the  necessity  of  its  nature  an  infinite  number 
of  things  (that  is,  everything  which  can  fall  within  the 
sphere  of  an  infinite  intellect)  must  necessarily  follow. 
Q.E.D. 

Corollary  /. — Hence  it  follows,  that  God  is  the  efficient 
cause  of  all  that  can  fall  within  the  sphere  of  an  infinite 
intellect. 

Corollary  II. — It  also  follows  that  God  is  a cause  in  him- 
self,  and  not  through  an  accident  of  his  nature^ 

Corollary  III. — It  follows,  thirdly,  that  God  is  the  abso- 
lutely  first  cause. 

Prop.  XVII.  God  acts  solely  by  the  laws  of  his  own  na- 
ture, and  is  not  constrained  by  any_onOr- 

Proof. — We  have  just  shown  (in  Prop,  xvi.),  that  solely 
from  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature,  or,  what  is  the 
same  thing,  solely  from  the  laws  of  his  nature,  an 
infinite  number  of  things  absolutely  follow  in  an  infinite 
number  of  ways;  and  we  proved  (in  Prop,  xv.),  that 
without  God  nothing  can  be,  nor  be  conceived;  but 
that  all  things  are  in  God.  Wherefore  nothing  can 
exist  outside  himself,  whereby  he  can  be  conditioned  or 
constrained  to  act.  Wherefore  God  acts  solely  by  the 
laws  of  his  own  nature,  and  is  not  constrained  by  any 
one.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary  I. — It  follows:  i.  That  there  can  be  no 

cause  which,  either  extrinsically  or  intrinsically,  besides 
the  perfection  of  his  own  nature,  moves  God  to  act. 

~'HWffltary  II. — It  follows:  2.  That  God  is  the  sole 


CONCERNING  GOD 


55 


free  cause.  For  God  alone  exists  by  the  sole  necessity  of 
his  nature  (by  Prop.  xi.  and  Prop,  xiv.,  Coroll.  i. ), 
and  acts  by  the  sole  necessity  of  his  nature,  where- 
fore God  is  (by  Def.  vii. ) the  sole  free  cause.  Q. E.D. 

Note. — Others  think  that  God  is  a free  cause,  be- 
cause he  can,  as  they  think,  bring  it  about,  that  those 
things  which  we  have  said  follow  from  his  nature  — 
that  is,  which  are  in  his  power,  should  not  come  to 
pass,  or  should  not  be  produced  by  him.  But  this  is 
the  same  as  if  they  said,  that  God  could  bring  it  about, 
that  it  should  not  follow  from  the  nature  of  a trian- 
gle, that  its  three  interior  angles  should  not  be  equal 
to  two  right  angles;  or  that  from  a given  cause  no 
effect  should  follow,  which  is  absurd. 

Moreover,  I will  show  below,  without  the  aid  of  this 
proposition,  that  neither  intellect  nor  will  appertain  to 
God’s  nature.  I know  that  there  are  many  who  think 
that  they  can  show,  that  supreme  intellect  and  free 
will  do  appertain  to  God’s  nature;  for  they  say  they 
know  of  nothing  more  perfect,  which  they  can  attrib- 
ute to  God,  than  that  which  is  the  highest  perfection 
in  ourselves.  Further,  although  they  conceive  God  as 
actually  supremely  intelligent,  they  yet  do  not  believe, 
that  he  can  bring  into  existence  everything  which  he 
actually  understands,  for  they  think  that  they  would 
thus  destroy  God’s  power.  If,  they  contend,  God  had 
created  everything  which  is  in  his  intellect,  he  would  not 
be  able  to  create  anything  more,  and  this,  they  think, 
would  clash  with  God’s  omnipotence ; therefore,  they  pre- 
fer to  assert  that  God  is  indifferent  to  all  things,  and 
that  he  creates  nothing  except  that  which  he  has  de- 
cided, by  some  absolute  exercise  of  will,  to  create.  How- 
ever, I think  I have  shown  sufficiently  clearly  (by  Prop, 
xvi. ),  that  from  God’s  supreme  power,  or  infinite  na- 
ture, an  infinite  number  of  things  — that  is,  all  things 
have  necessarily  flowed  forth  in  an  infinite  number  of 
ways,  or  always  follow  from  the  same  necessity;  in 
the  same  way  as  from  the  nature  of  a triangle  it  fol- 
lows from  eternity  and  for  eternity,  that  its  three  in- 
terior angles  are  equal  to  two  right  angles.  Wherefore  the 


5« 


THE  ETHICS 


omnipotence  of  God  has  been  displayed  from  all  eter- 
nity, and  will  for  all  eternity  remain  in  the  same  state  of 
activity.  This  manner  of  treating  the  question  attrib- 
utes to  God  an  omnipotence,  in  my  opinion,  far  more 
perfect.  For,  otherwise,  we  are  compelled  to  confess 
that  God  understands  an  infinite  number  of  creatable 
things,  which  he  will  never  be  able  to  create,  for,  if 
he  created  all  that  he  understands,  he  would,  accord- 
ing to  this  showing,  exhaust  his  omnipotence,  and  ren- 
der himself  imperfect.  Wherefore,  in  order  to  establish 
that  God  is  perfect,  we  should  be  reduced  to  estab- 
lishing at  the  same  time,  that  he  cannot  bring  to  pass 
everything  over  which  his  power  extends;  this  seems 
to  be  an  hypothesis  most  absurd,  and  most  repugnant 
to  God’s  omnipotence. 

Further  (to  say  a word  here  concerning  the  intellect 
and  the  will  which  we  attribute  to  God),  if  intellect  and 
will  appertain  to  the  eternal  essence  of  God,  we  must 
take  these  words  in  some  significations  quite  different 
from  those  they  usually  bear.  For  intellect  and  will, 
which  should  constitute  the  essence  of  God,  would  per- 
force be  as  far  apart  as  the  poles  from  the  human  intel- 
lect and  will,  in  fact,  would  have  nothing  in  common 
with  them  but  the  name ; there  would  be  about  as  much 
correspondence  between  the  two  as  there  is  between  the 
Dog,  the  heavenly  constellation,  and  a dog,  an  animal 
that  barks.  This  I will  prove  as  follows:  If  intellect 

belongs  to  the  divine  nature,  it  cannot  be  in  nature,  as 
ours  is  generally  thought  to  be,  posterior  to,  or  simulta- 
neous with  the  things  understood,  inasmuch  as  God  is 
prior  to  all  things  by  reason  of  his  casualty  (Prop.  xvi. 
Coroll.  i.).  On  the  contrary,  the  truth  and  formal  es- 
sence of  things  is  as  it  is,  because  it  exists  by  represen- 
tation as  such  in  the  intellect  of  God.  Wherefore  the 
intellect  of  God,  in  so  far  as  it  is  conceived  to  constitute 
God’s  essence,  is,  in  reality,  the  cause  of  things,  both  of 
their  essence  and  of  their  existence.  This  seems  to  have 
been  recognized  by  those  who  have  asserted,  that  God’s 
intellect,  God’s  will,  and  God’s  power,  are  one  and  the 
same.  As,  therefore,  God’s  intellect  is  the  sole  cause  of 


CONCERNING  GOD 


57 


things,  namely,  both  of  their  essence  and  existence,  it 
must  necessarily  differ  from  them  in  respect  to  its  es- 
sence, and  in  respect  to  its  existence.  For  a cause  dif- 
fers from  a thing  it  causes,  precisely  in  the  quality 
which  the  latter  gains  from  the  former. 

For  example,  a man  is  the  cause  of  another  man’s 
existence,  but  not  of  his  essence  (for  the  latter  is  an 
eternal  truth),  and,  therefore,  the  two  men  may  be  en- 
tirely similar  in  essence,  but  must  be  different  in  exist- 
ence; and  hence  if  the  existence  of  one  of  them  cease, 
the  existence  of  the  other  will  not  necessarily  cease  also ; 
but  if  the  essence  of  one  could  be  destroyed,  and  be  made 
false,  the  essence  of  the  other  would  be  destroyed  also. 
Wherefore,  a thing  which  is  the  cause  both  of  the  essence 
and  of  the  existence  of  a given  effect,  must  differ  from 
such  effect  both  in  respect  to  its  essence,  and  also  in 
respect  to  its  existence.  Now  the  intellect  of  God  is 
the  cause  of  both  the  essence  and  the  existence 
of  our  intellect;  therefore  the  intellect  of  God  in  so  faf 
as  it  is  conceived  to  constitute  the  divine  essence,  dif- 
fers from  our  intellect  both  in  respect  to  essence  and  in 
respect  to  existence,  nor  can  it  in  anywise  agree  there- 
with save  in  name,  as  we  said  before.  The  reasoning 
would  be  identical,  in  the  case  of  the  will,  as  any  one 
can  easily  see. 

Prop.  XVIII.  God  is  the  indwelling  and  not  the  tran- 
sient  cause  of  all  things. 

Proof. — All  things  which  are,  are  in  God,  and  must  be 
conceived  through  God  (by  Prop,  xv.),  therefore  (by 
Prop,  xvi.,  Coroll,  i.)  God  is  the  cause  of  those  things 
which  are  in  him.  This  is  our  first  point.  Further, 
besides  God  there  can  be  no  substance  (by  Prop,  xiv.), 
that  is  nothing  in  itself  external  to  God.  This  is  our 
second  point.  God,  therefore,  is  the  indwelling  and  not 
the  transient  cause  of  all  things.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XIX.  God,  and  all  the  attributes  of  God,  are 
eternal. 

Proof. — God  (by  Def.  vi.)  is  substance,  which  (by 
Prop,  xi.)  necessarily  exists,  that  is  (by  Prop,  vii.)  exist- 


THE  ETHICS 


58 

ence  appertains  to  its  nature,  or  (what  is  the  same  thing) 
follows  from  its  definition;  therefore,  God  is  eternal  (by 
Def.  viii.).  Further,  by  the  attributes  of  God  we  must 
understand  that  which  (by  Def.  iv.)  expresses  the  essence 
of  the  divine  substance  — in  other  words,  that  which  apper- 
tains to  substance : that,  I say,  should  be  involved  in  the 
attributes  of  substance.  Now  eternity  appertains  to  the 
nature  of  substance  (as  I have  already  shown  in 
Prop,  vii.);  therefore,  eternity  must  appertain  to  each 
of  the  attributes,  and  thus  all  are  eternal.  Q.  E.D. 

Note. — This  proposition  is  also  evident  from  the  man- 
ner in  which  (in  Prop,  xi.)  I demonstrated  the  existence 
of  God;  it  is  evident,  I repeat,  from  that  proof,  that  the 
existence  of  God,  like  his  essence,  is  an  eternal  truth. 
Further  (in  Prop.  xix.  of  my  <(  Principles  of  the  Cartesian 
Philosophy  ”),  I have  proved  the  eternity  of  God,  in  an- 
other manner,  which  I need  not  here  repeat. 

Prop.  XX.  The  existence  of  God  and  his  essence  are 
one  and  the  same. 

Proof. — God  (by  the  last  Prop.)  and  all  his  attributes 
are  eternal,  that  is  (by  Def.  viii.)  each  of  his  attributes 
expresses  existence.  Therefore  the  same  attributes  of 
God  which  explain  his  eternal  essence,  explain  at  the 
same  time  his  eternal  existence  — in  other  words,  that 
which  constitutes  God’s  essence  constitutes  at  the  same 
time  his  existence.  Wherefore  God’s  existence  and  God’s 
essence  are  one  and  the  same.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary  I. — Hence  it  follows  that  God’s  existence, .like 
his  essence,  is  an  eternal  truth. 

Corollary  II.  — Secondly,  it  follows  that  God,  and  all  the 
attributes  of  God,  are  unchangeable.  For  if  they  could  be 
changed  in  respect  to  existence,  they  must  also  be  able 
to  be  changed  in  respect  to  essence  — that  is,  obviously, 
be  changed  from  true  to  false,  which  is  absurd. 

Prop.  XXI.  All  things  which  follow  from  the  absolute 
nature  of  any  attribute  of  God  must  always  exist  and  be 
infinite,  or,  in  other  words,  are  eternal  and  infinite 
through  the  said  attribute. 

Proof. — Conceive,  if  it  be  possible  (supposing  the  prop- 
osition to  be  denied),  that  something  in  some  attribute 


CONCERNING  GOD 


59 


of  God  can  follow  from  the  absolute  nature  of  the  said 
attribute,  and  that  at  the  same  time  it  is  finite,  and 
has  a conditioned  existence  or  duration ; for  instance,  the 
idea  of  God  expressed  in  the  attribute  thought.  Now 
thought,  in  so  far  as  it  is  supposed  to  be  an  attribute  of 
God,  is  necessarily  (by  Prop,  xi.)  in  its  nature  infinite. 
But,  in  so  far  as  it  possesses  the  idea  of  God,  it  is  sup- 
posed finite.  It  cannot,  however,  be  conceived  as  finite, 
unless  it  be  limited  by  thought  (by  Def.  ii. ) ; but  it  is 
not  limited  by  thought  itself,  in  so  far  as  it  has  consti- 
tuted the  idea  of  God  (for  so  far  it  is  supposed  to  be 
finite);  therefore,  it  is  limited  by  thought,  in  so  far  as 
it  has  not  constituted  the  idea  of  God,  which  neverthe- 
less (by  Prop,  xi.)  must  necessarily  exist. 

We  have  now  granted,  therefore,  thought  not  constitut- 
ing the  idea  of  God,  and,  accordingly,  the  idea  of  God 
does  not  naturally  follow  from  its  nature  in  so  far  as  it 
is  absolute  thought  (for  it  is  conceived  as  constituting, 
and  also  as  not  constituting,  the  idea  of  God),  which  is 
against  our  hypothesis.  Wherefore,  if  the  idea  of  God 
expressed  in  the  attribute  thought,  or,  indeed,  anything 
else  in  any  attribute  of  God  ( for  we  may  take  any  exam- 
ple, as  the  proof  is  of  universal  application)  follows  from 
the  necessity  of  the  absolute  nature  of  the  said  attribute, 
the  said  thing  must  necessarily  be  infinite,  which  was 
our  first  point. 

Furthermore,  a thing  which  thus  follows  from  the  neces- 
sity of  the  nature  of  any  attribute  cannot  have  a limited 
duration.  For  if  it  can  suppose  a thing,  which  follows 
from  the  necessity  of  the  nature  of  some  attribute,  to 
exist  in  some  attribute  of  God,  for  instance,  the  idea  of 
God  expressed  in  the  attribute  thought,  and  let  it  be  sup- 
posed at  some  time  not  to  have  existed,  or  to  be  about 
not  to  exist. 

Now  thought  being  an  attribute  of  God,  must  neces- 
sarily exist  unchanged  (by  Prop,  xi.,  and  Prop,  xx., 
Coroll,  ii.);  and  beyond  the  limits  of  the  duration  of  the 
idea  of  God  (supposing  the  latter  at  some  time  not  to 
have  existed,  or  not  to  be  going  to  exist),  thought  would 
perforce  have  existed  without  the  idea  of  God,  which  is 


6o 


THE  ETHICS 


contrary  to  our  hypothesis,  for  we  supposed  that,  thought 
being  given,  the  idea  of  God  necessarily  flowed  there- 
from. Therefore  the  idea  of  God  expressed  in  thought, 
or  anything  which  necessarily  follows  from  the  absolute 
nature  of  some  attribute  of  God,  cannot  have  a limited 
duration,  but  through  the  said  attribute  is  eternal,  which 
is  our  second  point.  Bear  in  mind  that  the  same  propo- 
sition may  be  affirmed  of  anything,  which  in  any  attribute 
necessarily  follows  from  God’s  absolute  nature. 

Prop.  XXII.  Whatsoever  follows  from  any  attribute 
of  God,  in  so  far  as  it  is  modified  by  a modification, 
which  exists  necessarily  and  as  infinite,  through  the 
said  attribute,  must  also  exist  necessarily  and  as  in- 
finite^ 

Proof. — The  proof  of  this  proposition  is  similar  to  that 
of  the  preceding  one. 

Prop.  XXIII.  Every  mode,  which  exists  both  neces- 
sarily and  as  infinite,  must  necessarily  follow  either  from 
the  absolute  nature  of  some  attribute  of  God,  or  from  an 
attribute  modified  by  a modification  which  exists  neces- 
sjtrily,  and  as  infinite.- - 

Proof. — A mode  exists  in  something  else,  through  which 
it  must  be  conceived  (Def.  v.),  that  is  (Prop,  xv.),  it 
exists  solely  in  God,  and  solely  through  God  can  be  con- 
ceived. If,  therefore,  a mode  is  conceived  as  necessarily 
existing  and  infinite,  it  must  necessarily  be  inferred  or 
perceived  through  some  attribute  of  God,  in  so  far  as 
such  attribute  is  conceived  as  expressing  the  infinity  and 
necessity  of  existence,  in  other  words  (Def.  viii.)  eternity; 
that  is,  in  so  far  as  it  is  considered  absolutely.  A mode, 
therefore,  which  necessarily  exists  as  infinite,  must  follow 
from  the  absolute  nature  of  some  attribute  of  God,  either 
immediately  (Prop,  xxi.)  or  through  the  means  of  some 
modification,  which  follows  from  the  absolute  nature  of 
the  said  attribute;  that  is  (by  Prop,  xxii.),  which  exists 
necessarily  and  as  infinite. 

Prop.  XXIV.  The  essence  of  things  produced  by  God 
does  not  involve  existence. 

Proof. — This  proposition  is  evident  from  Def.  i.  For 
that  of  which  the  nature  (considered  in  itself)  involves 


CONCERNING  GOD 


61 


existence  is  self-caused,  and  exists  by  the  sole  necessity 
of  its  own  nature. 

Corollary. — Hence  it  follows  that  God  is  not  only  the 
cause  of  things  coming  into  existence,  but  also  of  their 
continuing  in  existence,  that  is,  in  scholastic  phraseology, 
God  is  cause  of  the  being  of  things  ( essendi  rerum). 
For  whether  things  exist,  or  do  not  exist,  whenever  we 
contemplate  their  essence,  we  see  that  it  involves  neither 
existence  nor  duration;  consequently,  it  cannot  be  the 
cause  of  either  the  one  or  the  other.  God  must  be  the 
sole  cause,  inasmuch  as  to  him  alone  does  existence  ap- 
pertain. (Prop.  xiv.  Coroll,  i.)  Q.E. D. 

Prop.  XXV.  God  is  the  efficient  cause  not  only  of  the 
existence  of  things,  but  also  of  their  essence. 

Proof. — If  this  be  denied,  then  God  is  not  the  cause 
of  the  essence  of  things;  and  therefore  the  essence  of 
things  can  (by  Ax.  iv.)  be  conceived  without  God.  This 
(by  Prop,  xv.)  is  absurd.  Therefore,  God  is  the  cause  of 
the  essence  of  things.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — This  proposition  follows  more  clearly  from 
Prop.  xvi.  For  it  is  evident  thereby  that,  given  the 
divine  nature,  the  essence  of  things  must  be  inferred 
from  it,  no  less  than  their  existence — in  a word,  God 
must  be  called  the  cause  of  all  things,  in  the  same 
sense  as  he  is  called  the  cause  of  himself.  This  will  be 
made  still  clearer  by  the  following  corollary. 

Corollary. — Individual  things  are  nothing  but  modi- 
fications of  the  attributes  of  God,  or  modes  by  which 
the  attributes  of  God  are  expressed  in  a fixed  and 
definite  manner.  The  proof  appears  from  Prop.  xv. 
and  Def.  v. 

Prop.  XXVI.  A thing  which  is  conditioned  to  act 
in  a particular  manner,  has  necessarily  been  thus  con- 
ditioned by  God ; and  that  which  has  not  been  conditioned 
by  God  cannot  condition  itself  to  act. 

Proof. — That  by  which  things  are  said  to  be  conditioned 
to  act  in  a particular  manner  is  necessarily  something 
positive  ( this  is  obvious ) ; therefore  both  of  its  essence  and 
of  its  existence  God  by  the  necessity  of  his  nature  is  the 
efficient  cause  ( Props,  xxv.  and  xvi.) ; this  is  our  first  point. 


62 


THE  ETHICS 


Our  second  point  is  plainly  to  be  inferred  therefrom.  For 
if  a thing,  which  has  not  been  conditioned  by  God,  could 
condition  itself,  the  first  part  of  our  proof  would  be  false, 
and  this,  as  we  have  shown,  is  absurd. 

Prop.  XXVII.  A thing,  which  has  been  conditioned  by 
God  to  act  in  a particular  way,  cannot  render  itself  uncon- 
ditioned. 

Proof.  — This  proposition  is  evident  from  the  third 
axiom. 

Prop.  XXVIII.  Every  individual  thing,  or  everything 
which  is  finite  and  has  a conditioned  existence,  cannot 
exist  or  be  conditioned  to  act,  unless  it  be  conditioned 
for  existence  and  action  by  a cause  other  than  itself, 
which  also  is  finite,  and  has  a conditioned  existence; 
and  likewise  this  cause  cannot  in  its  turn  exist,  or  be 
conditioned  to  act,  unless  it  be  conditioned  for  existence 
and  action  by  another  cause,  which  also  is  finite,  and 
has  a conditioned  existence,  and  so  on  to  infinity. 

Proof.  — Whatsoever  is  conditioned  to  exist  and  act,  has 
been  thus  conditioned  by  God  (by  Prop.  xxvi.  and  Prop, 
xxiv.,  Coroll.) 

But  that  which  is  finite  and  has  a conditioned  exist- 
ence, cannot  be  produced  by  the  absolute  nature  of  any 
attribute  of  God;  for  whatsoever  follows  from  the  abso- 
lute nature  of  any  attribute  of  God  is  infinite  and  eternal 
(by  Prop.  xxi).  It  must,  therefore,  follow  from  some 
attribute  of  God,  in  so  far  as  the  said  attribute  is  con- 
sidered as  in  some  way  modified ; for  substance  and 
modes  make  up  the  sum  total  of  existence  (by  Ax.  i. 
and  Def.  iii. , v.),  while  modes  are  merely  modifications 
of  the  attributes  of  God.  But  from  God,  or  from  any  of 
his  attributes,  in  so  far  as  the  latter  is  modified  by  a 
modification  infinite  and  eternal,  a conditioned  thing  can- 
not follow.  Wherefore  it  must  follow  from,  or  be  con- 
ditioned for,  existence  and  action  by  God  or  one  of  his 
attributes,  in  so  far  as  the  latter  are  modified  by  some 
modification  which  is  finite  and  has  a conditioned  exist- 
ence. This  is  our  first  point.  Again,  this  cause  or  this 
modification  (for  the  reason  by  which  we  established  the 
first  part  of  this  proof)  must  in  its  turn  be  conditioned  by 


CONCERNING  GOD 


63 


another  cause,  which  also  is  finite,  and  has  a conditioned 
existence,  and  again,  this  last  by  another  (for  the  same 
reason ) ; and  so  on  ( for  the  same  reason ) to  infinity. 
Q.E.D. 

Note. — As  certain  things  must  be  produced  immediately 
by  God,  namely  those  things  which  necessarily  follow 
from  his  absolute  nature,  through  the  means  of  these 
primary  attributes,  which,  nevertheless,  can  neither  exist 
nor  be  conceived  without  God,  it  follows:  — 1.  That  God 
is  absolutely  the  proximate  cause  of  those  things  imme- 
diately produced  by  him.  I say  absolutely,  not  after  his 
kind,  as  is  usually  stated.  For  the  effects  of  God  cannot 
either  exist  or  be  conceived  without  a cause  (Prop.  xv. 
and  Prop.  xxiv. , Coroll.).  2.  That  God  cannot  properly 
be  styled  the  remote  cause  of  individual  things,  except 
for  the  sake  of  distinguishing  these  from  what  he  imme- 
diately produces,  or  rather  from  what  follows  from  his 
absolute  nature.  For,  by  a remote  cause,  we  understand 
a cause  which  is  in  no  way  conjoined  to  the  effect.  But 
all  things  which  are,  are  in  God,  and  so  depend  on 
God,  that  without  him  they  can  neither  be  nor  be  con- 
ceived. 

Prop.  XXIX.  Nothing  in  the  universe  is  contingent, 
but  all  things  are  conditioned  to  exist  and  operate  in  a 
particular  manner  by  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature. 

Proof. — Whatsoever  is,  is  in  God  (Prop.  xv.).  But  God 
cannot  be  called  a thing  contingent.  For  (by  Prop,  xi.) 
he  exists  necessarily,  and  not  contingently.  Further,  the 
modes  of  the  divine  nature  follow  therefrom  necessarily, 
and  not  contingently  (Prop,  xvi.);  and  they  thus  follow, 
whether  we  consider  the  divine  nature  absolutely  or 
whether  we  consider  it  as  in  any  way  conditioned  to  act 
(Prop,  xxvii.).  Further,  God  is  not  only  the  cause  of 
these  modes,  in  so  far  as  they  simply  exist  (by  Prop, 
xxiv.,  Coroll.),  but  also  in  so  far  as  they  are  considered 
as  conditioned  for  operating  in  a particular  manner 
(Prop.  xxvi.).  If  they  be  not  conditioned  by  God  (Prop, 
xxvi.),  it  is  impossible,  and  not  contingent,  that  they 
should  condition  themselves;  contrariwise,  if  they  be 
conditioned  by  God,  it  is  impossible,  and  not  contingent 


64 


THE  ETHICS 


that  they  should  render  themselves  unconditioned. 
Wherefore  all  things  are  conditioned  by  the  necessity  of 
the  divine  nature,  not  only  to  exist,  but  also  to  exist 
and  operate  in  a particular  manner,  and  there  is  nothing 
that  is  contingent.  Q.  E.  D. 

Note. — Before  going  any  further,  I wish  here  to  ex- 
plain, what  we  should  understand  by  nature  viewed  as 
active  ( natura  natur ans ),  and  nature  viewed  as  passive 
{natura  natur at  a).  I say  to  explain,  or  rather  call  atten- 
tion to  it,  for  I think  that,  from  what  has  been  said,  it  is 
sufficiently  clear,  that  by  nature  viewed  as  active  we 
should  understand  that  which  is  in  itself,  and  is  con- 
ceived through  itself,  or  those  attributes  of  substance, 
which  express  eternal  and  infinite  essence,  in  other 
words  (Prop,  xiv.,  Coroll,  i.,  and  Prop,  xvii.,  Coroll,  ii.) 
God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  considered  as  a free  cause. 

By  nature  viewed  as  passive  I understand  all  that 
which  follows  from  the  necessity  of  the  nature  of  God, 
or  of  any  of  the  attributes  of  God,  that  is,  all  the 
modes  of  the  attributes  of  God,  in  so  far  as  they  are 
considered  as  things  which  are  in  God,  and  which  with- 
out God  cannot  exist  or  be  conceived. 

Prop.  XXX.  Intellect,  in  function  ( actu ) finite,  or  in 
function  infinite,  must  comprehend  the  attributes  of  God 
and  the  modifications  of  God,  and  nothing  else. 

Proof. — A true  idea  must  agree  with  its  object  (Ax.  vi.); 
in  other  words  (obviously),  that  which  is  contained  in 
the  intellect  in  representation  must  necessarily  be  granted 
in  nature.  But  in  nature  (by  Prop,  xiv.,  Coroll,  i.) 
there  is  no  substance  save  God,  nor  any  modifications 
save  those  (Prop,  xv.)  which  are  in  God,  and  cannot 
without  God  either  be  or  be  conceived.  Therefore  the 
intellect,  in  function  finite,  or  in  function  infinite,  must 
comprehend  the  attributes  of  God  and  the  modifications 
of  God,  and  nothing  else.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXI.  The  intellect  in  function,  whether  finite 
or  infinite,  as  will,  desire,  love,  etc.,  should  be  referred 
to  passive  nature  and  not  to  active  nature. 

Proof. — By  the  intellect  we  do  not  (obviously)  mean 
absolute  thought,  but  only  a certain  mode  of  thinking, 


CONCERNING  GOD 


65 


differing  from  other  modes,  such  as  love,  desire,  etc., 
and  therefore  ( Def . v. ) requiring  to  he  conceived  through 
absolute  thought.  It  must  (by  Prop.  xv.  and  Def.  vi.), 
through  some  attribute  of  God  which  expresses  the 
eternal  and  infinite  essence  of  thought,  be  so  conceived, 
that  without  such  attribute  it  could  neither  be  nor  be 
conceived.  It  must  therefore  be  referred  to  nature  pas- 
sive rather  than  to  nature  active,  as  must  also  the  other 
modes  of  thinking.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — I do  not  here,  by  speaking  of  intellect  in  func- 
tion, admit  that  there  is  such  a thing  as  intellect  in 
potentiality:  but,  wishing  to  avoid  all  confusion,  I de- 
sire to  speak  only  of  what  is  most  clearly  perceived  by 
us,  namely,  of  the  very  act  of  understanding,  than  which 
nothing  is  more  clearly  perceived.  For  we  cannot  per- 
ceive anything  without  adding  to  our  knowledge  of  the 
act  of  understanding. 

Prop.  XXXII.  Will  cannot  be  called  a free  cause,  but 
only  a necessary  cause. 

Proof. — Will  is  only  a particular  mode  of  thinking,  like 
intellect;  therefore  (by  Prop,  xxviii.)  no  volition  can  exist, 
nor  be  conditioned  to  act,  unless  it  be  conditioned  by 
some  cause  other  than  itself,  which  cause  is  conditioned  by 
a third  cause,  and  so  on  to  infinity.  But  if  will  be  sup- 
posed infinite,  it  must  also  be  conditioned  to  exist  and 
act  by  God,  not  by  virtue  of  his  being  substance  abso- 
lutely infinite,  but  by  virtue  of  his  possessing  an  attribute 
which  expresses  the  infinite  and  eternal  essence  of  thought 
(by  Prop,  xxiii.).  Thus,  however  it  be  conceived,  whether 
as  finite  or  infinite,  it  requires  a cause  by  which  it  should 
be  conditioned  to  exist  and  act.  Thus  ( Def.  vii. ) it  can- 
not be  called  a free  cause,  but  only  a necessary  or  con- 
strained cause.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary.  I. — Hence  it  follows,  first,  that  God  does  not 
act  according  to  freedom  of  the  will. 

Corollary.  II. — It  follows  secondly,  that  will  and  intel- 
lect stand  in  the  same  relation  to  the  nature  of  God  as  do 
motion,  and  rest,  and  absolutely  all  natural  phenomena, 
which  must  be  conditioned  by  God  (Prop,  xxix.)  to  exist 
and  act  in  a particular  manner.  For  will,  like  the  rest, 

5 


66 


THE  ETHICS 


stands  in  need  of  a cause,  by  which  it  is  conditioned  to 
exist  and  act  in  a particular  manner.  And  although,  when 
will  or  intellect  be  granted,  an  infinite  number  of  results 
may  follow,  yet  God  cannot  on  that  account  be  said  to 
act  from  freedom  of  the  will,  any  more  than  the  infinite 
number  of  results  from  motion  and  rest  would  justify 
us  in  saying  that  motion  and  rest  act  by  free  will.  Where- 
fore will  no  more  appertains  to  God  than  does  anything 
else  in  nature,  but  stands  in  the  same  relation  to  him  as 
motion,  rest,  and  the  like,  which  we  have  shown  to  follow 
from  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature,  and  to  be  con- 
ditioned by  it  to  exist  and  act  in  a particular  manner. 

Prop.  XXXIII.  Things  could  not  have  been  brought 
into  being  by  God  in  any  manner  or  in  any  order  differ- 
ent from  that  which  has  in  fact  obtained. 

Proof.  — All  things  necessarily  follow  from  the  nature  of 
God  (Prop,  xvi.),  and  by  the  nature  of  God  are  con- 
ditioned to  exist  and  act  in  a particular  way  (Prop.  xxix). 
If  things,  therefore,  could  have  been  of  a different  nature, 
or  have  been  conditioned  to  act  in  a different  way,  so 
that  the  order  of  nature  would  have  been  different,  God’s 
nature  would  also  have  been  able  to  be  different  from 
what  it  now  is ; and  therefore  ( by  Prop.  xi. ) that  different 
nature  also  would  have  perforce  existed,  and  consequently 
there  would  have  been  able  to  be  two  or  more  Gods. 
This  (by  Prop,  xiv.,  Coroll,  i.)  is  absurd.  Therefore 
things  could  not  have  been  brought  into  being  by  God 
in  any  other  manner,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Note  I. — As  I have  thus  shown,  more  clearly  than  the 
sun  at  noonday,  that  there  is  nothing  to  justify  us  in 
calling  things  contingent,  I wish  to  explain  briefly 
what  meaning  we  shall  attach  to  the  word  contin- 
gent; but  I will  first  explain  the  words  necessary  and 
impossible. 

A thing  is  called  necessary  either  in  respect  to  its 
essence  or  in  respect  to  its  cause;  for  the  existence  of  a 
thing  necessarily  follows,  either  from  its  essence  and 
definition,  or  from  a given  efficient  cause.  For  similar 
reasons  a thing  is  said  to  be  impossible ; namely,  inasmuch 
as  its  essence  or  definition  involves  a contradiction,  or 


CONCERNING  GOD 


67 


because  no  external  cause  is  granted,  which  is  conditioned 
to  produce  such  an  effect;  but  a thing  can  in  no  respect 
be  called  contingent,  save  in  relation  to  the  imperfection 
of  our  knowledge. 

A thing  of  which  we  do  not  know  whether  the  essence 
does  or  does  not  involve  a contradiction,  or  of  which 
knowing  that  it  does  not  involve  a contradiction,  we  are 
still  in  doubt  concerning  the  existence,  because  the  order 
of  causes  escapes  us, — such  a thing,  I say,  cannot  appear 
to  us  either  necessary  or  impossible.  Wherefore  we  call 
it  contingent  or  possible. 

Note  II. — It  clearly  follows  from  what  we  have  said, 
that  things  have  been  brought  into  being  by  God  in  the 
highest  perfection,  inasmuch  as  they  have  necessarily 
followed  from  a most  perfect  nature.  Nor  does  this 
prove  any  imperfection  in  God,  for  it  has  compelled  us 
to  affirm  his  perfection.  From  its  contrary  proposition, 
we  should  clearly  gather  (as  I have  just  shown),  that 
God  is  not  supremely  perfect,  for  if  things  had  been 
brought  into  being  in  any  other  way,  we  should  have  to 
assign  to  God  a nature  different  from  that,  which  we  are 
bound  to  attribute  to  him  from  the  consideration  of  an 
absolutely  perfect  being. 

I do  not  doubt,  that  many  will  scout  this  idea  as  absurd, 
and  will  refuse  to  give  their  minds  up  to  contemplating  it, 
simply  because  they  are  accustomed  to  assign  to  God  a 
freedom  very  different  from  that  which  we  (Def.  vii.)  have 
deduced.  They  assign  to  him,  in  short,  absolute  free  will. 
However,  I am  also  convinced  that  if  such  persons  reflect 
on  the  matter,  and  duly  weigh  in  their  minds  our  series  of 
propositions,  they  will  reject  such  freedom  as  they  now 
attribute  to  God,  not  only  as  nugatory,  but  also  as  a great 
impediment  to  organized  knowledge.  There  is  no  need  for 
me  to  repeat  what  I said  in  the  note  to  Prop.  xvii.  But, 
for  the  sake  of  my  opponents,  I will  show  further,  that 
although  it  be  granted  that  will  appertains  to  the  essence 
of  God,  it  nevertheless  follows  from  his  perfection,  that 
things  could  not  have  been  by  him  created  other  than 
they  are,  or  in  a different  order;  this  is  easily  proved,  if 
we  reflect  on  what  our  opponents  themselves  concede, 


68 


THE  ETHICS 


namely,  that  it  depends  solely  on  the  decree  and  will  of 
God,  that  each  thing  is  what  it  is.  If  it  were  otherwise, 
God  would  not  be  the  cause  of  all  things.  Further,  that 
all  the  decrees  of  God  have  been  ratified  from  all  eter- 
nity by  God  himself.  If  it  were  otherwise,  God  would 
be  convicted  of  imperfection  or  change.  But  in  eternity 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  when,  before,  or  after;  hence 
it  follows  solely  from  the  perfection  of  God,  that  God 
never  can  decree,  or  never  could  have  decreed  anything 
but  what  is;  that  God  did  not  exist  before  his  decrees, 
and  would  not  exist  without  them.  But,  it  is  said,  sup- 
posing that  God  had  made  a different  universe,  or  had 
ordained  other  decrees  from  all  eternity  concerning  nature 
and  her  order,  we  could  not  therefore  conclude  any  imper- 
fection in  God.  But  persons  who  say  this  must  admit  that 
God  can  change  his  decrees.  For  if  God  had  ordained  any 
decrees  concerning  nature  and  her  order,  different  from 
those  which  he  has  ordained  — in  other  words,  if  he  had 
willed  and  conceived  something  different  concerning  nature 
— he  would  perforce  have  had  a different  intellect  from 
that  which  he  has,  and  also  a different  will.  But  if  it 
were  allowable  to  assign  to  God  a different  intellect  and 
a different  will,  without  any  change  in  his  essence  or 
his  perfection,  what  would  there  be  to  prevent  him 
changing  the  decrees  which  he  has  made  concerning  cre- 
ated things,  and  nevertheless  remaining  perfect  ? For 
his  intellect  and  will  concerning  things  created  and  their 
order  are  the  same,  in  respect  to  his  essence  and  per- 
fection, however  they  be  conceived. 

Further,  all  the  philosophers  whom  I have  read  admit 
that  God’s  intellect  is  entirely  actual,  and  not  at  all 
potential;  as  they  also  admit  that  God’s  intellect,  and 
God’s  will,  and  God’s  essence  are  identical,  it  follows  that, 
if  God  had  had  a different  actual  intellect  and  a different 
will,  his  essence  would  also  have  been  different;  and 
thus,  as  I concluded  at  first,  if  things  had  been  brought 
into  being  by  God  in  a different  way  from  that  which 
has  obtained,  God’s  intellect  and  will,  that  is  (as  is  ad- 
mitted) his  essence  would  perforce  have  been  different, 
which  is  absurd. 


CONCERNING  GOD 


69 


As  these  things  could  not  have  been  brought  into  being 
by  God  in  any  but  the  actual  way  and  order  which  has 
obtained ; and  as  the  truth  of  this  proposition  follows  from 
the  supreme  perfection  of  God;  we  can  have  no  sound 
reason  for  persuading  ourselves  to  believe  that  God  did 
not  wish  to  create  all  the  things  which  were  in  his  intel- 
lect, and  to  create  them  in  the  same  perfection  as  he  had 
understood  them. 

But,  it  will  be  said,  there  is  in  things  no  perfection  nor 
imperfection;  that  which  is  in  them,  and  which  causes 
them  to  be  called  perfect  or  imperfect,  good  or  bad, 
depends  solely  on  the  will  of  God.  If  God  had  so  willed, 
he  might  have  brought  it  about  that  what  is  now  perfec- 
tion should  be  extreme  imperfection,  and  vice  versd.  What 
is  such  an  assertion,  but  an  open  declaration  that  God, 
who  necessarily  understands  that  which  he  wishes,  might 
bring  it  about  by  his  will,  that  he  should  understand 
things  differently  from  the  way  in  which  he  does  under- 
stand them?  This  (as  we  have  just  shown)  is  the  height 
of  absurdity.  Wherefore,  I may  turn  the  argument  against 
its  employers,  as  follows : All  things  depend  on  the 

power  of  God.  In  order  that  things  should  be  different 
from  what  they  are,  God’s  will  would  necessarily  have  to 
be  different.  But  God’s  will  cannot  be  different  (as  we 
have  just  most  clearly  demonstrated ) from  God’s  perfec- 
tion. Therefore  neither  can  things  be  different.  I con- 
fess that  the  theory  which  subjects  all  things  to  the  will 
of  an  indifferent  deity,  and  asserts  that  they  are  all 
dependent  on  his  fiat,  is  less  far  from  the  truth  than  the 
theory  of  those,  who  maintain  that  God  acts  in  all  things 
with  a view  of  promoting  what  is  good.  For  these  latter 
persons  seem  to  set  up  something  beyond  God,  which 
does  not  depend  on  God,  but  which  God  in  acting  looks 
to  as  an  exemplar,  or  which  he  aims  at  as  a definite 
goal.  This  is  only  another  name  for  subjecting  God  to 
the  dominion  of  destiny,  an  utter  absurdity  in  respect  to 
God,  whom  we  have  shown  to  be  the  first  and  only  free 
cause  of  the  essence  of  all  things  and  also  of  their  exist- 
ence. I need,  therefore,  spend  no  time  in  refuting  such 
wild  theories. 


7° 


THE  ETHICS 


Prop.  XXXIV.  God’s  power  is  identical  with  his  es- 
sence. 

Proof.  — From  the  sole  necessity  of  the  essence  of  God 
it  follows  that  God  is  the  cause  of  himself  (Prop,  xi.) 
and  of  all  things  (Prop.  xvi.  and  Coroll.).  Wherefore 
the  power  of  God,  by  which  he  and  all  things  are  and 
act,  is  identical  with  his  essence.  Q.  E.D. 

Prop.  XXXV.  Whatsoever  we  conceive  to  be  in  the 
power  of  God,  necessarily  exists. 

Proof.  — Whatsoever  is  in  God’s  power,  must  (by  the 
last  Prop.)  be  comprehended  in  his  essence  in  such  a 
manner,  that  it  necessarily  follows  therefrom,  and  there- 
fore necessarily  exists.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXVI.  There  is  no  cause  from  whose  nature 
some  effect  does  not  follow. 

Proof.  — Whatsoever  exists  expresses  God’s  nature  or 
essence  in  a given  conditioned  manner  (by  Prop,  xxv., 
Coroll.);  that  is  (by  Prop,  xxxiv.),  whatsoever  exists,  ex- 
presses in  a given  conditioned  manner  God’s  power,  which 
is  the  cause  of  all  things,  therefore  an  effect  must  (by 
Prop,  xvi.)  necessarily  follow.  Q.E.D. 

Appendix. — In  the  foregoing  I have  explained  the  na- 
ture and  properties  of  God.  I have  shown  that  he  neces- 
sarily exists,  that  he  is  one : that  he  is,  and  acts  solely  by 
the  necessity  of  his  own  nature ; that  he  is  the  free  cause 
of  all  things,  and  how  he  is  so;  that  all  things  are  in 
God,  and  so  depend  on  him,  that  without  him  they  could 
neither  exist  nor  be  conceived;  lastly,  that  all  things  are 
pre-determined  by  God,  not  through  his  free  will  or  ab- 
solute fiat,  but  from  the  very  nature  of  God  or  infinite 
power.  I have  further,  where  occasion  offered,  taken  care 
to  remove  the  prejudices,  which  might  impede  the  com- 
prehension of  my  demonstrations.  Yet  there  still  remain 
misconceptions  not  a few,  which  might  and  may  prove 
very  grave  hindrances  to  the  understanding  of  the  con- 
catenation of  things,  as  I have  explained  it  above.  I 
have  therefore  thought  it  worth  while  to  bring  these 
misconceptions  before  the  bar  of  reason. 

All  such  opinions  spring  from  the  notion  commonly 


CONCERNING  GOD 


7i 


entertained,  that  all  things  in  nature  act  as  men  them- 
selves act,  namely,  with  an  end  in  view.  It  is  accepted 
as  certain,  that  God  himself  directs  all  things  to  a defi- 
nite goal  (for  it  is  said  that  God  made  all  things  for  man, 
and  man  that  he  might  worship  him).  I will,  therefore, 
consider  this  opinion,  asking  first,  why  it  obtains  general 
credence,  and  why  all  men  are  naturally  so  prone  to  adopt 
it  ? secondly,  I will  point  out  its  falsity ; and,  lastly,  I will 
show  how  it  has  given  rise  to  prejudices  about  good  and 
bad,  right  and  wrong,  praise  and  blame,  order  and  con- 
fusion, beauty  and  ugliness,  and  the  like.  However,  this 
is  not  the  place  to  deduce  these  misconceptions  from  the 
nature  of  the  human  mind:  it  will  be  sufficient  here,  if 
I assume  as  a starting  point,  what  ought  to  be  universally 
admitted,  namely,  that  all  men  are  born  ignorant  of  the 
causes  of  things,  that  all  have  the  desire  to  seek  for  what 
is  useful  to  them,  and  that  they  are  conscious  of  such 
desire.  Herefrom  it  follows  first,  that  men  think  them- 
selves free,  inasmuch  as  they  are  conscious  of  their 
volitions  and  desires,  and  never  even  dream,  in  their  igno- 
rance, of  the  causes  which  have  disposed  them  to  wish 
and  desire.  Secondly,  that  men  do  all  things  for  an  end, 
namely,  for  that  which  is  useful  to  them,  and  which  they 
seek.  Thus  it  comes  to  pass  that  they  only  look  for  a 
knowledge  of  the  final  causes  of  events,  and  when  these 
are  learned,  they  are  content,  as  having  no  cause  for 
further  doubt.  If  they  cannot  learn  such  causes  from 
external  sources,  they  are  compelled  to  turn  to  considering 
themselves,  and  reflecting  what  end  would  have  induced 
them  personally  to  bring  about  the  given  event,  and  thus 
they  necessarily  judge  other  natures  by  their  own.  Fur- 
ther, as  they  find  in  themselves  and  outside  themselves 
many  means  which  assist  them  not  a little  in  their  search 
for  what  is  useful,  for  instance,  eyes  for  seeing,  teeth 
for  chewing,  herbs  and  animals  for  yielding  food,  the  sun 
for  giving  light,  the  sea  for  breeding  fish,  etc. , they  come 
to  look  on  the  whole  of  nature  as  a means  for  obtaining 
such  conveniences.  Now  as  they  are  aware,  that  they 
found  -these  conveniences  and  did  not  make  them  they 
think  they  have  cause  for  believing,  that  some  other  being 


72 


THE  ETHICS 


has  made  them  for  their  use.  As  they  look  upon  things 
as  means,  they  cannot  believe  them  to  be  self -created ; 
but,  judging  from  the  means  which  they  are  accustomed 
to  prepare  for  themselves,  they  are  bound  to  believe  in 
some  ruler  or  rulers  of  the  universe  endowed  with 
human  freedom,  who  have  arranged  and  adapted  every- 
thing for  human  use.  They  are  bound  to  estimate  the 
nature  of  such  rulers  (having  no  information  on  the 
subject)  in  accordance  with  their  own  nature,  and  there- 
fore they  assert  that  the  gods  ordained  everything  for 
the  use  of  man,  in  order  to  bind  man  to  themselves  and 
obtain  from  him  the  highest  honors.  Hence  also  it  fol- 
lows, that  everyone  thought  out  for  himself,  according  to 
his  abilities,  a different  way  of  worshipping  God,  so  that 
God  might  love  him  more  than  his  fellows,  and  direct 
the  whole  course  of  nature  for  the  satisfaction  of  his 
blind  cupidity  and  insatiable  avarice.  Thus  the  preju- 
dice developed  into  superstition,  and  took  deep  root  in 
the  human  mind;  and  for  this  reason  everyone  strove 
most  zealously  to  understand  and  explain  the  final  causes 
of  things;  but  in  their  endeavor  to  show  that  nature 
does  nothing  in  vain,  i.  e.,  nothing  which  is  useless  to 
man,  they  only  seem  to  have  demonstrated  that  nature, 
the  gods,  and  men  are  all  mad  together.  Consider,  I 
pray  you,  the  result:  among  the  many  helps  of  nature 
they  were  bound  to  find  some  hindrances,  such  as  storms, 
earthquakes,  diseases,  etc. : so  they  declared  that  such 
things  happen,  because  the  gods  are  angry  at  some 
wrong  done  them  by  men,  or  at  some  fault  committed 
in  their  worship.  Experience  day  by  day  protested  and 
showed  by  infinite  examples,  that  good  and  evil  fortunes 
fall  to  the  lot  of  pious  and  impious  alike ; still  they 
would  not  abandon  their  inveterate  prejudice,  for  it  was 
more  easy  for  them  to  class  such  contradictions  among 
other  unknown  things  of  whose  use  they  were  ignorant, 
and  thus  to  retain  their  actual  and  innate  condition  of 
ignorance,  than  to  destroy  the  whole  fabric  of  their  rea- 
soning and  start  afresh.  They  therefore  laid  down  as  an 
axiom,  that  God’s  judgments  far  transcend  human  under- 
standing. Such  a doctrine  might  well  have  sufficed  to 


CONCERNING  GOD 


73 


conceal  the  truth  from  the  human  race  for  all  eternity, 
if  mathematics  had  not  furnished  another  standard  of 
verity  in  considering  solely  the  essence  and  properties  of 
figures  without  regard  to  their  final  causes.  There  are 
other  reasons  (which  I need  not  mention  here)  besides 
mathematics,  which  might  have  caused  men’s  minds  to  be 
directed  to  these  general  prejudices,  and  have  led  them  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  truth. 

I have  now  sufficiently  explained  my  first  point.  There 
is  no  need  to  show  at  length,  that  nature  has  no  particu- 
lar goal  in  view,  and  that  final  causes  are  mere  human 
figments.  This,  I think,  is  already  evident  enough,  both 
from  the  causes  and  foundations  on  which  I have  shown 
such  prejudice  to  be  based,  and  also  from  Prop,  xvi.,  and 
the  Corollary  of  Prop,  xxxii.,  and,  in  fact,  all  those 
propositions  in  which  I have  shown,  that  everything  in 
nature  proceeds  from  a sort  of  necessity,  and  with  the 
utmost  perfection.  However,  I will  add  a few  remarks, 
in  order  to  overthrow  this  doctrine  of  a final  cause  utterly. 
That  which  is  really  a cause  it  considers  as  an  effect,  and 
vice  versd:  it  makes  that  which  is  by  nature  first  to  be 
last,  and  that  which  is  highest  and  most  perfect  to  be 
most  imperfect.  Passing  over  the  questions  of  cause  and 
priority  as  self-evident,  it  is  plain  from  Props,  xxi.,  xxii., 
xxiii.  that  that  effect,  is  most  perfect  which  is  produced 
immediately  by  God;  the  effect  which  requires  for  its 
production  several  intermediate  causes  is,  in  that  respect, 
more  imperfect.  But  if  those  things  which  were  made 
immediately  by  God  were  made  to  enable  him  to  attain 
his  end,  then  the  things  which  come  after,  for  the  sake 
of  which  the  first  were  made,  are  necessarily  the  most 
excellent  of  all. 

Further,  this  doctrine  does  away  with  the  perfection  of 
God:  for,  if  God  acts  for  an  object,  he  necessarily  desires 
something  which  he  lacks.  Certainly,  theologians  and 
metaphysicians  draw  a distinction  between  the  object  of 
want  and  the  object  of  assimilation ; still  they  confess  that 
God  made  all  things  for  the  sake  of  himself,  not  for  the 
sake  of  creation.  They  are  unable  to  point  to  anything 
prior  to  creation,  except  God  himself,  as  an  object  for 


74 


THE  ETHICS 


which  God  should  act,  and  are  therefore  driven  to  admit 
(as  they  clearly  must),  that  God  lacked  those  things  for 
whose  attainment  he  created  means,  and  further  that  he 
desired  them. 

We  must  not  omit  to  notice  that  the  followers  of  this 
doctrine,  anxious  to  display  their  talent  in  assigning 
final  causes,  have  imported  a new  method  of  argument 
in  proof  of  their  theory  — namely,  a reduction,  not  to 
the  impossible,  but  to  ignorance ; thus  showing  that  they 
have  no  other  method  of  exhibiting  their  doctrine.  For 
example,  if  a stone  falls  from  a roof  on  to  some  one’s 
head  and  kills  him,  they  will  demonstrate  by  their  new 
method,  that  the  stone  fell  in  order  to  kill  the  man ; for, 
if  it  had  not  by  God’s  will  fallen  with  that  object,  how 
could  so  many  circumstances  ( and  there  are  often  many 
concurrent  circumstances)  have  all  happened  together  by 
chance  ? Perhaps  you  will  answer  that  the  event  is  due 
to  the  facts  that  the  wind  was  blowing,  and  the  man  was 
walking  that  way.  <(  But  why,  ® they  will  insist,  w was 
the  wind  blowing,  and  why  was  the  man  at  that  very 
time  walking  that  way  ? ® If  you  again  answer,  that  the 
wind  had  then  sprung  up  because  the  sea  had  begun  to 
be  agitated  the  day  before,  the  weather  being  previously 
calm,  and  that  the  man  had  been  invited  by  a friend, 
they  will  again  insist : (<  But  why  was  the  sea  agitated, 
and  why  was  the  man  invited  at  that  time  ? ® So  they 
will  pursue  their  questions  from  cause  to  cause,  till  at 
last  you  take  refuge  in  the  will  of  God  — in  other  words, 
the  sanctuary  of  ignorance.  So,  again,  when  they  sur- 
vey the  frame  of  the  human  body,  they  are  amazed ; and 

being  ignorant  of  the  causes  of  so  great  a work  of  art 

conclude  that  it  has  been  fashioned,  not  mechan- 
ically, but  by  divine  and  supernatural  skill,  and  has 

been  so  put  together  that  one  part  shall  not  hurt  an- 
other. 

Hence  any  one  who  seeks  for  the  true  causes  of  mira- 
cles, and  strives  to  understand  natural  phenomena  as  an 
intelligent  being,  and  not  to  gaze  at  them  like  a fool,  is 
set  down  and  denounced  as  an  impious  heretic  by  those, 
whom  the  masses  adore  as  the  interpreters  of  nature  and 


CONCERNING  GOD 


75 


the  gods.  Such  persons  know  that,  with  the  removal  of 
ignorance,  the  wonder  which  forms  their  only  available 
means  for  proving  and  preserving  their  authority  would 
vanish  also.  But  I now  quit  this  subject,  and  pass  on  to 
my  third  point. 

After  men  persuaded  themselves,  that  everything  which 
is  created  is  created  for  their  sake,  they  were  bound  to 
consider  as  the  chief  quality  in  everything  that  which  is 
most  useful  to  themselves,  and  to  account  those  things 
the  best  of  all  which  have  the  most  beneficial  effect  on 
mankind.  Further,  they  were  bound  to  form  abstract 
notions  for  the  explanation  of  the  nature  of  things,  such 

as  GOODNESS,  BADNESS,  ORDER,  CONFUSION,  WARMTH,  COLD, 
beauty,  deformity,  and  so  on ; and  from  the  belief  that 
they  are  free  agents  arose  the  further  notions  praise  and 

BLAME,  SIN  and  MERIT. 

I will  speak  of  these  latter  hereafter,  when  I treat  of 
human  nature ; the  former  I will  briefly  explain  here. 

Everything  which  conduces  to  health  and  the  worship 
of  God  they  have  called  good,  everything  which  hinders 
these  objects  they  have  styled  bad;  and  inasmuch  as 
those  who  do  not  understand  the  nature  of  things  do  not 
verify  phenomena  in  any  way,  but  merely  imagine  them 
after  a fashion,  and  mistake  their  imagination  for  under- 
standing, such  persons  firmly  believe  that  there  is  an 
order  in  things,  being  really  ignorant  both  of  things 
and  their  own  nature.  When  phenomena  are  of  such  a 
kind,  that  the  impression  they  make  on  our  senses 
requires  little  effort  of  imagination,  and  can  consequently 
be  easily  remembered,  we  say  that  they  are  well-ordered  ; 
if  the  contrary,  that  they  are  ill-ordered  or  confused. 
Further,  as  things  which  are  easily  imagined  are  more 
pleasing  to  us,  men  prefer  order  to  confusion  — as  though 
there  were  any  order  in  nature,  except  in  relation  to  our 
imagination  — and  say  that  God  has  created  all  things  in 
order;  thus,  without  knowing  it,  attributing  imagination 
to  God,  unless,  indeed,  they  would  have  it  that  God  fore- 
saw human  imagination,  and  arranged  everything,  so 
that  it  should  be  most  easily  imagined.  If  this  be  their 
theory  they  would  not,  perhaps,  be  daunted  by  the  fact 


76 


THE  ETHICS 


that  we  find  an  infinite  number  of  phenomena,  far  sur- 
passing our  imagination,  and  very  many  others  which 
confound  its  weakness.  But  enough  has  been  said  on 
this  subject.  The  other  abstract  notions  are  nothing  but 
modes  of  imagining,  in  which  the  imagination  is  differ- 
ently affected,  though  they  are  considered  by  the  ignorant 
as  the  chief  attributes  of  things,  inasmuch  as  they  believe 
that  everything  was  created  for  the  sake  of  themselves; 
and,  according  as  they  are  affected  by  it,  style  it  good 
or  bad,  healthy  or  rotten  and  corrupt.  For  instance,  if 
the  motion  whose  objects  we  see  communicate  to  our 
nerves  be  conducive  to  health,  the  objects  causing  it  are 
styled  beautiful;  if  a contrary  motion  be  excited,  they 
are  styled  ugly. 

Things  which  are  perceived  through  our  sense  of  smell 
are  styled  fragrant  or  fetid;  if  through  our  taste,  sweet 
or  bitter,  full-flavored  or  insipid,  if  through  our  touch, 
hard  or  soft,  rough  or  smooth,  etc. 

Whatsoever  affects  our  ears  is  said  to  give  rise  to  noise, 
sound,  or  harmony.  In  this  last  case,  there  are  men  lu- 
natic enough  to  believe  that  even  God  himself  takes 
pleasure  in  harmony;  and  philosophers  are  not  lacking 
who  have  persuaded  themselves,  that  the  motion  of  the 
heavenly  bodies  gives  rise  to  harmony  — all  of  which  in- 
stances sufficiently  show  that  everyone  judges  of  things 
according1  to  the  state  of  his  brain,  or  rather  mistakes  for 
things  the  forms  of  his  imagination.  We  need  no  longer 
wonder  that  there  have  arisen  all  the  controversies  we 
have  witnessed  and  finally  scepticism : for,  although  hu- 
man bodies  in  many  respects  agree,  yet  in  very  many 
others  they  differ;  so  that  what  seems  good  to  one 
seems  bad  to  another;  what  seems  well  ordered  to  one 
seems  confused  to  another;  what  is  pleasing  to  one  dis- 
pleases another,  and  so  on.  I need  not  further  enumer- 
ate, because  this  is  not  the  place  to  treat  the  subject  at 
length,  and  also  because  the  fact  is  sufficiently  well 
known.  It  is  commonly  said : (<  So  many  men,  so  many 
minds ; everyone  is  wise  in  his  own  way ; brains  differ  as 
completely  as  palates.  * All  of  which  proverbs  show,  that 
men  judge  of  things  according  to  their  mental  disposi- 


CONCERNING  GOD 


77 


tion,  and  rather  imagine  than  understand : for,  if  they  un- 
derstood phenomena,  they  would,  as  mathematics  attest, 
be  convinced,  if  not  attracted,  by  what  I have  urged. 

We  have  now  perceived,  that  all  the  explanations  com- 
monly given  of  nature  are  mere  modes  of  imagining, 
and  do  not  indicate  the  true  nature  of  anything,  but 
only  the  constitution  of  the  imagination;  and,  although 
they  have  names,  as  though  they  were  entities,  existing 
externally  to  the  imagination,  I call  them  entities  imag- 
inary rather  than  real;  and,  therefore,  all  arguments 
against  us  drawn  from  such  abstractions  are  easily 
rebutted. 

Many  argue  in  this  way.  If  all  things  follow  from  a 
necessity  of  the  absolutely  perfect  nature  of  God,  why  are 
there  so  many  imperfections  in  nature  ? such,  for  instance, 
as  things  corrupt  to  the  point  of  putridity,  loathsome 
deformity,  confusion,  evil,  sin,  etc.  But  these  reasoners 
are,  as  I have  said,  easily  confuted,  for  the  perfection  of 
things  is  to  be  reckoned  only  from  their  own  nature  and 
power;  things  are  not  more  or  less  perfect,  according  as 
they  delight  or  offend  human  senses,  or  according  as 
they  are  serviceable  or  repugnant  to  mankind.  To  those 
who  ask  why  God  did  not  so  create  all  men,  that  they 
should  be  governed  only  by  reason,  I give  no  answer 
but  this:  because  matter  was  not  lacking  to  him  for  the 
creation  of  every  degree  of  perfection  from  highest  to 
lowest;  or,  more  strictly,  because  the  laws  of  his  nature 
are  so  vast,  as  to  suffice  for  the  production  of  everything 
conceivable  by  an  infinite  intelligence,  as  I have  shown 
in  Prop.  xvi. 

Such  are  the  misconceptions  I have  undertaken  to 
note;  if  there  are  any  more  of  the  same  sort,  everyone 
may  easily  dissipate  them  for  himself  with  the  aid  of  a 
little  reflection. 


PART  II. 


OF  THE  NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND. 

Preface. 

I now  pass  on  to  explaining  the  results,  which  must 
necessarily  follow  from  the  essence  of  God,  or  of  the 
eternal  and  infinite  being;  not,  indeed,  all  of  them  (for 
we  proved  in  Part,  i.,  Prop,  xvi.,  that  an  infinite  number 
must  follow  in  an  infinite  number  of  ways),  but  only 
those  which  are  able  to  lead  us,  as  it  were  by  the  hand, 
to  the  knowledge  of  the  human  mind  and  its  highest 
blessedness. 

Definitions. 

I.  By  body  I mean  a mode  which  expresses  in  a cer- 
tain determinate  manner  the  essence  of  God,  in  so  far  as 
he  is  considered  as  an  extended  thing.  ( See  Part  i.,  Prop, 
xxv.  Coroll.). 

II.  I consider  as  belonging  to  the  essence  of  a thing 
that,  which  being  given,  the  thing  is  necessarily  given  also, 
and,  which  being  removed,  the  thing  is  necessarily  re- 
moved also;  in  other  words,  that  without  which  the  thing, 
and  which  itself  without  the  thing,  can  neither  be  nor 
be  conceived. 

III.  By  idea,  I mean  the  mental  conception  which  is 
formed  by  the  mind  as  a thinking  thing. 

Explanation. — I say  conception  rather  than  perception, 
because  the  word  perception  seems  to  imply  that  the 
mind  is  passive  in  respect  to  the  object;  whereas  concep- 
tion seems  to  express  an  activity  of  the  mind. 

IV.  By  an  adequate  idea,  I mean  an  idea  which,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  considered  in  itself,  without  relation  to  the 
object,  has  all  the  properties  or  intrinsic  marks  of  a true 
idea. 


(78) 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


79 


Explanation. — I say  intrinsic,  in  order  to  exclude  that 
mark  which  is  extrinsic,  namely,  the  agreement  between 
the  idea  and  its  object  ( ideatum ). 

V.  Duration  is  the  indefinite  continuance  of  existing. 

Explanation. — I say  indefinite,  because  it  cannot  be 

determined  through  the  existence  itself  of  the  existing 
thing,  or  by  its  efficient  cause,  which  necessarily  gives 
the  existence  of  the  thing,  but  does  not  take  it  away. 

VI.  Reality  and  perfection  I use  as  synonymous 
terms. 

VII.  By  particular  things,  I mean  things  which  are 
finite  and  have  a conditioned  existence;  but  if  several 
individual  things  concur  in  one  action,  so  as  to  be  all 
simultaneously  the  effect  of  one  cause,  I consider  them 
all  so  far,  as  one  particular  thing. 

Axioms. 

I.  The  essence  of  man  does  not  involve  necessary  exist- 
ence, that  is,  it  may,  in  the  order  of  nature,  come  to  pass 
that  this  or  that  man  does  or  does  not  exist. 

II.  Man  thinks. 

III.  Modes  of  thinking,  such  as  love,  desire,  or  any 
other  of  the  passions,  do  not  take  place,  unless  there  be 
in  the  same  individual  an  idea  of  the  thing  loved,  desired, 
etc.  But  the  idea  can  exist  without  the  presence  of  any 
other  mode  of  thinking. 

IV.  We  perceive  that  a certain  body  is  affected  in  many 
ways. 

V.  We  feel  and  perceive  no  particular  things,  save 
bodies  and  modes  of  thought. 

N.  B.  The  postulates  are  given  after  the  conclusion  of 
Prop.  xiii. 

Propositions. 

Prop.  I.  Thought  is  an  attribute  of  God,  or  God  is  a 
thinking  thing. 

Proof. — Particular  thoughts,  or  this  or  that  thought,  are 
modes  which,  in  a certain  conditioned  manner,  express 
the  nature  of  God  (Parti.,  Prop,  xxv.,  Coroll.).  God  there- 
fore possesses  the  attribute  (Part  i.,  Def.  v.)  of  which  the 


8o 


THE  ETHICS 


concept  is  involved  in  all  particular  thoughts,  which  latter 
are  conceived  thereby.  Thought,  therefore,  is  one  of 
the  infinite  attributes  of  God,  which  express  God’s  eternal 
and  infinite  essence  (Part  i.,  Def.  vi.).  In  other  words, 
God  is  a thinking  thing.  Q.E.D. 

Note.  — This  proposition  is  also  evident  from  the  fact, 
that  we  are  able  to  conceive  an  infinite  thinking  being. 
For,  in  proportion  as  a thinking  being  is  conceived  as 
thinking  more  thoughts,  so  it  is  conceived  as  containing 
more  reality  or  perfection.  Therefore  a being  which  can 
think  an  infinite  number  of  things  in  an  infinite  number 
of  ways,  is,  necessarily,  in  respect  of  thinking,  infinite. 
As,  therefore,  from  the  consideration  of  thought  alone  we 
conceive  an  infinite  being,  thought  is  necessarily  (Part  i. , 
Def.  iv.  and  vi.)  one  of  the  infinite  attributes  of  God,  as 
we  were  desirous  of  showing. 

Prop.  II.  Extension  is  an  attribute  of  God,  or  God  is 
an  extended  thing. 

Proof. — The  proof  of  this  proposition  is  similar  to  that 
of  the  last. 

Prop.  III.  In  God  there  is  necessarily  the  idea  not  only 
of  his  essence,  but  also  of  all  things  which  necessarily 
follow  from  his  essence. 

Proof. — God  (by  the  first  Prop,  of  this  Part)  can  think 
an  infinite  number  of  things  in  infinite  ways,  or  (what 
is  the  same  thing,  by  Prop,  xvi.,  Part  i.)  can  form  the 
idea  of  his  essence,  and  of  all  things  which  necessarily 
follow  therefrom.  Now  all  that  is  in  the  power  of  God 
necessarily  is.  (Parti.,  Prop,  xxxv.)  Therefore,  such  an 
idea  as  we  are  considering  necessarily  is,  and  in  God 
alone.  Q.E.D.  (Part  i.,  Prop,  xv.) 

Note. — The  multitude  understand  by  the  power  of  God 
the  free  will  of  God,  and  the  right  over  all  things  that 
exist,  which  latter  are  accordingly  generally  considered 
as  contingent.  For  it  is  said  that  God  has  the  power  to 
destroy  all  things,  and  to  reduce  them  to  nothing.  Further, 
the  power  of  God  is  very  often  likened  to  the  power  of 
kings.  But  this  doctrine  we  have  refuted  (Parti.,  Prop, 
xxxii.,  Corolls,  i.  and  ii.),  and  we  have  shown  (Part  i., 
Prop,  xvi.)  that  God  acts  by  the  same  necessity,  as  that 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


81 


by  which  he  understands  himself;  in  other  words,  as  it 
follows  from  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature  (as  all 
admit),  that  God  understands  himself,  so  also  does  it 
follow  by  the  same  necessity,  that  God  performs  infinite 
acts  in  infinite  ways.  We  further  showed  (Parti.,  Prop, 
xxxiv.)  that  God’s  power  is  identical  with  God’s  essence 
in  action;  therefore  it  is  as  impossible  for  us  to  conceive 
God  as  not  acting  as  to  conceive  him  as  non-existent. 
If  we  might  pursue  the  subject  further,  I could  point 
out,  that  the  power  which  is  commonly  attributed  to  God 
is  not  only  human  (as  showing  that  God  is  conceived  by 
the  multitude  as  a man,  or  in  the  likeness  of  a man) 
but  involves  a negation  of  power.  However,  I am  un- 
willing to  go  over  the  same  ground  so  often.  I would 
only  beg  the  reader  again  and  again,  to  turn  over  fre- 
quently in  his  mind  what  I have  said  in  Part  i.  from 
Prop.  xvi.  to  the  end.  No  one  will  be  able  to  follow 
my  meaning,  unless  he  is  scrupulously  careful  not  to  con- 
found the  power  of  God  with  the  human  power  and  right 
of  kings. 

Prop.  IV.  The  idea  of  God,  from  which  an  infinite 
number  of  things  follow  in  infinite  ways,  can  only 
be  one. 

Proof. — Infinite  intellect  comprehends  nothing  save  the 
attributes  of  God  and  his  modifications  (Part  i.,  Prop, 
xxx.).  Now  God  is  one  (Part  i.,  Prop  xiv.,  Coroll.). 
Therefore  the  idea  of  God,  wherefrom  an  infinite  num- 
ber of  things  follow  in  infinite  ways,  can  only  be  one. 
Q.E.D. 

Prop.  V.  The  actual  being  of  ideas  owns  God  as  its 
cause,  only  in  so  far  as  he  is  considered  as  a thinking 
thing,  not  in  so  far  as  he  is  unfolded  in  any  other  attri- 
bute ; that  is,  the  ideas  both  of  the  attributes  of  God  and 
of  particular  things  do  not  own  as  their  efficient  cause  their 
objects  ( ideata ) or  the  things  perceived,  but  God  himself 
in  so  far  as  he  is  a thinking  thing. 

Proof. — This  proposition  is  evident  from  Prop.  iii.  of 
this  Part.  We  there  drew  the  conclusion,  that  God  can 
form  the  idea  of  his  essence,  and  of  all  things  which 
follow  necessarily  therefrom,  solely  because  he  is  a think  - 
6 


82 


THE  ETHICS 


ing  thing,  and  not  because  he  is  the  object  of  his  own  idea. 
Wherefore  the  actual  being  of  ideas  owns  for  cause  God, 
in  so  far  as  he  is  a thinking  thing.  It  may  be  differently 
proved  as  follows : the  actual  being  of  ideas  is  ( obviously  ) a 
mode  of  thought,  that  is  ( Part  i.,  Prop,  xxv.,  Coroll.)  a mode 
which  expresses  in  a certain  manner  the  nature  of  God,  in 
so  far  as  he  is  a thinking  thing,  and  therefore  (Part  i. , Prop, 
x.)  involves  the  conception  of  no  other  attribute  of  God, 
and  consequently  (by  Part  i.,  Ax.  iv.)  is  not  the  effect  of 
any  attribute  save  thought.  Therefore  the  actual  being  of 
ideas  owns  God  as  its  cause,  in  so  far  as  he  is  considered 
as  a thinking  thing,  etc.  Q.  E.  D. 

Prop.  VI.  The  modes  of  any  given  attribute  are  caused 
by  God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  considered  through  the  attri- 
bute of  which  they  are  modes,  and  not  in  so  far  as  he  is 
considered  through  any  other  attribute. 

Proof. — Each  attribute  is  conceived  through  itself,  with- 
out any  other  (Part  i.,  Prop,  x.);  wherefore  the  modes  of 
each  attribute  involve  the  conception  of  that  attribute, 
but  not  of  any  other.  Thus  (Part  i.,  Ax.  iv.)  they  are 
caused  by  God,  only  in  so  far  as  he  is  considered  through 
the  attribute  whose  modes  they  are,  and  not  in  so  far  as 
he  is  considered  through  any  other.  Q.  E.D. 

Corollary. — Hence  the  actual  being  of  things,  which 
are  not  modes  of  thought,  does  not  follow  from  the 
divine  nature,  because  that  nature  has  prior  knowledge 
of  the  things.  Things  represented  in  ideas  follow,  and 
are  derived  from  their  particular  attribute,  in  the  same 
manner,  and  with  the  same  necessity  as  ideas  follow 
(according  to  what  we  have  shown)  from  the  attribute 
of  thought. 

Prop.  VII.  The  order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the 
same  as  the  order  and  connection  of  things. 

Proof.  — This  proposition  is  evident  from  Part  i.,  Ax.  iv. 
For  the  idea  of  everything  that  is  caused  depends  on  a 
knowledge  of  the  cause,  whereof  it  is  an  effect. 

Corollary. — Hence  God’s  power  of  thinking  is  equal  to 
his  realized  power  of  action  — that  is,  whatsoever  follows 
from  the  infinite  nature  of  God  in  the  world  of  extension 
( for  malit  er ),  follows  without  exception  in  the  same  order 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


83 


and  connection  from  the  idea  of  God  in  the  world  of 
thought  ( objective ). 

Note.  — Before  going  any  further,  I wish  to  recall  to  mind 
what  has  been  pointed  out  above  — namely,  that  whatsoever 
can  be  perceived  by  the  infinite  intellect  as  constituting 
the  essence  of  substance,  belongs  altogether  only  to  one 
substance:  consequently,  substance  thinking  and  substance 
extended  are  one  and  the  same  substance,  comprehended 
now  through  one  attribute,  now  through  the  other.  So, 
also,  a mode  of  extension  and  the  idea  of  that  mode  are 
one  and  the  same  thing,  though  expressed  in  two  ways. 
This  truth  seems  to  have  been  dimly  recognized  by  those 
Jews  who  maintained  that  God,  God’s  intellect,  and  the 
things  understood  by  God  are  identical.  For  instance,  a 
circle  existing  in  nature,  and  the  idea  of  a circle  exist- 
ing, which  is  also  in  God,  are  one  and  the  same  thing 
displayed  through  different  attributes.  Thus,  whether  we 
conceive  nature  under  the  attribute  of  extension,  or  under 
the  attribute  of  thought,  or  under  any  other  attribute,  we 
shall  find  the  same  order,  or  one  and  the  same  chain  of 
causes  — that  is,  the  same  things  following  in  either  case. 

I said  that  God  is  the  cause  of  an  idea  — for  instance, 
of  the  idea  of  a circle  — in  so  far  as  he  is  a thinking 
thing;  and  of  a circle,  in  so  far  as  he  is  an  extended 
thing,  simply  because  the  actual  being  of  the  idea  of  a 
circle  can  only  be  perceived  as  a proximate  cause  through 
another  mode  of  thinking,  and  that  again  through  an- 
other, and  so  on  to  infinity;  so  that,  so  long  as  we  con- 
sider things  as  modes  of  thinking,  we  must  explain 
the  order  of  the  whole  of  nature,  or  the  whole  chain  of 
causes,  through  the  attribute  of  thought  only.  And,  in 
so  far  as  we  consider  things  as  modes  of  extension,  we 
must  explain  the  order  of  the  whole  nature  through 
the  attribute  of  extension  only;  and  so  on,  in  the  case 
of  other  attributes.  Wherefore  of  things  as  they  are  in 
themselves  God  is  really  the  cause,  inasmuch  as  he  con- 
sists of  infinite  attributes.  I cannot  for  the  present  ex- 
plain my  meaning  more  clearly. 

Prop.  VIII.  The  ideas  of  particular  things,  or  of  modes, 
that  do  not  exist,  must  be  comprehended  in  the  infinite 


84 


THE  ETHICS 


idea  of  God,  in  the  same  way  as  the  formal  essences  of 
particular  things  or  modes  are  contained  in  the  attributes 
of  God. 

Proof.  — This  proposition  is  evident  from  the  last ; it 
is  understood  more  clearly  from  the  preceding  note. 

Corollary.  — Hence,  so  long  as  particular  things  do  not 
exist,  except  in  so  far  as  they  are  comprehended  in  the 
attributes  of  God,  their  representations  in  thought  or 
ideas  do  not  exist,  except  in  so  far  as  the  infinite  idea 
of  God  exists;  and  when  particular  things  are  said  to 
exist,  not  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  involved  in  the 
attributes  of  God,  but  also  in  so  far  as  they  are  said  to 
continue,  their  ideas  will  also  involve  existence,  through 
which  they  are  said  to  continue. 

Note.  — If  anyone  desires  an  example  to  throw  more 
light  on  this  question,  I shall,  I fear,  not  be  able  to  give 
him  any,  which  adequately  explains  the  thing  of  which  I 
here  speak,  inasmuch  as  it  is  unique,  however,  I will 
endeavor  to  illustrate  it  as  far  as  possible.  The  nature 
of  a circle  is  such  that  if  any  number  of  straight  lines 
intersect  within  it,  the  rectangles  formed  by  their  seg- 
ments will  be  equal  to  one  another;  thus,  infinite  equal 
rectangles  are  contained  in  a circle.  Yet  none  of  these 
rectangles  can  be  said  to  exist,  except  in  so  far  as  the 
circle  exists;  nor  can  the  idea  of  any  of  these  rectangles 
be  said  to  exist,  except  in  so  far  as  they  are  compre- 
hended in  the  idea  of  the  circle.  Let  us  grant  that, 
from  this  infinite  number  of  rectangles,  two  only  exist. 
The  ideas  of  these  two  not  only  exist,  in  so  far  as  they 
are  contained  in  the  idea  of  the  circle,  but  also  as  they 
involve  the  existence  of  those  rectangles;  wherefore  they 
are  distinguished  from  the  remaining  ideas  of  the  remain- 
ing rectangles. 

Prop.  IX.  The  idea  of  an  individual  thing  actually  ex- 
isting is  caused  by  God,  not  in  so  far  as  he  is  infinite, 
but  in  so  far  as  he  is  considered  as  effected  by  another 
idea  of  a thing  actually  existing,  of  which  he  is  the 
cause,  in  so  far  as  he  is  affected  by  a third  idea,  and  so 
on  to  infinity. 

Proof. — The  idea  of  an  individual  thing  actually  exist- 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


85 


ing  is  an  individual  mode  of  thinking,  and  is  distinct 
from  other  modes  (by  the  Corollary  and  Note  to  Prop, 
viii.  of  this  part) ; thus  (by  Prop.  vi.  of  this  part)  it  is 
caused  by  God,  in  so  far  only  as  he  is  a thinking  thing. 
But  not  (by  Prop,  xxviii.  of  Part  i.)  in  so  far  as  he  is  a 
thing  thinking  absolutely,  only  in  so  far  as  he  is  consid- 
ered as  affected  by  another  mode  of  thinking;  and  he 
is  the  cause  of  this  latter,  as  being  affected  by  a third, 
and  so  on  to  infinity.  Now,  the  order  and  connection  of 
ideas  is  (by  Prop.vii.  of  this  book)  the  same  as  the  order 
and  connection  of  causes.  Therefore  of  a given  individ- 
ual idea  another  individual  idea,  or  God,  in  so  far  as 
he  is  considered  as  modified  by  that  idea,  is  the  cause; 
and  of  this  second  idea  God  is  the  cause  in  so  far  as  he 
is  affected  by  another  idea  and  so  on  to  infinity.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary.  — Whatsoever  takes  place  in  the  individual  ob- 
ject of  any  idea,  the  knowledge  thereof  is  in  God,  in  so 
far  only  as  he  has  the  idea  of  the  object. 

Proof.  — Whatsoever  takes  place  in  the  object  of  any 
idea,  its  idea  is  in  God  (by  Prop.  iii.  of  this  part),  not 
in  so  far  as  he  is  infinite,  but  in  so  far  as  he  is  consid- 
ered as  affected  by  another  idea  of  an  individual  thing 
(by  the  last  Prop.) ; but  (by  Prop.  vii.  of  this  part)  the  order 
and  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order  and 
connection  of  things.  The  knowledge,  therefore,  of  that 
which  takes  place  in  any  individual  object  will  be  in  God, 
in  so  far  only  as  he  has  the  idea  of  that  object.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  X.  — The  being  or  substance  does  not  appertain 
to  the  essence  of  man  — in  other  words,  substance  does 
not  constitute  the  actual  being*  of  man. 

Proof. — The  being  of  substance  involves  necessary  ex- 
istence (Parti.,  Prop.  vii.).  If,  therefore,  the  being  of  sub- 
stance appertains  to  the  essence  of  man,  substance  being 
granted,  man  would  necessarily  be  granted  also  (II.  Def. 
ii),  and,  consequently,  man  would  necessarily  exist,  which 
is  absurd  (II.  Ax.  i.).  Therefore,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — This  proposition  may  also  be  proved  from  I.  v., 
in  which  it  is  shown  that  there  cannot  be  two  substances 
of  the  same  nature;  for  as  there  may  be  many  men,  the 

*«  Forma.» 


86 


THE  ETHICS 


being  of  substance  is  not  that  which  constitutes  the 
actual  being  of  man.  Again,  the  proposition  is  evident 
from  the  other  properties  of  substance  — namely,  that  sub- 
stance is  in  its  nature  infinite,  immutable,  indivisible,  etc., 
as  anyone  may  see  for  himself. 

Corollary. — Hence  it  follows,  that  the  essence  of  man 
is  constituted  by  certain  modifications  of  the  attributes 
of  God.  For  (by  the  last  Prop.)  the  being  of  substance 
does  not  belong  to  the  essence  of  man.  That  essence 
therefore  (by  i.  15)  is  something  which  is  in  God, 
and  which  without  God  can  neither  be  nor  be  con- 
ceived, whether  it  be  a modification  (i.  25  Coroll.),  or  a 
mode  which  expresses  God’s  nature  in  a certain  conditioned 
manner. 

Note. — Everyone  must  surely  admit,  that  nothing  can 
be  or  be  conceived  without  God.  All  men  agree  that 
God  is  the  one  and  only  cause  of  all  things,  both  of 
their  essence  and  of  their  existence;  that  is,  God  is  not 
only  the  cause  of  things  in  respect  to  their  being  made 
( secundum  fieri),  but  also  in  respect  to  their  being  ( secun- 
dum. esse). 

At  the  same  time  many  assert,  that  that,  without  which 
a thing  cannot  be  nor  be  conceived,  belongs  to  the  essence 
of  that  thing;  wherefore  they  believe  that  either  the 
nature  of  God  appertains  to  the  essence  of  created  things, 
or  else  that  created  things  can  be  or  be  conceived  with- 
out God ; or  else,  as  is  more  probably  the  case,  they  hold 
inconsistent  doctrines.  I think  the  cause  for  such  con- 
fusion is  mainly,  that  they  do  not  keep  to  the  proper  or- 
der of  philosophic  thinking.  The  nature  of  God,  which 
should  be  reflected  on  first,  inasmuch  as  it  is  prior  both 
in  the  order  of  knowledge  and  the  order  of  nature,  they 
have  taken  to  be  last  in  the  order  of  knowledge,  and 
have  put  into  the  first  place  what  they  call  the  objects 
of  sensation;  hence,  while  they  are  considering  natural 
phenomena,  they  give  no  attention  at  all  to  the  divine 
nature,  and,  when  afterward  they  apply  their  mind  to 
the  study  of  the  divine  nature,  they  are  quite  unable  to 
bear  in  mind  the  first  hypotheses,  with  which  they  have 
overlaid  the  knowledge  of  natural  phenomena,  inasmuch 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


8 7 


as  such  hypotheses  are  no  help  toward  under- 
standing the  Divine  nature.  So  that  it  is  hardly  to 
be  wondered  at,  that  these  persons  contradict  themselves 
freely. 

However,  I pass  over  this  point.  My  intention  here 
was  only  to  give  a reason  for  not  saying,  that  that, 
without  which  a thing  cannot  be  or  be  conceived,  be- 
longs to  the  essence  of  that  thing:  individual  things 
cannot  be  or  be  conceived  without  God,  yet  God  does 
not  appertain  to  their  essence.  I said  that  <(  I considered 
as  belonging  to  the  essence  of  a thing  that,  which  being 
given,  the  thing  is  necessarily  given  also,  and  which 
being  removed,  the  thing  is  necessarily  removed  also; 
or  that  without  which  the  thing,  and  which  itself  with- 
out the  thing  can  neither  be  nor  be  conceived.”  (II. 
Def.  ii.) 

Ppop.  XI.  The  first  element  which  constitutes  the^fir 
tual  being  of  the  human  mind,  is  the  idea  of  some  par- 
ticular thing  actually  existing. 

Proof. — The  essence  of  man  (by  the  Coroll,  of  the 
last  Prop.)  is  constituted  by  certain  modes  of  the  attri- 
butes of  God,  namely  (by  II.  Ax.  ii.),  by  the  modes  of 
thinking,  of  all  which  (by  II.  Ax.  iii.)  the  idea  is  prior 
in  nature,  and,  when  the  idea  is  given,  the  other  modes 
(namely,  those  of  which  the  idea  is  prior  in  nature) 
must  be  in  the  same  individual  (by  the  same  Axiom). 
Therefore  an  idea  is  the  first  element  constituting  the 
human  mind.  But  not  the  idea  of  a non-existent  thing, 
for  then  (II  viii.  Coroll.)  the  idea  itself  cannot  be  said 
to  exist;  it  must  therefore  be  the  idea  of  something 
actually  existing.  But  not  of  an  infinite  thing.  For  an 
infinite  thing  (I.  xxi.,  xxii.)  must  always  necessarily 
exist;  this  would  (by  II.  Ax.  i.)  involve  an  absurdity. 
Therefore  the  first  element,  which  constitutes  the  actual 
being  of  the  human  mind,  is  the  idea  of  something  ac- 
tually existing.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — Hence  it  follows,  that  the  human  mind  is. 
part  of  the  infinite  intellect_of  God;  thus  when  we  say, 
that  the  human  mind  perceives  this  or  that,  we  make 
the  assertion,  that  God  has  this  or  that  idea,  not  in  so 


88 


THE  ETHICS 


far  as  he  is  infinite,  but  in  so  far  as  he  is  displayed 
through  the  nature  of  the  human  mind,  or  in  so  far  as 
he  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  human  mind;  and  when 
we  say  that  God  has  this  or  that  idea,  not  only  in  so  far 
as  he  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  human  mind,  but 
also  in  so  far  as  he,  simultaneously  with  the  human 
mind,  has  the  further  idea  of  another  thing,  we  assert 
that  the  human  mind  perceives  a thing  in  part  or  in- 
adequately. 

Note.  — Here,  I doubt  not,  readers  will  come  to  a stand, 
and  will  call  to  mind  many  things  which  will  cause  them 
to  hesitate ; I therefore  beg  them  to  accompany  me 
slowly,  step  by  step,  and  not  to  pronounce  on  my  state- 
ments, till  they  have  read  to  the  end. 

Prop.  XII.  Whatsoever  comes  to  pass  in  the  object  of 
the  idea,  which  constitutes  the  human  mind,  must  be  per- 
ceived  by  the  human  mind,  or  there  will  necessarily  be 
an  idea  in  the  human  mind  of  the  said  occurrence.  That 
is,  if  the  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind 
be  a body,  nothing  can  take  place  in  that  body  without 
being  perceived  by  fhp..jmitvd- — - 

Proof. — Whatsoever  comes  to  pass  in  the  object  of  any 
idea,  the  knowledge  thereof  is  necessarily  in  God  (II.  ix. 
Coroll.),  in  so  far  as  he  is  considered  as  affected  by  the 
idea  of  the  said  object,  that  is  (II.  xi.),  in  so  far  as  he 
constitutes  the  mind  of  anything.  Therefore,  whatsoever 
takes  place  in  the  object  constituting  the  idea  of  the 
human  mind,  the  knowledge  thereof  is  necessarily  in  God, 
in  so  far  as  he  constitutes  the  nature  of  the  human  mind ; 
that  is  (by  II.  xi.  Coroll.)  the  knowledge  of  the  said  thing 
will  necessarily  be  in  the  mind,  in  other  words  the  mind 
perceives  it. 

Note. — This  proposition  is  also  evident,  and  is  more 
clearly  to  be  understood  from  II.  vii.,  which  see. 

Prop.  XIII.  The  object  of  the  idea  constituting  tim 
human  mind  is  the  body,  in  other  wbrds  a certain  mode 
of  extension  which  actually  exists,  and  nothin?  else. 


human  mind,  the  ideas  of  the  modifications  of  the  body 
would  not  be  in  God  (II.  ix.  Coroll.)  in  virtue  of  his  con- 


Proof. — If  indeed 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


89 


stituting  our  mind,  but  in  virtue  of  his  constituting  the 
mind  of  something  else;  that  is  (II.  xi.  Coroll.),  the  ideas 
of  the  modifications  of  the  body  would  not  be  in  our  mind ; 
now  (by  II.  Ax.  iv.)  we  do  possess  the  ideas  of  the  modi- 
fications of  the  body.  Therefore  the  object  of  the  idea 
constituting  the  human  mind  is  the  body,  and  the  body 
as  it  actually  exists  (II.  xi.).  Further,  if  there  were  any 
other  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  mind  besides 
body,  then,  as  nothing  can  exist  from  which  some  effect 
does  not  follow  (I.  xxxvi.)  there  would  necessarily  have 
to  be  in  our  mind  an  idea,  which  would  be  the  effect  of 
that  other  object  (II.  xi.);  but  (II.  Ax.  v.)  there  is  no  such 
idea.  Wherefore  the  object  of  our  mind  is  the  body  as 
it  exists,  and  nothing  else.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — We  thus  comprehend,  not  only  that  the  human 
mind  is  united  to  the  body,  but  also  the  nature  of  the 
union  between  mind  and  body.  However  no  one  will  be 
able  to  grasp  this  adequately  or  distinctly,  unless  he  first 
has  adequate  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  our  body.  The 
propositions  we  have  advanced  hitherto  have  been  entirely 
general,  applying  not  more  to  men  than  to  other  individ- 
ual things,  all  of  which,  though  in  different  degrees,  are 
animated.*  For  of  everything  there  is  necessarily  an  idea 
in  God,  of  which  God  is  the  cause,  in  the  same  way  as 
there  is  an  idea  of  the  human  body;  thus  whatever  we 
have  asserted  of  the  idea  of  the  human  body  must  neces- 
sarily also  be  asserted  of  the  idea  of  everything  else.  Still, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  deny  that  ideas,  like  objects, 
differ  one  from  the  other,  one  being  more  excellent  than 
another  and  containing  more  reality,  just  as  the  object  of 
one  idea  is  more  excellent  than  the  object  of  another  idea, 
and  ^contains  more  reality. 

Wherefore,  in  order  to  determine,  wherein  the  human 
mind  differs  from  other  things,  and  wherein  it  surpasses 
them,  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  know  the  nature  of  its  object, 
that  is,  of  the  human  body.  What  this  nature  is,  I am  not 
able  here  to  explain,  nor  is  it  necessary  for  the  proof  of 
what  I advance,  that  I should  do  so.  I will  only  say  gen- 
erally, that  in  proportion  as  any  given  body  is  more  fitted 

♦«Animata.» 


9° 


THE  ETHICS 


than  others  for  doing  many  actions  or  receiving  many  im- 
pressions at  once,  so  also  is  the  mind,  of  which  it  is  the 
object,  more  fitted  than  others  for  forming  many  simul- 
taneous perceptions ; and  the  more  the  actions  of  one  body 
depend  on  itself  alone,  and  the  fewer  other  bodies  concur 
with  it  in  action,  the  more  fitted  is  the  mind  of  which  it 
is  the  object  for  distinct  comprehension.  We  may  thus 
recognize  the  superiority  of  one  mind  over  others,  and  may 
further  see  the  cause,  why  we  have  only  a very  confused 
knowledge  of  our  body,  and  also  many  kindred  questions, 
which  I will,  in  the  following  propositions,  deduce  from 
what  has  been  advanced.  Wherefore  I have  thought  it 
worth  while  to  explain  and  prove  more  strictly  my  present 
statements.  In  order  to  do  so,  I must  premise  a few 
propositions  concerning  the  nature  of  bodies. 

Axiom  I.  All  bodies  are  either  in  motion  or  at  rest. 

Axiom  II.  Every  body  is  moved  sometimes  more  slowly, 
sometimes  more  quickly. 

Lemma  I.  “Bodies  are  distinguished  from  one  another  in- 
respect of  motion  and  rest,  quickness  and  slowness,  and 
not  in  respect  of  substance. — 

Proof. — The  first  part  of  this  proposition  is,  I take 
it,  self-evident.  That  bodies  are  not  distinguished  in 
respect  of  substance,  is  plain  both  from  I.  v.  and  I. 
viii.  It  is  brought  out  still  more  clearly  from  I.  xv. , note. 

Lemma  II.  All  bodies  agree  in  certain-respects.  _ 

Proof.  — All  bodies  agree  in  the  fact,  that  they  involve 
the  conception  of  one  and  the  same  attribute  ( II. , Def. 
i.).  Further,  in  the  fact  that  they  may  be  moved  less 
or  more  quickly,  and  may  be  absolutely  in  motion  or  at 
rest. 

Lemma  III.  A body  in  motion  or  at  rest  must  be_ 
determined  to  motion  or  rest  by  another  body,  which 
other  body  has  been  determined  to  motion  or  rest  by  a 
third  body,  and  that  third  again  by  a fourth,  and  so  on 
to  infinity. 

Proof. — Bodies  are  individual  things  (II.,  Def.  i.)  which 
(Lemma  I.)  are  distinguished  one  from  the  other  in 
respect  to  motion  and  rest;  thus  (I.  xxviii.)  each  must 
necessarily  be  determined  to  motion  or  rest  by  another 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


9i 


individual  thing,  namely  (II.  vi.),  by  another  body,  which 
other  body  is  also  (Ax.  i.),  in  motion  or  at  rest.  And 
this  body  again  can  only  have  been  set  in  motion  or 
caused  to  rest  by  being  determined  by  a third  body  to 
motion  or  rest.  This  third  body  again  by  a fourth,  and 
so  onto  infinity.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — Hence  it  follows,  that  a body  in  motion' 
keeps  in  motion,  until  it  is  determined  to~a~state^  of  rest 
bv  some~oUieF~bodv : and  a body  at  rest  remains  so,  until 
it  is  determined  to  a state  of  motion  by  some  other  body. 
This  is  indeed  self-evident.  For  when  I suppose,  for 
instance,  that  a given  body,  a,  is  at  rest,  and  do  not  take 
into  consideration  other  bodies  in  motion,  I cannot  affirm 
anything  concerning  the  body  a,  except  that  it  is  at  rest. 
If  it  afterward  comes  to  pass  that  a is  in  motion,  this 
cannot  have  resulted  from  its  having  been  at  rest,  for  no 
other  consequence  could  have  been  involved  than  its 
remaining  at  rest.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  a be  given  in 
motion,  we  shall,  so  long  as  we  only  consider  a,  be 
unable  to  affirm  anything  concerning  it,  except  that  it  is 
in  motion.  If  a is  subsequently  found  to  be  at  rest,  this 
rest  cannot  be  the  result  of  a’s  previous  motion,  for  such 
motion  can  only  have  led  to  continued  motion;  the  state 
of  rest  therefore  must  have  resulted  from  something, 
which  was  not  in  a,  namely,  from  an  external  cause 
determining  a to  a state  of  rest. 

Axiom  I.  All  modes,  wherein  one  body  is  affected  by 
another  body,  follow  simultaneously  from  the  nature  of 
the  body  affected  and  the  body  affecting ; so  that  one  and 
the  same  body  may  be  moved  in  different  modes,  accord- 
ing  to  the  difference  in  the  nature  of  the  bodies  moving 
it;  on  the  other  hand,  different  bodies  may  be  moved  in 
different  modes  by  one  and  the  same  body. 

Axiom  II 
body  at  rest 


When  a body  in  motion  impinges  on  another 
which  it  is  unable  to  move,  it  recoils  in 


order  to  continue  its  motion,  and  the  angle  made  by  the 
lmelff'~5mtion  in  the  recoil  and  the  plane  of  the  body  at 
resU  whereon  the  moving  body  has  impinged,  will  be  equal 
to  the  angle  formed~by  the  line  of  motion  of  incidence 
and  the  same  plane. 


92 


THE  ETHICS 


So  far  we  have  been  speaking  only  of  the  most  simple 
bodies,  which  are  only  distinguished  one  from  the  other 
by  motion  and  rest,  quickness  and  slowness.  We  now 
pass  on  to  compound  bodies. 

Definition. — When  any  given  bodies  of  the  same  or  dif- 
ferent magnitude  are  compelled  by  other  bodies  to  remain 
in  contact,  or  if  they  be  moved  at  the  same  or  different 
rates  of  speed,  so  that  their  mutual  movements  should 
preserve  among  themselves  a certain  fixed  relation,  we 
say  that  such  bodies  are  in  union,  and  that  together  they 
compose  one  body  or  individual,  which  is  distinguished 
from  other  bodies  by  this  fact  of  union. 

Axiom  III.  In  proportion  as  the  parts  of  an  individual, 
or  a compound  body,  are  in  contact  over  a greater  or  less 
superficies,  they  will  with  greater  or  less  difficulty  admit 
of  being  moved  from  their  position;  consequently  the 
individual  will,  with  greater  or  less  difficulty,  be  brought 
to  assume  another  form.  Those  bodies  whose  parts  are 
in  contact  over  large  superficies,  are  called  hard;  those, 
whose  parts  are  in  contact  over  small  superficies,  are 
called  soft  ; those,  whose  parts  are  in  motion  among  one 
another,  are  called  fluid. 

Lemma  IV.  If  from  a body  or  individual,  compounded  of 
several  bodies,  certain  bodies  be  separated,  and  if  at  the 
same  time,  an  equal  number  of  other  bodies  of  the  same 
nature  take  their  place,  the  individual  will  preserve  its  nature 
as  before,  without  any  change  in  its  actuality  (forma). 

Proof. — Bodies  (Lemma  i.)  are  not  distinguished  in  re- 
spect of  substance:  that  which  constitutes  the  actuality 
(fortnam)  of  an  individual  consists  (by  the  last  Def.)  in 
a union  of  bodies;  but  this  union,  although  there  is  a 
continual  change  of  bodies,  will  (by  our  hypothesis)  be 
maintained;  the  individual,  therefore,  will  retain  its  na- 
ture as  before,  both  in  respect  of  substance  and  in  re- 
spect of  mode.  Q.  E.D. 

Lemma  V.  If  the  parts  composing  an  individual  become 
greater  or  less,  but  in  such  proportion,  that  they  all  pre- 
serve the  same  mutual  relations  of  motion  and  rest,  the 
individual  will  still  preserve  its  original  nature,  and  its 
actuality  will  not  be  changed. 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


93 


Proof. — The  same  as  for  the  last  Lemma. 

Lemma  VI.  If  certain  bodies  composing  an  individual 
be  compelled  to  change  the  motion,  which  they  have  in 
one  direction,  for  motion  in  another  direction,  but  in  such 
a manner,  that  they  be  able  to  continue  their  motions 
and  their  mutual  communication  in  the  same  relations  as 
before,  the  individual  will  retain  its  own  nature  without 
any  change  of  its  actuality. 

Proof. — This  proposition  is  self-evident,  for  the  indi- 
vidual is  supposed  to  retain  all  that,  which,  in  its  defi- 
nition, we  spoke  of  as  its  actual  being. 

Lemma  VII.  Furthermore,  the  individual  thus  composed 
preserves  its  nature  whether  it  be,  as  a whole,  in  motion 
or  at  rest,  whether  it  be  moved  in  this  or  that  direc- 
tion; so  long  as  each  part  retains  its  motion,  and  pre- 
serves its  communication  with  other  parts  as  before. 

Proof. — This  proposition  is  evident  from  the  defini- 
tion of  an  individual  prefixed  to  Lemma  iv. 

Note. — We  thus  see,  how  a composite  individual  may 
be  affected  in  many  different  ways,  and  preserve  its 
nature  notwithstanding.  Thus  far  we  have  conceived  an 
individual  as  composed  of  bodies  only  distinguished  one 
from  the  other  in  respect  of  motion  and  rest,  speed  and 
slowness;  that  is,  of  bodies  of  the  most  simple  character. 
If,  however,  we  now  conceive  another  individual  com- 
posed of  several  individuals  of  diverse  natures,  we  shall 
find  that  the  number  of  ways  in  which  it  can  be  affected, 
without  losing  its  nature,  will  be  greatly  multiplied. 
Each  of  its  parts  would  consist  of  several  bodies,  and 
therefore  (by  Lemma  vi.)  each  part  would  admit,  with- 
out change  to  its  nature,  of  quicker  or  slower  motion, 
and  would  consequently  be  able  to  transmit  its  motions 
more  quickly  or  more  slowly  to  the  remaining  parts.  If 
we  further  conceive  a third  kind  of  individuals  composed 
of  individuals  of  this  second  kind,  we  shall  find  that  they 
may  be  affected  in  a still  greater  number  of  ways  with- 
out changing  their  actuality.  We  may  easily  proceed 
thus  to  infinity,  and  conceive  the  whole  of  nature  as  one 
individual,  whose  parts,  that  is,  all  bodies,  vary  in  infi- 
nite ways,  without  any  change  in  the  individual  as  a 


94 


THE  ETHICS 


whole.  I should  feel  bound  to  explain  and  demonstrate 
this  point  at  more  length,  if  I were  writing  a special 
treatise  on  body.  But  I have  already  said  that  such  is 
not  my  object,  I have  only  touched  on  the  question,  be- 
cause it  enables  me  to  prove  easily  that  which  I have  in 
view. 


Postulates. 


I.  The  human  body  is  composed  of  a number  of  indi- 
J vidual  parts,  of  diverse  nature,  each  one  of  which  is  in 
' itself  extremely  cnmplpjz. — 

II.  Of  the  individual  parts  composing  the  human  body 
some  are  fluid,  some  soft,  some  haxcL- 

III.  The  individual  parts  composing  the  human  body, 
and  consequently  the  human  body  itself,  are  affected  in 
a variety  of  ways  by  external  hndies- 

IV.  The  human  body  stands  in  need  for  its  preserva- 
tion of  a number  of  other  bodies,  by  which  it  is  continu- 
ally, so  to  speak,  regenerated. 

V.  When  the  fluid  part  of  the  human  body  is  deter-^ 
mined  by  an  external  body  to  impinge  often  on  another 
soft  part,  it  changes  the  surface  of  the  latter,  and,  as  it 
were,  leaves  the  impression  thereupon  of  the  external 
body  which  imp.els.it. 

VI.  The  human  body  can  move  external  bodies,  and 
arrange  them  in  a variety  of  wavs. 

Prop.  XIV.  The  human  mind  is  capable  of  perceiving 
a jjreat  number  of  things,  and  is  so  in  proportion  as  its 
body  is  capable  ot  receiving  a Jgreat  number  of  im.- 
pressions. 

Proof.  — The  human  body  (by  Post.  iii.  and  vi.)  is 
affected  in  very  many  ways  by  external  bodies,  and  is 
capable  in  very  many  ways  of  affecting  external  bodies. 
But  (II.  xii. ) the  human  mind  must  perceive  all  that 
takes  place  in  the  human  body;  the  human  mind  is, 
therefore,  capable  of  perceiving  a great  number  of 
things,  and  is  so  in  proportion,  etc.  Q.  E.  D. 

Prop.  XV.  The  idea,  which  constitutes  the  actual  being 
of  the  human  mind,  is  not  simple,  but  compounded  of  a 
great  number  of  ideas. 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


95 


Proof. — The  idea  constituting-  the  actual  being  of  the 
human  mind  is  the  idea  of  the  body  (II.  xiii.),  which 
(Post,  i.)  is  composed  of  a great  number  of  complex 
individual  parts.  But  there  is  necessarily  in  God  the 
idea  of  each  individual  part  whereof  the  body  is  com- 
posed (II.  viii.,  Coroll.);  therefore  (II.  vii.),  the  idea  of 
the  human  body  is  composed  of  these  numerous  ideas  of 
its  component  parts.  Q.  E.D. 

Prop.  XVI.  The  idea  of  every  mode,  in  which  the, 
human  body  is  affected  by  external  bodies,  must  involve 
theliature  of  the  human  body,  and  also  the  nature"  of  the 
external  S6dyT'~~' 

Proof. — ATT  the  modes,  in  which  any  given  body  is 
affected,  follow  from  the  nature  of  the  body  affected,  and 
also  from  the  nature  of  the  affecting  body  (by  Ax.  i., 
after  the  Coroll,  of  Lemma  iii.),  wherefore  their  idea 
also  necessarily  (by  I.  Ax.  iv.)  involves  the  nature  of 
both  bodies;  therefore,  the  idea  of  every  mode,  in  which 
the  human  body  is  affected  by  external  bodies,  involves 
the  nature  of  the  human  body  and  of  the  external  body. 
Q.E.D. 

Corollary  I. — Hence  it  follows,  first,  that  the  human 
paind  perceives  the  nature  of  a variety  of  bodies,  together 
with  the  nature  of  its  own. 

Corollary  IL- — It  follows,  secondly,  that  the  ideas,  which 
we  have  of  external  bodies,  indicate  rather  the  constitu- 
tion of  our  own  body  than  the  nature  of  external  bodies. 

I have  amply  illustrated  this  in  the  Appendix  to  Part  I. 

Prop.  XVII.  If  the  human  body  is  affected  in  a man- 
ner which  involves~the  nature  ~bf~any  external  body,  the 
human  mind  will  regard  the  said  external  body  as  actually 
existing,  oras  present  to  itself,  untiTtKe  human  body  be 
affected  in  such  a way,  as  to  exclude  the  existence  or  the' 
presence  of  the  said  external  body. 

Proof. — This  proposition  is  self-evident,  for  so  long  as 
the  human  body  continues  to  be  thus  affected,  so  long 
will  the  human  mind  (II.  xii.)  regard  this  modification 
of  the  body  — that  is  (by  the  last  Prop.),  it  will  have 
the  idea  of  the  mode  as  actually  existing,  and  this  idea 
involves  the  nature  of  the  external  body.  In  other  words, 


96 


THE  ETHICS 


it  will  have  the  idea  which  does  not  exclude,  but  postulates 
the  existence  or  presence  of  the  nature  of  the  external 
body;  therefore  the  mind  (by  II.  xvi.,  Coroll,  i.)  will 
regard  the  external  body  as  actually  existing,  until  it  is 
affected,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — The  mind  is  able  to  regard  as  present 
external  bodies,  by  which  the  human  body  has  once  been 
affected,  even  though  they  be  no  longer  in  existence  or 
present. 

Proof. — When  external  bodies  determine  the  fluid  parts 
of  the  human  body,  so  that  they  often  impinge  on  the 
softer  parts,  they  change  the  surface  of  the  last  named 
(Post,  v.);  hence  (Ax.  ii. , after  Coroll,  of  Lemma  iii.) 
they  are  refracted  therefrom  in  a different  manner  from 
that  which  they  followed  before  such  change;  and, 
further,  when  afterward  they  impinge  on  the  new  sur- 
faces by  their  own  spontaneous  movement,  they  will  be 
refracted  in  the  same  manner,  as  though  they  had  been 
impelled  toward  those  surfaces  by  external  bodies;  con- 
sequently, they  will,  while  they  continue  to  be  thus 
refracted,  affect  the  human  body  in  the  same  manner, 
whereof  the  mind  (II.  xii.)  will  again  take  cognizance  — 
that  is  (II.  xvii.),  the  mind  will  again  regard  the  ex- 
ternal body  as  present,  and  will  do  so,  as  often  as  the 
fluid  parts  of  the  human  body  impinge  on  the  aforesaid 
surfaces  by  their  own  spontaneous  motion.  Wherefore, 
although  the  external  bodies,  by  which  the  human 
body  has  once  been  affected,  be  no  longer  in  existence,  the 
mind  will  nevertheless  regard  them  as  present,  as  often  as 
this  action  of  the  body  is  repeated.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — We  thus  see  how  it  comes  about,  as  is  often  the 
case,  that  we  regard  as  present  things  which  are  not.  It 
is  possible  that  the  same  result  may  be  brought  about  by 
other  causes;  but  I think  it  suffices  for  me  here  to  have 
indicated  one  possible  explanation,  just  as  well  as  if  I 
had  pointed  out  the  true  cause.  Indeed,  I do  not  think 
I am  very  far  from  the  truth,  for  all  my  assumptions  are 
based  on  postulates,  which  rest,  almost  without  exception, 
on  experience,  that  cannot  be  controverted  by  those  who 
have  shown,  as  we  have,  that  the  human  body,  as  we  feel 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


97 


it,  exists  (Coroll,  after  II.  xiii).  Furthermore  (II.  vii., 
Coroll.,  II.  xvi.,  Coroll,  ii.),  we  clearly  understand  what  is 
the  difference  between  the  idea,  say,  of  Peter,  which  con- 
stitutes the  essence  of  Peter’s  mind,  and  the  idea  of  the 
said  Peter,  which  is  in  another  man,  say,  Paul.  The 
former  directly  answers  to  the  essence  of  Peter’s  own 
body,  and  only  implies  existence  so  long  as  Peter  exists ; 
the  latter  indicates  rather  the  disposition  of  Paul’s  body 
than  the  nature  of  Peter,  and,  therefore,  while  this  dis- 
position of  Paul’s  body  lasts,  Paul’s  mind  will  regard 
Peter  as  present  to  itself,  even  though  he  no  longer 
exists.  Further,  to  retain  the  usual  phraseology,  the 
modifications  of  the  human  body,  of  which  the  ideas  rep- 
resent external  bodies  as  present  to  us,  we  will  call  the 
images  of  things,  though  they  do  not  recall  the  figure  of 
things.  When  the  mind  regards  bodies  in  this  fashion, 
we  say  that  it  imagines.  I will  here  draw  attention  to 
the  fact,  in  order  to  indicate  where  error  lies,  that  the 
imaginations  of  the  mind,  looked  at  in  themselves,  do  not 
contain  error.  The  mind  does  not  err  in  the  mere  act 
of  imagining,  but  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  regarded  as 
being  without  the  idea,  which  excludes  the  existence  of 
such  things  as  it  imagines  to  be  present  to  it.  If  the 
mind,  while  imagining  non-existent  things  as  present  to 
it,  is  at  the  same  time  conscious  that  they  do  not  really 
exist,  this  power  of  imagination  must  be  set  down  to  the 
efficacy  of  its  nature,  and  not  to  a fault,  especially  if 
this  faculty  of  imagination  depend  solely  on  its  own 
nature  — that  is  (I.  Def.  vii.),  if  this  faculty  of  imagination 
be  free. 

Prop.  XVIII.  If  the  human  body  has  once  been  affected  ' 
by  two  or  more  bodies  at  the  same  time,  when  the  mind 
afterward  imagines  any  of  them,  it  will  straightway 
remember  the  others  also.. 

Proof. — The  mind  (II.  xvii.  Coroll.)  imagines  any  given 
body,  because  the  human  body  is  affected  and  disposed  by 
the  impressions  from  an  external  body,  in  the  same  manner 
as  it  is  affected  when  certain  of  its  parts  are  acted  on  by 
the  said  external  body;  but  (by  our  hypothesis)  the  body 
was  then  so  disposed,  that  the  mind  imagined  two  bodies 


cjl/ 

(9 


7 


98 


THE  ETHICS 


at  once ; therefore,  it  will  also  in  the  second  case  imagine 
two  bodies  at  once,  and  the  mind,  when  it  imagines  one, 
will  straightway  remember  the  other.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — We  now  clearly  see  what  Memory  is.  It  is  simply 
a certain  association  of  ideas  involving  the  nature  of  things 
outside  the  human  body,  which  association  arises  in  the 
mind  according  to  the  order  and  association  of  the  modi- 
fications ( affectiones ) of  the  human  body.  I say,  first,  it 
is  an  association  of  those  ideas  only,  which  involve  the 
nature  of  things  outside  the  human  body:  not  of  ideas 
which  answer  to  the  nature  of  the  said  things : ideas  of  the 
modifications  of  the  human  body  are,  strictly  speaking 
(II.  xvi.),  those  which  involve  the  nature  both  of  the 
human  body  and  of  external  bodies.  I say,  secondly,  that 
this  association  arises  according  to  the  order  and  associ- 
ation of  the  modifications  of  the  human  body,  in  order  to 
distinguish  it  from  that  association  of  ideas,  which  arises 
from  the  order  of  the  intellect,  whereby  the  mind  per- 
ceives things  through  their  primary  causes,  and  which  is 
in  all  men  the  same.  And  hence  we  can  further  clearly 
understand,  why  the  mind  from  the  thought  of  one  thing, 
should  straightway  arrive  at  the  thought  of  another  thing, 
which  has  no  similarity  with  the  first ; for  instance,  from  the 
thought  of  the  word  pomum  (an  apple),  a Roman  would 
straightway  arrive  at  the  thought  of  the  fruit  apple,  which 
has  no  similitude  with  the  articulate  sound  in  question,  nor 
anything  in  common  with  it,  except  that  the  body  of  the  man 
has  often  been  affected  by  these  two  things ; that  is,  that 
the  man  has  often  heard  the  word  pomum , while  he  was 
looking  at  the  fruit ; similarly  every  man  will  go  on  from 
one  thought  to  another,  according  as  his  habit  has  ordered 
the  images  of  things  in  his  body.  For  a soldier,  for  in- 
stance, when  he  sees  the  tracks  of  a horse  in  sand,  will 
at  once  pass  from  the  thought  of  a horse  to  the  thought 
of  a horseman,  and  thence  to  the  thought  of  war,  etc. ; 
while  a countryman  will  proceed  from  the  thought  of  a 
horse  to  the  thought  of  a plow,  a field,  etc.  Thus  every 
man  will  follow  this  or  that  train  of  thought,  according  as 
he  has  been  in  the  habit  of  conjoining  and  associating  the 
mental  images  of  things  in  this  or  that  manner. 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


99 


Prop.  XIX.  The  human  mind  has  no  knowledge  of  the 
body,  and  does  not  know  it  to  exist,  save  through  the 
ideas  of  the  modifications  whereby  the  body  is  affected. 

Proof. — The  human  mind  is  the  very  idea  or  knowl- 
edge of  the  human  body  (II.  xiii.),  which  (II.  ix.)  is  in 
God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  regarded  as  affected  by  another 
idea  of  a particular  thing  actually  existing:  or,  inasmuch 
as  (Post,  iv.)  the  human  body  stands  in  need  of  very 
many  bodies  whereby  it  is,  as  it  were,  continually  regen- 
erated ; and  the  order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same 
as  the  order  and  connection  of  causes  (II.  vii.);  this  idea 
will  therefore  be  in  God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  regarded  as 
affected  by  the  ideas  of  very  many  particular  things. 
Thus  God  has  the  idea  of  the  human  body,  or  knows  the 
human  body,  in  so  far  as  he  is  affected  by  very  many 
other  ideas,  and  not  in  so  far  as  he  constitutes  the  nature 
of  the  human  mind;  that  is  (by  II.  xi.  Coroll.),  the  human 
mind  does  not  know  the  human  body.  But  the  ideas  of 
the  modifications  of  body  are  in  God,  in  so  far  as  he 
constitutes  the  nature  of  the  human  mind,  or  the  human 
mind  perceives  those  modifications  (II.  xii.),  and  conse- 
quently (II.  xvi.)  the  human  body  itself,  and  as  actually 
existing;  therefore  the  mind  perceives  thus  far  only  the 
human  body.  Q.  E.  D. 

Prop.  XX.  The  idea  or  knowledge  of  the  human  mind. 
is  „ also  in  God,  following  in  God  in  the  same  manner, 
and  being  referred  to  God  in  the  same  manner,  as  the 
idea  or  knowledge  of  the  human  body. 

Proof. — Thought  is  an  attribute  of  God  (II.  i.);  there- 
fore (II.  iii.)  there  must  necessarily  be  in  God  the  idea 
both  of  thought  itself  and  of  all  its  modifications,  conse- 
quently also  of  the  human  mind  (II.  xi.).  Further,  this 
idea  or  knowledge  of  the  mind  does  not  follow  from  God, 
in  so  far  as  he  is  infinite,  but  in  so  far  as  he  is  affected 
by  another  idea  of  an  individual  thing  (II.  ix.).  But 
(II.  vii.)  the  order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same 
as  the  order  and  connection  of  causes ; therefore  this  idea 
or  knowledge  of  the  mind  is  in  God  and  is  referred  to 
God,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  idea  or  knowledge  of 
the  body.  Q.  E.  D. 


IOO 


THE  ETHICS 


Prop.  XXI.  This  jdea  of  the  mind  is  united  to  the 
mind  in  the  same  wav  as  the  mind  is  united  to  the 
body. 

Proof. — That  the  mind  is  united  to  the  body  we  have 
shown  from  the  fact,  that  the  body  is  the  object  of  the 
mind  (II.  xii.  and  xiii.);  and  so  for  the  same  reason  the 
idea  of  the  mind  must  be  united  with  its  object,  that  is, 
with  the  mind  in  the  same  manner  as  the  mind  is  united 
to  the  body.  Q.  E.D. 

Note. — This  proposition  is  comprehended  much  more 
clearly  from  what  we  said  in  the  note  to  II.  vii.  We  there 
showed  that  the  idea  of  body  and  body,  that  is,  mind  and 
body  (II.  xiii.),  are  one  and  the  same  individual  conceived 
now  under  the  attribute' of  thought,  now  under  the  attri- 
bute of  extension ; wherefore  the  idea  of  the  mind  and  the 
mind  itself  are  one  and  the  same  thing,  which  is  conceived 
under  one  and  the  same  attribute,  namely,  thought.  The 
idea  of  the  mind,  I repeat,  and  the  mind  itself  are  in  God 
by  the  same  necessity  and  follow  from  him  from  the  same 
power  of  thinking.  Strictly  speaking,  the  idea  of  the  mind, 
that  is,  the  idea  of  an  idea,  is  nothing  but  the  distinctive 
quality  (forma)  of  the  idea  in  so  far  as  it  is  conceived  as 
a mode  of  thought  without  reference  to  the  object;  if  a 
man  knows  anything,  he,  by  that  very  fact,  knows  that  he 
knows  it,  and  at  the  same  time  knows  that  he  knows  that 
he  knows  it,  and  so  on  to  infinity.  But  I will  treat  of  this 
hereafter. 

Prop.  XXII.  The  human  mind  perceives  not  only  the 
modifications  of  the  body,  but  also  the  ideas  of  such 
modifications. 

Proof.  — The  ideas  of  the  ideas  of  modifications  follow  in 
God  in  the  same  manner,  and  are  referred  to  God  in  the 
same  manner,  as  the  ideas  of  the  said  modifications.  This 
is  proved  in  the  same  way  as  II.  xx.  But  the  ideas  of  the 
modifications  of  the  body  are  in  the  human  mind  (II.  xii.), 
that  is,  in  God,  in  so  far  as  he  constitutes  the  essence  of 
the  human  mind;  therefore  the  ideas  of  these  ideas  will 
be  in  God,  in  so  far  as  he  has  the  knowledge  or  idea  of 
the  human  mind,  that  is  (II.  xxi.),  they  will  be  in  the 
human  mind  itself,  which  therefore  perceives  not  only 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


IOI 


the  modifications  of  the  body,  but  also  the  ideas  of  such 
modifications.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXIII.  The  mind  does  not  know  itself,  except 
in  so  far  as  it  perceives  the  ideas  of  the  modifications  of 
the  body. 

Proof. — The  idea  or  knowledge  of  the  mind  (II.  xx.) 
follows  in  God  in  the  same  manner,  and  is  referred  to 
God  in  the  same  manner,  as  the  idea  or  knowledge  of  the 
body.  But  since  (II.  xix.)  the  human  mind  does  not 
know  the  human  body  itself,  that  is  (II.  xi.  Coroll.)  since 
the  knowledge  of  the  human  body  is  not  referred  to  God, 
in  so  far  as  he  constitutes  the  nature  of  the  human  mind ; 
therefore,  neither  is  the  knowledge  of  the  mind  referred 
to  God,  in  so  far  as  he  constitutes  the  essence  of  the 
human  mind;  therefore  (by  the  same  Coroll.  II.  xi.),  the 
human  mind  thus  far  has  no  knowledge  of  itself.  Fur- 
ther the  ideas  of  the  modifications,  whereby  the  body  is 
affected,  involve  the  nature  of  the  human  body  itself 
(II.  xvi.),  that  is  (II.  xiii.),  they  agree  with  the  nature  of 
the  mind;  wherefore  the  knowledge  of  these  ideas  neces- 
sarily involves  knowledge  of  the  mind;  but  (by  the  last 
Prop.)  the  knowledge  of  these  ideas  is  in  the  human  mind 
itself;  wherefore  the  human  mind  thus  far  only  has 
knowledge  of  itself.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXIV.  The  human  mind  does  not  involve  an 
adequate  knowledge  of  the  parts  composing  the  human  body^ 

Proof. — The  parts  composing  the  human  body  do  not 
belong  to  the  essence  of  that  body,  except  in  so  far  as 
they  communicate  their  motions  to  one  another  in  a cer- 
tain fixed  relation  (Def.  after  Lemma  iii),  not  in  so  far 
as  they  can  be  regarded  as  individuals  without  relation  to 
the  human  body.  The  parts  of  the  human  body  are  highly 
complex  individuals  (Post,  i.),  whose  parts  (Lemma  iv.) 
can  be  separated  from  the  human  body  without  in  any 
way  destroying  the  nature  and  distinctive  quality  of  the 
latter,  and  they  can  communicate  their  motions  (Ax.  i., 
after  Lemma  iii.)  to  other  bodies  in  another  relation; 
therefore  (II.  iii.)  the  idea  or  knowledge  of  each  part  will 
be  in  God,  inasmuch  (II.  ix.)  as  he  is  regarded  as 
affected  by  another  idea  of  a particular  thing,  which  par- 


102 


THE  ETHICS 


ticular  thing  is  prior  in  the  order  of  nature  to  the  afore- 
said part  (II.  vii.).  We  may  affirm  the  same  thing  of 
each  part  of  each  individual  composing  the  human  body; 
therefore,  the  knowledge  of  each  part  composing  the  hu- 
man body  is  in  God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  affected  by  very 
many  ideas  of  things,  and  not  in  so  far  as  he  has  the 
idea  of  the  human  body  only,  in  other  words,  the  idea 
which  constitutes  the  nature  of  the  human  mind  (II.  xiii.); 
therefore  (II.  xi.  Coroll.)  the  human  mind  does  not  in- 
volve an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  human  body.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXV.  The  idea  of  each  modification  of  the  hu- 
man  body  does  not  involve  an  adequate  knowledge  of 
the  external  body. 

Proof. — We  have  shown  that  the  idea  of  a modification 
of  the  human  body  involves  the  nature  of  an  external 
body,  in  so  far  as  that  external  body  conditions  the 
human  body  in  a given  manner.  But,  in  so  far  as  the 
external  body  is  an  individual,  which  has  no  reference  to 
the  human  body,  the  knowledge  or  idea  thereof  is  in  God 
(II.  ix.),  in  so  far  as  God  is  regarded  as  affected  by  the 
idea  of  a further  thing,  which  (II.  vii.)  is  naturally  prior 
to  the  said  external  body.  Wherefore  an  adequate  knowl- 
edge of  the  external  body  is  not  in  God,  in  so  far  as  he 
has  the  idea  of  the  modification  of  the  human  body;  in 
other  words,  the  idea  of  the  modification  of  the  human 
body  does  not  involve  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the 
external  body.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXVI.  The  human  mind  does  not  perceive  any 


mal  oocly  as  actually  existing,  except 
ideas  of  the  modifications  ..of-its  own  body. 

Proof.  — If  the  human  body  is  in  no  way  affected  by  a 
given  external  body,  then  (II.  vii.)  neither  is  the  idea  of 
the  human  body,  in  other  words,  the  human  mind,  affected 
in  any  way  by  the  idea  of  the  existence  of  the  said  ex- 
ternal body,  nor  does  it  in  any  manner  perceive  its  exist- 
ence. But,  in  so  far  as  the  human  body  is  affected  in  any 
way  by  a given  external  body,  thus  far  (II.  xvi.  and 
Coroll.)  it  perceives  that  external  body.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary.  — In  so  far  as  the  human  mind  imagines  an 
external  body,  it  has  not  an  adequate  knowledge  thereof. 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


103 


Proof. — When  the  human  mind  regards  external  bodies 
through  the  ideas  of  the  modifications  of  its  own  body, 
we  say  that  it  imagines  (see  II.  xvii.  note);  now  the 
mind  can  only  imagine  external  bodies  as  actually  exist- 
ing. Therefore  (by  II.  xxv.),  in  so  far  as  the  mind 
imagines  external  bodies,  it  has  not  an  adequate  knowl- 
edge of  them.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXVII.  The  idea  of  each  modification  of  the 
human  body  does  not  involve  an  adequate  knowledge  of 

Proof. — Every  idea  of  the  modification  of  the  human 
body  involves  the  nature  of  the  human  body,  in  so  far  as 
the  human  body  is  regarded  as  affected  in  a given  man- 
ner (II.  xvi.).  But,  inasmuch  as  the  human  body  is  an 
individual  which  may  be  affected  in  many  other  ways, 
the  idea  of  the  said  modification,  etc.  Q.  E.  D. 

Prop.  XXVIII.  The  ideas  of  the  modifications  of  the 
human  body,  in  so  far  as  they  Iiave  reference  only  to' the 
'human  rnmd,"  ar(T  not  clear  and  distinct,  but  confusedT~ 

Proof. — The  ideas  of  the  modifications  of  the  human 
body  involve  the  nature  both  of  the  human  body  and  of 
external  bodies  (II.  xvi.);  they  must  involve  the  nature 
not  only  of  the  human  body  but  also  of  its  parts ; for  the 
modifications  are  modes  (Post.  iii. ) , whereby  the  parts  of 
the  human  body,  and,  consequently,  the  human  body  as  a 
whole  are  affected.  But  (by  II.  xxiv.,  xxv.)  the  adequate 
knowledge  of  external  bodies,  as  also  of  the  parts  com- 
posing the  human  body,  is  not  in  God,  in  so  far  as  he  is 
regarded  as  affected  by  the  human  mind,  but  in  so  far  as 
he  is  regarded  as  affected  by  other  ideas.  These  ideas  of 
modifications,  in  so  far  as  they  are  referred  to  the  human 
mind  alone,  are  as  consequences  without  premises,  in 
other  words,  confused  ideas.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — The  idea  which  constitutes  the  nature  of  the 
human  mind  is,  in  the  same  manner,  proved  not  to  be, 
when  considered  in  itself  alone,  clear  and  distinct ; as  also 
is  the  case  with  the  idea  of  the  human  mind,  and  the 
ideas  of  the  ideas  of  the  modifications  of  the  human  body, 
in  so  far  as  they  are  referred  to  the  mind  only,  as  every- 
one may  easily  see. 


104 


THE  ETHICS 


Prop.  XXIX.  The  idea  of  the  idea  of  each  modification 
of  the  human  body  does  not  involve  an  adequate  knowl- 
edge of  the  human  mind- 

Proof.  — The  idea  of  a modification  of  the  human  body 
(II.  xxvii.)  does  not  involve  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the 
said  body,  in  other  words,  does  not  adequately  express  its 
nature;  that  is  (II.  xiii.)  it  does  not  agree  with  the  nature 
of  the  mind  adequately;  therefore  (I.  Ax.  vi.),  the  idea  of 
this  idea  does  not  adequately  express  the  nature  of  the 
human  mind,  or  does  not  involve  an  adequate  knowledge 
thereof. 

Corollary. — Hence  it  follows  that  the  human  mind, 
when  it  perceives  things  after  the  common  order  of 
nature,  has  not  an  adequate  but  only  a confused  and 
fragmentary  knowledge  of  itself,  of  its  own  body^  and  of 
external  bodies.  For  the  mind  does  not  know  itself, 
except  in  so  far  as  it  perceives  the  ideas  of  the  modifi’- 
cations  of -body  (II.  xxiii.).  'It  only  perceives  its  own 
body  (II.  xix.)  through  the  ideas  of  the  modifications, 
and  only  perceives  external  bodies  through  the  same 
means;  thus,  in  so  far  as  it  has  such  ideas  of  modifica- 
tion, it  has  not  an  adequate  knowledge  of  itself  (II.  xxix.), 
nor  of  its  own  body  (II.  xxvii.),  nor  of  external  bodies 
(II.  xxv.),  but  only  a fragmentary  and  confused  knowl- 
edge thereof  (II.  xxviii.  and  note).  Q.E.  D. 

Note. — I say  expressly,  that  the  mind  has  not  an  ade- 
quate but  only  a confused  knowledge  of  itself,  its  own 
body,  and  of  external  bodies,  whenever  it  perceives  things 
after  the  common  order  of  nature ; that  is,  whenever  it  is 
determined  from  without,  namely,  by  the  fortuitous  play 
of  circumstance,  to  regard  this  or  that ; not  at  such  times 
as  it  is  determined  from  within,  that  is,  by  the  fact  of 
regarding  several  things  at  once,  to  understand  their  points 
of  agreement,  difference,  and  contrast.  Whenever  it  is 
determined  in  anywise  from  within,  it  regards  things 
clearly  and  distinctly,  as  I will  show  below. 

Prop.  XXX.  We  can  only  have  a very  inadequate  knowl- 
edge of  the_duration  of  our  body. 

Proof. — The  duration  of  our  body  does  not  depend  on 
its  essence  (II.  Ax.  i.),  nor  on  the  absolute  nature  of 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND  105 

God  (I.  xxi.).  But  (I.  xxviii.)  it  is  conditioned  to  exist 
and  operate  by  causes,  which  in  their  turn  are  conditioned 
to  exist  and  operate  in  a fixed  and  definite  relation  by 
other  causes,  these  last  again  being  conditioned  by  others, 
and  so  on  to  infinity.  The  duration  of  our  body  there- 
fore depends  on  the  common  order  of  nature,  or  the  con- 
stitution of  things.  Now,  however  a thing  may  be 
constituted,  the  adequate  knowledge  of  that  thing  is  in 
God,  in  so  far  as  he  has  the  ideas  of  all  things,  and  not 
in  so  far  as  he  has  the  idea  of  the  human  body  only. 
(II.  ix.  Coroll.)  Wherefore  the  knowledge  of  the  duration 
of  our  body  is  in  God  very  inadequate,  in  so  far  as  he  is 
only  regarded  as  constituting  the  nature  of  the  human 
mind;  that  is  (II.  xi.  Coroll.),  this  knowledge  is  very 
inadequate  in  our  mind.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXI.  We  can  only  have  a very  inadequate  knowl- 
edge of  the  duration  of  particular  things  external  to  our- 
selves. 

Proof. — Every  particular  thing,  like  the  human  body, 
must  be  conditioned  by  another  particular  thing  to  exist 
and  operate  in  a fixed  and  definite  relation;  this  other 
particular  thing  must  likewise  be  conditioned  by  a third, 
and  so  on  to  infinity.  (I.  xxviii.)  As  we  have  shown  in 
the  foregoing  proposition,  from  this  common  property  of 
particular  things,  we  have  only  a very  inadequate  knowl- 
edge of  the  duration  of  our  body;  we  must  draw  a similar 
conclusion  with  regard  to  the  duration  of  particular  things, 
namely,  that  we  can  only  have  a very  inadequate  knowl- 
edge of  the  duration  thereof.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary.  — Hence  it  follows  that  all  particular  things 
are  contingent  and  perishable.  For  we  can  have  no 
adequate  idea  of  their  duration  (by  the  last  Prop.),  and 
this  is  what  we  must  understand  by  the  contingency 
and  perishableness  of  things.  (I.  xxxiii.,  Note  i.)  For 
(I.  xxix.),  except  in  this  sense,  nothing  is  contingent. 

Prop.  XXXII.  All^ideas,  in  so  far  as  they  are  re- 
ferred to  God,  are  true. 

Proof.— All  ideas  which  are  in  God  agree  in  every  re- 
spect with  their  objects  (II.  vii.  Coroll.),  therefore  (I. 
Ax.  vi.)  they  are  all  true.  Q.E.D. 


io6 


THE  ETHICS 


Prop.  XXXIII.  There  is  nothing  positive  in  ideas, 
which  causes  them  to  be  called  false. 

Proof. — If  this  be  denied,  conceive,  if  possible,  a posi- 
tive mode  of  thinking,  which  should  constitute  the  dis- 
tinctive quality  of  falsehood.  Such  a mode  of  thinking 
cannot  be  in  God  (II.  xxxii.);  external  to  God  it  cannot 
be  or  be  conceived  (I.  xv.).  Therefore  there  is  noth- 
ing positive  in  ideas  which  causes  them  to  be  called 
false.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXIV.  Every  idea,  which  in  us  is  absolute  or 
adequate  and  perfect,  is  true. 

Proof. — When  we  say  that  an  idea  in  us  is  adequate  and 
perfect,  we  say,  in  other  words  (II.  xi.  Coroll.),  that  the 
idea  is  adequate  and  perfect  in  God,  in  so  far  as  he 
constitutes  the  essence  of  our  minds;  consequently  (II. 
xxxii.),  we  say  that  such  an  idea  is  true.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXV.  Falsity  consists  in  the  privation  of  knowl- 
edge,  which  inadequate,  fragmentary,  or  confused  ideas, 
involve. 

Proof. — There  is  nothing  positive  in  ideas,  which  causes 
them  to  be  called  false  ( II.  xxxiii) ; but  falsity  cannot 
consist  in  simple  privation  (for  minds,  not  bodies,  are 
said  to  err  and  to  be  mistaken),  neither  can  it  consist  in 
absolute  ignorance,  for  ignorance  and  error  are  not  iden- 
tical ; wherefore  it  consists  in  the  privation  of  knowledge, 
which  inadequate,  fragmentary,  or  confused  ideas  in- 
volve. Q.E.D. 

Note. — In  the  note  to  II.  xvii.  I explained  how  error 
consists  in  the  privation  of  knowledge,  but  in  order  to 
throw  more  light  on  the  subject  I will  give  an  example. 
For  instance,  men  are  mistaken  in  thinking  themselves 
free ; their  opinion  is  made  up  of  consciousness  of  their 
own  actions,  and  ignorance  of  the  causes  by  which  they 
are  conditioned.  Their  idea  of  freedom,  therefore,  is 
simply  their  ignorance  of  any  cause  for  their  actions. 
As  for  their  saying  that  human  actions  depend  on  the 
will,  this  is  a mere  phrase  without  any  idea  to  correspond 
thereto.  What  the  will  is,  and  how  it  moves  the  body, 
they  none  of  them  know ; those  who  boast  of  such  knowl- 
edge, and  feign  dwellings  and  habitations  for  the  soul, 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


107 


are  wont  to  provoke  either  laughter  or  disgust.  So, 
again,  when  we  look  at  the  sun,  we  imagine  that  it  is 
distant  from  us  about  two  hundred  feet;  this  error  does 
not  lie  solely  in  this  fancy,  but  in  the  fact  that,  while  we 
thus  imagine,  we  do  not  know  the  sun’s  true  distance 
or  the  cause  of  the  fancy.  For  although  we  afterward 
learn,  that  the  sun  is  distant  from  us  more  than  six  hun- 
dred of  the  earth’s  diameters,  we  none  the  less  shall 
fancy  it  to  be  near;  for  we  do  not  imagine  the  sun  as 
near  us,  because  we  are  ignorant  of  its  true  distance,  but 
because  the  modification  of  our  body  involves  the  essence 
of  the  sun,  in  so  far  as  our  said  body  is  affected  thereby. 

Prop.  XXXVI.  Inadequate  and  confused  ideas  follow  by_ 
the  same  necessity,  as  adequate  or  clear  and  distinct  ideas. 

Proof. — All  ideas  are  in  God  (I.  xv.),  and  in  so  far  as 
they  are  referred  to  God  are  true  (II.  xxxii.)  and  (II.  vii. 
Coroll.)  adequate;  therefore  there  are  no  ideas  confused 
or  inadequate,  except  in  respect  to  a particular  mind 
(cf.  II.  xxiv.  and  xxviii.);  therefore  all  ideas,  whether 
adequate  or  inadequate,  follow  by  the  same  necessity 
(II.  vi.).  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXVII.  That  which  is  common  to  all  (cf. 
Lemma  II.  above),  and  which  is  equally  in  a part  and 
in  the  whole,  does  not  constitute  the  essence  of  any  par- 
ticular thing. 

Proof. — If  this  be  denied,  conceive,  if  possible,  that 
it  constitutes  the  essence  of  some  particular  thing ; for  in- 
stance, the  essence  of  b.  Then  (II.  Def.  ii.)  it  cannot 
without  b either  exist  or  be  conceived ; but  this  is  against 
our  hypothesis.  Therefore  it  does  not  appertain  to  b’s  es- 
sence nor  does  it  constitute  the  essence  of  any  particular 
thing.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXVIII.  Those  things,  which  are  common  to 
all,  and  which  are  equaHy~ln~a  part  and  in  the^whole, 
cannot  be  conceived  except  adequately. 

Proof.  — Let  a be  something  which  is  common  to  all 
bodies,  and  which  is  equally  present  in  the  part  of  any 
given  body  and  in  the  whole.  I say  a cannot  be  con- 
ceived except  adequately.  For  the  idea  thereof  in  God 
will  necessarily  therefore  be  adequate  (II.  vii.  Coroll.) 


io8 


THE  ETHICS 


both  in  so  far  as  God  has  the  idea  of  the  human  body, 
and  also  in  so  far  as  he  has  the  idea  of  the  modifications 
of  the  human  body  (II.  xvi.,  xxv.,  xxvii.),  involve  in  part 
the  nature  of  the  human  body  and  the  nature  of  external 
bodies;  that  is  (II.  xii.,  xiii.).  the  idea  in  God  will  nec- 
essarily be  adequate,  both  in  so  far  as  he  constitutes  the 
human  mind,  and  in  so  far  as  he  has  the  ideas,  which 
are  in  the  human  mind.  Therefore  the  mind  (II.  xi. 
Coroll.)  necessarily  perceives  a adequately,  and  has  this 
adequate  perception,  both  in  so  far  as  it  perceives 
itself  and  in  so  far  as  it  perceives  its  own  or 
any  external  body,  nor  can  a be  conceived  in  any  other 
manner.  Q.  E.  D. 

Corollary.  — Hence  it  follows  that  there  are  certain 
ideas  or  notions  common  to  all  men;  for  (by  Lemma  ii.) 
all  bodies  agree  in  certain  respects,  which  (by  the  fore- 
going Prop. ) must  be  adequately  or  clearly  and  distinctly 
perceived  by  all. 

Prop.  XXXIX.  That,  which  is  common  to  and  a prop- 
erty of  the  human  body  and  such  other  bodies  as  are 
wont  to  affect  the  human  body,  and  which  is  present 
equally  in  each  part  of  either,  or  in  the  whole,  will  be 
represented  by  an  adequate  idea  in  the  rmnd. 

Proof.  — If  a be  that,  which  is  common  to  and  a prop- 
erty of  the  human  body  and  external  bodies,  and  equally 
present  in  the  human  body  and  in  the  said  external 
bodies,  in  each  part  of  each  external  body  and  in  the 
whole  there  will  be  an  adequate  idea  of  a in  God  (II. 
vii.  Coroll.)  both  in  so  far  as  he  has  the  idea  of  the  hu- 
man body,  and  in  so  far  as  he  has  the  ideas  of  the  given 
external  bodies.  Let  it  now  be  granted,  that  the  human 
body  is  affected  by  an  external  body  through  that,  which 
it  has  in  common  therewith,  namely,  a ; the  idea  of  this 
modification  will  involve  the  property  a (II.  xvi.),  and 
therefore  (II.  vii.  Coroll.)  the  idea  of  this  modification, 
in  so  far  as  it  involves  the  property  a,  will  be  adequate 
in  God,  in  so  far  as  God  is  affected  by  the  idea  of  the 
human  body;  that  is  (II.  xiii.),  in  so  far  as  he  constitutes 
the  nature  of  the  human  mind;  therefore  (II.  xi.  Coroll.) 
this  idea  is  also  adequate  in  the  human  mind.  Q.E.D. 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


109 


Corollary. — Hence  it  follows  that  the  mind  is  fitted  to 
perceive  adequately  more  things,  in  proportion  as  its  body 
has  more  in  common  with  other  -bodies. 

Prop.  XL.  Whatsoever  ideas  in  the  mind  follow  from 
ideas  which  are  therein  adequate,  are  also  themselves^ 
adequate. 

Proof. — This  proposition  is  self-evident.  For  when  we 
say  that  an  idea  in  the  human  mind  follows  from  ideas 
which  are  therein  adequate,  we  say,  in  other  words  (II.  xi. 

Coroll.)  that  an  idea  is  in  the  divine  intellect,  whereof 
God  is  the  cause,  not  in  so  far  as  he  is  infinite,  nor  in 
so  far  as  he  is  affected  by  the  ideas  of  very  many  partic- 
ular things,  but  only  in  so  far  as  he  constitutes  the  essence 
of  the  human  mind.  I & 

Note  I. — I have  thus  set  forth  the  cause  of  those  ^ iaAvv/vv%M1 
notions,  which  are  common  to  all  men,  and  which  form 
the  basis  of  our  ratiocination.  But  there  are  other  causes 
of  certain  axioms  or  notions,  which  it  would  be  to  the 
purpose  to  set  forth  by  this  method  of  ours ; for  it  would 
thus  appear  what  notions  are  more  useful  than  others, 
and  what  notions  have  scarcely  any  use  at  all.  Further- 
more, we  should  see  what  notions  are  common  to  all  men, 
and  what  notions  are  only  clear  and  distinct  to  those  who 
are  unshackeled  by  prejudice,  and  we  should  detect  those 
which  are  ill-founded.  Again  we  should  discern  whence 
the  notions  called  secondary  derived  their  origin,  and 
consequently  the  axioms  on  which  they  are  founded,  and 
other  points  of  interest  connected  with  these  questions. 

But  I have  decided  to  pass  over  the  subject  here,  partly 
because  I have  set  it  aside  for  another  treatise,  partly 
because  I am  afraid  of  wearying  the  reader  by  too  great 
prolixity.  Nevertheless,  in  order  not  to  omit  anything 
necessary  to  be  known,  I will  briefly  set  down  the  causes, 
whence  are  derived  the  terms  styled  transcendental, 
such  as  Being,  Thing,  Something.  These  terms  arose 
from  the  fact,  that  the  human  body,  being  limited,  is 
only  capable  of  distinctly  forming  a certain  number  of 
images  (what  an  image  is  I explained  in  II.  xvii.  note) 
within  itself  at  the  same  time ; if  this  number  be  exceeded 
the  images  will  begin  to  be  confused;  if  this  numbet 


I T C 


THE  ETHICS 


of  images  which  the  body  is  capable  of  forming 
distinctly  within  itself,  be  largely  exceeded,  all  will  be- 
come entirely  confused  one  with  another.  This  being 
so,  it  is  evident  ( from  II.  Prop.  xvii.  Coroll,  and  xviii. ) 
that  the  human  mind  can  distinctly  imagine  as  many 
things  simultaneously,  as  its  body  can  form  images  simul- 
taneously. When  the  images  become  quite  confused  in 
the  body,  the  mind  also  imagines  all  bodies  confusedly 
without  any  distinction,  and  will  comprehend  them,  as  it 
were,  under  one  attribute,  namely,  under  the  attribute 
of  Being,  Thing,  etc.  The  same  conclusion  can  be  drawn 
from  the  fact  that  images  are  not  always  equally  vivid, 
and  from  other  analogous  causes,  which  there  is  no  need 
to  explain  here;  for  the  purpose  which  we  have  in  view 
it  is  sufficient  for  us  to  consider  one  only.  All  may  be 
reduced  to  this,  that  these  terms  represent  ideas  in  the 
highest  degree  confused.  From  similar  causes  arise  those 
notions,  which  we  call  general,  such  as  man,  horse,  dog, 
etc.  They  arise,  to  wit,  from  the  fact  that  so  many  im- 
ages, for  instance,  of  men,  are  formed  simultaneously  in 
the  human  mind,  that  the  powers  of  imagination  break 
down,  not  indeed  utterly,  but  to  the  extent  of  the  mind 
losing  count  of  small  differences  between  individuals 
( e . g.,  color,  size,  etc.)  and  their  definite  number,  and 
only  distinctly  imagining  that,  in  which  all  the  individuals, 
in  so  far  as  the  body  is  affected  by  them,  agree ; for  that 
is  the  point,  in  which  each  of  the  said  individuals  chiefly 
affected  the  body;  this  the  mind  expresses  by  the  name 
man,  and  this  it  predicates  of  an  infinite  number  of  par- 
ticular individuals.  For,  as  we  have  said,  it  is  unable  to 
imagine  the  definite  number  of  individuals.  We  must, 
however,  bear  in  mind,  that  these  general  notions  are 
not  formed  by  all  men  in  the  same  way,  but  vary  in  each 
individual  according  as  the  point  varies,  \vhereby  the  body 
has  been  most  often  affected  and  which  the  mind  most 
easily  imagines  or  remembers.  For  instance,  those  who 
have  most  often  regarded  with  admiration  the  stature  of 
man,  will  by  the  name  of  man  understand  an  animal  of 
erect  stature ; those  who  have  been  accustomed  to  regard 
some  other  attribute,  will  form  a different  general  image 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


nr 


of  man,  for  instance,  that  man  is  a laughing  animal,  a 
two-footed  animal  without  feathers,  a rational  animal,  and 
thus,  in  other  cases,  everyone  will  form  general  images 
of  things  according  to  the  habit  of  his  body. 

It  is  thus  not  to  be  wondered  at,  that  among  philoso- 
phers, who  seek  to  explain  things  in  nature  merely  by 
the  images  formed  of  them,  so  many  controversies  should 
have  arisen. 

Note  II. — From  all  that  has  been  said  above  it  is 
clear,  that  we,  in  many  cases,  perceive  and  form  our 
general  notions:  (i.)  From  particular  things  represented 
to  our  intellect  fragmentarily,  confusedly,  and  without 
order  through  our  senses  (II.  xxix.  Coroll.).  I have  set- 
tled to  call  such  perceptions  by  the  name  of  knowledge 
from  the  mere  suggestions  of  experience.  (2.)  From 
symbols,  e.g.,  from  the  fact  of  having  read  or  heard  cer- 
tain words  we  remember  things  and  form  certain  ideas 
concerning  them,  similar  to  those  through  which  we 
imagine  things  (II.  xviii.  note).  I shall  call  both  these 
ways  of  regarding  things  knowledge  of  the  first  kind, 
opinion,  or  imagination.  (3.)  From  the  fact  that  we 
have  notions  common  to  all  men,  and  adequate  ideas  of 
the  properties  of  things  (II.  xxxviii.  Coroll,  xxxix.  and 
Coroll,  and  xl.);  this  I call  reason  and  knowledge  of 
the  second  kind.  Besides  these  two  kinds  of  knowledge, 
there  is,  as  I will  hereafter  show,  a third  kind  of  knowl- 
edge, which  we  will  call  intuition.  This  kind  of  knowl- 
edge proceeds  from  an  adequate  idea  of  the  absolute 
essence  of  certain  attributes  of  God  to  the  adequate 
knowledge  of  the  essence  of  things.  I will  illustrate  all 
three  kinds  of  knowledge  by  a single  example.  Three 
numbers  are  given  for  finding  a fourth,  which  shall  be 
to  the  third  as  the  second  is  to  the  first.  Tradesmen 
without  hesitation  multiply  the  second  by  the  third,  and 
divide  the  product  by  the  first;  either  because  they  have 
not  forgotten  the  rule  which  they  received  from  a master 
without  any  proof,  or  because  they  have  often  made  trial 
of  it  with  simple  numbers,  or  by  virtue  of  the  proof  of 
the  nineteenth  proposition  of  the  seventh  book  of  Euclid, 
namely,  in  virtue  of  the  general  property  of  proportionals. 


I 12 


THE  ETHICS 


But  with  very  simple  numbers  there  is  no  need  of  this. 
For  instance,  one,  two,  three,  being  given,  everyone  can 
see  that  the  fourth  proportional  is  six;  and  this  is  much 
clearer,  because  we  infer  the  fourth  number  from  an  in- 
tuitive grasping  of  the  ratio,  which  the  first  bears  to  the 
second. 

Prop.  XLI.  Knowledge  of  the  first  kind  is  the  only 
source  of  falsity,  knowledge  of  the  second  and  third 
kinds  is  necessarily  true. 

Proof. — To  knowledge  of  the  first  kind  we  have  (in  the 
foregoing  note)  assigned  all  those  ideas,  which  are  inade- 
quate and  confused;  therefore  this  kind  of  knowledge  is 
the  only  source  of  falsity  (II.  xxxv.).  Furthermore,  we 
assigned  to  the  second  and  third  kinds  of  knowledge  those 
ideas  which  are  adequate;  therefore  these  kinds  are  nec- 
essarily true  (II.  xxxiv.).  Q. E.D. 

Prop.  XLII.  Knowledge  of  the  second  and  third  kinds, 
not  knowledge  of  the  first  kind,  teaches  us  to  distinguish 
the  true  from  the  ialse. 

Proof. — This  proposition  is  self-evident.  He,  who  knows 
how  to  distinguish  between  true  and  false,  must  have  an 
adequate  idea  of  true  and  false.  That  is  (II.  xl.,  note  ii. ), 
he  must  know  the  true  and  the  false  by  the  second  or 
third  kind  of  knowledge. 

Prop.  XLIII.  He,  who_has  a true  idea,  simultaneously 
knows  that  he  has  a true  idea,  and  cannot  doubt  of  the 
truth  of~the  thing  perceived. 

Proof. — A true  idea  in  us  is  an  idea  which  is  adequate 
in  God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  displayed  through  the  nature  of 
the  human  mind  (II.  xi.  Coroll.).  Let  us  suppose  that 
there  is  in  God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  displayed  through  the 
human  mind,  an  adequate  idea,  a.  The  idea  of  this  idea 
must  also  necessarily  be  in  God,  and  be  referred  to  him  in 
the  same  way  as  the  idea  a (by  II.  xx. , whereof  the  proof 
is  of  universal  application).  But  the  idea  a is  supposed  to 
be  referred  to  God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  displayed  through 
the  human  mind;  therefore  the  idea  of  the  idea  a must 
be  referred  to  God  in  the  same  manner;  that  is  (by  II. 
xi.  Coroll.),  the  adequate  idea  of  the  idea  a will  be  in 
the  mind,  which  has  the  adequate  idea  a;  therefore  he, 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


”3 


who  has  an  adequate  idea  or  knows  a thing  truly  (II. 
xxxiv.),  must  at  the  same  time  have  an  adequate  idea 
or  true  knowledge  of  his  knowledge;  that  is,  obviously, 
he  must  be  assured.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — I explained  in  the  note  to  II.  xxi.  what  is  meant 
by  the  idea  of  an  idea;  but  we  may  remark  that  the 
foregoing  proposition  is  in  itself  sufficiently  plain.  No 
one,  who  has  a true  idea,  is  ignorant  that  a true  idea 
involves  the  highest  certainty.  For  to  have  a true  idea 
is  only  another  expression  for  knowing  a thing  perfectly, 
or  as  well  as  possible.  No  one,  indeed,  can  doubt  of 
this,  unless  he  thinks  that  an  idea  is  something  lifeless, 
like  a picture  on  a panel,  and  not  a mode  of  thinking  — 
namely,  the  very  act  of  understanding.  And  who,  I ask, 
can  know  that  he  understands  anything,  unless  he  do 
first  understand  it  ? In  other  words,  who  can  know  that 
he  is  sure  of  a thing,  unless  he  be  first  sure  of  that 
thing  ? Further,  what  can  there  be  more  clear,  and  more 
certain,  than  a true  idea  as  a standard  of  truth  ? Even 
as  light  displays  both  itself  and  darkness,  so  is  truth  a 
standard  both  of  itself  and  of  falsity. 

I think  I have  thus  sufficiently  answered  these  ques- 
tions— namely,  if  a true  idea  is  distinguished  from  a 
false  idea,  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  said  to  agree  with  its 
object,  a true  idea  has  no  more  reality  or  perfection 
than  a false  idea  (since  the  two  are  only  distinguished 
by  an  extrinsic  mark ) ; consequently,  neither  will  a man 
who  has  true  ideas  have  any  advantage  over  him  who 
has  only  false  ideas.  Further,  how  comes  it  that  men 
have  false  ideas  ? Lastly,  how  can  any  one  be  sure,  that 
he  has  ideas  which  agree  with  their  objects  ? These 
questions,  I repeat,  I have,  in  my  opinion,  sufficiently 
answered.  The  difference  between  a true  idea  and  a 
false  idea  is  plain:  from  what  was  said  in  II.  xxxv.,  the 
former  is  related  to  the  latter  as  being  is  to  not-being. 
The  causes  of  falsity  I have  set  forth  very  clearly  in  II. 
xix.  and  II.  xxxv.  with  the  note.  From  what  is  there 
stated,  the  difference  between  a man  who  has  true  ideas, 
and  a man  who  has  only  false  ideas,  is  made  apparent. 
As  for  the  last  question  — as  to  how  a man  can  be  sure 
8 


THE  ETHICS 


114 

that  he  has  ideas  that  agree  with  their  objects,  I have 
just  pointed  out,  with  abundant  clearness,  that  his  knowl- 
edge arises  from  the  simple  fact,  that  he  has  an  idea 
which  corresponds  with  its  object  — in  other  words,  that 
truth  is  its  own  standard.  We  may  add  that  our  mind, 
in  so  far  as  it  perceives  things  truly,  is  part  of  the  infinite 
intellect  of  God  (II.  xi.  Coroll.);  therefore,  the  clear  and 
distinct  ideas  of  the  mind  are  as  necessarily  true  as  the 
ideas  of  God. 

Prop.  XLIV.  It  is  not  in  the  nature  of  reason  to  regard 
things^  as  contingent,  but  as  necessary. 

Proof. — It  is  in  the  nature  of  reason  to  perceive  things 
truly  (II.  xli.),  namely  (I.  Ax.  vi.),  as  they  are  in  them- 
selves— that  is  (I.  xxix.),  not  as  contingent,  but  as  neces- 
sary. Q.  E.  D. 

Corollary  I. — Hence  it  follows,  that  it  is  only  through 
our  imagination  that  we  consider  things,  whether  in 
respect  to  the  future  or  the  past,  as  contingent. 

Note.—  How  this  way  of  looking  at  things  arises,  I will 
briefly  explain.  We  have  shown  above  ( II.  xvii.  and 
Coroll.)  that  the  mind  always  regards  things  as  present 
to  itself,  even  though  they  be  not  in  existence,  until  some 
causes  arise  which  exclude  their  existence  and  presence. 
Further  (II.  xviii.),  we  showed  that,  if  the  human  body 
has  once  been  affected  by  two  external  bodies  simul- 
taneously, the  mind,  when  it  afterward  imagines  one  of 
the  said  external  bodies,  will  straightway  remember  the 
other  — that  is,  it  will  regard  both  as  present  to  itself, 
unless  there  arise  causes  which  exclude  their  existence 
and  presence.  Further,  no  one  doubts  that  we  imagine 
time,  from  the  fact  that  we  imagine  bodies  to  be  moved 
some  more  slowly  than  others,  some  more  quickly,  some 
at  equal  speed.  Thus,  let  us  suppose  that  a child  yes- 
terday saw  Peter  for  the  first  time  in  the  morning,  Paul 
at  noon,  and  Simon  in  the  evening;  then  that  to-day  he 
again  sees  Peter  in  the  morning.  It  is  evident,  from 
II.  Prop,  xviii.,  that,  as  soon  as  he  sees  the  morning  light, 
he  will  imagine  that  the  sun  will  traverse  the  same  parts 
of  the  sky,  as  it  did  when  he  saw  it  on  the  preceding 
day;  in  other  words,  he  will  imagine  a complete  day, 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


u5 


and,  together  with  his  imagination  of  the  morning,  he 
will  imagine  Peter;  with  noon,  he  will  imagine  Paul; 
and  with  evening,  he  will  imagine  Simon  — that  is,  he 
will  imagine  the  existence  of  Paul  and  Simon  in  relation 
to  a future  time ; on  the  other  hand,  if  he  sees  Simon  in 
the  evening,  he  will  refer  Peter  and  Paul  to  a past  time, 
by  imagining  them  simultaneously  with  the  imagination 
of  a past  time.  If  it  should  at  any  time  happen,  that  on 
some  other  evening  the  child  should  see  James  instead 
of  Simon,  he  will,  on  the  following  morning,  associate 
with  his  imagination  of  evening  sometimes  Simon,  some- 
times James,  not  both  together:  for  the  child  is  supposed 
to  have  seen,  at  evening,  one  or  other  of  them,  not 
both  together.  His  imagination  will  therefore  waver; 
and,  with  the  imagination  of  future  evenings,  he  will 
associate  first  one,  then  the  other  — that  is,  he  will 
imagine  them  in  the  future,  neither  of  them  as  certain, 
but  both  as  contingent.  This  wavering  of  the  imagina- 
tion will  be  the  same,  if  the  imagination  be  concerned 
with  things  which  we  thus  contemplate,  standing  in  rela- 
tion to  time  past  or  time  present:  consequently,  we  may 
imagine  things  as  contingent,  whether  they  be  referred 
to  time  present,  past,  or  future. 

Corollary  II. — It  is  in  the  nature  of  reason  to  perceive  i 
things  under  a certain  form  of  eternity  ( sub  quddam J 
ceternitatis  specie). 

Proof. — It  is  in  the  nature  of  reason  to  regard  things, 
not  as  contingent,  but  as  necessary  (II.  xliv.).  Reason 
perceives  this  necessity  of  things  (II.  xli.)  truly  — that  is 
(I.  Ax.  vi.),  as  it  is  in  itself.  But  (I.  xvi.)  this  necessity 
of  things  is  the  very  necessity  of  the  eternal  nature  of 
God;  therefore,  it  is  in  the  nature  of  reason  to  regard 
things  under  this  form  of  eternity.  We  may  add  that  the 
bases  of  reason  are  the  notions  (II.  xxxviii.)  which 
answer  to  things  common  to  all,  and  which  (II 
xxxvii.)  do  not  answer  to  the  essence  of  any  par- 
ticular thing:  which  must  therefore  be  conceived  with- 
out any  relation  to  time,  under  a certain  form  of 
eternity. 

Prop.  XLV.  Every  idea  of  everybody,  or  of  every  par- 


1 1 6 


THE  ETHICS 


ticular  thing-  actually  existing,  necessarily  involves  the 
eternal  and  infinite  essence  of  God. 

Proof.  — The  idea  of  a particular  thing  actually  existing 
necessarily  involves  both  the  existence  and  the  essence  of 
the  said  thing  (II.  viii.).  Now  particular  things  cannot 
be  conceived  without  God  (I.  xv.);  but,  inasmuch  as 
(II.  vi.)  they  have  God  for  their  cause,  in  so  far  as  he  is 
regarded  under  the  attribute  of  which  the  things  in 
question  are  modes,  their  ideas  must  necessarily  involve 
(I.  Ax.  iv.)  the  conception  of  the  attribute  of  those 
ideas — that  is  (I.  vi.),  the  eternal  and  infinite  essence 
of  God.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — By  existence  I do  not  here  mean  duration  — that 
is,  existence  in  so  far  as  it  is  conceived  abstractedly,  and 
as  a certain  form  of  quantity.  I am  speaking  of  the  very 
nature  of  existence,  which  is  assigned  to  particular  things, 
because  they  follow  in  infinite  numbers  and  in  infinite 
ways  from  the  eternal  necessity  of  God’s  nature  (I.  xvi.). 
I am  speaking,  I repeat,  of  the  very  existence  of  particu- 
lar things,  in  so  far  as  they  are  in  God.  For  although 
each  particular  thing  be  conditioned  by  another  particular 
thing  to  exist  in  a given  way,  yet  the  force  whereby  each 
particular  thing  perseveres  in  existing  follows  from  the 
eternal  necessity  of  God’s  nature  (cf.  I.  xxiv. , Coroll.). 

Prop.  XLVI.  The  knowledge  of  the  eternal  and  infinite 
essence  of  God  which  every  idea  involves  is  adequate  and 
perfects 

Proof. — The  proof  of  the  last  proposition  is  universal; 
and  whether  a thing  be  considered  as  a part  or  a whole, 
the  idea  thereof,  whether  of  the  whole  or  of  a part  (by 
the  last  Prop.),  will  involve  God’s  eternal  and  infinite 
essence.  Wherefore,  that,  which  gives  knowledge  of 
the  eternal  and  infinite  essence  of  God,  is  common 
to  all,  and  is  equally  in  the  part  and  in  the  whole; 
therefore  (II.  xxxviii.)  this  knowledge  will  be  ade- 
quate. Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XLVII.  The  human  mind  has  an  adequate  knowl- 
edge of  the  eternal  and  infinite  essence  of  God. 

Proof. — The  human  mind  has  ideas  (II.  xxii.)  from 
which  (II.  xxiii.)  it  perceives  itself  and  its  own  body 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


117 


(II.  xix.)  and  external  bodies  (II.  xvi.  Coroll.  I.  and  II. 
xvii.)  as  actually  existing;  therefore  (II.  xlv.  xlvi.)  it 
has  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  eternal  and  infinite 
essence  of  God.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — Hence  we  see,  that  the  infinite  essence  and  the 
eternity  of  God  are  known  to  all.  Now  as  all  things  are 
in  God,  and  are  conceived  through  God,  we  can  from  this 
knowledge  infer  many  things,  which  we  may  adequately 
know,  and  we  may  form  that  third  kind  of  knowledge  of 
which  we  spoke  in  the  note  to  II.  xl.,  and  of  the  excel- 
lence and  use  of  which  we  shall  have  occasion  to  speak  in 
Part  V.  Men  have  not  so  clear  a knowledge  of  God  as 
they  have  of  general  notions,  because  they  are  unable  to 
imagine  God  as  they  do  bodies,  and  also  because  they  have 
associated  the  name  of  God  with  images  of  things  that  they 
are  in  the  habit  of  seeing,  as  indeed  they  can  hardly  avoid 
doing,  being,  as  they  are,  men,  and  continually  affected  by 
external  bodies.  Many  errors,  in  truth,  can  be  traced  to 
this  head,  namely,  that  we  do  not  apply  names  to  things 
rightly.  For  instance,  when  a man  says  that  the  lines 
drawn  from  the  centre  of  a circle  to  its  circumference  are 
not  equal,  he  then,  at  all  events,  assuredly  attaches  a 
meaning  to  the  word  circle  different  from  that  assigned  by 
mathematicians.  So  again,  when  men  make  mistakes  in 
calculation,  they  have  one  set  of  figures  in  their  mind,  and 
another  on  the  paper.  If  we  could  see  into  their  minds, 
they  do  not  make  a mistake ; they  seem  to  do  so,  because 
we  think  that  they  have  the  same  numbers  in  their  mind 
as  they  have  on  the  paper.  If  this  were  not  so,  we  should 
not  believe  them  to  be  in  error,  any  more  than  I thought 
that  a man  was  in  error,  whom  I lately  heard  exclaiming 
that  his  entrance  hall  had  flown  into  a neighbor’s  hen, 
for  his  meaning  seemed  to  me  sufficiently  clear.  Very 
many  controversies  have  arisen  from  the  fact,  that  men  do 
not  rightly  explain  their  meaning,  or  do  not  rightly  inter- 
pret the  meaning  of  others.  For,  as  a matter  of  fact,  as 
they  flatly  contradict  themselves,  they  assume  now  one 
side,  now  another,  of  the  argument,  so  as  to  oppose  the 
opinions,  which  they  consider  mistaken  and  absurd  in  their 
opponents. 


THE  ETHICS 


/ 

v? 


'r\ 
3 r 


118 

Prop.  XLVIII.  In  the  mind  there  is  no  absolute  or 
free  will ; but  the_jnind_is~  determined  to  wish  this  or  that 
by  a cause,  which  has  also  been  determined  by  another 
cause,  and  this  last  by  another  cause,  and  so  on  to 
infinity. 

Proof. — The  mind  is  a fixed  and  definite  mode  of  thought 
(II.  xi.),  therefore  it  cannot  be  the  free  cause  of  its  actions 
(I.  xvii.  Coroll.  ii. ) ; in  other  words  it  cannot  have  an  ab- 
solute faculty  of  positive  or  negative  volition ; but  ( by  I. 
xxviii. ) it  must  be  determined  by  a cause,  which  has  also 
been  determined  by  another  cause,  and  this  last  by  another, 
etc.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — In  the  same  way  it  is  proved,  that  there  is  in 
the  mind  no  absolute  faculty  of  understanding,  desiring, 
loving,  etc.  Whence  it  follows  that  these  and  similar 
faculties  are  either  entirely  fictitious,  or  are  merely  ab- 
stract or  general  terms,  such  as  we  are  accustomed  to  put 
together  from  particular  things.  Thus  the  intellect  and 
the  will  stand  in  the  same  relation  to  this  or  that  idea, 
or  this  or  that  volition,  as  (<  lapidity  ® to  this  or  that  stone, 
or  as  (<  man  ® to  Peter  and  Paul.  The  cause  which  leads 
men  to  consider  themselves  free  has  been  set  forth  in  the 
Appendix  to  Part  I.  But,  before  I proceed  further,  I 
would  here  remark  that,  by  the  will  to  affirm  and  decide, 
I mean  the  faculty,  not  the  desire.  I mean,  I repeat,  the 
faculty,  whereby  the  mind  affirms  or  denies  what  is  true 
or  false,  not  the  desire,  wherewith  the  mind  wishes  for  or 
turns  away  from  any  given  thing.  After  we  have  proved, 
that  these  faculties  of  ours  are  general  notions,  which 
cannot  be  distinguished  from  the  particular  instances  on 
which  they  are  based,  we  must  inquire  whether  volitions 
themselves  are  anything  besides  the  ideas  of  things.  We 
must  inquire,  I say,  whether  there  is  in  the  mind  any 
affirmation  or  negation  beyond  that,  which  the  idea,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  an  idea,  involves.  On  which  subject  see  the 
following  proposition,  and  II.  Def.  iii.,  lest  the  idea  of 
pictures  should  suggest  itself.  For  by  ideas  I do  not 
mean  images  such  as  are  formed  at  the  back  of  the 
eye,  or  in  the  midst  of  the  brain,  but  the  conceptions 
of  thought. 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND  119 

Prop.  XLIX.  There  is  in  the  mind  no  volition  or 
affirmation  and  negation,  save  that  which  an  idea,  inas- 
much as  it  is  an  idea,  involves.  . 

Proof. — There  is  in  the  mind  no  absolute  faculty  of 
positive  or  negative  volition,  but  only  particular  volitions, 
namely,  this  or  that  affirmation,  and  this  or  that  negation. 
Now  let  us  conceive  a particular  volition,  namely  the  mode 
of  thinking  whereby  the  mind  affirms,  that  the  three  in- 
terior angles  of  a triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles. 
This  affirmation  involves  the  conception  or  idea  of  a 
triangle,  that  is,  without  the  idea  of  a triangle  it  cannot 
be  conceived.  It  is  the  same  thing  to  say,  that  the  con- 
cept a must  involve  the  concept  b,  as  it  is  to  say,  that 
a cannot  be  conceived  without  b.  Further,  this  affirma- 
tion cannot  be  made  (II.  Ax.  iii)  without  the  idea  of  a 
triangle.  Therefore,  this  affirmation  can  neither  be  nor 
be  conceived,  without  the  idea  of  a triangle.  Again,  this 
idea  of  a triangle  must  involve  this  same  affirmation, 
namely,  that  its  three  interior  angles  are  equal  to  two 
right  angles.  Wherefore,  and  vice  versa,  this  idea  of  a 
triangle  can  neither  be  nor  be  conceived  without  this 
affirmation,  therefore,  this  affirmation  belongs  to  the 
essence  of  the  idea  of  a triangle,  and  is  nothing  besides. 
What  we  have  said  of  this  volition  ( inasmuch  as  we 
have  selected  it  at  random)  may  be  said  of  any  other 
volition,  namely,  that  it  is  nothing  but  an  idea.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — Will  and  understanding__areL  . one  and  the 
same. 

Proof.  — Will  and  understanding  are  nothing  beyond  the 
individual  volitions  and  ideas  (II.  xlviii.  and  note).  But 
a particular  volition  and  a particular  idea  are  one  and 
the  same  (by  the  foregoing  Prop.);  therefore,  will  and 
understanding  are  one  and  the  same.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — We  have  thus  removed  the  cause  which  is  com- 
monly assigned  for  error.  For  we  have  shown  above, 
that  falsity  consists  solely  in  the  privation  of  knowledge 
involved  in  ideas  which  are  fragmentary  and  confused. 
Wherefore  a false  idea,  inasmuch  as  it  is  false,  does  not 
involve  certainty.  When  we  say,  then,  that  a man  acqui- 
esces in  what  is  false,  and  that  he  has  no  doubts  on  the 


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subject,  we  do  not  say  that  he  is  certain,  but  only  that  he 
does  not  doubt,  or  that  he  acquiesces  in  what  is  false, 
inasmuch  as  there  are  no  reasons,  which  should  cause  his 
imagination  to  waver  (see  II.  xliv.  note).  Thus,  although 
the  man  be  assumed  to  acquiesce  in  what  is  false,  we 
shall  never  say  that  he  is  certain.  For  by  certainty  we 
mean  something  positive  (II.  xliii.  and  note),  not  merely 
the  absence  of  doubt. 

However,  in  order  that  the  foregoing  proposition  may 
be  fully  explained,  I will  draw  attention  to  a few  addi- 
tional points,  and  I will  furthermore  answer  the  objec- 
tions which  may  be  advanced  against  our  doctrine.  Lastly, 
in  order  to  remove  every  scruple,  I have  thought  it  worth 
while  to  point  out  some  of  the  advantages,  which  follow 
therefrom.  I say  "some,”  for  they  will  be  better  appre- 
ciated from  what  we  shall  set  forth  in  the  fifth  part. 

I begin,  then,  with  the  first  point,  and  warn  my  readers 
to  make  an  accurate  distinction  between  an  idea,  or  con- 
ception of  the  mind  and  the  images  of  things  which  we 
imagine.  It  is  further  necessary  that  they  should  distin- 
guish between  idea  and  words,  whereby  we  signify  things. 
These  three  — namely,  images,  words,  and  ideas  — are  by 
many  persons  either  entirely  confused  together,  or  not  dis- 
tinguished with  sufficient  accuracy  or  care,  and  hence 
people  are  generally  in  ignorance,  how  absolutely  neces- 
sary is  a knowledge  of  this  doctrine  of  the  will,  both 
for  philosophic  purposes  and  for  the  wise  ordering  of  life. 
Those  who  think  that  ideas  consist  in  images  which  are 
formed  in  us  by  contact  with  external  bodies,  persuade 
themselves  that  the  ideas  of  those  things,  whereof  we 
can  form  no  mental  picture,  are  not  ideas,  but  only  fig- 
ments, which  we  invent  by  the  free  decree  of  our  will; 
they  thus  regard  ideas  as  though  they  were  inanimate 
pictures  on  a panel,  and  filled  with  this  misconception, 
do  not  see  that  an  idea,  inasmuch  as  it  is  an  idea,  involves 
an  affirmation  or  negation.  Again,  those  who  confuse 
words  with  ideas,  or  with  the  affirmation  which  an  idea 
involves,  think  that  they  can  wish  something  contrary  to 
what  they  feel,  affirm,  or  deny.  This  misconception  will 
easily  be  laid  aside  by  one  who  reflects  on  the  nature  of 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


121 


knowledge,  and  seeing  that  it  in  no  wise  involves  the 
conception  of  extension,  will  therefore  clearly  understand, 
that  an  idea  (being  a mode  of  thinking)  does  not  con- 
sist in  the  image  of  anything,  nor  in  words.  The  essence 
of  words  and  images  is  put  together  by  bodily  motions, 
which  in  no  wise  involve  the  conception  of  thought. 

These  few  words  on  this  subject  will  suffice:  I will 
therefore  pass  on  to  consider  the  objections  which  may 
be  raised  against  our  doctrine.  Of  these,  the  first  is  ad- 
vanced by  those,  who  think  that  the  will  has  a wider 
scope  than  the  understanding,  and  that  therefore  it  is 
different  therefrom.  The  reason  for  their  holding  the 
belief,  that  the  will  has  wider  scope  than  the  understand- 
ing, is  that  they  assert,  that  they  have  no  need  of  an  in- 
crease in  their  faculty  of  assent,  that  is  of  affirmation 
or  negation,  in  order  to  assent  to  an  infinity  of  things 
which  we  do  not  perceive,  but  that  they  have  need  of  an 
increase  in  their  faculty  of  understanding.  The  will  is 
thus  distinguished  from  the  intellect,  the  latter  being 
finite  and  the  former  infinite.  Secondly,  it  may  be  objected 
that  experience  seems  to  teach  us  especially  clearly,  that  we 
are  able  to  suspend  our  judgment  before  assenting  to 
things  which  we  perceive,  this  is  confirmed  by  the  fact 
that  no  one  is  said  to  be  deceived;  in  so  far  as  he  per- 
ceives anything,  but  only  in  so  far  as  he  assents  or  dis- 
sents. 

For  instance,  he  who  feigns  a winged  horse,  does  not 
therefore  admit  that  a winged  horse  exists;  that  is,  he 
is  not  deceived,  unless  he  admits  in  addition  that  a 
winged  horse  does  exist.  Nothing  therefore  seems  to  be 
taught  more  clearly  by  experience,  than  that  the  will  or 
faculty  of  assent  is  free  and  different  from  the  faculty 
of  understanding.  Thirdly,  it  may  be  objected  that  one 
affirmation  does  not  apparently  contain  more  reality  than 
another;  in  other  words,  that  we  do  not  seem  to  need 
for  affirming,  that  what  is  true  is  true,  any  greater  power 
than  for  affirming,  that  what  is  false  is  true.  We  have, 
however,  seen  that  one  idea  has  more  reality  or  perfection 
than  another,  for  as  objects  are  some  more  excellent  than 
others,  so  also  are  the  ideas  of  them  some  more  excel- 


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THE  ETHICS 


lent  than  others ; this  also  seems  to  point  to  a difference 
between  the  understanding  and  the  will.  Fourthly,  it 
may  be  objected,  if  man  does  not  act  from  free  will, 
what  will  happen  if  the  incentives  to  action  are  equally 
balanced  as  in  the  case  of  Buridan’s  ass  ? Will  he  per- 
ish of  hunger  and  thirst  ? If  I say  that  he  would,  I shall 
seem  to  have  in  my  thoughts  an  ass  or  the  statue  of  a 
man  rather  than  actual  man.  If  I say  that  he  would  not, 
he  would  then  determine  his  own  action,  and  would  con- 
sequently possess  the  faculty  of  going  and  doing  whatever 
he  liked.  Other  objections  might  also  be  raised,  but,  as 
I am  not  bound  to  put  in  evidence  everything  that  any 
one  may  dream,  I will  only  set  myself  to  the  task  of  re- 
futing those  I have  mentioned,  and  that  as  briefly  as 
possible. 

To  the  first  objection  I answer,  that  I admit  that  the 
will  has  a wider  scope  than  the  understanding,  if  by  the 
understanding  be  meant  only  clear  and  distinct  ideas; 
but  I deny  that  the  will  has  a wider  scope  than  the  per- 
ceptions, and  the  faculty  of  forming  conceptions;  nor  do 
I see  why  the  faculty  of  volition  should  be  called  infinite, 
any  more  than  the  faculty  of  feeling:  for,  as  we  are 
able  by  the  same  faculty  of  volition  to  affirm  an  infinite 
number  of  things  (one  after  the  other,  for  we  cannot 
affirm  an  infinite  number  simultaneously),  so  also  can 
we,  by  the  same  faculty  of  feeling,  feel  or  perceive  ( in 
succession ) an  infinite  number  of  bodies.  If  it  be  said 
that  there  is  an  infinite  number  of  things  which  we  can- 
not perceive,  I answer,  that  we  cannot  attain  to  such 
things  by  any  thinking,  nor,  consequently,  by  any  faculty 
of  volition.  But,  it  may  still  be  urged,  if  God  wished 
to  bring  it  about  that  we  should  perceive  them,  he  would 
be  obliged  to  endow  us  with  a greater  faculty  of  per- 
ception, but  not  a greater  faculty  of  volition  than  we 
have  already.  This  is  the  same  as  to  say  that,  if  God 
wished  to  bring  it  about  that  we  should  understand  an 
infinite  number  of  other  entities,  it  would  be  necessary 
for  him  to  give  us  a greater  understanding,  but  not  a 
more  universal  idea  of  entity  than  that  which  we  have 
already,  in  order  to  grasp  such  infinite  entities.  We  have 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


123 


shown  that  will  is  a universal  entity  or  idea,  whereby  we 
explain  all  particular  volitions  — in  other  words,  that 
which  is  common  to  all  such  volitions. 

As,  then,  our  opponents  maintain  that  this  idea,  com- 
mon or  universal  to  all  volitions,  is  a faculty,  it  is  little 
to  be  wondered  at  that  they  assert,  that  such  a faculty 
extends  itself  into  the  infinite,  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
understanding:  for  what  is  universal  is  predicated  alike 
of  one,  of  many,  and  of  an  infinite  number  of  indi- 
viduals. 

To  the  second  objection  I reply  by  denying,  that  we 
have  a free  power  of  suspending  our  judgment;  for, 
when  we  say  that  any  one  suspends  his  judgment,  we 
merely  mean  that  he  sees,  that  he  does  not  perceive  the 
matter  in  question  adequately.  Suspension  of  judg- 
ment is,  therefore,  strictly  speaking,  a perception,  and 
not  free  will.  In  order  to  illustrate  the  point,  let  us  sup- 
pose a boy  imagining  a horse,  and  perceiving  nothing 
else.  Inasmuch  as  this  imagination  involves  the  existence 
of  the  horse  (II.  xvii.  Coroll.),  and  the  boy  does  not  per- 
ceive anything  which  would  exclude  the  existence  of  the 
horse,  he  will  necessarily  regard  the  horse  as  present ; he 
will  not  be  able  to  doubt  of  its  existence,  although  he 
be  not  certain  thereof.  We  have  daily  experience  of  such 
a state  of  things  in  dreams;  and  I do  not  suppose  that 
there  is  any  one,  who  would  maintain  that,  while  he  is 
dreaming,  he  has  the  free  power  of  suspending  his 
judgment  concerning  the  things  in  his  dream,  and 
bringing  it  about  that  he  should  not  dream  those  things, 
which  he  dreams  that  he  sees;  yet  it  happens,  notwith- 
standing, that  even  in  dreams  we  suspend  our  judgment, 
namely,  when  we  dream  that  we  are  dreaming. 

Further,  I grant  that  no  one  can  be  deceived,  so  far 
as  actual  perception  extends  — that  is,  I grant  that  the 
mind’s  imaginations,  regarded  in  themselves,  do  not  in- 
volve error  (II.  xvii. , note) ; but  I deny,  that  a man  does 
not,  in  the  act  of  perception,  make  any  affirmation.  For 
what  is  the  perception  of  a winged  horse,  save  affirming 
that  a horse  has  wings  ? If  the  mind  could  perceive 
nothing  else  but  the  winged  horse,  it  would  regard  the 


124 


THE  ETHICS 


same  as  present  to  itself;  it  would  have  no  reasons  for 
doubting  its  existence,  nor  any  faculty  of  dissent,  unless 
the  imagination  of  a winged  horse  be  joined  to  an  idea 
which  precludes  the  existence  of  the  said  horse,  or  un- 
less the  mind  perceives  that  the  idea  which  it  possesses 
of  a winged  horse  is  inadequate,  in  which  case  it  will 
either  necessarily  deny  the  existence  of  such  a horse,  or 
will  necessarily  be  in  doubt  on  the  subject. 

I think  that  I have  anticipated  my  answer  to  the  third 
objection,  namely,  that  the  will  is  something  universal 
which  is  predicated  of  all  ideas,  and  that  it  only  signi- 
fies that  which  is  common  to  all  ideas,  namely,  an 
affirmation,  whose  adequate  essence  must,  therefore,  in 
so  for  as  it  is  thus  conceived  in  the  abstract,  be  in  every 
idea,  and  be,  in  this  respect  alone,  the  same  in  all,  not 
in  so  far  as  it  is  considered  as  constituting  the  idea’s 
essence : for,  in  this  respect,  particular  affirmations  differ 
one  from  the  other,  as  much  as  do  ideas.  For  instance, 
the  affirmation  which  involves  the  idea  of  a circle, 
differs  from  that  which  involves  the  idea  of  a triangle, 
as  much  as  the  idea  of  a circle  differs  from  the  idea  of 
a triangle. 

Further,  I absolutely  deny,  that  we  are  in  need  of  an 
equal  power  of  thinking,  to  affirm  that  that  which  is 
true  is  true,  and  to  affirm  that  that  which  is  false  is 
true.  These  two  affirmations,  if  we  regard  the  mind, 
are  in  the  same  relation  to  one  another  as  being  and 
not  being;  for  there  is  nothing  positive  in  ideas,  which 
constitutes  the  actual  reality  of  falsehood  ( II.  xxxv.  note, 
and  xlvii.  note). 

We  must  therefore  conclude  that  we  are  easily  de- 
ceived, when  we  confuse  universals  with  singulars,  and 
the  entities  of  reason  and  abstractions  with  realities. 
As  for  the  fourth  objection,  I am  quite  ready  to  admit, 
that  a man  placed  in  the  equilibrium  described  (namely, 
as  perceiving  nothing  but  hunger  and  thirst,  a certain 
food  and  a certain  drink,  each  equally  distant  from  him) 
would  die  of  hunger  and  thirst.  If  I am  asked,  whether 
such  an  one  should  not  rather  be  considered  an  ass  than 
a man ; I answer,  that  I do  not  know,  neither  do  I know 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MIND 


125 


how  a man  should  be  considered,  who  hangs  himself, 
or  how  we  should  consider  children,  fools,  madmen,  etc. 

It  remains  to  point  out  the  advantages  of  a knowledge 
of  this  doctrine  as  bearing  on  conduct,  and  this  may  be  easily 
gathered  from  what  has  been  said.  The  doctrine  is  good. 

1.  Inasmuch  as  it  teaches  us  to  act  solely  according  to 
the  decree  of  God,  and  to  be  partakers  in  the  Divine 
nature,  and  so  much  the  more,  as  we  perform  more  per- 
fect actions  and  more  and  more  understand  God.  Such 
a doctrine  not  only  completely  tranquillizes  our  spirit,  but 
also  shows  us  where  our  highest  happiness  and  blessed- 
ness is,  namely,  solely  in  the  knowledge  of  God,  whereby 
we  are  led  to  act  only  as  love  and  piety  shall  bid  us. 
We  may  thus  clearly  understand,  how  far  astray  from  a 
true  estimate  of  virtue  are  those  who  expect  to  be  deco- 
rated by  God  with  high  rewards  for  their  virtue,  and  their 
best  actions,  as  for  having  endured  the  direst  slavery;  as 
if  virtue  and  the  service  of  God  were  not  in  itself  happi- 
ness and  perfect  freedom. 

2.  Inasmuch  as  it  teaches  us,  how  we  ought  to  conduct 
ourselves  with  respect  to  the  gifts  of  fortune,  or  matters 
which  are  not  in  our  own  power,  and  do  not  follow  from 
our  nature.  For  it  shows  us  that  we  should  await  and 
endure  fortune’s  smiles  or  frowns  with  an  equal  mind, 
seeing  that  all  things  follow  from  the  eternal  decree  of 
God  by  the  same  necessity,  as  it  follows  from  the  essence 
of  a triangle,  that  the  three  angles  are  equal  to  two  right 
angles. 

3.  This  doctrine  raises  social  life,  inasmuch  as  it  teaches 
us  to  hate  no  man,  neither  to  despise,  to  deride,  to  envy, 
or  to  be  angry  with  any.  Further,  as  it  tells  us  that 
each  should  be  content  with  his  own,  and  helpful  to  his 
neighbor,  not  from  any  womanish  pity,  favor,  or  super- 
stition, but  solely  by  the  guidance  of  reason,  accord- 
ing as  the  time  and  occasion  demand,  as  I will  show  in 
Part  III. 

4.  Lastly,  this  doctrine  confers  no  small  advantage  on 
the  commonwealth ; for  it  teaches  how  citizens  should  be 
governed  and  led,  not  so  as  to  become  slaves,  but  so  that 
they  may  freely  do  whatsoever  things  are  best. 


126 


THE  ETHICS 


I have  thus  fulfilled  the  promise  made  at  the  begin- 
hing  of  this  note,  and  I thus  bring  the  second  part  of  my 
treatise  to  a close.  I think  I have  therein  explained  the 
nature  and  properties  of  the  human  mind  at  sufficient 
length,  and,  considering  the  difficulty  of  the  subject,  with 
sufficient  clearness.  I have  laid  a foundation,  whereon 
may  be  raised  many  excellent  conclusions  of  the  highest 
utility  and  most  necessary  to  be  known,  as  will,  in  what 
follows,  be  partly  made  plain. 


ON  THE  ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE 
EMOTIONS. 


0% 


Most  writers  on  the  emotions  and  on  human  conduct 
seem  to  be  treating  rather  of  matters  outside  nature  than 
of  natural  phenomena  following  nature’s  general  laws. 
They  appear  to  conceive  man  to  be  situated  in  nature  as 
a kingdom  within  a kingdom:  for  they  believe  that  he 
disturbs  rather  than  follows  nature’s  order,  that  he  has 
absolute  control  over  his  actions,  and  that  he  is  deter- 
mined solely  by  himself.  They  attribute  human  infirmities 
and  fickleness,  not  to  the  power  of  nature  in  general,  but 
to  some  mysterious  flaw  in  the  nature  of  man,  which 
accordingly  they  bemoan,  deride,  despise,  or,  as  usually 
happens,  abuse : he,  who  succeeds  in  hitting  off  the  weak- 
ness of  the  human  mind  more  eloquently  or  more  acutely 
than  his  fellows  is  looked  upon  as  a seer.  Still  there  has 
been  no  lack  of  very  excellent  men  ( to  whose  toil  and 
industry  I confess  myself  much  indebted ),  who  have  written 
many  noteworthy  things  concerning  the  right  way  of  life, 
and  have  given  much  sage  advice  to  mankind.  But  no 
one,  so  far  as  I know,  has  defined  the  nature  and  strength 
of  the  emotions,  and  the  power  of  the  mind  against  them 
for  their  restraint. 

I do  not  forget,  that  the  illustrious  Descartes,  though 
he  believed,  that  the  mind  has  absolute  power  over  its 
actions,  strove  to  explain  human  emotions  by  their  primary 
causes,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  point  out  a way,  by 
which  the  mind  might  attain  to  absolute  dominion  over 
them.  However,  in  my  opinion,  he  accomplishes  nothing 
beyond  a display  of  the  acuteness  of  his  own  great 
intellect,  as  I will  show  in  the  proper  place.  For  the 
present  I wish  to  revert  to  those,  who  would  rather 

(127) 


128 


THE  ETHICS 


I abuse  or  deride  human  emotions  than  understand  them. 
Such  persons  will  doubtless  think  it  strange  that  I should 
attempt  to  treat  of  human  vice  and  folly  geometrically, 
and  should  wish  to  set  forth  with  rigid  reasoning  those 
matters  which  they  cry  out  against  as  repugnant  to 
reason,  frivolous,  absurd,  and  dreadful.  However,  such 
is  my  plan.  Nothing  comes  to  pass  in  nature,  which  can 
be  set  down  to  a flaw  therein;  for  nature  is  always  the 
same,  and  everywhere  one  and  the  same  in  her  efficacy 
and  power  of  action ; that  is,  nature’s  laws  and  ordinances, 
whereby  all  things  come  to  pass  and  change  from  one 
form  to  another,  are  everywhere  and  always  the  same; 
so  that  there  should  be  one  and  the  same  method  of 
understanding  the  nature  of  all  things  whatsoever,  namely, 
through  nature’s  universal  laws  and  rules.  Thus  the 
passions  of  hatred,  anger,  envy,  and  so  on,  considered 
in  themselves,  follow  from  this  same  necessity  and 
efficacy  of  nature ; they  answer  to  certain  definite  causes, 
through  which  they  are  understood,  and  possess  certain 
properties  as  worthy  of  being  known  as  the  properties 
of  anything  else,  .^whereof  the  contemplation  in  itself 
affords  us  delight^!  shall,  therefore,  treat  of  the  nature 
and  strength  of  the  emotions  according  to  the  same 
method,  as  I employed  heretofore  in  my  investigations 
concerning  God  and  the  mind.  I shall  consider  human 
actions  and  desires  in  exactly  the  same  manner, 
though  I were  concerned  with  lines,  planes,  and  soli 


I.  By  an  adequate  cause,  I mean  a cause  through  which 
its  effect  can  be  clearly  and  distinctly  perceived.  By  an 
inadequate  or  partial  cause,  I mean  a cause  through 
which,  by  itself,  its  effect  cannot  be  understood. 

II.  I say  that  we  act  when  anything  takes  place,  either 
within  us  or  externally  to  us,  Vhereof  we  are  the  adequate 
cause ; that  is  ( by  the  foregoing  definition ) when  through 
our  nature  something  takes  place  within  us  or  externally 
to  us,  which  can  through  our  nature  alone  be  clearly 
and  distinctly  understood.  On  the  other  hand,  I say  that 
we  are  passive  as  regards  something  when  that  something 


Definitions.  i 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  129 


takes  place  within  us,  or  follows  from  our  nature  exter- 
nally, we  being  only  the  partial  cause. 

III.  By  emotion  I mean  the  modifications  of  the  body, 
whereby  the  active  power  of  the  said  body  is  increased 
or  diminished,  aided  or  constrained,  and  also  the  ideas 
of  such  modifications. 

N.  B.  If  we  can  be  the  adequate  cause  of  any  of  these 
modifications,  I then  call  the  emotion  an  activity,  other- 
wise I call  it  a passion,  or  state  wherein  the  mind  is 
passive. 

Postulates. 

I.  The  human  body  can  be  affected  in  many  ways, 
whereby  its  power  of  activity  is  increased  or  diminished, 
and  also  in  other  ways  which  do  not  render  its  power  of 
activity  either  greater  or  less. 

N.  B.  This  postulate  or  axiom  rests  on  Postulate  i.  and 
Lemmas  v.  and  vii.,  which  see  after  II.  xiii. 

II.  The  human  body  can  undergo  many  changes,  and, 
nevertheless,  retain  the  impressions  or  traces  of  objects 
( cf.  II.  Post,  v.)  and,  consequently,  the  same  images  of 
things  (see  note  II.  xvii.). 

Prop.  I.  Our  mind  is  in  certain  cases  active,  and  in 
certain  cases  passive.  In  so  far  as  it  has  adequate  ideas 
it  is  necessarily  active,  and  in  so  far  as  it  has  inadequate 
ideas,  it  is  necessarily  passive. 

Proof. — In  every  human  mind  there  are  some  adequate 
ideas,  and  some  ideas  that  are  fragmentary  and  confused 
(II.  xl.  note).  Those  ideas  which  are  adequate  in  the 
mind  are  adequate  also  in  God,  inasmuch  as  he  con- 
stitutes the  essence  of  the  mind  (II.  xl.  Coroll.),  and 
those  which  are  inadequate  in  the  mind  are  likewise  (by 
the  same  Coroll.)  adequate  in  God,  not  inasmuch  as  he 
contains  in  himself  the  essence  of  the  given  mind  alone, 
but  as  he,  at  the  same  time,  contains  the  minds  of  other 
things.  Again,  from  any  given  idea  some  effect  must 
necessarily  follow  (I.  36 ) ; of  this  effect  God  is  the  ade- 
quate cause  (III.  Def.  i.)  not  inasmuch  as  he  is  infinite, 
but  inasmuch  as  he  is  conceived  as  affected  by  the  given 
idea  (II.  ix.).  But  of  that  effect  whereof  God  is  the 
cause,  inasmuch  as  he  is  affected  by  an  idea  which  is  ade- 
9 


13° 


THE  ETHICS 


quate  in  a given  mind,  of  that  effect,  I repeat,  the  mind 
in  question  is  the  adequate  cause  (II.  xi.  Coroll.). 
Therefore  our  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  has  adequate  ideas 
(III.  Def.  ii.),  is  in  certain  cases  necessarily  active;  this 
was  our  first  point.  Again,  whatsoever  necessarily  fol- 
lows from  the  idea  which  is  adequate  in  God,  not  by 
virtue  of  his  possessing  in  himself  the  mind  of  one  man 
only,  but  by  virtue  of  his  containing,  together  with  the 
mind  of  that  one  man,  the  minds  of  other  things  also, 
of  such  an  effect  (II.  xi.  Coroll.)  the  mind  of  the  given 
man  is  not  an  adequate,  but  only  a partial  cause;  thus 
(III.  Def.  ii.)  the  mind,  inasmuch  as  it  has  inadequate 
ideas,  is  in  certain  cases  necessarily  passive ; this  was  our 
second  point.  Therefore  our  mind,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — Hence  it  follows  that  the  mind  is  more  or 
less  liable  to  be  acted  upon,  in  proportion  as  it  posses- 
ses inadequate  ideas,  and  contrariwise,  is  more  or  less  ac- 
tive in  proportion  as  it  possesses  adequate  ideas. 

Prop.  II.  Body  cannot  determine  mind  to  think,  neither 
can  mind  determine  body  to  motion  or  rest  or  any  state 
different  from  these,  if  such  there  be. 

Proof. — All  modes  of  thinking  have  for  their  cause 
God,  by  virtue  of  his  being  a thinking  thing,  and  not  by 
virtue  of  his  being  displayed  under  any  other  attribute 
(II.  vi.).  That,  therefore,  which  determines  the  mind 
to  thought  is  a mode  of  thought,  and  not  a mode  of  ex- 
tension; that  is  (II.  Def.  i.),  it  is  not  body.  This  was 
our  first  point  Again,  the  motion  and  rest  of  a body 
must  arise  from  another  body,  which  has  also  been  de- 
termined to  a state  of  motion  or  rest  by  a third  body, 
and  absolutely  everything  which  takes  place  in  a body 
must  spring  from  God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  regarded  as 
affected  by  some  mode  of  extension,  and  not  by  some 
mode  of  thought  (II.  vi.);  that  is,  it  cannot  spring  from 
the  mind,  which  is  a mode  of  thought.  This  was  our 
second  point.  Therefore  body  cannot  determine  mind, 
etc.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — This  is  made  more  clear  by  what  was  said  in 
the  note  to  II.  vii.,  namely,  that  mind  and  body  are  one 
and  the  same  thing,  conceived  first  under  the  attribute 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  131 


of  thought,  secondly,  under  the  attribute  of  extension. 
Thus  it  follows  that  the  order  or  concatenation  of  things 
is  identical,  whether  nature  be  conceived  under  the  one 
attribute  or  the  other;  consequently  the  order  of  states 
of  activity  and  passivity  in  our  body  is  simultaneous  in 
nature  with  the  order  of  states  of  activity  and  passivity 
in  the  mind.  The  same  conclusion  is  evident  from  the 
manner  in  which  we  proved  II.  xii. 

Nevertheless,  though  such  is  the  case,  and  though 
there  be  no  further  room  for  doubt,  I can  scarcely  be- 
lieve, until  the  fact  is  proved  by  experience,  that  men 
can  be  induced  to  consider  the  question  calmly  and  fairly, 
so  firmly  are  they  conceived  that  it  is  merely  at  the  bid- 
ding of  the  mind  that  the  body  is  set  in  motion  or  at 
rest,  or  performs  a variety  of  actions  depending  solely  on 
the  mind’s  will  or  the  exercise  of  thought.  However,  no 
one  has  hitherto  laid  down  the  limits  to  the  powers  of 
the  body,  that  is,  no  one  has  as  yet  been  taught  by  ex- 
perience what  the  body  can  accomplish  solely  by  the 
laws  of  nature,  in  so  far  as  she  is  regarded  as  extension. 
No  one  hitherto  has  gained  such  an  accurate  knowledge 
of  the  bodily  mechanism,  that  he  can  explain  all  its 
functions ; nor  need  I call  attention  to  the  fact  that 
many  actions  are  observed  in  the  lower  animals,  which 
far  transcend  human  sagacity,  and  that  somnambulists 
do  many  things  in  their  sleep,  which  they  would  not 
venture  to  do  when  awake:  these  instances  are  enough 
to  show,  that  the  body  can  by  the  sole  laws  of  its  nature 
do  many  things  which  the  mind  wonders  at. 

Again,  no  one  knows  how  or  by  what  means  the  mind 
moves  the  body,  nor  how  many  various  degrees  of 
motion  it  can  impart  to  the  body,  nor  how  quickly  it  can 
move  it.  Thus,  when  men  say  that  this  or  that  physical 
action  has  its  origin  in  the  mind,  which  latter  has 
dominion  over  the  body,  they  are  using  words  without 
meaning,  or  are  confessing  in  specious  phraseology  that 
they  are  ignorant  of  the  cause  of  the  said  action,  and  do 
not  wonder  at  it. 

But,  they  will  say,  whether  we  know  or  do  not  know 
the  means  whereby  the  mind  acts  on  the  body,  we  have, 


132 


THE  ETHICS 


at  any  rate,  experience  of  the  fact  that  unless  the  human 
mind  is  in  a fit  state  to  think,  the  body  remains  inert. 
Moreover,  we  have  experience,  that  the  mind  alone  can 
determine  whether  we  speak  or  are  silent,  and  a variety 
of  similar  states  which,  accordingly,  we  say  depend  on 
the  mind’s  decree.  But,  as  to  the  first  point,  I ask  such 
objectors,  whether  experience  does  not  also  teach,  that  if 
the  body  be  inactive  the  mind  is  simultaneously  unfitted 
for  thinking  ? For  when  the  body  is  at  rest  in  sleep, 
the  mind  simultaneously  is  in  a state  of  torpor  also,  and 
has  no  power  of  thinking,  such  as  it  possesses  when  the 
body  is  awake.  Again,  I think  everyone’s  experience 
will  confirm  the  statement,  that  the  mind  is  not  at  all 
times  equally  fit  for  thinking  on  a given  subject,  but 
according  as  the  body  is  more  or  less  fitted  for  being 
stimulated  by  the  image  of  this  or  that  object,  so  also  is 
the  mind  more  or  less  fitted  for  contemplating  the  said 
object. 

But,  it  will  be  urged,  it  is  impossible  that  solely  from 
the  laws  of  nature  considered  as  extended  substance,  we 
should  be  able  to  deduce  the  causes  of  buildings,  pictures, 
and  things  of  that  kind,  which  are  produced  only  by 
human  art;  nor  would  the  human  body,  unless  it  were 
determined  and  led  by  the  mind,  be  capable  of  building 
a single  temple.  However,  I have  just  pointed  out  that 
the  objectors  cannot  fix  the  limits  of  the  body’s  power, 
or  say  what  can  be  concluded  from  a consideration  of  its 
sole  nature,  whereas  they  have  experience  of  many  things 
being  accomplished  solely  by  the  laws  of  nature,  which 
they  would  never  have  believed  possible  except  under 
the  direction  of  mind:  such  are  the  actions  performed  by 
somnambulists  while  asleep,  and  wondered  at  by  their 
performers  when  awake.  I would  further  call  attention 
to  the  mechanism  of  the  human  body  which  far  sur- 
passes in  complexity  all  that  has  been  put  together  by 
human  art,  not  to  repeat  what  I have  already  shown, 
namely,  that  from  nature,  under  whatever  attribute  she 
be  considered,  infinite  results  follow.  As  for  the  second 
objection,  I submit  that  the  world  would  be  much  hap- 
pier, if  men  were  as  fully  able  to  keep  silence  as  they 


NATURE  AND  ORIGIN  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  133 

are  to  speak.  Experience  abundantly  shows  that  men 
can  govern  anything  more  easily  than  their  tongues,  and 
restrain  anything  more  easily  than  their  appetites ; whence 
it  comes  about  that  many  believe,  that  we  are  only  free 
in  respect  to  objects  which  we  moderately  desire,  be- 
cause our  desire  for  such  can  easily  be  controlled  by 
the  thought  of  something  else  frequently  remembered, 
but  that  we  are  by  no  means  free  in  respect  to  what 
we  seek  with  violent  emotion,  for  our  desire  cannot 
then  be  allayed  with  the  remembrance  of  anything 
else.  However,  unless  such  persons  had  proved  by 
experience  that  we  do  many  things  which  we  afterward 
repent  of,  and  again  that  we  often,  when  assailed  by  con- 
trary emotions,  see  the  better  and  follow  the  worse,  there 
would  be  nothing  to  prevent  their  believing  that  we  are 
free  in  all  things.  Thus  an  infant  believes  that  of  its 
own  free  will  it  desires  milk,  an  angry  child  believes  that 
it  freely  desires  vengeance,  a timid  child  believes  that  it 
freely  desires  to  run  away;  further,  a drunken  man  be- 
lieves that  he  utters  from  the  free  decision  of  his  mind 
words  which,  when  he  is  sober,  he  would  willingly  have 
withheld:  thus,  too,  a delirious  man,  a garrulous  woman, 
a child,  and  others  of  like  complexion,  believe  that  they 
speak  from  the  free  decision  of  their  mind,  when  they  are 
in  reality  unable  to  restrain  their  impulse  to  talk.  Experi- 
ence teaches  us  no  less  clearly  than  reason,  that  men 
believe  themselves  to  be  free,  simply  because  they  are 
conscious  of  their  actions,  and  unconscious  of  the  causes 
whereby  those  actions  are  determined ; and,  further,  it  is 
plain  that  the  dictates  of  the  mind  are  but  another  name 
for  the  appetites,  and  therefore  vary  according  to  the 
varying  state  of  the  body.  Every  one  shapes  his  actions 
according  to  his  emotion,  those  who  are  assailed  by  con- 
flicting emotions  know  not  what  they  wish ; those  who  are 
not  attacked  by  any  emotion  are  readily  swayed  this  way 
or  that.  All  these  considerations  clearly  show  that  a 
mental  decision  and  a bodily  appetite,  or  determined 
state,  are  simultaneous,  or  rather  are  one  and  the  same 
thing,  which  we  call  decision,  when  it  is  regarded  under 
and  explained  through  the  attribute  of  thought,  and  a 


134 


THE  ETHICS 


conditioned  state,  when  it  is  regarded  under  the  attribute 
of  extension,  and  deduced  from  the  laws  of  motion  and 
rest.  This  will  appear  yet  more  plainly  in  the  sequel. 
For  the  present  I wish  to  call  attention  to  another  point, 
namely,  that  we  cannot  act  by  the  decision  of  the  mind, 
unless  we  have  a remembrance  of  having  done  so.  For 
instance,  we  cannot  say  a word  without  remembering  that 
we  have  done  so.  Again,  it  is  not  within  the  free  power 
of  the  mind  to  remember  or  forget  a thing  at  will.  There- 
fore the  freedom  of  the  mind  must  in  any  case  be  limited 
to  the  power  of  uttering  or  not  uttering  something  which 
it  remembers.  But  when  we  dream  that  we  speak,  we 
believe  that  we  speak  from  a free  decision  of  the  mind, 
yet  we  do  not  speak,  or,  if  we  do,  it  is  by  a spontaneous 
motion  of  the  body.  Again,  we  dream  that  we  are  con- 
cealing something,  and  we  seem  to  act  from  the  same 
decision  of  the  mind  as  that,  whereby  we  keep  silence 
when  awake  concerning  something  we  know.  Lastly,  we 
dream  that  from  the  free  decision  of  our  mind  we  do 
something,  which  we  should  not  dare  to  do  when  awake. 

Now  I should  like  to  know  whether  there  be  in  the 
mind  two  sorts  of  decisions,  one  sort  illusive,  and  the 
other  sort  free  ? If  our  folly  does  not  carry  us  so  far  as 
this,  we  must  necessarily  admit,  that  the  decision  of  the 
mind  which  is  believed  to  be  free,  is  not  distinguishable 
from  the  imagination  or  memory,  and  is  nothing  more 
than  the  affirmation,  which  an  idea,  by  virtue  of  being 
an  idea,  necessarily  involves  (II.  xlix.).  Wherefore  these 
decisions  of  the  mind  arise  in  the  mind  by  the  same 
necessity,  as  the  ideas  of  things  actually  existing.  There- 
fore, those  who  believe,  that  they  speak  or  keep  silence  or 
act  in  any  way  from  the  free  decision  of  their  mind, 
do  but  dream  with  their  eyes  open. 

Prop.  III.  The  activities  of  the  mind  arise  solely  from 
adequate  ideas;  the  passive  states  of  the  mind  depend 
solely  on  inadequate  ideas. 

Proof. — The  first  element,  which  constitutes  the  essence 
of  the  mind,  is  nothing  else  but  the  idea  of  the  actually 
existent  body  (II.  xi.  and  xiii.),  which  (II.  xv.)  is  com- 
pounded of  many  other  ideas,  whereof  some  are  adequate 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  135 


and  some  inadequate  (II.  xxix.  Coroll.,  II.  xxxviii  Coroll.). 
Whatsoever  therefore  follows  from  the  nature  of  mind, 
and  has  mind  for  its  proximate  cause,  through  which  it 
must  be  understood,  must  necessarily  follow  either  from 
an  adequate  or  from  an  inadequate  idea.  But  in  so  far 
as  the  mind  (III.  i.)  has  inadequate  ideas,  it  is  necessarily 
passive : wherefore  the  activities  of  the  mind  follow  solely 
from  adequate  ideas,  and  accordingly  the  mind  is  only 
passive  in  so  far  as  it  has  inadequate  ideas.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — Thus  we  see,  that  passive  states,  are  not  attrib- 
uted to  the  mind,  except  in  so  far  as  it  contains  some- 
thing involving  negation,  or  in  so  far  as  it  is  regarded  as 
a part  of  nature  which  cannot  be  clearly  and  distinctly 
perceived  through  itself  without  other  parts : I could  thus 
show,  that  passive  states  are  attributed  to  individual 
things  in  the  same  way  that  they  are  attributed  to 
the  mind,  and  that  they  cannot  otherwise  be  perceived, 
but  my  purpose  is  solely  to  treat  of  the  human  mind. 

Prop.  IV.  Nothing  can  be  destroyed,  except  by  a cause 
external  to  itself. 

Proof. — This  proposition  is  self-evident,  for  the  defini- 
tion of  anything  affirms  the  essence  of  that  thing,  but 
does  not  negative  it;  in  other  words,  it  postulates  the 
essence  of  the  thing,  but  does  not  take  it  away.  So  long 
therefore  as  we  regard  only  the  thing  itself,  without 
taking  into  account  external  causes,  we  shall  not  be  able 
to  find  in  it  anything  which  could  destroy  it.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  V.  Things  are  naturally  contrary,  that  is,  cannot 
exist  in  the  same  object,  in  so  far  as  one  is  capable  of 
destroying  the  other. 

Proof. — If  they  could  agree  together  or  coexist  in  the 
same  object,  there  would  then  be  in  the  said  object 
something  which  could  destroy  it;  but  this,  by  the  fore- 
going proposition,  is  absurd;  therefore  things,  etc.  Q.E.D. 
^Prop.  VI.  Everything,  in  so  far  as  it  is  in  itself, 
endeavors  to  persist  in  its  own  being. 

^ Proof . — Individual  things  are  modes  whereby  the  attri- 
butes of  God  are  expressed  in  a given  determinate  man- 
ner (I.  xxv.  Coroll.),  that  is  (I.  xxxiv.),  they  are  things 
which  express  in  a given  determinate  manner  the  power 


THE  ETHICS 


136 

of  God,  whereby  God  is  and  acts ; now  no  thing  contains 
in  itself  anything  whereby  it  can  be  destroyed,  or  which 
can  take  away  its  existence  (III.  iv.);  but  contrariwise 
it  is  opposed  to  all  that  could  take  away  its  existence 
(III.  v.).  Therefore,  in  so  far  as  it  can,  and  in  so  far 
as  it  is  in  itself,  it  endeavors  to  persist  in  its  own  being. 
Q.E.D. 

CProp.  VII.  The  endeavor,  wherewith  everything  en- 
deavors to  persist  in  its  own  being,  is  nothing  else  but 
the  actual  essence  of  the  thing  in  question. 

Proof. — From  the  given  essence  of  anything  certain 
consequences  necessarily  follow  (I.  xxxvi.  ),  nor  have 
things  any  power  save  such  as  necessarily  follows  from 
their  nature  as  determined  ( I.  xxix. ) ; wherefore  the 
power  of  any  given  thing,  or  the  endeavor  whereby, 
either  alone  or  with  other  things,  it  acts,  or  endeavors 
to  act,  that  is  (III.  vi.),  the  power  or  endeavor,  where- 
with it  endeavors  to  persist  in  its  own  being,  is  nothing 
else  but  the  given  or  actual  essence  of  the  thing  in 
question.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  VIII.  The  endeavor,  whereby  a thing  endeavors 
to  persist  in  its  being,  involves  no  finite  time,  but  an 
indefinite  time. 

Proof. — If  it  involved  a limited  time,  which  should 
determine  the  duration  of  the  thing,  it  would  then  follow 
solely  from  that  power  whereby  the  thing  exists,  that  the 
thing  could  not  exist  beyond  the  limits  of  that  time,  but 
that  it  must  be  destroyed;  but  this  (III.  iv.)  is  absurd. 
Wherefore  the  endeavor  wherewith  a thing  exists  involves 
no  definite  time;  but,  contrariwise,  since  (III.  iv.)  it  will, 
by  the  same  power  whereby  it  already  exists,  always  con- 
tinue to  exist,  unless  it  be  destroyed  by  some  external 
cause,  this  endeavor  involves  an  indefinite  time. 

Prop.  IX.  The  mind,  both  in  so  far  as  it  has  clear  and 
distinct  ideas,  and  also  in  so  far  as  it  has  confused  ideas, 
endeavors  to  persist  in  its  being  for  an  indefinite  period, 
and  of  this  endeavor  it  is  conscious. 

Proof. — The  essence  of  the  mind  is  constituted  by  ade- 
quate and  inadequate  ideas  (III.  iii. ) ; therefore  (III.  vii.), 
both  in  so  far  as  it  possesses  the  former,  and  in  so  far  as 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  137 


it  possesses  the  latter,  it  endeavors  to  persist  in  its  own 
being1,  and  that  for  an  indefinite  time  (III.  viii.).  Now 
as  the  mind  (II.  xxiii.)  is  necessarily  conscious  of  itself 
through  the  ideas  of  the  modifications  of  the  body,  the 
mind  is  therefore  (III.  vii.)  concious  of  its  own  en- 
deavor. __ 

Note. — This  endeavor,  when  referred  solely  to  the  mind, 
is  called  jwill,  when  referred  to  the  mind  and  body  in 
conjunction  it  is  called  appetite;  it  is,  in  fact,  nothing 
else  but  man’s  essence,  from  the  nature  of  which  neces- 
sarily follow  all  those  results  which  tend  to  its  preserva- 
tion ; and  which  man  has  thus  been  determined  to  perform. 

Further,  between  appetite  and  desire  there  is  no  differ- 
ence, except  that  the  term  desire  is  generally  applied  to 
men,  in  so  far  as  they  are  conscious  of  their  appetite,  and 
may  accordingly  be  thus  defined:  Desire  is  appetite  with 
consciousness  thereof.  It  is  thus  plain  from  what  has  v 
been  said,  that  in  no  case  do  we  strive  for,  wish  for,  long 
for,  or  desire  anything,  because  we  deem  it  to  be  good, 
but  on  the  other  hand  we  deem  a thing  to  be  good,  because 
we  strive  for  it,  wish  for  it,  long  for  it,  or  desire  it. 

Prop.  X.  An  idea,  which  excludes  the  existence  of  our 
body,  cannot  be  postulated  in  our  mind,  but  is  contrary 
thereto. 

Proof. — Whatsoever  can  destroy  our  body,  cannot  be 
postulated  therein  (III.  v.).  Therefore,  neither  can  the 
idea  of  such  a thing  occur  in  God,  in  so  far  as  he  has 
the  idea  of  our  body  (II.  ix.  Coroll.);  that  is  (II.  xi.xiii.), 
the  idea  of  that  thing  cannot  be  postulated  as  in  our 
mind,  but  contrariwise,  since  (II.  xi.  xiii.,)  the  first  ele- 
ment, that  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  mind,  is  the 
idea  of  the  human  body  as  actually  existing,  it  follows 
that  the  first  and  chief  endeavor  of  our  mind  is  the  en- 
deavor to  affirm  the  existence  of  our  body;  thus,  an  idea, 
which  negatives  the  existence  of  our  body,  is  contrary  to 
our  mind,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XI.  Whatsoever  increases  or  diminishes,  helps  or 
hinders  the  power  of  activity  in  our  body,  the  idea  there- 
of increases  or  diminishes,  helps  or  hinders  the  power  of 
thought  in  our  mind. 


138 


THE  ETHICS 


Proof.  — This  proposition  is  evident  from  II.  vii.  or 
from  II.  xiv. 

Note.  — Thus  we  see,  that  the  mind  can  undergo  many 
changes,  and  can  pass  sometimes  to  a state  of  greater 
perfection,  sometimes  to  a state  of  lesser  perfection. 
These  passive  states  of  transition  explain  to  us  the  emotions 
of  pleasure  and  pain.  By  pleasure  therefore  in  the  fol- 
lowing propositions  I shall  signify  a passive  state 

WHEREIN  THE  MIND  PASSES  TO  A GREATER  PERFECTION.  By 

pain  I shall  signify  a passive  state  wherein  the  mind 
passes  to  a lesser  perfection.  Further,  the  emotion  of 
pleasui^  in  .reference  to  the  body  and  mind  together  I shall 
call  stimulation  {titillatio)  or  meXrIment  ( hilaritas ),  the 
emotfdn/  of  pain  in  the  same  relation  I shall  call  suffering 
or  mel^cjjqly.  But  we  must  bear  in  mind,  that  stimu- 
lation and  suffering  are  attributed  to  man,  when  one 
part  of  his  nature  is  more  affected  than  the  rest,  merri- 
ment and  melancholy,  when  all  parts  are  alike  affected. 
What  I mean  by  desire  I have  explained  in  the  note  to 
Prop.  ix.  of  this  part ; beyond  these  three  I recognize  no 
other  primary  emotion;  I will  show  as  I proceed,  that 
all  other  emotions  arise  from  these  three.  But,  before  I 
go  further,  I should  like  here  to  explain  at  greater 
length  Prop.  x.  of  this  part,  in  order  that  we  may  clearly 
understand  how  one  idea  is  contrary  to  another.  In  the 
note  to  II.  xvii.  we  showed  that  the  idea,  which  consti- 
tutes the  essence  of  mind,  involves  the  existence  of 
body,  so  long  as  the  body  itself  exists.  Again,  it  follows 
from  what  we  have  pointed  out  in  the  Coroll,  to  II.  viii., 
that  the  present  existence  of  our  mind  depends  solely  on 
the  fact,  that  the  mind  involves  the  actual  existence  of 
the  body.  Lastly,  we  showed  (II.  xvii.  xviii.  and  note) 
that  the  power  of  the  mind,  whereby  it  imagines  and 
remembers  things,  also  depends  on  the  fact,  that  it  in- 
volves the  actual  existence  of  the  body.  Whence  it 
follows,  that  the  present  existence  of  the  mind  and  its 
power  of  imagining  are  removed,  as  soon  as  the  mind 
ceases  to  affirm  the  present  existence  of  the  body.  Now 
the  cause,  why  the  mind  ceases  to  affirm  this  existence 
of  the  body,  cannot  be  the  mind  itself  (III.  iv.),  nor 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  139 


again  the  fact  that  the  body  ceases  to  exist.  For  (by  II. 
vi.)  the  cause,  why  the  mind  affirms  the  existence  of 
the  body,  is  not  that  the  body  began  to  exist ; therefore, 
for  the  same  reason,  it  does  not  cease  to  affirm  the 
existence  of  the  body,  because  the  body  ceases  to  exist; 
but  (II.  xvii.)  this  result  follows  from  another  idea, 
which  excludes  the  present  existence  of  our  body  and, 
consequently  of  our  mind,  and  which  is  therefore  con- 
trary to  the  idea  constituting  the  essence  of  our  mind. 

Prop.  XII.  The  mind,  as  far  as  it  can,  endeavors  to 
conceive  those  things,  which  increase  or  help  the  power 
of  activity  in  the  body. 

Proof. — So  long  as  the  human  body  is  affected  in  a 
mode,  which  involves  the  nature  of  any  external  body, 
the  human  mind  will  regard  that  external  body  as  pres- 
ent (II.  xvii.),  and  consequently  (II.  vii.),  so  long  as  the 
human  mind  regards  an  external  body  as  present,  that 
is  (II.  xvii.  note),  conceives  it,  the  human  body  is  affected 
in  a mode,  which  involves  the  nature  of  the  said  external 
body;  thus  so  long  as  the  mind  conceives  things,  which 
increase  or  help  the  power  of  activity  in  our  body,  the 
body  is  affected  in  modes  which  increase  or  help  its 
power  of  activity  (III.  Post,  i.);  consequently  (III.  xi.) 
the  mind’s  power  of  thinking  is  for  that  period  increased 
or  helped.  Thus  (III.  vi.  ix.)  the  mind,  as  far  as  it  can, 
endeavors  to  imagine  such  things.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XIII.  When  the  mind  conceives  things  which 
diminish  or  hinder  the  body’s  power  of  activity,  it 
endeavors,  as  far  as  possible,  to  remember  things  which 
exclude  the  existence  of  the  first-named  things. 

Proof. — So  long  as  the  mind  conceives  anything  of  the 
kind  alluded  to,  the  power  of  the  mind  and  body  is 
diminished  or  constrained  {of.  III.  xii.  Proof);  neverthe- 
less it  will  continue  to  conceive  it,  until  the  mind  con- 
ceives something  else,  which  excludes  the  present  existence 
thereof  (II.  xvii.);  that  is  (as  I have  just  shown),  the 
power  of  the  mind  and  of  the  body  is  diminished,  or 
constrained,  until  the  mind  conceives  something  else, 
which  excludes  the  existence  of  the  former  thing 
conceived:  therefore  the  mind  (III.  ix.),  as  far  as  it 


THE  ETHICS 


140 

can,  will  endeavor  to  conceive  or  remember  the  latter. 
Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — Hence  it  follows,  that  the  mind  shrinks 
from  conceiving  those  things,  which  diminish  or  constrain 
the  power  of  itself  and  of  the  body. 

Note. — From  what  has  been  said  we  may  clearly  under- 
stand the  nature  of  Love  and  Hate.  Love  is  nothing 
else  but  pleasure  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  an  exter- 
nal cause:  Hate  is  nothing  else  but  pain  accompanied 
by  the  idea  of  an  external  cause.  We  further  see, 
that  he  who  loves  necessarily  endeavors  to  have,  and  to 
keep  present  to  him,  the  object  of  his  love;  while  he 
who  hates  endeavors  to  remove  and  destroy  the  object 
of  his  hatred.  But  I will  treat  of  these  matters  at  more 
length  hereafter. 

Prop.  XIV.  If  the  mind  has  once  been  affected  by  two 
emotions  at  the  same  time,  it  will,  whenever  it  is  after- 
ward affected  by  one  of  the  two,  be  also  affected  by  the 
other. 

Proof. — If  the  human  body  has  once  been  affected  by 
two  bodies  at  once,  whenever  afterward  the  mind  con- 
ceives one  of  them,  it  will  straightway  remember  the 
other  also  (II.  xviii.).  But  the  mind’s  conceptions  indi- 
cate rather  the  emotions  of  our  body  than  the  nature  of 
external  bodies  (II.  xvi.  Coroll.  ii. ) ; therefore,  if  the  body, 
and  consequently  the  mind  (III.  Def.  iii.)  has  been  once 
affected  by  two  emotions  at  the  same  time,  it  will,  when- 
ever it  is  afterward  affected  by  one  of  the  two,  be  also 
affected  by  the  other. 

Prop.  XV.  Anything  can  accidentally  be  the  cause  of 
pleasure,  pain,  or  desire. 

Proof. — Let  it  be  granted  that  the  mind  is  simultane- 
ously affected  by  two  emotions,  of  which  one  neither 
increases  nor  diminishes  its  power  of  activity,  and  the 
other  does  either  increase  or  diminish  the  said  power 
(III.  Post.  i.).  From  the  foregoing  proposition  it  is  evi- 
dent that,  whenever  the  mind  is  afterward  affected  by 
the  former,  through  its  true  cause,  which  (by  hypothesis) 
neither  increases  nor  diminishes  its  power  of  action,  it 
will  be  at  the  same  time  affected  by  the  latter,  which 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  141 


does  increase  or  diminish  its  power  of  activity,  that  is 
(III.  xi.  note),  it  will  be  affected  with  pleasure  or  pain. 
Thus  the  former  of  the  two  emotions  will,  not  through 
itself,  but  accidentally,  be  the  cause  of  pleasure  or 
pain.  In  the  same  way  also  it  can  be  easily  shown, 
that  a thing  may  be  accidentally  the  cause  of  desire. 
Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — Simply  from  the  fact  that  we  have  re- 
garded a thing  with  the  emotion  of  pleasure  or  pain, 
though  that  thing  be  not  the  efficient  cause  of  the  emo- 
tion, we  can  either  love  or  hate  it. 

Proof. — For  from  this  fact  alone  it  arises  (III.  xiv.), 
that  the  mind  afterward  conceiving  the  said  thing  is 
affected  with  the  emotion  of  pleasure  or  pain,  that  is 
(III.  xi.  note),  according  as  the  power  of  the  mind  and 
body  may  be  increased  or  diminished,  etc. ; and  conse- 
quently (III.  xii.),  according  as  the  mind  may  desire  or 
shrink  from  the  conception  of  it  (III.  xiii.  Coroll.),  in 
other  words  (III.  xiii.  note),  according  as  it  may  love  or 
hate  the  same.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — Hence  we  understand  how  it  may  happen,  that 
we  love  or  hate  a thing  without  any  cause  for  our  emo- 
tion being  known  to  us;  merely,  as  the  phrase  is,  from 
sympathy  or  antipathy.  We  should  refer  to  the  same 
category  those  objects,  which  affect  us  pleasurably  or 
painfully,  simply  because  they  resemble  other  objects 
which  affect  us  in  the  same  way.  This  I will  show  in 
the  next  proposition.  I am  aware  that  certain  authors,  who 
were  the  first  to  introduce  these  terms  “ sympathy ” and 
“antipathy,”  wished  to  signify  thereby  some  occult 
qualities  in  things;  nevertheless  I think  we  may  be  per- 
mitted to  use  the  same  terms  to  indicate  known  or  man- 
ifest qualities. 

Prop.  XVI.  Simply  from  the  fact  that  we  conceive  that 
a given  object  has  some  point  of  resemblance  with  another 
object  which  is  wont  to  affect  the  mind  pleasurably  or 
painfully,  although  the  point  of  resemblance  be  not  the 
efficient  cause  of  the  said  emotions,  we  shall  still  regard 
the  first-named  object  with  love  or  hate. 

Proof. — The  point  of  resemblance  was  in  the  object  (by 


142 


THE  ETHICS 


hypothesis),  when  we  regarded  it  with  pleasure  or  pain, 
thus  (III.  xiv.),  when  the  mind  is  affected  by  the  image 
thereof,  it  will  straightway  be  affected  by  one  or  the  other 
emotion,  and  consequently  the  thing,  which  we  perceive 
to  have  the  same  point  of  resemblance,  will  be  acci- 
dentally (III.  xv.)  a cause  of  pleasure  or  pain.  Thus 
( by  the  foregoing  Corollary),  although  the  point  in  which 
the  two  objects  resemble  one  another  be  not  the  efficient 
cause  of  the  emotion,  we  shall  still  regard  the  first-named 
object  with  love  or  hate.  Q.  E.D. 

Prop.  XVII.  If  we  conceive  that  a thing  which  is 
wont  to  affect  us  painfully,  has  any  point  of  resemblance 
with  another  thing  which  is  wont  to  affect  us  with  an 
equally  strong  emotion  of  pleasure,  we  shall  hate  the 
first-named  thing,  and  at  the  same  time  we  shall  love  it. 

Proof. — The  given  thing  is  (by  hypothesis)  in  itself  a 
cause  of  pain,  and  (III.  xiii.  note),  in  so  far  as  we  im- 
agine it  with  this  emotion,  we  shall  hate  it:  further, 
inasmuch  as  we  conceive  that  it  has  some  point  of  resem- 
blance to  something  else,  which  is  wont  to  affect  us  with 
an  equally  strong  emotion  of  pleasure,  we  shall  with  an 
equally  strong  impulse  of  pleasure  love  it  (III.  xvi.); 
thus  we  shall  both  hate  and  love  the  same  thing.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — This  disposition  of  the  mind,  which  arises  from 
two  contrary  emotions,  is  called  vacillation;  it  stands  to 
the  emotions  in  the  same  relation  as  doubt  does  to  the 
imagination  ( II.  xliv.  note ) ; vacillation  and  doubt  do  not 
differ  one  from  the  other  except  as  greater  differs  from 
less.  But  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  I have  deduced 
this  vacillation  from  causes,  which  give  rise  through  them- 
selves to  one  of  the  emotions,  and  to  the  other  acciden- 
tally. I have  done  this,  in  order  that  they  might  be  more 
easily  deduced  from  what  went  before ; but  I do  not  deny 
that  vacillation  of  the  disposition  generally  arises  from 
an  object,  which  is  the  efficient  cause  of  both  emotions. 
The  human  body  is  composed  ( II.  Post.  i. ) of  a variety 
of  individual  parts  of  different  nature,  and  may  therefore 
(Ax.  i.  after  Lemma  iii.  after  II.  xiii.)  be  affected  in  a 
variety  of  different  ways  by  one  and  the  same  body;  and 
contrariwise,  as  one  and  the  same  thing  can  be  affected 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  143 

in  many  ways,  it  can  also  in  many  different  ways  affect 
one  and  the  same  part  of  the  body.  Hence  we  can  easily 
conceive,  that  one  and  the  same  object  may  be  the  cause 
of  many  and  conflicting  emotions. 

Prop.  XVIII.  A man  is  as  much  affected  pleasurably 
or  painfully  by  the  image  of  a thing  past  or  future  as 
by  the  image  of  a thing  present. 

Proof. — So  long  as  a man  is  affected  by  the  image  of 
anything,  he  will  regard  that  thing  as  present,  even  though 
it  be  non-existent  (II.  xvii.  and  Coroll.),  he  will  not  con- 
ceive it  as  past  or  future,  except  in  so  far  as  its  image 
is  joined  to  the  image  of  time  past  or  future  (II.  xliv. 
note).  Wherefore  the  image  of  a thing,  regarded  in 
itself  alone,  is  identical,  whether  it  be  referred  to  time 
past,  time  future,  or  time  present;  that  is  (II.  xvi.  Coroll.), 
the  disposition  or  emotion  of  the  body  is  identical, 
whether  the  image  be  of  a thing  past,  future,  or  pres- 
ent. Thus  the  emotion  of  pleasure  or  pain  is  the  same, 
whether  the  image  be  of  a thing  past  or  future.  Q.  E.D. 

Note  I. — I call  a thing  past  or  future,  according  as 
we  either  have  been  or  shall  be  affected  thereby.  For 
instance,  according  as  we  have  seen  it,  or  are  about  to 
see  it,  according  as  it  has  recreated  us,  or  will  recreate 
us,  according  as  it  has  harmed  us,  or  will  harm  us.  For, 
as  we  thus  conceive  it,  we  affirm  its  existence;  that  is, 
the  body  is  affected  by  no  emotion  which  excludes  the 
existence  of  the  thing,  and  therefore  (II.  xvii.)  the  body 
is  affected  by  the  image  of  the  thing,  in  the  same  way 
as  if  the  thing  were  actually  present.  However,  as 
it  generally  happens  that  those,  who  have  had  many  ex- 
periences, vacillate,  so  long  as  they  regard  a thing  as 
future  or  past,  and  are  usually  in  doubt  about  its  issue 
(II.  xliv.  note) ; it  follows  that  the  emotions  which  arise 
from  similar  images  of  things  are  not  so  constant,  but 
are  generally  disturbed  by  the  images  of  other  things, 
until  men  become  assured  of  the  issue. 

Note  II. — From  what  has  just  been  said,  we  under- 
stand what  is  meant  by  the  terms  Hope,  Fear,  Confi- 
dence, Despair,  Joy,  and  Disappointment.  Hope  is  noth- 
ing else  but  an  inconstant  pleasure,  arising  from  the 


144 


THE  ETHICS 


image  of  something  future  or  past,  whereof  we  do  not 
yet  know  the  issue.  Fear  on  the  other  hand,  is  an  in- 
constant pain  also  arising  from  the  image  of  something 
concerning  which  we  are  in  doubt.  If  the  element  of 
doubt  be  removed  from  these  emotions,  hope  becomes 
Confidence  and  fear  becomes  Despair.  In  other  words, 
Pleasure  or  Pain  arising  from  the  image  of  something 
concerning  which  we  have  hoped  or  feared.  Again,  Joy 
is  Pleasure  arising  from  the  image  of  something  past 
whereof  we  doubted  the  issue.  Disappointment  is  the 
Pain  opposed  to  Joy. 

Prop.  XIX.  He  who  conceives  that  the  object  of  his 
love  is  destroyed  will  feel  pain ; if  he  conceives  that  it  is 
preserved  he  will  feel  pleasure. 

Proof.  — The  mind,  as  far  as  possible,  endeavors  to 
conceive  those  things  which  increase  or  help  the  body’s 
power  of  activity  (III.  xii.);  in  other  words  (III.  xii. 
note),  those  things  which  it  loves.  But  conception  is 
helped  by  those  things  which  postulate  the  existence  of 
a thing,  and  contrariwise  is  hindered  by  those  which 
exclude  the  existence  of  a thing  (II.  xvii.);  therefore  the 
images  of  things,  which  postulate  the  existence  of  an 
object  of  love,  help  the  mind’s  endeavor  to  conceive  the 
object  of  love,  in  other  words  (III.  xi.  note),  affect  the 
mind  pleasurably;  contrariwise  those  things,  which 
exclude  the  existence  of  an  object  of  love,  hinder  the 
aforesaid  mental  endeavor;  in  other  words,  affect  the 
mind  painfully.  He,  therefore,  who  conceives  that 
the  object  of  his  love  is  destroyed  will  feel  pain,  etc. 
Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XX.  He  who  conceives  that  the  object  of  his 
hate  is  destroyed  will  feel  pleasure. 

Proof. — The  mind  (III.  xiii.)  endeavors  to  conceive 
those  things,  which  exclude  the  existence  of  things 
whereby  the  body’s  power  of  activity  is  diminished  or 
constrained;  that  is  (III.  xiii.  note),  it  endeavors  to 
conceive  such  things  as  exclude  the  existence  of  what 
it  hates;  therefore  the  image  of  a thing,  which  excludes 
the  existence  of  what  the  mind  hates,  helps  the  aforesaid 
mental  effort,  in  other  words  (III.  xi.  note),  affects  the 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  145 


mind  pleasurably.  Thus  he  who  conceives  that  the  object 
of  his  hate  is  destroyed  will  feel  pleasure.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXI.  He  who  conceives  that  the  object  of 
his  love  is  affected  pleasurably  or  painfully,  will  him- 
self be  affected  pleasurably  or  painfully;  and  the  one 
or  the  other  emotion  will  be  greater  or  less  in  the 
lover  according  as  it  is  greater  or  less  in  the  thing 
loved. 

Proof. — The  images  of  things  (as  we  showed  in  III. 
xix.)  which  postulate  the  existence  of  the  object  of  love, 
help  the  mind’s  endeavor  to  conceive  the  said  object. 
But  pleasure  postulates  the  existence  of  something  feel- 
ing pleasure,  so  much  the  more  in  proportion  as  the 
emotion  of  pleasure  is  greater;  for  it  is  (III.  xi.  note)  a 
transition  to  a greater  perfection;  therefore  the  image 
of  pleasure  in  the  object  of  love  helps  the  mental  en- 
deavor of  the  lover ; that  is,  it  affects  the  lover  pleasurably, 
and  so  much  the  more,  in  proportion  as  this  emotion 
may  have  been  greater  in  the  object  of  love.  This  was 
our  first  point.  Further,  in  so  far  as  a thing  is  affected 
with  pain,  it  is  to  that  extent  destroyed,  the  extent 
being  in  proportion  to  the  amount  of  pain  ( III.  xi. 
note);  therefore  (III.  xix.)  he  who  conceives,  that  the 
object  of  his  love  is  affected  painfully,  will  himself  be 
affected  painfully,  in  proportion  as  the  said  emotion  is 
greater  or  less  in  the  object  of  love.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXII.  If  we  conceive  that  anything  pleasurably 
affects  some  object  of  our  love,  we  shall  be  affected 
with  love  toward  that  thing.  Contrariwise,  if  we  con- 
ceive that  it  affects  an  object  of  our  love  painfully,  we 
shall  be  affected  with  hatred  toward  it. 

Proof. — He,  who  affects  pleasurably  or  painfully  the 
object  of  our  love,  affects  us  also  pleasurably  or  pain- 
fully— that  is,  if  we  conceive  the  loved  object  as  af- 
fected with  the  said  pleasure  or  pain  (III.  xxi.).  But 
this  pleasure  or  pain  is  postulated  to  come  to  us  accom- 
panied by  the  idea  of  an  external  cause;  therefore  (III. 
xiii.  note),  if  we  conceive  that  any  one  affects  an  object 
of  our  love  pleasurably  or  painfully,  we  shall  be  affected 
with  love  or  hatred  toward  him.  Q.E.D. 

10 


146 


THE  ETHICS 


Note. — Prop.  xxi.  explains  to  us  the  nature  of  Pity, 
which  we  may  define  as  pain  arising  from  another’s 
hurt.  What  term  we  can  use  for  pleasure  arising  from 
another’s  gain,  I know  not. 

We  will  call  the  love  toward  him  who  confers  a 

BENEFIT  ON  ANOTHER,  APPROVAL;  and  the  HATRED  TOWARD 
HIM  WHO  INJURES  ANOTHER,  We  will  Call  INDIGNATION. 

We  must  further  remark,  that  we  not  only  feel  pity  for 
a thing  which  we  have  loved  (as  shown  in  III.  xxi.), 
but  also  for  a thing  which  we  have  hitherto  regarded 
without  emotion,  provided  that  we  deem  that  it  resembles 
ourselves  ( as  I will  show  presently).  Thus,  we  bestow 
approval  on  one  who  has  benefited  anything  resembling 
ourselves,  and,  contrariwise,  are  indignant  with  him  who 
has  done  it  an  injury. 

Prop.  XXIII.  He  who  conceives,  that  an  object  of 
his  hatred  is  painfully  affected,  will  feel  pleasure.  Con- 
trariwise, if  he  thinks  that  the  said  object  is  pleasurably 
affected,  he  will  feel  pain.  Each  of  these  emotions  will 
be  greater  or  less,  according  as  its  contrary  is  greater  or 
less  in  the  object  of  hatred. 

Proof. — In  so  far  as  an  object  of  hatred  is  painfully 
affected,  it  is  destroyed  to  an  extent  proportioned  to  the 
strength  of  the  pain  (III.  xi.  note).  Therefore,  he 
(III.  xx.)  who  conceives,  that  some  object  of  his  hatred 
is  painfully  affected,  will  feel  pleasure  to  an  extent  pro- 
portioned to  the  amount  of  pain  he  conceives  in  the 
object  of  his  hatred.  This  was  our  first  point.  Again, 
pleasure  postulates  the  existence  of  the  pleasurably 
affected  thing  (III.  xi.  note),  in  proportion  as  the  pleasure 
is  greater  or  less.  If  anyone  imagines  that  an  object  of 
his  hatred  is  pleasurably  affected,  this  conception  ( III. 
xiii.)  will  hinder  his  own  endeavor  to  persist;  in  other 
words  (III.  xi.  note),  he  who  hates  will  be  painfully 
affected.  Q.E.  D. 

Note.  — This  pleasure  can  scarcely  be  felt  unalloyed, 
and  without  any  mental  conflict.  For  (as  I am  about 
to  show  in  Prop,  xxvii.),  in  so  far  as  a man  conceives 
that  something  similar  to  himself  is  affected  by  pain, 
be  will  himself  be  affected  in  like  manner;  and  he  will 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  147 


have  the  contrary  emotion  in  contrary  circumstances.  But 
here  we  are  regarding  hatred  only. 

Prop.  XXIV.  If  we  conceive  that  anyone  pleasurably 
affects  an  object  of  our  hate,  we  shall  feel  hatred  toward 
him  also.  If  we  conceive  that  he  painfully  affects  the 
said  object,  we  shall  feel  love  toward  him. 

Proof. — This  proposition  is  proved  in  the  same  way  as 
III.  xxii.,  which  see. 

Note. — These  and  similar  emotions  of  hatred  are  attrib- 
utable to  envy,  which,  accordingly,  is  nothing  else  but 

HATRED,  IN  SO  FAR  AS  IT  IS  REGARDED  AS  DISPOSING  A MAN 
TO  REJOICE  IN  ANOTHER’S  HURT,  AND  TO  GRIEVE  AT  AN- 
OTHER’S ADVANTAGE. 

Prop.  XXV.  We  endeavor  to  affirm,  concerning  our- 
selves, and  concerning  what  we  love,  everything  that  we 
conceive  to  affect  pleasurably  ourselves,  or  the  loved 
object.  Contrariwise,  we  endeavor  to  negative  every- 
thing, which  we  conceive  to  affect  painfully  ourselves  or 
the  loved  object. 

Proof. — That,  which  we  conceive  to  affect  an  object  of 
our  love  pleasurably  or  painfully,  affects  us  also  pleasur- 
ably or  painfully  (III.  xxi.).  But  the  mind  (III.  xii.) 
endeavors,  as  far  as  possible,  to  conceive  those  things 
which  affect  us  pleasurably;  in  other  words  (II.  xvii.  and 
Coroll.),  it  endeavors  to  regard  them  as  present.  And, 
contrariwise  (III.  xiii.),  it  endeavors  to  exclude  the  exist- 
ence of  such  things  as  affect  us  painfully;  therefore,  we 
endeavor  to  affirm  concerning  ourselves,  and  concerning 
the  loved  object,  whatever  we  conceive  to  affect  ourselves, 
or  the  loved  object  pleasurably.  Q.  E.D. 

Prop.  XXVI.  We  endeavor  to  affirm,  concerning  that 
which  we  hate,  everything  which  we  conceive  to  affect  it 
painfully;  and,  contrariwise,  we  endeavor  to  deny,  con- 
cerning it,  everything  which  we  conceive  to  affect  it 
pleasurably. 

Proof.  — This  proposition  follows  from  III.  xxiii.,  as  the 
foregoing  proposition  followed  from  III.  xxi. 

Note. — Thus  we  see  that  it  may  readily  happen,  that  a 
man  may  easily  think  too  highly  of  himself,  or  a loved 
object,  and,  contrariwise,  too  meanly  of  a hated  object. 


148 


THE  ETHICS 


This  feeling  is  called  pride,  in  reference  to  the  man  who 
thinks  too  highly  of  himself,  and  is  a species  of  madness, 
wherein  a man  dreams  with  his  eyes  open,  thinking  that 
he  can  accomplish  all  things  that  fall  within  the  scope  of 
his  conception,  and  thereupon  accounting  them  real,  and 
exulting  in  them,  so  long  as  he  is  unable  to  conceive 
anything  which  excludes  their  existence,  and  determines 
his  own  power  of  action.  Pride,  therefore,  is  pleasure 

SPRINGING  FROM  A MAN  THINKING  TOO  HIGHLY  OF  HIMSELF. 

Again,  the  pleasure  which  arises  from  a man  thinking 
too  highly  of  another  is  called  over-esteem.  Whereas 

the  PLEASURE  WHICH  ARISES  FROM  THINKING  TOO  LITTLE  OF 

a man  is  called  disdain. 

Prop.  XXVII.  By  the  very  fact  that  we  conceive  a 
thing,  which  is  like  ourselves,  and  which  we  have  not 
regarded  with  any  emotion,  to  be  affected  with  any  emo- 
tion, we  are  ourselves  affected  with  a like  emotion 
{affectus). 

Proof. — The  images  of  things  are  modifications  of  the 
human  body,  whereof  the  ideas  represent  external  bodies 
as  present  to  us  (II.  xvii.);  in  other  words  (II.  x.), 
whereof  the  ideas  involve  the  nature  of  our  body,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  the  nature  of  external  bodies  as  pres- 
ent. If,  therefore,  the  nature  of  the  external  body  be 
similar  to  the  nature  of  our  body,  then  the  idea  which 
we  form  of  the  external  body  will  involve  a modification 
of  our  own  body  similar  to  the  modification  of  the  ex- 
ternal body.  Consequently,  if  we  conceive  anyone  similar 
to  ourselves  as  affected  by  any  emotion,  this  conception 
will  express  a modification  of  our  body  similar  to  that 
emotion.  Thus,  from  the  fact  of  conceiving  a thing  like 
ourselves  to  be  affected  with  any  emotion,  we  are  our- 
selves affected  with  a like  emotion.  If,  however,  we  hate 
the  said  thing  like  ourselves,  we  shall,  to  that  extent, 
be  affected  by  a contrary,  and  not  similar,  emotion. 
Q.E.D. 

Note  I. — This  imitation  of  emotions,  when  it  is  re- 
ferred to  pain,  is  called  compassion  ( cf.  III.  xxii.  note); 
when  it  is  referred  to  desire,  it  is  called  emulation, 
which  is  nothing  else  but  the  desire  of  anything 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  149 


ENGENDERED  IN  US  BY  THE  FACT  THAT  WE  CONCEIVE  THAT 
OTHERS  HAVE  THE  LIKE  DESIRE. 

Corollary  I. — If  we  conceive  that  anyone,  whom  we 
have  hitherto  regarded  with  no  emotion,  pleasurably  af- 
fects something  similar  to  ourselves,  we  shall  be  affected 
with  love  toward  him.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  con- 
ceive that  he  painfully  affects  the  same,  we  shall  be 
affected  with  hatred  toward  him. 

Proof. — This  is  proved  from  the  last  proposition  in  the 
same  manner  as  III.  xxii.  is  proved  from  III.  xxi. 

Corollary  II. — We  cannot  hate  a thing  which  we  pity, 
because  its  misery  affects  us  painfully. 

Proof. — If  we  could  hate  it  for  this  reason,  we  should 
rejoice  in  its  pain,  which  is  contrary  to  the  hypothesis. 

Corollary  III. — We  seek  to  free  from  misery,  as  far  as 
we  can,  a thing  which  we  pity. 

Proof. — That,  which  painfully  affects  the  object  of  our 
pity,  affects  us  also  with  similar  pain  ( by  the  foregoing 
proposition ) ; therefore,  we  shall  endeavor  to  recall  every- 
thing which  removes  its  existence,  or  which  destroys  it 
( cf III.  xiii);  in  other  words  (III.  ix.  note),  we  shall 
desire  to  destroy  it,  or  we  shall  be  determined  for  its 
destruction;  thus,  we  shall  endeavor  to  free  from  misery 
a thing  which  we  pity.  Q.E.  D. 

Note  II. — This  will  or  appetite  for  doing  good,  which 
arises  from  pity  of  the  thing  whereon  we  would  confer  a 
benefit,  is  called  benevolence,  and  is  nothing  else  but 
desire  arising  from  compassion.  Concerning  love  or  hate 
toward  him  who  has  done  good  or  harm  to  something, 
which  we  conceive  to  be  like  ourselves,  see  III.  xxii. 
note. 

Prop.  XXVIII.  We  endeavor  to  bring  about  whatso- 
ever we  concede  to  conduce  to  pleasure ; but  we  endeavor 
to  remove  or  destroy  whatsoever  we  conceive  to  be  truly 
repugnant  thereto,  or  to  conduce  to  pain. 

Proof.  — We  endeavor,  as  far  as  possible,  to  conceive 
that  which  we  imagine  to  conduce  to  pleasure  (III.  xii.); 
in  other  words  (II.  xvii.)  we  shall  endeavor  to  conceive 
it  as  far  as  possible  as  present  or  actually  existing.  But 
the  endeavor  of  the  mind,  or  the  mind’s  power  of  thought, 


4 


THE  ETHICS 


150 

is  equal  to  and  simultaneous  with,  the  endeavor  of  the 
body,  or  the  body’s  power  of  action.  (This  is  clear  from 
II.  vii.  Coroll,  and  II.  xi.  Coroll.)  Therefore  we  make 
an  absolute  endeavor  for  its  existence,  in  other  words 
(which  by  III.  ix.  note  come  to  the  same  thing)  we 
desire  and  strive  for  it;  this  was  our  first  point.  Again, 
if  we  conceive  that  something,  which  we  believe  to  be 
the  cause  of  pain,  that  is  (III.  xiii.  note),  which  we  hate, 
is  destroyed,  we  shall  rejoice  (III.  xx.).  We  shall,  there- 
fore ( by  the  first  part  of  this  proof  ),  endeavor  to  destroy 
the  same,  or  (III.  xiii.)  to  remove  it  from  us,  so  that 
we  may  not  regard  it  as  present;  this  was  our  second 
point.  Wherefore  whatsoever  conduces  to  pleasure,  etc. 
Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXIX.  We  shall  also  endeavor  to  do  whatsoever 
we  conceive  men*  to  regard  with  pleasure,  and  contrari- 
wise we  shall  shrink  from  doing  that  which  we  conceive 
men  to  shrink  from. 

Proof. — From  the  fact  of  imagining,  that  men  love  or 
hate  anything,  we  shall  love  or  hate  the  same  thing  (III. 
xxvii.).  That  is  (III.  xiii.  note),  from  this  mere  fact  we 
shall  feel  pleasure  or  pain  at  the  thing’s  presence.  And 
so  we  shall  endeavor  to  do  whatever  we  conceive  men  to 
love  or  regard  with  pleasure,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — This  endeavor  to  do  a thing  or  leave  it  undone, 
solely  in  order  to  please  men,  we  call  ambition,  especially 
when  we  so  eagerly  endeavor  to  please  the  vulgar,  that 
we  do  or  omit  certain  things  to  our  own  or  another’s 
hurt:  in  other  cases  it  is  generally  called  kindliness. 
Furthermore  I give  the  name  of  praise  to  the  pleas- 
ure, WITH  WHICH  WE  CONCEIVE  THE  ACTION  OF  ANOTHER, 
WHEREBY  HE  HAS  ENDEAVORED  TO  PLEASE  US;  but  of 
BLAME  tO  the  PAIN  WHEREWITH  WE  FEEL  AVERSION  TO 
HIS  ACTION. 

Prop.  XXX.  If  anyone  has  done  something  which  he 
conceives  as  affecting  other  men  pleasurably,  he  will  be 
affected  by  pleasure,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  himself 
as  cause;  in  other  words,  he  will  regard  himself  with 

* N.  B.  By  « men » in  this  and  the  following  propositions,  I mean 
men  whom  we  regard  without  any  particular  emotion. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  151 


/ 
f y 
fs} 
\/t 

W 


pleasure.  On  the  other  hand,  if  he  has  done  anything 
which  he  conceives  as  affecting  others  painfully,  he  will 
regard  himself  with  pain. 

Proof. — He  who  conceives,  that  he  affects  others  with 
pleasure  or  pain,  will,  by  that  very  fact,  himself  be 
affected  with  pleasure  or  pain  (III.  xxvii.),  but,  as  a 
man,  (II.  xix.  and  xxiii. ) is  conscious  of  himself  through 
the  modifications  whereby  he  is  determined  to  action,  it 
follows  that  he  who  conceives,  that  he  affects  others 
pleasurably,  will  be  affected  with  pleasure  accompanied 
by  the  idea  of  himself  as  cause;  in  other  words,  will  re- 
gard himself  with  pleasure.  And  so  mutatis  mutandis  in 
the  case  of  pain.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — As  love  (III.  xiii.)  is  pleasure  accompanied  by 
the  idea  of  an  external  cause,  and  hatred  is  pain  accom- 
panied by  the  idea  of  an  external  cause ; the  pleasure  and 
pain  in  question  will  be  a species  of  love  and  hatred. 
But,  as  the  terms  love  and  hatred  are  used  in  reference 
to  external  objects,  we  will  employ  other  names  for  the 
emotions  now  under  discussion : pleasure  accompanied  by 
the  idea  of  an  external  cause  we  will  style  Honor,  and 
the  emotion  contrary  thereto  we  will  style  Shame  : I mean 
in  such  cases  as  where  pleasure  or  pain  arises  from  a 
man’s  belief,  that  he  is  being  praised  or  blamed:  other- 
wise pleasure  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  an  external 
cause  is  called  self-complacency,  and  its  contrary  pain 
is  called  repentance.  Again,  as  it  may  happen  ( II.  xvii. 
Coroll.)  that  the  pleasure,  wherewith  a man  conceives 
that  he  affects  others,  may  exist  solely  in  his  own  imagi- 
nation, and  as  (III.  xxv.)  everyone  endeavors  to  conceive 
concerning  himself  that  which  he  conceives  will  affect  him 
with  pleasure,  it  may  easily  come  to  pass  that  a vain  man 
may  be  proud  and  may  imagine  that  he  is  pleasing  to 
all,  when  in  reality  he  may  be  an  annoyance  to  all. 

Prop.  XXXI.  If  we  conceive  that  anyone  loves,  desires, 
or  hates  anything  which  we  ourselves  love,  desire,  or  hate, 
we  shall  thereupon  regard  the  thing  in  question  with  more 
steadfast  love,  etc.  On  the  contrary,  if  we  think  that 
anyone  shrinks  from  something  that  we  love,  we  shall 
undergo  vacillation  of  soul. 


THE  ETHICS 


152 

Proof.  — From  the  mere  fact  of  conceiving  that  anyone 
loves  anything  we  shall  ourselves  love  that  thing  (III. 
xxvii.):  but  we  are  assumed  to  love  it  already;  there  is, 
therefore,  a new  cause  of  love,  whereby  our  former 
emotion  is  fostered;  hence  we  shall  thereupon  love  it 
more  steadfastly.  Again,  from  the  mere  fact  of  conceiv- 
ing that  anyone  shrinks  from  anything,  we  shall  ourselves 
shrink  from  that  thing  (III.  xxvii.).  If  we  assume  that 
we  at  the  same  time  love  it,  we  shall  then  simultaneously 
love  it  and  shrink  from  it;  in  other  words,  we  shall  be 
subject  to  vacillation  (III.  xvii.  note).  Q. E.D. 

Corollary. — From  the  foregoing,  and  also  from  III. 
xxviii.  it  follows  that  everyone  endeavors,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, to  cause  others  to  love  what  he  himself  loves,  and 
to  hate  what  he  himself  hates:  as  the  poet  says:  <(As 
lovers  let  us  share  every  hope  and  every  fear : iron-hearted 
were  he  who  should  love  what  the  other  leaves.” 

Note. — This  endeavor  to  bring  it  about,  that  our  own 
likes  and  dislikes  should  meet  with  universal  approval,  is 
really  ambition  (see  III.  xxix.  note) ; wherefore  we  see 
that  every  one  by  nature  desires  (appetere),  that  the  rest 
of  mankind  should  live  according  to  his  own  individual 
disposition:  when  such  a desire  is  equally  present  in  all, 
every  one  stands  in  every  one  else’s  way,  and  in  wishing 
to  be  loved  or  praised  by  all,  all  become  mutually  hate- 
ful. 

Prop.  XXXII.  If  we  conceive  that  any  one  takes  delight 
in  something,  which  only  one  person  can  possess,  we  shall 
endeavor  to  bring  it  about  that  the  man  in  question  shall 
not  gain  possession  thereof. 

Proof. — From  the  mere  fact  of  our  conceiving  that  an- 
other person  takes  delight  in  a thing  (III.  xxvii.  and 
Coroll.)  we  shall  ourselves  love  that  thing  and  desire  to 
take  delight  therein.  But  we  assumed  that  the  pleasure 
in  question  would  be  prevented  by  another’s  delight  in  its 
object;  we  shall,  therefore,  endeavor  to  prevent  his  posses- 
sion thereof  (III.  xxviii.).  Q.E.D. 

Note.  — We  thus  see  that  man’s  nature  is  generally  so 
constituted,  that  he  takes  pity  on  those  who  fare  ill,  and 
envies  those  who  fare  well  with  an  amount  of  hatred 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  153 


proportioned  to  his  own  love  for  the  goods  in  their  posses- 
sion. Further,  we  see  that  from  the  same  property  of 
human  nature,  whence  it  follows  that  men  are  merciful, 
it  follows  also  that  they  are  envious  and  ambitious. 
Lastly, 'df  we  make  appeal  to  Experience,  we  shall  find  that 
she  entirely  confirms  what  we  have  said ; more  especially 
if  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  first  years  of  our  life.  We 
find  that  children,  whose  body  is  continually,  as  it  were, 
in  equilibrium,  laugh  or  cry  simply  because  they  see 
others  laughing  or  crying;  moreover,  they  desire  forth- 
with to  imitate  whatever  they  see  others  doing,  and  to 
possess  themselves  whatever  they  conceive  as  delighting 
others : inasmuch  as  the  images  of  things  are,  as  we  have 
said,  modifications  of  the  human  body,  or  modes  wherein 
the  human  body  is  affected  and  disposed  by  external 
causes  to  act  in  this  or  that  manner. 

Prop.  XXXIII.  When  we  love  a thing  similar  to  our- 
selves we  endeavor,  as  far  as  we  can,  to  bring  about  that 
it  should  love  us  in  return. 

Proof. — That  which  we  love  we  endeavor,  as  far  as  we 
can,  to  conceive  in  preference  to  anything  else  (III.  xii.). 
If  the  thing  be  similar  to  ourselves,  we  shall  endeavor  to 
affect  it  pleasurably  in  preference  to  anything  else  (III. 
xxix.).  In  other  words,  we  shall  endeavor,  as  far  as  we 
can,  to  bring  it  about,  that  the  thing  should  be  affected 
with  pleasure,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  ourselves, 
that  is  (III.  xiii.  note)  that  it  should  love  us  in  return. 
Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXIV.  The  greater  the  emotion  with  which  we 
conceive  a loved  object  to  be  affected  toward  us,  the 
greater  will  be  our  complacency. 

Proof. — We  endeavor  (III.  xxxiii.),  as  far  as  we  can, 
to  bring  about,  that  what  we  love  should  love  us  in  re- 
turn ; in  other  words,  that  what  we  love  should  be  affected 
with  pleasure  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  ourself  as 
cause.  Therefore,  in  proportion  as  the  loved  object  is 
more  pleasurably  affected  because  of  us,  our  endeavor 
will  be  assisted — that  is  (III.  xi.  and  note)  the  greater 
will  be  our  pleasure.  But  when  we  take  pleasure  in  the 
fact,  that  we  pleasurably  affect  something  similar  to  our- 


154 


THE  ETHICS 


selves,  we  regard  ourselves  with  pleasure  (III.  30); 
therefore  the  greater  the  emotion  with  which  we  con- 
ceive a loved  object  to  be  affected,  etc.  Q.  E.D. 

Prop.  XXXV.  If  any  one  conceive,  that  an  object  of  his 
love  joins  itself  to  another  with  closer  bonds  of  friend- 
ship than  he  himself  has  attained  to,  he  will  be  affected 
with  hatred  toward  the  loved  object  and  with  envy 
toward  his  rival. 

Proof. — In  proportion  as  a man  thinks  that  a loved 
object  is  well  affected  toward  him,  will  be  the  strength 
of  his  self-approval  (by  the  last  Prop.),  that  is  (III.  xxx. 
note),  of  his  pleasure;  he  will,  therefore  (III.  xxviii.),  en- 
deavor, as  far  as  he  can,  to  imagine  the  loved  object  as 
most  closely  bound  to  him:  this  endeavor  or  desire  will 
be  increased,  if  he  thinks  that  some  one  else  has  a similar 
desire  (III.  xxxi.).  But  this  endeavor  or  desire  is  assumed 
to  be  checked  by  the  image  of  the  loved  object  in  con- 
junction with  the  image  of  him  whom  the  loved  object  has 
joined  to  itself;  therefore  (III.  xi.  note)  he  will  for  that 
reason  be  affected  with  pain,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of 
the  loved  object  as  a cause  in  conjunction  with  the  image 
of  his  rival;  that  is,  he  will  be  (III.  xiii.)  affected  with 
hatred  toward  the  loved  object  and  also  toward  his  rival 
(III.  xv.  Coroll.),  which  latter  he  will  envy  as  enjoying  the 
beloved  object.  Q.  E.  D. 

Note.  — This  hatred  toward  an  object  of  love  joined  with 
envy  is  called  Jealousy,  which  accordingly  is  nothing  else 
but  a wavering  of  the  disposition  arising  from  combined 
love  and  hatred,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  some  rival 
who  is  envied.  Further,  this  hatred  toward  the  object  of 
love  will  be  greater,  in  proportion  to  the  pleasure  which 
the  jealous  man  had  been  wont  to  derive  from  the  recip- 
rocated love  of  the  said  object;  and  also  in  proportion  to 
the  feelings  he  had  previously  entertained  toward  his 
rival.  If  he  had  hated  him,  he  will  forthwith  hate  the 
object  of  his  love,  because  he  conceives  it  is  pleasurably 
affected  by  one  whom  he  himself  hates:  and  also  because 
he  is  compelled  to  associate  the  image  of  his  loved  one 
with  the  image  of  him  whom  he  hates.  This  condition 
generally  comes  into  play  in  the  case  of  love  for  a woman: 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  155 


for  he  who  thinks,  that  a woman  whom  he  loves  prosti- 
tutes herself  to  another,  will  feel  pain,  not  only  because 
his  own  desire  is  restrained,  but  also  because,  being  com- 
pelled to  associate  the  image  of  her  he  loves  with  the 
parts  of  shame  and  the  excreta  of  another,  he  therefore 
shrinks  from  her. 

We  must  add,  that  a jealous  man  is  not  greeted  by  his 
beloved  with  the  same  joyful  countenance  as  before, 
and  this  also  gives  him  pain  as  a lover,  as  I will  now 
show 

Prop.  XXXVI.  He  who  remembers  a thing,  in  which  he 
has  once  taken  delight,  desires  to  possess  it  under  the 
same  circumstances  as  when  he  first  took  delight  therein. 

Proof. — Everything,  which  a man  has  seen  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  object  of  his  love,  will  be  to  him  accident- 
ally a cause  of  pleasure  (III.  xv.);  he  will,  therefore, 
desire  to  possess  it  in  conjunction  with  that  wherein  he 
has  taken  delight;  in  other  words,  he  will  desire  to  pos- 
sess the  object  of  his  love  under  the  same  circumstances 
as  when  he  first  took  delight  therein.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — A lover  will,  therefore,  feel  pain  if  one  of 
the  aforesaid  attendant  circumstances  be  missing. 

Proof. — For,  in  so  far  as  he  finds  some  circumstances 
to  be  missing,  he  conceives  something  which  excludes  its 
existence.  As  he  is  assumed  to  be  desirous  for  love’s 
sake  of  that  thing  or  circumstance  (by  the  last  Prop.), 
he  will,  in  so  far  as  he  conceives  it  to  be  missing,  feel 
pain  (III.  xix.).  Q.E.D. 

Note. — This  pain,  in  so  far  as  it  has  reference  to  the 
absence  of  the  object  of  love,  is  called  Regret. 

Prop.  XXXVII.  Desire  arising  through  pain  or  pleas- 
ure, hatred  or  love,  is  greater  in  proportion  as  the  emo- 
tion is  greater. 

Proof. — Pain  diminishes  or  constrains  man’s  power  of 
activity  (III.  xi.  note),  in  other  words  (III.  vii.),  di- 
minishes or  constrains  the  effort,  wherewith  he  endeavors 
to  persist  in  his  own  being;  therefore  (III.  v.)  it  is  con- 
trary to  the  said  endeavor:  thus  all  the  endeavors  of  a 
man  affected  by  pain  are  directed  to  removing  that  pain. 
But  (by  the  definition  of  pain),  in  proportion  as  the  I 


156 


THE  ETHICS 


pain  is  greater,  so  also  is  it  necessarily  opposed  to  a 
greater  part  of  man’s  power  of  activity;  therefore  the 
greater  the  pain,  the  greater  the  power  of  activity  em- 
ployed to  remove  it;  that  is,  the  greater  will  be  the 
desire  or  appetite  in  endeavoring  to  remove  it.  Again, 
since  pleasure  (III.  xi.  note)  increases  or  aids  a man’s 
power  of  activity,  it  may  easily  be  shown  in  like  man- 
ner, that  a man  affected  by  pleasure  has  no  desire 
further  than  to  preserve  it,  and  his  desire  will  be  in  pro- 
portion to  the  magnitude  of  the  pleasure. 

Lastly,  since  hatred  and  love  are  themselves  emotions 
of  pain  and  pleasure,  it  follows  in  like  manner  that  the 
endeavor,  appetite,  or  desire,  which  arises  through  ha- 
tred or  love,  will  be  greater  in  proportion  to  the  hatred 
or  love.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXVIII.  If  a man  has  begun  to  hate  an  ob- 
ject of  his  love,  so  that  love  is  thoroughly  destroyed,  he 
will,  causes  being  equal,  regard  it  with  more  hatred 
than  if  he  had  never  loved  it,  and  his  hatred  will  be  in 
proportion  to  the  strength  of  his  former  love. 

Proof. — If  a man  begins  to  hate  that  which  he  had 
loved,  more  of  his  appetites  are  put  under  restraint  than 
if  he  had  never  loved  it.  For  love  is  a pleasure  (III. 
xiii.  note ) which  a man  endeavors  as  far  as  he  can  to 
render  permanent  (III.  xxviii.);  he  does  so  by  regarding 
the  object  of  his  love  as  present,  and  by  affecting  it  as 
far  as  he  can  pleasurably;  this  endeavor  is  greater  in 
proportion  as  the  love  is  greater,  and  so  also  is  the 
endeavor  to  bring  about  that  the  beloved  should  return 
his  affection  (III.  xxxiii.).  Now  these  endeavors  are  con- 
strained by  hatred  toward  the  object  of  love  (III.  xiii. 
Coroll,  and  III.  xxiii.);  wherefore  the  lover  (III.  xi.  note) 
will  for  this  cause  also  be  affected  with  pain,  the  more 
so  in  proportion  as  his  love  has  been  greater;  that  is,  in 
addition  to  the  pain  caused  by  hatred,  there  is  a pain 
caused  by  the  fact  that  he  has  loved  the  object;  where- 
fore the  lover  will  regard  the  beloved  with  greater  pain, 
or  in  other  words,  will  hate  it  more  than  if  he  had  never 
loved  it,  and  with  the  more  intensity  in  proportion  as  his 
former  love  was  greater.  Q.E.D. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  157 


Prop.  XXXIX.  He  who  hates  anyone  will  endeavor  to 
do  him  an  injury,  unless  he  fears  that  a greater  injury 
will  thereby  accrue  to  himself;  on  the  other  hand,  he 
who  loves  anyone  will,  by  the  same  law,  seek  to  benefit 
him. 

Proof. — To  hate  a man  is  (III.  xiii.  note)  to  conceive 
him  as  a cause  of  pain;  therefore  he  who  hates  a man 
will  endeavor  to  remove  or  destroy  him.  But  if  anything 
more  painful,  or,  in  other  words,  a greater  evil,  should 
accrue  to  the  hater  thereby  — and  if  the  hater  thinks  he 
can  avoid  such  evil  by  not  carrying  out  the  injury, 
which  he  planned  against  the  object  of  his  hate  — he 
will  desire  to  abstain  from  inflicting  that  injury  (III. 
xxviii.),  and  the  strength  of  his  endeavor  (III.  xxxvii.), 
will  be  greater  than  his  former  endeavor  to  do  injury, 
and  will  therefore  prevail  over  it,  as  we  asserted.  The 
second  part  of  this  proof  proceeds  in  the  same  manner. 
Wherefore  he  who  hates  another,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — By  good  I here  mean  every  kind  of  pleasure, 
and  all  that  conduces  thereto,  especially  that  which  satis- 
fies our  longings,  whatsoever  they  may  be.  By  evil,  I 
mean  every  kind  of  pain,  especially  that  which  frustrates 
our  longings.  For  I have  shown  (III.  ix.  note)  that  we 
in  no  case  desire  a thing  because  we  deem  it  good,  but, 
contrariwise,  we  deem  a thing  good  because  we  desire 
it : consequently  we  deem  evil  that  which  we  shrink  from ; 
every  one,  therefore,  according  to  his  particular  emotions, 
judges  or  estimates  what  is  good,  what  is  bad,  what  is 
better,  what  is  worse,  lastly,  what  is  best,  and  what  is 
worst.  Thus  a miser  thinks  that  abundance  of  money  is 
the  best,  and  want  of  money  the  worst;  an  ambitious 
man  desires  nothing  so  much  as  glory,  and  fears  nothing 
so  much  as  shame.  To  an  envious  man  nothing  is  more 
delightful  than  another’s  misfortune,  and  nothing  more 
painful  than  another’s  success.  So  every  man,  according 
to  his  emotions,  judges  a thing  to  be  good  or  bad,  useful 
or  useless.  The  emotion,  which  induces  a man  to  turn 
from  that  which  he  wishes,  or  to  wish  for  that  which  he 
turns  from,  is  called  timidity,  which  may  accordingly  be 
defined  as  the  fear  whereby  a man  is  induced  to  avoid 


THE  ETHICS 


158 

AN  EVIL  WHICH  HE  REGARDS  AS  FUTURE  BY  ENCOUNTERING 

a lesser  evil  (III.  xxviii.).  But  if  the  evil  which  he 
fears  be  shame,  timidity  becomes  bashfulness.  Lastly, 
if  the  desire  to  avoid  a future  evil  be  checked  by  the 
fear  of  another  evil,  so  that  the  man  knows  not  which 
to  choose,  fear  becomes  consternation,  especially  if  both 
the  evils  feared  be  very  great. 

Prop.  XL.  He,  who  conceives  himself  to  be  hated  by 
another,  and  believes  that  he  has  given  him  no  cause 
for  hatred,  will  hate  that  other  in  return. 

Proof. — He  who  conceives  another  as  affected  with 
hatred,  will  thereupon  be  affected  himself  with  hatred 
(III.  xxvii.),  that  is,  with  pain,  accompanied  by  the  idea 
of  an  external  cause.  But,  by  the  hypothesis,  he  con- 
ceives no  cause  for  this  pain  except  him  who  is  his  enemy; 
therefore,  from  conceiving  that  he  is  hated  by  some  one, 
he  will  be  affected  with  pain,  accompanied  by  the  idea 
of  his  enemy ; in  other  words,  he  will  hate  his  enemy  in 
return.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — He  who  thinks  that  he  has  given  just  cause  for 
hatred  will  ( III.  xxx.  and  note ) be  affected  with  shame ; 
but  this  case  ( III.  xxv. ) rarely  happens.  This  recipro- 
cation of  hatred  may  also  arise  from  the  hatred,  which 
follows  an  endeavor  to  injure  the  object  of  our  hate  ( III. 
xxxix. ).  He  therefore  who  conceives  that  he  is  hated 
by  another  will  conceive  his  enemy  as  the  cause  of  some 
evil  or  pain;  thus  he  will  be  affected  with  pain  or  fear, 
accompanied  by  the  idea  of  his  enemy  as  cause ; in  other 
words,  he  will  be  affected  with  hatred  toward  his  enemy, 
as  I said  above. 

Corollary  I. — He  who  conceives,  that  one  whom  he 
loves  hates  him,  will  be  a prey  to  conflicting  hatred  and 
love.  For,  in  so  far  as  he  conceives  that  he  is  an  object 
of  hatred,  he  is  determined  to  hate  his  enemy  in  return. 
But,  by  the  hypothesis,  he  nevertheless  loves  him : where- 
fore he  will  be  a prey  to  conflicting  hatred  and  love. 

Corollary  II. — If  a man  conceives  that  one,  whom  he 
has  hitherto  regarded  without  emotion,  has  done  him  any 
injury  from  motives  of  hatred,  he  will  forthwith  seek  to 
repay  the  injury  in  kind. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  159 


Proof. — He  who  conceives,  that  another  hates  him,  will 
(by  the  last  proposition)  hate  his  enemy  in  return,  and 
(III.  xxvi. ) will  endeavor  to  recall  everything  which  can 
affect  him  painfully ; he  will  moreover,  endeavor  to  do  him 
an  injury  (III.  xxxix. ).  Now  the  first  thing  of  this  sort 
which  he  conceives  is  the  injury  done  to  himself;  he  will, 
therefore,  forthwith  endeavor  to  repay  it  in  kind.  Q.  E.  D. 

Note. — The  endeavor  to  injure  one  whom  we  hate  is 
called  Anger;  the  endeavor  to  repay  in  kind  injury  done 
to  ourselves  is  called  Revenge. 

Prop.  XLI.  If  any  one  conceives  that  he  is  loved  by 
another,  and  believes  that  he  has  given  no  cause  for  such 
love,  he  will  love  that  other  in  return.  (cf.  III.  xv. 
Coroll.,  and  III.  xvi.  ). 

Proof. — This  proposition  is  proved  in  the  same  way  as 
the  preceding  one.  See  also  the  note  appended  thereto. 

Note. — If  he  believes  that  he  has  given  just  cause  for 
the  love,  he  will  take  pride  therein  (III.  xxx.  and  note); 
this  is  what  most  often  happens  (III.  xxv. ),  and  we  said 
that  its  contrary  took  place  whenever  a man  conceives 
himself  to  be  hated  by  another.  ( See  note  to  preceding 
proposition).  This  reciprocal  love,  and  consequently  the 
desire  of  benefiting  him  who  loves  us  (III.  xxxix.), 
and  who  endeavors  to  benefit  us,  is  called  gratitude 
or  thankfulness.  It  thus  appears  that  men  are  much 
more  prone  to  take  vengeance  than  to  return  benefits. 

Corollary. — He  who  imagines,  that  he  is  loved  by 
one  whom  he  hates,  will  be  a prey  to  conflicting  hatred 
and  love.  This  is  proved  in  the  same  way  as  the  first 
corollary  of  the  preceding  proposition. 

Note. — If  hatred  be  the  prevailing  emotion,  he  will 
endeavor  to  injure  him  who  loves  him;  this  emotion 
is  called  cruelty,  especially  if  the  victim  be  believed 
to  have  given  no  ordinary  cause  for  hatred. 

Prop.  XLII.  He  who  has  conferred  a benefit  on  any 
one  from  motives  of  love  or  honor  will  feel  pain,  if 
he  sees  that  the  benefit  is  received  without  gratitude. 

Proof. — When  a man  loves  something  similar  to  him- 
self, he  endeavors,  as  far  as  he  can,  to  bring  it  about  that 
he  should  be  loved  thereby  in  return  ( III.  xxxiii.).  There- 


(6o 


THE  ETHICS 


fore  he  who  has  conferred  a benefit  confers  it  in  obedi 
ence  to  the  desire,  which  he  feels  of  being  loved  in  return , 
that  is  ( III.  xxxiv,)  from  the  hope  of  honor  or  (III.  xxx. 
note ) pleasure ; hence  he  will  endeavor,  as  far  as  he  can, 
to  conceive  this  cause  of  honor,  or  to  regard  it  as  actually- 
existing.  But,  by  the  hypothesis,  he  conceives  something 
else,  which  excludes  the  existence  of  the  said  cause  of 
honor:  wherefore  he  will  thereat  feel  pain  (III.  xix.  ) 
Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XLIII.  Hatred  is  increased  by  being  reciprocated, 
and  can  on  the  other  hand  be  destroyed  by  love. 

Proof.  — He  who  conceives,  that  an  object  of  his  hate 
hates  him  in  return,  will  thereupon  feel  a new  hatred, 
while  the  former  hatred  ( by  hypothesis ) still  remains 
(III.  xl.).  But  if  on  the  other  hand,  he  conceives  that 
the  object  of  hate  loves  him,  he  will  to  this  extent  (III. 
xxxviii.)  regard  himself  with  pleasure,  and  (III.  xxix.) 
will  endeavor  to  please  the  cause  of  his  emotion.  In  other 
words,  he  will  endeavor  not  to  hate  him  (III.  xli.),  and 
not  to  affect  him  painfully ; this  endeavor  ( III.  xxxvii.  ) 
will  be  greater  or  less  in  proportion  to  the  emotion  from 
which  it  arises.  Therefore,  if  it  be  greater  than  that 
which  arises  from  hatred,  and  through  which  the  man 
endeavors  to  affect  painfully  the  thing  which  he  hates, 
it  will  get  the  better  of  it  and  banish  the  hatred  from 
his  mind.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XLIV.  Hatred  which  is  completely  vanquished 
by  love  passes  into  love:  and  love  is  thereupon  greater 
than  if  hatred  had  not  preceded  it. 

Proof.  — The  proof  proceeds  in  the  same  way  as  Prop, 
xxxviii.  of  this  Part:  for  he  who  begins  to  love  a thing, 
which  he  was  wont  to  hate  or  regard  with  pain,  from  the 
very  fact  of  loving  feels  pleasure.  To  this  pleasure 
involved  in  love  is  added  the  pleasure  arising  from  aid 
given  to  the  endeavor  to  remove  the  pain  involved  in 
hatred  (III.  xxxvii.),  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  the 
former  object  of  hatred  as  cause. 

Note.  — Though  this  be  so,  no  one  will  endeavor  to 
hate  anything,  or  to  be  affected  with  pain  for  the  sake 
of  enjoying  this  greater  pleasure;  that  is,  no  one  will 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  161 


desire  that  he  should  be  injured,  in  the  hope  of  recover- 
ing from  the  injury,  nor  long  to  be  ill  for  the  sake  of 
getting  well.  For  every  one  will  always  endeavor  to  per- 
sist in  his  being,  and  to  ward  off  pain  as  far  as  he  can. 
If  the  contrary  is  conceivable,  namely,  that  a man  should 
desire  to  hate  some  one,  in  order  that  he  might  love  him 
the  more  thereafter,  he  will  always  desire  to  hate  him. 
For  the  strength  of  the  love  is  in  proportion  to  the 
strength  of  the  hatred,  wherefore  the  man  would  desire, 
that  the  hatred  be  continually  increased  more  and  more, 
and,  for  a similar  reason,  he  would  desire  to  become 
more  and  more  ill,  in  order  that  he  might  take  greater 
pleasure  in  being  restored  to  health;  in  such  a case  he 
would  always  endeavor  to  be  ill,  which  (III.  vi.)  is  ab- 
surd. 

Prop.  XLV.  If  a man  conceives,  that  any  one  similar 
to  himself  hates  anything  also  similar  to  himself,  which 
he  loves,  he  will  hate  that  person. 

Proof. — The  beloved  object  feels  reciprocal  hatred 
toward  him  who  hates  it  (III.  xl.);  therefore  the  lover,  in 
conceiving  that  anyone  hates  the  beloved  object,  conceives 
the  beloved  thing  as  affected  by  hatred,  in  other  words 
(III.  xiii.),  by  pain;  consequently  he  is  himself  affected 
by  pain  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  the  hater  of  the  be- 
loved thing  as  cause ; that  is,  he  will  hate  him  who  hates 
anything  which  he  himself  loves  (III.  xiii.  note).  Q.  E.D. 

Prop.  XLVI.  If  a man  has  been  affected  pleasurably  or 
painfully  by  any  one,  of  a class  or  nation  different  from 
his  own,  and  if  the  pleasure  or  pain  has  been  accompan- 
ied by  the  idea  of  the  said  stranger  as  cause,  under  the 
general  category  of  the  class  or  nation : the  man  will  feel 
love  or  hatred  not  only  to  the  individual  stranger,  but 
also  to  the  whole  class  or  nation  whereto  he  belongs. 

Proof. — This  is  evident  from  III.  xvi. 

Prop.  XLVIL  Joy  arising  from  the  fact,  that  anything 
we  hate  is  destroyed,  or  suffers  other  injury,  is  never 
unaccompanied  by  a certain  pain  in  us. 

Proof. — This  is  evident  from  III.  xxvii.  For  in  so  far 
as  we  conceive  a thing  similar  to  ourselves  to  be  affected 
with  pain,  we  ourselves  feel  pain. 

ii 


THE  ETHICS 


162 

Note. — This  proposition  can  also  be  proved  from  the 
Corollary  to  II.  xvii.  Whenever  we  remember  anything, 
even  if  it  does  not  actually  exist,  we  regard  it  only  as 
present  and  the  body  is  affected  in  the  same  manner; 
wherefore,  in  so  far  as  the  remembrance  of  the  thing  is 
strong,  a man  is  determined  to  regard  it  with  pain;  this 
determination,  while  the  image  of  the  thing  in  question 
lasts,  is  indeed  checked  by  the  remembrance  of  other 
things  excluding  the  existence  of  the  aforesaid  thing,  but 
is  not  destroyed:  hence,  a man  only  feels  pleasure  in  so 
far  as  the  said  determination  is  checked:  for  this  reason 
the  joy  arising  from  the  injury  done  to  what  we  hate  is 
repeated,  every  time  we  remember  that  object  of  hatred. 
For,  as  we  have  said,  when  the  image  of  the  thing  in 
question  is  aroused,  inasmuch  as  it  involves  the  thing’s 
existence,  it  determines  the  man  to  regard  the  thing 
with  the  same  pain  as  he  was  wont  to  do,  when  it  actually 
did  exist.  However,  since  he  has  joined  to  the  image 
of  the  thing  other  images,  which  exclude  its  existence, 
this  determination  to  pain  is  forthwith  checked,  and  the 
man  rejoices  afresh  as  often  as  the  repetition  takes  place. 
This  is  the  cause  of  men’s  pleasure  in  recalling  past 
evils,  and  delight  in  narrating  dangers  from  which  they 
have  escaped.  For  when  men  conceive  a danger,  they 
conceive  it  as  still  future,  and  are  determined  to  fear  it ; 
this  determination  is  checked  afresh  by  the  idea  of  free- 
dom, which  became  associated  with  the  idea  of  the 
danger  when  they  escaped  therefrom:  this  renders  them 
secure  afresh:  therefore  they  rejoice  afresh. 

Prop.  XLVIII.  Love  or  hatred  toward,  for  instance, 
Peter  is  destroyed,  if  the  pleasure  involved  in  the  former, 
or  the  pain  involved  in  the  latter  emotion,  be  associated 
with  the  idea  of  another  cause:  and  will  be  diminished 
in  proportion  as  we  conceive  Peter  not  to  have  been  the 
sole  cause  of  either  emotion. 

Proof. — This  proposition  is  evident  from  the  mere  defini- 
tion of  love  and  hatred  (III.  xiii.  note).  For  pleasure  is 
called  love  toward  Peter,  and  pain  is  called  hatred  toward 
Peter,  simply  in  so  far  as  Peter  is  regarded  as  the  cause 
of  one  emotion  or  the  other.  When  this  condition  of 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  163 


causality  is  either  wholly  or  partly  removed,  the  emo- 
tion toward  Peter  also  wholly  or  in  part  vanishes.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XLIX.  Love  or  hatred  toward  a thing,  which 
we  conceive  to  be  free,  must,  other  conditions  being  sim- 
ilar, be  greater  than  if  it  were  felt  toward  a thing  act- 
ing by  necessity. 

Proof. — A thing  which  we  conceive  as  free  must  (I.  Def. 
vii.)  be  perceived  through  itself  without  anything  else. 
If,  therefore,  we  conceive  it  as  the  cause  of  pleasure  or 
pain,  we  shall  therefore  (III.  xiii.  note)  love  it  or  hate  it, 
and  shall  do  so  with  the  utmost  love  or  hatred  that  can 
arise  from  the  given  emotion.  But  if  the  thing  which 
causes  the  emotion  be  conceived  as  acting  by  necessity, 
we  shall  then  (by  the  same  Def.  vii.  Part  i.)  conceive 
it  not  as  the  sole  cause,  but  as  one  of  the  causes  of  the 
emotion,  and  therefore  our  love  or  hatred  toward  it  will 
be  less.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — Hence  it  follows,  that  men,  thinking  themselves 
to  be  free,  feel  more  love  or  hatred  toward  one  another 
than  toward  anything  else:  to  this  consideration  we  must 
add  the  imitation  of  emotions  treated  of  in  III.  xxvii. 
xxxiv.  xl.  and  xliii. 

Prop.  L.  Anything  whatever  can  be,  accident-ally,  a 
cause  of  hope  or  fear. 

Proof. — This  proposition  is  proved  in  the  same  way 
as  III.  xv.,  which  see,  together  with  the  note  to  III. 
xviii. 

Note. — Things  which  are  accidently  the  causes  of  hope 
or  fear  are  called  good  or  evil  omens.  Now,  in  so  far 
as  such  omens  are  the  cause  of  hope  or  fear,  they  are 
(by  the  definitions  of  hope  and  fear  given  in  III.  xviii. 
note)  the  causes  also  of  pleasure  and  pain;  consequently 
we,  to  this  extent,  regard  them  with  love  or  hatred,  and 
endeavor  either  to  invoke  them  as  means  toward  that 
which  we  hope  for,  or  to  remove  them  as  obstacles,  or 
causes  of  that  which  we  fear.  It  follows,  further,  from 
III.  xxv.,  that  we  are  naturally  so  constituted  as  to  be- 
lieve readily  in  that  which  we  hope  for,  and  with  diffi- 
culty in  that  which  we  fear;  moreover,  we  are  apt  to 
estimate  such  objects  above  or  below  their  true  value. 


THE  ETHICS 


164 

Hence  there  have  arisen  superstitions,  whereby  men  are 
everywhere  assailed.  However,  I do  not  think  it  worth 
while  to  point  out  here  the  vacillations  springing  from 
hope  and  fear;  it  follows  from  the  definition  of  these 
emotions,  that  there  can  be  no  hope  without  fear,  and 
no  fear  without  hope,  as  I will  duly  explain  in  the  proper 
place.  Further,  in  so  far  as  we  hope  for  or  fear  anything, 
we  regard  it  with  love  or  hatred ; thus  everyone  can  apply 
by  himself  to  hope  and  fear  what  we  have  said  concerning 
love  and  hatred. 

Prop.  LI.  Different  men  may  be  differently  affected  by 
the  same  object,  and  the  same  man  may  be  differently 
affected  at  different  times  by  the  same  object. 

Proof. — The  human  body  is  affected  by  external  bodies 
in  a variety  of  ways  (II.  Post.  iii.).  Two  men  may 
therefore  be  differently  affected  at  the  same  time,  and 
therefore  (by  Ax.  i.  after  Lemma  iii.  after  II.  xiii.)  may 
be  differently  affected  by  one  and  the  same  object. 
Further  (by  the  same  Post.)  the  human  body  can  be 
affected  sometimes  in  one  way,  sometimes  in  another; 
consequently  (by  the  same  Axiom)  it  may  be  differently 
affected  at  different  times  by  one  and  the  same  object. 
Q.E.D. 

Note. — We  thus  see  that  it  is  possible,  that  what  one 
man  loves  another  may  hate,  and  that  what  one  man 
fears  another  may  not  fear;  or,  again,  that  one  and  the 
same  man  may  love  what  he  once  hated,  or  may  be  bold 
where  he  once  was  timid,  and  so  on.  Again,  as  every- 
one judges  according  to  his  emotions  what  is  good,  what 
bad,  what  better,  and  what  worse  (III.  xxxix.  note),  it 
follows  that  men’s  judgments  may  vary  no  less  than  their 
emotions,*  hence  when  we  compare  some  with  others,  we 
distinguish  them  solely  by  the  diversity  of  their  emo- 
tions, and  style  some  intrepid,  others  timid,  others  by 
some  other  epithet.  For  instance,  I shall  call  a man 
intrepid,  if  he  despises  an  evil  which  I am  accustomed 
to  fear;  if  I further  take  into  consideration,  that,  in  his 
desire  to  injure  his  enemies  and  to  benefit  those  whom 

* This  is  possible,  though  the  human  mind  is  part  of  the  divine 
intellect,  as  I have  shown  in  II.  xiii.  note. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  165 


he  loves,  he  is  not  restrained  by  the  fear  of  an  evil 
which  is  sufficient  to  restrain  me,  I shall  call  him  daring. 
Again,  a man  will  appear  timid  to  me,  if  he  fears  an  evil 
which  I am  accustomed  to  despise ; and  if  I further  take 
into  consideration  that  his  desire  is  restrained  by  the  fear 
of  an  evil,  which  is  not  sufficient  to  restrain  me,  I shall 
say  that  he  is  cowardly;  and  in  like  manner  will  every- 
one pass  judgment. 

Lastly,  from  this  inconstancy  in  the  nature  of  human 
judgment,  inasmuch  as  a man  often  judges  of  things 
solely  by  his  emotions,  and  inasmuch  as  the  things  which 
he  believes  cause  pleasure  or  pain,  and  therefore  endeav- 
ors to  promote  or  prevent,  are  often  purely  imaginary,  not 
to  speak  of  the  uncertainty  of  things  alluded  to  in  III. 
xxviii. ; we  may  readily  conceive  that  a man  may  be  at 
one  time  affected  with  pleasure,  and  at  another  with  pain, 
accompanied  by  the  idea  of  himself  as  cause.  Thus  we 
can  easily  understand  what  are  Repentance  and  Self- 
complacency.  Repentance  is  pain,  accompanied  by  the 

IDEA  OF  one’s  SELF  AS  CAUSE;  SELF-COMPLACENCY  IS  PLEAS- 
URE, accompanied  by  the  idea  of  one’s  self  as  cause, 
and  these  emotions  are  most  intense  because  men  believe 
themselves  to  be  free  (III.  xlix.). 

Prop.  LII.  An  object  which  we  have  formerly  seen  in 
conjunction  with  others,  and  which  we  do  not  conceive 
to  have  any  property  that  is  not  common  to  many,  will 
not  be  regarded  by  us  for  so  long,  as  an  object  which 
we  conceive  to  have  some  property  peculiar  to  itself. 

Proof. — As  soon  as  we  conceive  an  object  which  we 
have  seen  in  conjunction  with  others,  we  at  once  remem- 
ber those  others  (II.  xviii.  and  note),  and  thus  we  pass 
forthwith  from  the  contemplation  of  one  object  to  the 
contemplation  of  another  object.  And  this  is  the  case 
with  the  object,  which  we  conceive  to  have  no  property 
that  is  not  common  to  many.  For  we  thereupon  assume 
that  we  are  regarding  therein  nothing,  which  we  have 
not  before  seen  in  conjunction  with  other  objects.  But 
when  we  suppose  that  we  conceive  in  an  object  some- 
thing special,  which  we  have  never  seen  before,  we  must 
needs  say  that  the  mind,  while  regarding  that  object, 


THE  ETHICS 


166 

has  in  itself  nothing  which  it  can  fall  to  regarding  in- 
stead thereof ; therefore  it  is  determined  to  the  contempla- 
tion of  that  object  only.  Therefore  an  object,  etc.  Q.  E.D. 

Note. — This  mental  modification,  or  imagination  of  a 
particular  thing,  in  so  far  as  it  is  alone  in  the 
mind,  is  called  Wonder;  but  if  it  be  exited  by  an  object 
of  fear,  it  is  called  Consternation,  because  wonder  at 
an  evil  keeps  a man  so  engrossed  in  the  simple  contem- 
plation thereof,  that  he  has  no  power  to  think  of  any- 
thing else  whereby  he  might  avoid  the  evil.  If,  how- 
ever, the  object  of  wonder  be  a man’s  prudence,  indus- 
try, or  anything  of  that  sort,  inasmuch  as  the  said  man 
is  thereby  regarded  as  far  surpassing  ourselves,  wonder 
is  called  Veneration;  otherwise,  if  a man’s  anger,  envy, 
etc.,  be  what  we  wonder  at,  the  emotion  is  called  Hor- 
ror. Again,  if  it  be  the  prudence,  industry,  or  what 
not,  of  a man  we  love,  that  we  wonder  at,  our  love  will 
on  this  account  be  the  greater  (III.  xii.),  and  when 
joined  to  wonder  or  veneration  is  called  Devotion.  We 
may  in  like  manner  conceive  hatred,  hope,  confidence, 
and  the  other  emotions,  as  associated  with  wonder;  and 
we  should  thus  be  able  to  deduce  more  emotions  than 
those  which  have  obtained  names  in  ordinary  speech. 
Whence  it  is  evident,  that  the  names  of  the  emotions 
have  been  applied  in  accordance  rather  with  their  ordi- 
nary manifestations  than  with  an  accurate  knowledge  of 
their  nature. 

To  wonder  is  opposed  Contempt,  which  generally 
arises  from  the  fact  that,  because  we  see  someone  won- 
dering at,  loving,  or  fearing  something,  or  because  some- 
thing, at  first  sight,  appears  to  be  like  things,  which  we 
ourselves  wonder  at,  love,  fear,  etc.,  we  are,  in  conse- 
quence (III.  xv.  Coroll,  and  iii.  xxvii.),  determined  to 
wonder  at,  love,  or  fear  that  thing.  But  if  from  the 
presence,  or  more  accurate  contemplation  of  the  said 
thing,  we  are  compelled  to  deny  concerning  it  all  that 
can  be  the  cause  of  wonder,  love,  fear,  etc.,  the  mind, 
then,  by  the  presence  of  the  thing,  remains  determined 
to  think  rather  of  those  qualities  which  are  not  in  it, 
than  of  those  which  are  in  it;  whereas,  on  the  other 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  167 


hand,  the  presence  of  the  object  would  cause  it  more 
particularly  to  regard  that  which  is  therein.  As  devo- 
tion springs  from  wonder  at  a thing  which  we  love,  so 
does  Derision  spring  from  contempt  of  a thing  which 
we  hate  or  fear,  and  Scorn  from  contempt  of  folly,  as 
veneration  from  wonder  at  prudence.  Lastly,  we  can 
conceive  the  emotions  of  love,  hope,  honor,  etc.,  in  associa- 
tion with  contempt,  and  can  thence  deduce  other  emo- 
tions, which  are  not  distinguished  one  from  another  by 
any  recognized  name. 

Prop.  LIII.  When  the  mind  regards  itself  and  its  own 
power  of  activity,  it  feels  pleasure;  and  that  pleasure  is 
greater  in  proportion  to  the  distinctness  wherewith  it 
conceives  itself  and  its  own  power  of  activity. 

Proof. — A man  does  not  know  himself  except  through 
the  modifications  of  his  body,  and  the  ideas  thereof  (II. 
xix.  and  xxiii.).  When,  therefore,  the  mind  is  able  to 
contemplate  itself,  it  is  thereby  assumed  to  pass  to  a 
greater  perfection,  or  (III.  xi.  note)  to  feel  pleasure ; and 
the  pleasure  will  be  greater  in  proportion  to  the  distinct- 
ness, wherewith  it  is  able  to  conceive  itself  and  its  own 
power  of  activity.  Q.  E.D. 

Corollary.  — This  pleasure  is  fostered  more  and  more, 
in  proportion  as  a man  conceives  himself  to  be  praised 
by  others.  For  the  more  he  conceives  himself  as  praised 
by  others,  the  more  he  will  imagine  them  to  be  affected 
with  pleasure,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  himself  (III. 
xxix.  note);  thus  he  is  (III.  xxvii.)  himself  affected  with 
greater  pleasure,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  himself. 
Q.E.D. 

Prop.  LIV.  The  mind  endeavors  to  conceive  only  such 
things  as  assert  its  power  of  activity. 

Proof.  — The  endeavor  or  power  of  the  mind  is  the 
actual  essence  thereof  (III.  vii.);  but  the  essence  of  the 
mind  obviously  only  affirms  that  which  the  mind  is  and 
can  do ; not  that  which  it  neither  is  nor  can  do ; therefore 
the  mind  endeavors  to  conceive  only  such  things  as  assert 
or  affirm  its  power  of  activity.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  LV.  When  the  mind  contemplates  its  own  weak- 
ness, it  feels  pain  thereat. 


1 68 


THE  ETHICS 


Proof.  — The  essence  of  the  mind  only  affirms  that 
which  the  mind  is,  or  can  do;  in  other  words,  it  is  the 
mind’s  nature  to  conceive  only  such  things  as  assert  its 
power  of  activity  (last  Prop.).  Thus,  when  we  say  that 
the  mind  contemplates  its  own  weakness,  we  are  merely 
saying  that  while  the  mind  is  attempting  to  conceive 
something  which  asserts  its  power  of  activity,  it  is 
checked  in  its  endeavor — in  other  words  (III.  xi. 
note),  it  feels  pain.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — This  pain  is  more  and  more  fostered,  if  a 
man  conceives  that  he  is  blamed  by  others ; this  may  be 
proved  in  the  same  way  as  the  corollary  to  III.  liii. 

Note. — This  pain,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  our  own 
weakness,  is  called  humility;  the  pleasure,  which  springs 
from  the  contemplation  of  ourselves,  is  called  self-love 
or  self-complacency.  And  inasmuch  as  this  feeling  is 
renewed  as  often  as  a man  contemplates  his  own  virtues, 
or  his  own  power  of  activity,  it  follows  that  every  one  is 
fond  of  narrating  his  own  exploits,  and  displaying  the 
force  both  of  his  body  and  mind,  and  also  that  for  this 
reason,  men  are  troublesome  one  to  another.  Again,  it 
follows  that  men  are  naturally  envious  (III.  xxiv.  note, 
and  III.  xxxii.  note),  rejoicing  in  the  shortcomings  of 
their  equals,  and  feeling  pain  at  their  virtues.  For  when- 
ever a man  conceives  his  own  actions,  he  is  affected 
with  pleasure  (III.  liii.),  in  proportion  as  his  actions  dis- 
play more  perfection,  and  he  conceives  them  more  dis- 
tinctly— that  is  (II.  xl.  note),  in  proportion  as  he  can 
distinguish  them  from  others,  and  regard  them  as  some- 
thing special.  Therefore,  a man  will  take  most  pleasure 
in  contemplating  himself,  when  he  contemplates  some 
quality  which  he  denies  to  others.  But,  if  that  which  he 
affirms  of  himself  be  attributable  to  the  idea  of  man  or 
animals  in  general,  he  will  not  be  so  greatly  pleased ; he 
will,  on  the  contrary,  feel  pain,  if  he  conceives  that  his 
own  actions  fall  short  when  compared  with  those  of 
others.  This  pain  (III.  xxviii.)  he  will  endeavor  to  re- 
move, by  putting  a wrong  construction  on  the  actions  of 
his  equals,  or  by,  as  far  as  he  can,  embellishing  his 
own. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  169 


It  is  thus  apparent  that  men  are  naturally  prone  to 
hatred  and  envy,  which  latter  is  fostered  by  their  edu- 
cation. For  parents  are  accustomed  to  incite  their  chil- 
dren to  virtue  solely  by  the  spur  of  honor  and  envy. 
But,  perhaps,  some  will  scruple  to  assent  to  what  I have 
said,  because  we  not  seldom  admire  men’s  virtues,  and 
venerate  their  possessors.  In  order  to  remove  such 
doubts,  I append  the  following  corollary. 

Corollary. — No  one  envies  the  virtue  of  anyone  who 
is  not  his  equal. 

Proof. — Envy  is  a species  of  hatred  (III.  xxiv.  note)  or 
(III.  xiii.  note)  pain,  that  is  (III.  xi.  note),  a modification 
whereby  a man’s  power  of  activity,  or  endeavor  toward 
activity,  is  checked.  But  a man  does  not  endeavor  or 
desire  to  do  anything,  which  cannot  follow  from  his 
nature  as  it  is  given ; therefore  a man  will  not  desire  any 
power  of  activity  or  virtue  (which  is  the  same  thing)  to 
be  attributed  to  him,  that  is  appropriate  to  another’s 
nature  and  foreign  to  his  own;  hence  his  desire  cannot 
be  checked,  nor  he  himself  pained  by  the  contemplation 
of  virtue  in  some  one  unlike  himself,  consequently  he 
cannot  envy  such  an  one.  But  he  can  envy  his  equal, 
who  is  assumed  to  have  the  same  nature  as  himself. 
Q.E.D. 

Note. — When,  therefore,  as  we  said  in  the  note  to  III. 
lii.,  we  venerate  a man,  through  wonder  at  his  prudence, 
fortitude,  etc.,  we  do  so,  because  we  conceive  those  quali- 
ties to  be  peculiar  to  him,  and  not  as  common  to  our 
nature ; we,  therefore,  no  more  envy  their  possessor,  than 
we  envy  trees  for  being  tall,  or  lions  for  being  courageous. 

Prop.  LVI.  There  are  as  many  kinds  of  pleasure,  of 
pain,  of  desire,  and  of  every  emotion  compounded  of 
these,  such  as  vacillations  of  spirit,  or  derived  from  these, 
such  as  love,  hatred,  hope,  fear,  etc.,  as  there  are  kinds 
of  objects  whereby  we  are  affected. 

Proof. — Pleasure  and  pain,  and  consequently  the  emo- 
tions compounded  thereof,  or  derived  therefrom,  are 
passions,  or  passive  states  (III.  xi.  note);  now  we  are 
necessarily  passive  (III.  i.),  in  so  far  as  we  have  inade- 
quate ideas;  and  only  in  so  far  as  we  have  such  ideas  are 


170 


THE  ETHICS 


we  passive  (III.  iii.) ; that  is,  we  are  only  necessarily 
passive  (II.  xl.  note),  in  so  far  as  we  conceive,  or  (II. 
xvii.  and  note)  in  so  far  as  we  are  affected  by  an  emo- 
tion, which  involves  the  nature  of  our  own  body,  and 
the  nature  of  an  external  body.  Wherefore  the  nature 
of  every  passive  state  must  necessarily  be  so  explained, 
that  the  nature  of  the  object  whereby  we  are  affected 
be  expressed.  Namely,  the  pleasure,  which  arises  from, 
say,  the  object  a,  involves  the  nature  of  that  object  a, 
and  the  pleasure,  which  arises  from  the  object  b,  involves 
the  nature  of  the  object  b;  wherefore  these  two  pleas- 
urable emotions  are  by  nature  different,  inasmuch  as  the 
causes  whence  they  arise  are  by  nature  different.  So 
again  the  emotion  of  pain,  which  arises  from  one  object, 
is  by  nature  different  from  the  pain  arising  from  another 
object,  and,  similarly,  in  the  case  of  love,  hatred,  hope, 
fear,  vacillation,  etc. 

Thus,  there  are  necessarily  as  many  kinds  of  pleasure, 
pain,  love,  hatred,  etc.,  as  there  are  kinds  of  objects 
whereby  we  are  affected.  Now  desire  is  each  man’s  es- 
sence or  nature,  in  so  far  as  it  is  conceived  as  determined 
to  a particular  action  by  any  given  modification  of  itself 
(III.  ix.  note) ; therefore,  according  as  a man  is  affected 
through  external  causes  by  this  or  that  kind  of  pleasure, 
pain,  love,  hatred,  etc.,  in  other  words,  according  as  his 
nature  is  disposed  in  this  or  that  manner,  so  will  his 
desire  be  of  one  kind  or  another,  and  the  nature  of  one 
desire  must  necessarily  differ  from  the  nature  of  another 
desire,  as  widely  as  the  emotions  differ,  wherefrom  each 
desire  arose.  Thus  there  are  as  many  kinds  of  desire, 
as  there  are  kinds  of  pleasure,  pain,  love,  etc.,  conse- 
quently (by  what  has  been  shown)  there  are  as  many 
kinds  of  desire,  as  there  are  kinds  of  objects  whereby 
we  are  affected.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — Among  the  kinds  of  emotions,  which,  by  the 
last  proposition,  must  be  very  numerous,  the  chief  are 

LUXURY,  DRUNKENNESS,  LUST,  AVARICE,  and  AMBITION,  being 

merely  species  of  love  or  desire,  displaying  the  nature 
of  those  emotions  in  a manner  varying  according  to  the 
object,  with  which  they  are  concerned.  For  by  luxury, 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  171 


drunkenness,  lust,  avarice,  ambition,  etc.,  we  simply 
mean  the  immoderate  love  of  feasting,  drinking,  venery, 
riches,  and  fame.  Furthermore,  these  emotions,  in  so  far 
as  we  distinguish  them  from  others  merely  by  the  objects 
wherewith  they  are  concerned,  have  no  contraries.  For 
temperance,  sobriety,  and  chastity,  which  we  are  wont 
to  oppose  to  luxury,  drunkenness,  and  lust,  are  not  emo- 
tions or  passive  states,  but  indicate  a power  of  the  mind 
which  moderates  the  last  named  emotions.  However,  I 
cannot  here  explain  the  remaining  kinds  of  emotions  (see- 
ing that  they  are  as  numerous  as  the  kinds  of  objects), 
nor,  if  I could,  would  it  be  necessary.  It  is  sufficient 
for  our  purpose,  namely,  to  determine  the  strength  of 
the  emotions,  and  the  mind’s  power  over  them,  to  have 
a general  definition  of  each  emotion.  It  is  sufficient,  I 
repeat,  to  understand  the  general  properties  of  the  emo- 
tions and  the  mind,  to  enable  us  to  determine  the  quality 
and  extent  of  the  mind’s  power  in  moderating  and  check- 
ing the  emotions.  Thus,  though  there  is  a great  difference 
between  various  emotions  of  love,  hatred,  or  desire,  for  in- 
stance between  love  felt  toward  children,  and  love  felt 
toward  a wife,  there  is  no  need  for  us  to  take  cognizance 
of  such  differences,  or  to  track  out  further  the  nature  and 
origin  of  the  emotions. 

Prop.  LVII.  Any  emotion  of  a given  individual  differs 
from  the  emotion  of  another  individual,  only  in  so  far 
as  the  essence  of  the  one  individual  differs  from  the  essence 
of  the  other. 

Proof.  — This  proposition  is  evident  from  Ax.  i.  (which 
see  after  Lemma  iii.  Prop.  xiii.  Part  ii.).  Nevertheless, 
we  will  prove  it  from  the  nature  of  the  three  primary 
emotions. 

All  emotions  are  attributable  to  desire,  pleasure,  or 
pain,  as  their  definitions  above  given  show.  But  desire  is 
each  man’s  nature  or  essence  (III.  ix.  note);  therefore 
desire  in  one  individual  differs  from  desire  in  another 
individual,  only  in  so  far  as  the  nature  or  essence  of  the 
one  differs  from  the  nature  or  essence  of  the  other. 
Again,  pleasure  and  pain  are  passive  states  or  passions, 
whereby  every  man’s  power  or  endeavor  to  persist  in  his 


172 


THE  ETHICS 


being  is  increased  or  diminished,  helped  or  hindered 
(III.  xi.  and  note).  But  by  the  endeavor  to  persist  in  its 
being,  in  so  far  as  it  is  attributable  to  mind  and  body  in 
conjunction,  we  mean  appetite  and  desire  (III.  ix.  note); 
therefore  pleasure  and  pain  are  identical  with  desire  or 
appetite,  in  so  far  as  by  external  causes  they  are  in- 
increased  or  diminished,  helped  or  hindered,  in  other 
words,  they  are  every  man’s  nature ; wherefore  the  pleasure 
and  pain  felt  by  one  man  differ  from  the  pleasure  and 
pain  felt  by  another  man,  only  in  so  far  as  the  nature 
or  essence  of  the  one  man  differs  from  the  essence  of  the 
other;  consequently,  any  emotion  of  one  individual  only 
differs,  etc.  Q.  E.  D. 

Note. — Hence  it  follows,  that  the  emotions  of  the 
animals  which  are  called  irrational  ( for  after  learning 
the  origin  of  mind  we  cannot  doubt  that  brutes  feel), 
differ  only  from  man’s  emotions,  to  the  extent  that  brute 
nature  differs  from  human  nature.  Horse  and  man  are 
alike  carried  away  by  the  desire  of  procreation;  but  the 
desire  of  the  former  is  equine,  the  desire  of  the  latter  is 
human.  So  also  the  lusts  and  appetites  of  insects,  fishes, 
and  birds  must  needs  vary  accoiding  to  the  several  na- 
tures. Thus,  although  each  individual  lives  content  and 
rejoices  in  that  nature  belonging  to  him  wherein  he  has 
his  being,  yet  the  life,  wherein  each  is  content  and  re- 
joices, is  nothing  else  but  the  idea,  or  soul,  of  the  said 
individual,  and  hence  the  joy  of  one  differs  only  in  nature 
from  the  joy  of  another,  to  the  extent  that  the  essence 
of  one  differs  from  the  essence  of  another.  Lastly,  it 
follows  from  the  foregoing  proposition,  that  there  is  no 
small  difference  between  the  joy  which  actuates,  say,  a 
drunkard,  and  the  joy  possessed  by  a philosopher,  as  I 
just  mention  here  by  the  way.  Thus  far  I have  treated 
of  the  emotions  attributable  to  man,  in  so  far  as  he  is 
passive.  It  remains  to  add  a few  words  on  those  attrib- 
utable to  him  in  so  far  as  he  is  active. 

Prop.  LVIII.  Besides  pleasure  and  desire,  which  are 
passivities  or  passions,  there  are  other  emotions  derived 
from  pleasure  and  desire,  which  are  attributable  to  us  in 
so  far  as  we  are  active. 


ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  173 


Proof. — When  the  mind  conceives  itself  and  its  power 
of  activity,  it  feels  pleasure  (III.  liii.):  now  the  mind 
necessarily  contemplates  itself,  when  it  conceives  a true 
or  adequate  idea  (II.  xliii).  But  the  mind  does  conceive 
certain  adequate  ideas  (II.  xl.  note  2).  Therefore,  it 
feels  pleasure  in  so  far  as  it  conceives  adequate  ideas; 
that  is,  in  so  far  as  it  is  active  (III.  i).  Again,  the 
mind,  both  in  so  far  as  it  has  clear  and  distinct  ideas, 
and  in  so  far  as  it  has  confused  ideas,  endeavors  to  per- 
sist in  its  own  being  (III.  ix.);  but  by  such  an  endeavor 
we  mean  desire  (by  the  note  to  the  same  Prop.);  there- 
fore, desire  is  also  attributable  to  us,  in  so  far  as  we 
understand,  or  (III.  i.)  in  so  far  as  we  are  active. 
Q.E.D. 

Prop.  LIX.  Among  all  the  emotions  attributable  to  the 
mind  as  active,  there  are  none  which  cannot  be  referred 
to  pleasure  or  pain. 

Proof. — All  emotions  can  be  referred  to  desire,  pleasure, 
or  pain,  as  their  definitions,  already  given,  show.  Now 
by  pain  we  mean  that  the  mind’s  power  of  thinking  is 
diminished  or  checked  ( III.  xi.  and  note ) ; therefore,  in 
so  far  as  the  mind  feels  pain,  its  power  of  understanding, 
that  is,  of  activity,  is  diminished  or  checked  (III.  i.); 
therefore,  no  painful  emotions  can  be  attributed  to  the 
mind  in  virtue  of  its  being  active,  but  only  emotions 
of  pleasure  and  desire,  which  (by  the  last  Prop.)  are 
attributable  to  the  mind  in  that  condition.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — All  actions  following  from  emotion,  which  are 
attributable  to  the  mind  in  virtue  of  its  understanding, 
I set  down  to  strength  of  character  ( fortitudo ),  which 
I divide  into  courage  ( animositas ) and  high-mindedness 
{generositas}.  By  courage  I mean  the  desire  whereby 

EVERY  MAN  STRIVES  TO  PRESERVE  HIS  OWN  BEING  IN  AC- 
CORDANCE SOLELY  WITH  THE  DICTATES  OF  REASON.  By 
HIGH-MINDEDNESS  I mean  THE  DESIRE  WHEREBY  EVERY  MAN 
ENDEAVORS,  SOLELY  UNDER  THE  DICTATES  OF  REASON,  TO 
AID  OTHER  MEN  AND  TO  UNITE  THEM  TO  HIMSELF  IN  FRIEND- 
SHIP. Those  actions,  therefore,  which  have  regard  solely 
to  the  good  of  the  agent  I set  down  to  courage,  those 
which  aim  at  the  good  of  others  I set  down  to  high- 


174 


THE  ETHICS 


mindedness.  Thus  temperance,  sobriety,  and  presence 
of  mind  in  danger,  etc.,  are  varieties  of  courage;  courtesy, 
mercy,  etc.,  are  varieties  of  high-mindedness. 

I think  I have  thus  explained,  and  displayed  through 
their  primary  causes  the  principal  emotions  and  vacillations 
of  spirit,  which  arise  from  the  combination  of  the  three 
primary  emotions,  to  wit,  desire,  pleasure,  and  pain.  It  is 
evident  from  what  I have  said,  that  we  are  in  many  ways 
driven  about  by  external  causes,  and  that  like  waves  of  the 
sea  driven  by  contrary  winds  we  toss  to  and  fro  unwitting 
of  the  issue  and  of  our  fate.  But  I have  said,  that  I have 
only  set  forth  the  chief  conflicting  emotions,  not  all  that 
might  be  given.  For,  by  proceeding  in  the  same  way  as 
above,  we  can  easily  show  that  love  is  united  to  repentance, 
scorn,  shame,  etc.  I think  everyone  will  agree  from  what 
has  been  said,  that  the  emotions  may  be  compounded  one 
with  another  in  so  many  ways,  and  so  many  variations  may 
arise  therefrom,  as  to  exceed  all  possibility  of  computation. 
However,  for  my  purpose,  it  is  enough  to  have  enumerated 
the  most  important;  to  reckon  up  the  rest  which  I have 
omitted  would  be  more  curious  than  profitable.  It  remains 
to  remark  concerning  love,  that  it  very  often  happens  that 
while  we  are  enjoying  a thing  which  we  longed  for,  the 
body,  from  the  act  of  enjoyment,  acquires  a new  disposi- 
tion, whereby  it  is  determined  in  another  way,  other  images 
of  things  are  aroused  in  it,  and  the  mind  begins  to  con- 
ceive and  desire  something  fresh.  For  example,  when  we 
conceive  something  which  generally  delights  us  with  its 
flavor,  we  desire  to  enjoy,  that  is,  to  eat  it.  But  whilst 
we  are  thus  enjoying  it,  the  stomach  is  filled  and  the  body 
is  otherwise  disposed.  If,  therefore,  when  the  body  is  thus 
otherwise  disposed,  the  image  of  the  food  which  is  present 
be  stimulated,  and  consequently  the  endeavor  or  desire  to 
eat  it  be  stimulated  also,  the  new  disposition  of  the  body 
will  feel  repugnance  to  the  desire  or  attempt,  and  conse- 
quently the  presence  of  the  food  which  we  formerly  longed 
for  will  become  odious.  This  revulsion  of  feeling  is  called 
satiety  or  weariness.  For  the  rest,  I have  neglected  the 
outward  modifications  of  the  body  observable  in  emotions, 
such,  for  instance,  as  trembling,  pallor,  sobbing,  laughter, 


DEFINITIONS  OF  THE  EMOTIONS 


175 


etc.,  for  these  are  attibutable  to  the  body  only,  without 
any  reference  to  the  mind.  Lastly,  the  definitions  of  the 
emotions  require  to  be  supplemented  in  a few  points;  I 
will  therefore  repeat  them,  interpolating  such  observations 
as  I think  should  here  and  there  be  added. 

Definitions  of  the  Emotions. 

I.  Desire  is  the  actual  essence  of  man,  in  so  far  as  it 
is  conceived,  as  determined  to  a particular  activity  by 
some  given  modification  of  itself. 

Explanation. — We  have  said  above,  in  the  note  to  Prop, 
ix.  of  this  part,  that  desire  is  appetite,  with  consciousness 
thereof;  further,  that  appetite  is  the  essence  of  man,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  determined  to  act  in  a way  tending  to  pro- 
mote its  own  persistence.  But,  in  the  same  note,  I also 
remarked  that,  strictly  speaking,  I recognize  no  distinc- 
tion between  appetite  and  desire.  For  whether  a man 
be  conscious  of  his  appetite  or  not,  it  remains  one  and 
the  same  appetite.  Thus,  in  order  to  avoid  the  appear- 
ance of  tautology,  I have  refrained  from  explaining  desire 
by  appetite ; but  I have  taken  care  to  define  it  in  such  a 
manner,  as  to  comprehend,  under  one  head,  all  those 
endeavors  of  human  nature,  which  we  distinguish  by  the 
terms  appetite,  will,  desire,  or  impulse.  I might,  indeed, 
have  said,  that  desire  is  the  essence  of  man,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  conceived  as  determined  to  a particular  activity; 
but  from  such  a definition  (cf  II.  xxiii.)  it  would  not 
follow  that  the  mind  can  be  conscious  of  its  desire  or 
appetite.  Therefore,  in  order  to  imply  the  cause  of  such 
consciousness,  it  was  necessary  to  add,  in  so  far  as  it  is 

DETERMINED  BY  SOME  GIVEN  MODIFICATION,  etc.  For,  by  a 

modification  of  man’s  essence,  we  understand  every  dis- 
position of  the  said  essence,  whether  such  disposition  be 
innate,  or  whether  it  be  conceived  solely  under  the 
attribute  of  thought,  or  solely  under  the  attribute  of 
extension,  or  whether,  lastly,  it  be  referred  simultane- 
ously to  both  these  attributes.  By  the  term  desire,  then, 
I here  mean  all  man’s  endeavors,  impulses,  appetites,  and 
volitions,  which  vary  according  to  each  man’s  disposition, 
and  are,  therefore,  not  seldom  opposed  one  to  another, 


176 


THE  ETHICS 


according  as  a man  is  drawn  in  different  directions,  and 
knows  not  where  to  turn. 

II.  Pleasure  is  the  transition  of  a man  from  a less  to 
a greater  perfection. 

III.  Pain  is  the  transition  of  a man  from  a greater  to 
a less  perfection. 

Explanation. — I say  transition:  for  pleasure  is  not  per- 
fection itself.  For,  if  man  were  born  with  the  perfection 
to  which  he  passes,  he  would  possess  the  same,  without 
the  emotion  of  pleasure.  This  appears  more  clearly  from 
the  consideration  of  the  contrary  emotion,  pain.  No  one 
can  deny  that  pain  consists  in  the  transition  to  a less 
perfection  and  not  in  the  less  perfection  itself  : for  a man 
cannot  be  pained,  in  so  far  as  he  partakes  of  perfection 
of  any  degree.  Neither  can  we  say  that  pain  consists 
in  the  absence  of  a greater  perfection.  For  absence  is 
nothing,  whereas  the  emotion  of  pain  is  an  activity; 
wherefore  this  activity  can  only  be  the  activity  of  transi- 
tion from  a greater  to  a less  perfection  — in  other  words,  it 
is  an  activity  whereby  a man’s  power  of  action  is  lessened 
or  constrained  {cf.  III.  xi.  note).  I pass  over  the  defini- 
tions of  merriment,  stimulation,  melancholy,  and  grief, 
because  these  terms  are  generally  used  in  reference  to 
the  body,  and  are  merely  kinds  of  pleasure  or  pain. 

IV.  Wonder  is  the  conception  ( imaginatio ) of  any- 
thing, wherein  the  mind  comes  to  a stand,  because  the 
particular  concept  in  question  has  no  connection  with 
other  concepts  ( cf '.  III.  lii.  and  note). 

Explanation. — In  the  note  to  II.  xviii.  we  showed  the 
reason  why  the  mind,  from  the  contemplation  of  one 
thing,  straightway  falls  to  the  contemplation  of  another 
thing,  namely,  because  the  images  of  the  two  things  are 
so  associated  and  arranged,  that  one  follows  the  other. 
This  state  of  association  is  impossible,  if  the  image  of  the 
thing  be  new;  the  mind  will  then  be  at  a stand  in  the 
contemplation  thereof,  until  it  is  determined  by  other 
causes  to  think  of  something  else. 

Thus  the  conception  of  a new  object,  considered  in 
itself,  is  of  the  same  nature  as  other  conceptions ; hence,  I 
do  not  include  wonder  among  the  emotions,  nor  do  I see 


DEFINITIONS  OF  THE  EMOTIONS 


177 


why  I should  so  include  it,  inasmuch  as  this  distraction 
of  the  mind  arises  from  no  positive  cause  drawing  away 
the  mind  from  other  objects,  but  merely  from  the  absence 
of  a cause,  which  should  determine  the  mind  to  pass  from 
the  contemplation  of  one  object  to  the  contemplation  of 
another. 

I,  therefore,  recognize  only  three  primitive  or  primary 
emotions  (as  I said  in  the  note  to  III.  xi.),  namely, 
pleasure,  pain,  and  desire.  I have  spoken  of  wonder, 
simply  because  it  is  customary  to  speak  of  certain  emo- 
tions springing  from  the  three  primitive  ones  by  different 
names,  when  they  are  referred  to  the  objects  of  our 
wonder.  I am  led  by  the  same  motive  to  add  a definition 
of  contempt. 

V.  Contempt  is  the  conception  of  anything  which 
touches  the  mind  so  little,  that  its  presence  leads  the 
mind  to  imagine  those  qualities  which  are  not  in  it, 
rather  than  such  as  are  in  it  ( cf.  III.  lii.  note). 

The  definitions  of  veneration  and  scorn  I here  pass  over, 
for  I am  not  aware  that  any  emotions  are  named  after 
them. 

VI.  Love  is  pleasure,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  an 
external  cause. 

Explanation. — This  definition  explains  sufficiently  clearly 
the  essence  of  love ; the  definition  given  by  those  authors 
who  say  that  love  is  the  lover’s  wish  to  unite  himself 
to  the  loved  object  expresses  a property,  but  not  the 
essence  of  love ; and,  as  such  authors  have  not  sufficiently 
discerned  love’s  essence,  they  have  been  unable  to  acquire 
a true  conception  of  its  properties,  accordingly  their  defi- 
nition is  on  all  hands  admitted  to  be  very  obscure.  It 
must,  however,  be  noted,  that  when  I say  that  it  is  a 
property  of  love,  that  the  lover  should  wish  to  unite 
himself  to  the  beloved  object,  I do  not  here  mean  by 
wish  consent,  or  conclusion,  or  a free  decision  of  the 
mind  (for  I have  shown  such,  in  II.  xlviii.  to  be  fic- 
titious) ; neither  do  I mean  a desire  of  being  united  to 
the  loved  object  when  it  is  absent,  or  of  continuing  in 
its  presence  when  it  is  at  hand ; for  love  can  be  conceived 
without  either  of  these  desires;  but  by  wish  I mean  the 
12 


178 


THE  ETHICS 


contentment,  which  is  in  the  lover,  on  account  of  the 
presence  of  the  beloved  object,  whereby  the  pleasure  of 
the  lover  is  strengthened,  or  at  least  maintained. 

VII.  Hatred  is  pain,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  an 
external  cause. 

Explanation. — These  observations  are  easily  grasped 
after  what  has  been  said  in  the  explanation  of  the  pre- 
ceding definition  {cf  also  III.  xiii.  note). 

VIII.  Inclination  is  pleasure  accompanied  by  the  idea 
of  something  which  is  accidentally  a cause  of  pleasure. 

IX.  Aversion  is  pain,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  some- 
thing which  is  accidentally  the  cause  of  pain  {cf.  III.  xv. 
note ). 

X.  Devotion  is  love  toward  one  whom  we  admire. 

Explanation. — Wonder  ( admiratio ) arises  (as  we  have 

shown,  III.  lii.)  from  the  novelty  of  a thing.  If,  there- 
fore, it  happens  that  the  object  of  our  wonder  is  often 
conceived  by  us,  we  shall  cease  to  wonder  at  it;  thus  we 
see,  that  the  emotion  of  devotion  readily  degenerates  into 
simple  love. 

XI.  Derision  is  pleasure  arising  from  our  conceiving 
the  presence  of  a quality,  which  we  despise,  in  an  object 
which  we  hate. 

Explanation. — In  so  far  as  we  despise  a thing  which 
we  hate,  we  deny  existence  thereof  ( III.  lii.  note ),  and 
to  that  extent  rejoice  (III.  xx.).  But  since  we  assume 
that  man  hates  that  which  he  derides,  it  follows  that  the 
pleasure  in  question  is  not  without  alloy  {cf.  III.  xlvii. 
note). 

XII.  Hope  is  an  inconstant  pleasure,  arising  from  the 
idea  of  something  past  or  future,  whereof  we  to  a certain 
extent  doubt  the  issue. 

XIII.  Fear  is  an  inconstant  pain  arising  from  the  idea 
of  something  past  or  future,  whereof  we  to  a certain 
extent  doubt  the  issue  {cf.  III.  xviii.  note). 

Explanation.  — From  these  definitions  it  follows,  that 
there  is  no  hope  unmingled  with  fear,  and  no  fear  un- 
mingled with  hope.  For  he,  who  depends  on  hope  and 
doubts  concerning  the  issue  of  anything,  is  assumed  to 
conceive  something,  which  excludes  the  existence  of  the 


DEFINITIONS  OF  THE  EMOTIONS 


179 


said  thing  in  the  future;  therefore  he,  to  this  extent, 
feels  pain  ( cf.  III.  xix.);  consequently  while  dependent 
on  hope,  he  fears  for  the  issue.  Contrariwise  he,  who 
fears,  in  other  words  doubts,  concerning  the  issue  of 
something  which  he  hates,  also  conceives  something  which 
excludes  the  existence  of  the  thing  in  question;  to  this 
extent  he  feels  pleasure,  and  consequently  to  this  extent 
he  hopes  that  it  will  turn  out  as  he  desires  (III.  xx.). 

XIV.  Confidence  is  pleasure  arising  from  the  idea  of 
something  past  or  future,  wherefrom  all  cause  of  doubt 
has  been  removed. 

XV.  Despair  is  pain  arising  from  the  idea  of  some- 
thing past  or  future,  wherefrom  all  cause  of  doubt  has 
been  removed. 

Explanation.  — Thus  confidence  springs  from  hope,  and 
despair  from  fear,  when  all  cause  for  doubt  as  to  the  issue 
of  an  event  has  been  removed:  this  comes  to  pass,  because 
man  conceives  something  past  or  future  as  present  and 
regards  it  as  such,  or  else  because  he  conceives  other 
things,  which  exclude  the  existence  of  the  causes  of  his 
doubt.  For,  although  we  can  never  be  absolutely  certain 
of  the  issue  of  any  particular  event  (II.  xxxi.  Coroll.), 
it  may  nevertheless  happen  that  we  feel  no  doubt  con- 
cerning it.  For  we  have  shown,  that  to  feel  no  doubt 
concerning  a thing  is  not  the  same  as  to  be  quite  certain 
of  it  (II.  xlix.  note).  Thus  it  may  happen  that  we  are 
affected  by  the  same  emotion  of  pleasure  or  pain  con- 
cerning a thing  past  or  future,  as  concerning  the 
conception  of  a thing  present ; this  I have  already 
shown  in  III.  xviii.  to  which,  with  its  note,  I refer  the 
reader. 

XVI.  Joy  is  pleasure  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  some- 
thing past,  which  has  had  an  issue  beyond  our  hope. 

XVII.  Disappointment  is  pain  accompanied  by  the  idea 
of  something  past,  which  has  had  an  issue  contrary  to 
our  hope. 

XVIII.  Pity  is  pain  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  evil, 
which  has  befallen  some  one  else  whom  we  conceive  to 
be  like  ourselves  ( cf . III.  xxii.  note,  and  III.  xxvii.  note). 

Explanation. — Between  pity  and  sympathy  (; misericordia ) 


i8o 


THE  ETHICS 


there  seems  to  be  no  difference,  unless  perhaps  that  the 
former  term  is  used  in  reference  to  a particular  action, 
and  the  latter  in  reference  to  a disposition. 

XIX.  Approval  is  love  toward  one  who  has  done  good 
to  another. 

XX.  Indignation  is  hatred  toward  one  who  has  done 
evil  to  another. 

Explanation. — I am  aware  that  these  terms  are  employed 
in  senses  somewhat  different  from  those  usually  assigned. 
But  my  purpose  is  to  explain,  not  the  meaning  of  words, 
but  the  nature  of  things.  I therefore  make  use  of  such 
terms,  as  may  convey  my  meaning  without  any  violent 
departure  from  their  ordinary  signification.  One  state- 
ment of  my  method  will  suffice.  As  for  the  cause  of  the 
above  named  emotions  see  III,  xxvii.  Coroll,  i.,  and  III. 
xxii.  note. 

XXI.  Partiality  is  thinking  too  highly  of  anyone  because 
of  the  love  we  bear  him. 

XXII.  Disparagement  is  thinking  too  meanly  of  any  one, 
because  we  hate  him. 

Explanation. — Thus  partiality  is  an  effect  of  love  and 
disparagement  an  effect  of  hatred:  so  that  partiality  may 
also  be  defined  as  love,  in  so  far  as  it  induces  a man  to 
think  too  highly  of  a beloved  object.  Contrariwise,  dis- 
paragement may  be  defined  as  hatred,  in  so  far  as  it 
induces  a man  to  think  too  meanly  of  a hated  object. 
cf.  III.  xxvi.  note. 

XXIII.  Envy  is  hatred,  in  so  far  as  it  induces  a man 
to  be  pained  by  another’s  good  fortune,  and  to  rejoice  in 
another’s  evil  fortune. 

Explanation. — Envy  is  generally  opposed  to  sympathy, 
which,  by  doing  some  violence  to  the  meaning  of  the 
word,  may  therefore  be  thus  defined: 

XXIV.  Sympathy  ( misericordia ) is  love,  in  so  far  as  it 
induces  a man  to  feel  pleasure  at  another’s  good  fortune, 
and  pain  at  another’s  evil  fortune. 

Explanation. — Concerning  envy  see  the  notes  to  III. 
xxiv.  and  xxxii.  These  emotions  also  arise  from  pleasure 
or  pain  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  something  external, 
as  cause  either  in  itself  or  accidentally.  I now  pass  on 


DEFINITIONS  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  181 

to  other  emotions,  which  are  accompanied  by  the  idea  of 
something  within  as  a cause. 

XXV.  Self-approval  is  pleasure  arising  from  a man’s 
contemplation  of  himself  and  his  own  power  of  action. 

XXVI.  Humility  is  pain  arising  from  a man’s  con- 
templation of  his  own  weakness  of  body  or  mind. 

Explanation. — Self-complacency  is  opposed  to  humility, 
in  so  far  as  we  thereby  mean  pleasure  arising  from  a 
contemplation  of  our  own  power  of  action ; but,  in  so  far 
as  we  mean  thereby  pleasure  accompanied  by  the  idea 
of  any  action  which  we  believe  we  have  performed  by  the 
free  decision  of  our  mind,  it  is  opposed  to  repentance, 
which  we  may  thus  define: 

XXVII.  Repentance  is  pain  accompanied  by  the  idea 
of  some  action,  which  we  believe  we  have  performed  by 
the  free  decision  of  our  mind. 

Explanation. — The  causes  of  these  emotions  we  have 
set  forth  in  III.  li.  note,  and  in  III.  liii.  liv.  lv.  and  note. 
Concerning  the  free  decision  of  the  mind,  see  II.  xxxv. 
note.  This  is  perhaps  the  place  to  call  attention  to  the 
fact  that  it  is  nothing  wonderful  that  all  those  actions, 
which  are  commonly  called  wrong,  are  followed  by  pain, 
and  all  those,  which  are  called  right,  are  followed  by 
pleasure.  We  can  easily  gather,  from  what  has  been  said, 
that  this  depends  in  great  measure  on  education.  Parents, 
by  reprobating  the  former  class  of  actions,  and  by  fre- 
quently chiding  their  children  because  of  them,  and  also 
by  persuading  to  and  praising  the  latter  class,  have  brought 
it  about  that  the  former  should  be  associated  with  pain 
and  the  latter  with  pleasure.  This  is  confirmed  by  ex- 
perience. For  custom  and  religion  are  not  the  same 
among  all  men,  but  that  which  some  consider  sacred 
others  consider  profane,  and  what  some  consider  honor- 
able others  consider  disgraceful.  According  as  each  man 
has  been  educated,  he  feels  repentance  for  a given  action 
or  glories  therein. 

XXVIII.  Pride  is  thinking  too  highly  of  one’s  self  from 
self-love. 

Explanation. — Thus  pride  is  different  from  partiality, 
for  the  latter  term  is  used  in  reference  to  an  external 


182 


THE  ETHICS 


object,  but  pride  is  used  of  a man  thinking  too  highly  of 
himself.  However,  as  partiality  is  the  effect  of  love,  so 
is  pride  the  effect  or  property  of  self-love,  which  may 
therefore  be  thus  defined,  love  of  self  or  self-approval, 

IN  SO  FAR  AS  IT  LEADS  A MAN  TO  THINK  TOO  HIGHLY  OF 

himself.  To  this  emotion  there  is  no  contrary.  For  no 
one  thinks  too  meanly  of  himself  because  of  self-hatred; 
I say  that  no  one  thinks  too  meanly  of  himself,  in  so  far 
as  he  conceives  that  he  is  incapable  of  doing  this  or  that. 
For  whatsoever  a man  imagines  that  he  is  incapable  of 
doing,  he  imagines  this  of  necessity,  and  by  that  notion 
he  is  so  disposed,  that  he  really  cannot  do  that  which  he 
conceives  that  he  cannot  do.  For,  so  long  as  he  con- 
ceives that  he  cannot  do  it,  so  long  is  he  not  determined 
to  do  it,  and  consequently  so  long  is  it  impossible  for 
him  to  do  it.  However,  if  we  consider  such  matters  as 
only  depend  on  opinion,  we  shall  find  it  conceivable  that 
a man  may  think  too  meanly  of  himself ; for  it  may  hap- 
pen, that  a man,  sorrowfully  regarding  his  own  weakness, 
should  imagine  that  he  is  despised  by  all  men,  while  the 
rest  of  the  world  are  thinking  of  nothing  less  than  of  de- 
spising him.  Again,  a man  may  think  too  meanly  of 
himself,  if  he  deny  of  himself  in  the  present  something 
in  relation  to  a future  time  of  which  he  is  uncertain. 
As,  for  instance,  if  he  should  say  that  he  is  unable  to 
form  any  clear  conceptions,  or  that  he  can  desire  and  do 
nothing  but  what  is  wicked  and  base,  etc.  We  may  also 
say,  that  a man  thinks  too  meanly  of  himself,  when  we 
see  him  from  excessive  fear  of  shame  refusing  to  do 
things  which  others,  his  equals,  venture.  We  can, 
therefore,  set  down  as  a contrary  to  pride  an  emotion 
which  I will  call  self-abasement,  for  as  from  self- 
complacency  springs  pride,  so  from  humility  springs  self- 
abasement,  which  I will  accordingly,  thus  define: 

XXIX.  Self-abasement  is  thinking  too  meanly  of  one’s 
self  by  reason  of  pain. 

Explanation. — We  are  nevertheless  generally  accus- 
tomed to  oppose  pride  to  humility,  but  in  that  case  we 
pay  more  attention  to  the  effect  of  either  emotion  than 
to  its  nature.  We  are  wont  to  call  proud  the  man  who 


DEFINITIONS  OF  THE  EMOTIONS 


183 


boasts  too  much  (III,  xxx.  note),  who  talks  of  nothing 
but  his  own  virtues  and  other  people’s  faults,  who  wishes 
to  be  first ; and  lastly  who  goes  through  life  with  a style 
and  pomp  suitable  to  those  far  above  him  in  station.  On 
the  other  hand,  we  call  humble  the  man  who  too  often 
blushes,  who  confesses  his  faults,  who  sets  forth  other 
men’s  virtues,  and  who,  lastly,  walks  with  bent  head  and 
is  negligent  of  his  attire.  However,  these  emotions, 
humility  and  self-abasement,  are  extremely  rare.  For 
human  nature,  considered  in  itself,  strives  against  them 
as  much  as  it  can  (see  III.  xiii.  liv.) ; hence  those,  who 
are  believed  to  be  most  self-abased  and  humble,  are  gen- 
erally in  reality  the  most  ambitious  and  envious. 

XXX.  Honor  is  pleasure  accompanied  by  the  idea  of 
some  action  of  our  own,  which  we  believe  to  be  praised 
by  others. 

XXXI.  Shame  is  pain  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  some 
action  of  our  own,  which  we  believe  to  be  blamed  by 
others. 

Explanation. — On  this  subject  see  the.  note  to  III.  xxx. 
But  we  should  here  remark  the  difference  which  exists 
between  shame  and  modesty.  Shame  is  the  pain  follow- 
ing the  deed  whereof  we  are  ashamed.  Modesty  is  the 
fear  or  dread  of  shame,  which  restrains  a man  from 
committing  a base  action.  Modesty  is  usually  opposed 
to  shamelessness,  but  the  latter  is  not  an  emotion,  as  I 
will  duly  show;  however,  the  names  of  the  emotions  (as 
I have  remarked  already)  have  regard  rather  to  their 
exercise  than  to  their  nature. 

I have  now  fulfilled  my  task  of  explaining  the  emo- 
tions arising  from  pleasure  and  pain.  I therefore  proceed 
to  treat  of  those  which  I refer  to  desire. 

XXXII.  Regret  is  the  desire  or  appetite  to  possess 
something,  kept  alive  by  the  remembrance  of  the  said 
thing,  and  at  the  same  time  constrained  by  the  remem- 
brance of  other  things  which  exclude  the  existence  of  it. 

Explanation. — When  we  remember  a thing,  we  are  by 
that  very  fact,  as  I have  already  said  more  than  once,  dis- 
posed to  contemplate  it  with  the  same  emotion  as  if  it 
were  something  present ; but  this  disposition  or  endeavor, 


184 


THE  ETHICS 


while  we  are  awake,  is  generally  checked  by  the  images 
of  things  which  exclude  the  existence  of  that  which  we 
remember.  Thus  when  we  remember  something  which 
affected  us  with  a certain  pleasure,  we  by  that  very  fact 
endeavor  to  regard  it  with  the  same  emotion  of  pleasure 
as  though  it  were  present,  but  this  endeavor  is  at  once 
checked  by  the  remembrance  of  things  which  exclude  the 
existence  of  the  thing  in  question.  Wherefore,  regret  is, 
strictly  speaking,  a pain  opposed  to  that  pleasure,  which 
arises  from  the  absence  of  something  we  hate  (cf.  III. 
xlvii.  note).  But,  as  the  name  regret  seems  to  refer  to 
desire,  I set  this  emotion  down,  among  the  emotions 
springing  from  desire. 

XXXIII.  Emulation  is  the  desire  of  something,  engen- 
dered in  us  by  our  conception  that  others  have  the  same 
desire. 

Explanation. — He  who  runs  away,  because  he  sees  others 
running  away,  or  he  who  fears,  because  he  sees  others  in 
fear;  or  again,  he  who,  on  seeing  that  another  man  has 
burnt  his  hand,  draws  toward  him  his  own  hand,  and 
moves  his  body  as  though  his  own  hand  were  burnt;  such 
an  one  can  be  said  to  imitate  another’s  emotion,  but  not  to 
emulate  him ; not  because  the  causes  of  emulation  and  imi- 
tation are  different,  but  because  it  has  become  customary 
to  speak  of  emulation  only  in  him,  who  imitates  that  which 
we  deem  to  be  honorable,  useful,  or  pleasant.  As  to  the 
cause  of  emulation,  cf.  III.  xxvii.  and  note.  The  reason 
why  this  emotion  is  generally  coupled  with  envy  may  be 
seen  from  III.  xxxii.  and  note. 

XXXIV.  Thankfulness  or  Gratitude  is  the  desire  or 
zeal  springing  from  love,  whereby  we  endeavor  to  benefit 
him,  who  with  similar  feelings  of  love  has  conferred  a 
benefit  on  us.  Cf.  III.  xxxix.  note  and  xl. 

XXXV.  Benevolence  is  the  desire  of  benefiting  one 
whom  we  pity.  Cf.  III.  xxvii.  note. 

XXXVI.  Anger  is  the  desire,  whereby  through  hatred 
we  are  induced  to  injure  one  whom  we  hate,  III.  xxxix. 

XXXVII.  Revenge  is  the  desire  whereby  we  are  induced, 
through  mutual  hatred,  to  injure  one  who,  with  similar 
feelings,  has  injured  us.  (See  III.  xl.  Coroll.  ii.  and  note.) 


DEFINITIONS  OF  THE  EMOTIONS 


i8S 


XXXVIII.  Cruelty  or  savageness  is  the  desire,  where- 
by a man  is  impelled  to  injure  one  whom  we  love  or 
pity. 

Explanation. — To  cruelty  is  opposed  clemency,  which 
is  not  a passive  state  of  the  mind,  but  a power  whereby 
man  restrains  his  anger  and  revenge. 

XXXIX.  Timidity  is  the  desire  to  avoid  a greater  evil, 
which  we  dread,  by  undergoing  a lesser  evil.  Cf.  III. 
xxxix.  note. 

XL.  Daring,  is  the  desire,  whereby  a man  is  set  on  to  do 
something  dangerous  which  his  equals  fear  to  attempt. 

XLI.  Cowardice  is  attributed  to  one,  whose  desire  is 
checked  by  the  fear  of  some  danger  which  his  equals 
dare  to  encounter. 

Explanation. — Cowardice  is,  therefore,  nothing  else  but 
the  fear  of  some  evil,  which  most  men  are  wont  not  to 
fear ; hence  I do  not  reckon  it  among  the  emotions  spring- 
ing from  desire.  Nevertheless,  I have  chosen  to  explain 
it  here,  because,  in  so  far  as  we  look  to  the  desire,  it  is 
truly  opposed  to  the  emotion  of  daring. 

XLII.  Consternation  is  attributed  to  one,  whose  de- 
sire of  avoiding  evil  is  checked  by  amazement  at  the 
evil  which  he  fears. 

Explanation.  — Consternation  is,  therefore,  a species  of 
cowardice.  But,  inasmuch  as  consternation  arises  from  a 
double  fear,  it  may  be  more  conveniently  defined  as  a 
fear  which  keeps  a man  so  bewildered  and  wavering, 
that  he  is  not  able  to  remove  the  evil.  I say  bewildered, 
in  so  far  as  we  understand  his  desire  of  removing  the 
evil  to  be  constrained  by  his  amazement.  I say  waver- 
ing, in  so  far  as  we  understand  the  said  desire  to  be 
constrained  by  the  fear  of  another  evil,  which  equally 
torments  him:  whence  it  comes  to  pass  that  he  knows 
not,  which  he  may  avert  of  the  two.  On  this  subject, 
see  III.  xxxix.  note,  and  III.  lii.  note.  Concerning 
cowardice  and  daring,  see  III.  li.  note. 

XLIII.  Courtesy,  or  deference  ( humanitas  seu  modes- 
tia),  is  the  desire  of  acting  in  a way  that  should  please 
men,  and  refraining  from  that  which  should  displease 
them. 


THE  ETHICS 


186 

XLIV.  Ambition  is  the  immoderate  desire  of  power. 

Explanation. — Ambition  is  the  desire,  whereby  all  the 
emotions  (cf  III.  xxvii.  and  xxxi.)  are  fostered  and 
strengthened;  therefore  this  emotion  can  with  difficulty 
be  overcome.  For,  so  long  as  a man  is  bound  by  any 
desire,  he  is  at  the  same  time  necessarily  bound  by  this. 
“The  best  men,”  says  Cicero,  “are  especially  led  by 
honor.  Even  philosophers,  when  they  write  a book  con- 
temning honor,  sign  their  names  thereto,”  and  so  on. 

XLV.  Luxury  is  excessive  desire,  or  even  love  of  liv- 
ing sumptuously. 

XLVI.  Intemperance  is  the  excessive  desire  and  love 
of  drinking. 

XLVII.  Avarice  is  the  excessive  desire  and  love  of 
riches. 

XLVIII.  Lust  is  desire  and  love  in  the  matter  of  sex- 
ual intercourse. 

Explanation. — Whether  this  desire  be  excessive  or  not, 
it  is  still  called  lust.  These  last  five  emotions  (as  I have 
shown  in  III.  lvi.)  have  no  contraries.  For  deference  is 
a species  of  ambition.  Cf.  III.  xxix.  note. 

Again,  I have  already  pointed  out,  that  temperance, 
sobriety  and  chastity  indicate  rather  a power  than  a 
passivity  of  the  mind.  It  may,  nevertheless,  happen, 
that  an  avaricious,  an  ambitious,  or  a timid  man  may  ab- 
stain from  excess  in  eating,  drinking,  or  sexual  indul- 
gence, yet  avarice,  ambition,  and  fear  are  not  contraries 
to  luxury,  drunkenness,  and  debauchery.  For  an  avari- 
cious man  is  often  glad  to  gorge  himself  with  food  and  drink 
at  another  man’s  expense.  An  ambitious  man  will  re- 
strain himself  in  nothing,  so  long  as  he  thinks  his  in- 
dulgences are  secret;  and  if  he  lives  among  drunkards 
and  debauchees,  he  will,  from  the  mere  fact  of  being 
ambitious,  be  more  prone  to  those  vices.  Lastly,  a timid 
man  does  that  which  he  would  not.  For  though  an  av- 
aricious man  should,  for  the  sake  of  avoiding  death,  cast 
his  riches  into  the  sea,  he  will  none  the  less  remain 
avaricious;  so,  also,  if  a lustful  man  is  downcast,  because 
he  cannot  follow  his  bent,  he  does  not,  on  the  ground 
of  abstention,  cease  to  be  lustful.  In  fact,  these  emo- 


GENERAL  DEFINITIONS  OF  THE  EMOTIONS  187 


tions  are  not  so  much  concerned  with  the  actual  feasting, 
drinking,  etc.,  as  with  the  appetite  and  love  of  such. 
Nothing,  therefore,  can  be  opposed  to  these  emotions, 
but  high-mindedness  and  valor,  whereof  I will  speak 
presently. 

The  definitions  of  jealousy  and  other  waverings  of  the 
mind  I pass  over  in  silence,  first,  because  they  arise 
from  the  compounding  of  the  emotions  already  described ; 
secondly,  because  many  of  them  have  no  distinctive  names, 
which  shows  that  it  is  sufficient  for  practical  purposes 
to  have  merely  a general  knowledge  of  them.  However, 
it  is  established  from  the  definitions  of  the  emotions, 
which  we  have  set  forth,  that  they  all  spring  from  de- 
sire, pleasure,  or  pain,  or  rather,  that  there  is  nothing 
besides  these  three;  wherefore  each  is  wont  to  be  called 
by  a variety  of  names  in  accordance  with  its  various  rela- 
tions and  extrinsic  tokens.  If  we  now  direct  our  attention 
to  these  primitive  emotions,  and  to  what  has  been  said 
concerning  the  nature  of  the  mind,  we  shall  be  able  thus 
to  define  the  emotions,  in  so  far  as  they  are  referred  to 
the  mind  only. 

General  Definition  of  the  Emotions. 

Emotion,  which  is  called  a passivity  of  the  soul,  is  a 
confused  idea,  whereby  the  mind  affirms  concerning  its 
body,  or  any  part  thereof,  a force  for  existence  ( existendi 
vis)  greater  or  less  than  before,  and  by  the  presence  of 
which  the  mind  is  determined  to  think  of  one  thing 
rather  than  another. 

Explanation.  — I say,  first,  that  emotion  or  passion  of 
the  soul  is  a confused  idea.  For  we  have  shown  that 
the^mind  is  only  passive,  in  so  far  as  it  has  inadequate 

or  confuged~4deas. -(ITL-iif. ) I say,  further,  whereby 

thI  mind  afTtkm5~"Concerning  its  body  or  any  part 

THEREOF  A FORCE  FOR  EXISTENCE  GREATER  THAN  BEFORE. 

For  all  the  ideas  of  bodies,  which  we  possess,  denote 
rather  the  actual  disposition  of  our  own  body  (II.  xvi. 
Coroll,  ii.)  than  the  nature  of  an  external  body.  But 
the  idea  which  constitutes  the  reality  of  an  emotion 
must  denote  or  express  the  disposition  of  the  body,  or  of 


1 88 


THE  ETHICS 


some  part  thereof,  which  is  possessed  by  the  body,  or 
some  part  thereof,  because  its  power  of  action  or  force 
for  existence  is  increased  or  diminished,  helped  or  hin- 
dered. But  it  must  be  noted  that,  when  I say  a greater 
or  less  force  for  existence  than  before,  I do  not 
mean  that  the  mind  compares  the  present  with  the  past 
disposition  of  the  body,  but  that  the  idea  which  consti- 
tutes the  reality  of  an  emotion  affirms  something  of  the 
body,  which,  in  fact,  involves  more  or  less  of  reality 
than  before. 

And  inasmuch  as  the  essence  of  mind  consists  in  the 
fact  (II.  xi.  xiii.),  that  it  affirms  the  actual  existence  of 
its  own  body,  and  inasmuch  as  we  understand  by  per- 
fection the  very  essence  of  a thing,  it  follows  that  the 
mind  passes  to  greater  or  less  perfection,  when  it  hap- 
pens to  affirm  concerning  its  own  body,  or  any  part 
thereof,  something  involving  more  or  less  reality  than 
before. 

When,  therefore,  I said  above  that  the  power  of  the 
mind  is  increased  or  diminished,  I merely  meant  that  the 
mind  had  formed  of  its  own  body,  or  of  some  part 
thereof,  an  idea  involving  more  or  less  of  reality,  than 
it  had  already  affirmed  concerning  its  own  body.  For 
the  excellence  of  ideas,  and  the  actual  power  of  think- 
ing are  measured  by  the  excellence  of  the  object.  Lastly, 
I have  added  by  the  presence  of  which  the  mind  is 

DETERMINED  TO  THINK  OF  ONE  THING  RATHER  THAN  AN- 
OTHER, so  that,  besides  the  nature  of  pleasure  and  pain, 
which  the  first  part  of  the  definition  explains,  I might 
also  express  the  nature  of  desire. 


PART  IV. 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE,  OR  THE  STRENGTH  OF 
THE  EMOTIONS. 

Preface. 


V 


Human  infirmity  in  moderating-  and  checking  the  emo- 
tions I name  bondage;  for,  when  a man  is  a prey  to  his 
emotions,  he  is  not  his  own  master,  but  lies  at  the 
mercy  of  fortune:  so  much  so,  that  he  is  often  com- 
pelled, while  seeing  that  which  is  better  for  him,  to  fol- 
low that  which  is  worse.  Why  this  is  so,  and  what  is 
good  or  evil  in  the  emotions,  I propose  to  show  in  this 
part  of  my  treatise.  But,  before  I begin,  it  would  be 
well  to  make  a few  prefatory  observations  on  perfection 
and  imperfection,  good  and  evil. 

When  a man  has  purposed  to  make  a given  thing, 
and  has  brought  it  to  perfection,  his  work  will  be  pro- 
nounced perfect,  not  only  by  himself,  but  by  everyone 
who  rightly  knows,  or  thinks  that  he  knows,  the  inten- 
tion and  aim  of  its  author.  For  instance,  suppose 
anyone  sees  a work  (which  I assume  to  be  not  yet  com- 
pleted) and  knows  that  the  aim  of  the  author  of  that 
work  is  to  build  a house,  he  will  call  the  work  imper- 
fect; he  will,  on  the  other  hand,  call  it  perfect,  as  soon 
as  he  sees  that  it  is  carried  through  to  the  end,  which 
its  author  had  purposed  for  it.  But  if  a man  sees  a 
work,  the  like  whereof  he  has  never  seen  before,  and  if 
he  knows  not  the  intention  of  the  artificer,  he  plainly 
cannot  know,  whether  that  work  be  perfect  or  imper- 
fect. Such  seems  to  be  the  primary  meaning  of  these 
terms. 

But,  after  men  began  to  form  general  ideas,  to  think 
out  types  of  houses,  buildings,  towers,  etc.,  and  to  prefer 

(189) 


190 


THE  ETHICS 


certain  types  to  others,  it  came  about,  that  (.each  man 
called  perfect  that  which  he  saw  agree  with  the  general 
idea  he  had  formed  of  the  thing  in  question,  and  called 
imperfect  that  which  he  saw  agree  less  with  his  own 
preconceived  type,  even  though  it  had  evidently  been 
completed  in  acordance  with  the  idea  of  its  artificer. 
This  seems  to  be  the  only  reason  for  calling  natural 
phenomena,  which,  indeed,  are  not  made  with  human 
hands,  perfect  or  imperfect:  for  men  are  wont  to  form 
general  ideas  of  things  natural,  no  less  than  of  things 
artificial,  and  such  ideas  they  hold  as  types,  believing 
that  Nature  (who  they  think  does  nothing  without  an 
object)  has  them  in  view,  and  has  set  them  as  types 
before  herself.  Therefore,  when  they  behold  something 
in  Nature,  which  does  not  wholly  conform  to  the  pre- 
conceived type  which  they  have  formed  of  the  thing  in 
question,  they  say  that  Nature  has  fallen  short  or  has 
blundered,  and  has  left  her  work  incomplete.  Thus  we 
see  that  men  are  wont  to  style  natural  phenomena  per- 
fect or  imperfect  rather  from  their  own  prejudices,  than 
from  true  knowledge  of  what  they  pronounce  upon. 

Now  we  showed  in  the  appendix  to  Part  I.,  that 
nature  does  not  work  with  an  end  in  view.  For  the 
eternal  and  infinite  being,  which  we  call  God  or  nature, 
acts  by  the  same  necessity  as  that  whereby  it  exists. 
For  we  have  shown  that  by  the  same  necessity 
of  its  nature,  whereby  it  exists,  it  likewise  works  (I. 
xvi.).  The  reason  or  cause  why  God  or  nature  exists, 
and  the  reason  why  he  acts,  are  one  and  the  same. 
Therefore,  as  he  does  not  exist  for  the  sake  of  an  end, 
so  neither  does  he  act  for  the  sake  of  an  end;  of  his 
existence  and  of  his  action  there  is  neither  origin  nor 
end.  Wherefore,  a cause  which  is  called  final  is  nothing 
else  but  human  desire,  in  so  far  as  it  is  considered  as 
the  origin  or  cause  of  anything.  For  example,  when  we 
say  that  to  be  inhabited  is  the  final  cause  of  this  or  that 
house,  we  mean  nothing  more  than  that  a man.  conceiv- 
ing the  convenience  of  household  life,  had  a desire  to 
build  a house.  Wherefore,  the  being  inhabited,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  regarded  as  a final  cause,  is  nothing  else  but 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE  191 

this  particular  desire,  which  is  really  the  efficient  cause; 
it  is  regarded  as  the  primary  cause,  because  men  are 
generally  ignorant  of  the  causes  of  their  desires.  They 
are,  as  I have  often  said  already,  conscious  of  their  own 
actions  and  appetites,  but  ignorant  of  the  causes  whereby 
they  are  determined  to  any  particular  desire.  Therefore, 
the  common  saying  that  nature  sometimes  falls  short,  or 
blunders,  and  produces  things  which  are  imperfect,  I set 
down  among  the  glosses  treated  of  in  the  appendix  to 
Part  I.  Perfection  and  imperfection,  then,  are  in  reality 
merely  modes  of  thinking,  or  notions  which  we  form 
from  a comparison  among  one  another  of  individuals  of 
the  same  species;  hence  I said  above  (II.  Def.  vi.),  that 
by  reality  and  perfection  I mean  the  same  thing.  For 
we  are  wont  to  refer  all  the  individual  things  in  nature 
to  one  genus,  which  is  called  the  highest  genus,  namely; 
to  the  category  of  being,  whereto  absolutely  all  individ- 
uals in  nature  belong.  Thus,  in  so  far  as  we  refer  the 
individuals  in  nature  to  this  category,  and  comparing 
them  one  with  another,  find  that  some  possess  more  of 
being  or  reality  than  others,  we,  to  this  extent,  say  that 
some  are  more  perfect  than  others.  Again,  in  so  far  as 
we  attribute  to  them  anything  implying  negation  — as 
term,  end,  infirmity,  etc., — we,  to  this  extent,  call  them 
imperfect,  because  they  do  not  affect  our  mind  so  much 
as  the  things  which  we  call  perfect,  not  because  they 
have  any  intrinsic  deficiency,  or  because  nature  has 
blundered.  For  nothing  lies  within  the  scope  of  a thing’s 
nature,  save  that  which  follows  from  the  necessity  of 
the  nature  of  its  efficient  cause,  and  whatsoever  follows 
from  the  necessity  of  the  nature  of  its  efficient  cause 
necessarily  comes  to  pass. 

As  for  the  terms  good  and  bad,  they  indicate  no  pos- 
itive quality  in  things  regarded  in  themselves,  but  are 
merely  modes  of  thinking,  or  notions  which  we  form 
from  the  comparison  of  things  one  with  another.  Thus 
one  and  the  same  thing  can  be  at  the  same  time  good, 
bad,  and  indifferent.  For  instance,  music  is  good  for 
him  that  is  melancholy,  bad  for  him  that  mourns;  for 
him  that  is  deaf,  it  is  neither  good  nor  bad. 


192 


THE  ETHICS 


Nevertheless,  though  this  be  so,  the  terms  should  still 
be  retained.  For,  inasmuch  as  we  desire  to  form  an 
idea  of  man  as  a type  of  human  nature  which  we  may 
hold  in  view,  it  will  be  useful  for  us  to  retain  the  terms 
in  question,  in  the  sense  I have  indicated. 

In  what  follows,  then,  I shall  mean  by  “good”  that 
which  we  certainly  know  to  be  a means  of  approaching 
more  nearly  to  the  type  of  human  nature,  which  we 
have  set  before  ourselves;  by  “bad,”  that  which  we  cer- 
tainly know  to  be  a hindrance  to  us  in  approaching  the 
said  type.  Again,  we  shall  say  that  men  are  more  per- 
fect, or  more  imperfect,  in  proportion  as  they  approach 
more  or  less  nearly  to  the  said  type.  For  it  must  be 
specially  remarked  that,  when  I say  that  a man  passes 
from  a lesser  to  a greater  perfection,  or  vice  versd,  I do 
not  mean  that  he  is  changed  from  one  essence  or  real- 
ity to  another;  for  instance,  a horse  would  be  as  com- 
pletely destroyed  by  being  changed  into  a man,  as  by 
being  changed  into  an  insect.  What  I mean  is,  that  we 
conceive  the  thing’s  power  of  action,  in  so  far  as  this  is 
understood  by  its  nature,  to  be  increased  or  diminished. 
Lastly,  by  perfection  in  general  I shall,  as  I have  said, 
mean  reality  — in  other  words,  each  thing’s  essence,  in  so 
far  as  it  exists,  and  operates  in  a particular  manner,  and 
without  paying  any  regard  to  its  duration.  For  no  given 
thing  can  be  said  to  be  more  perfect,  because  it  has 
passed  a longer  time  in  existence.  The  duration  of 
things  cannot  be  determined  by  their  essence,  for  the 
essence  of  things  involves  no  fixed  and  definite  period 
of  existence;  but  everything,  whether  it  be  more  perfect 
or  less  perfect,  will  always  be  able  to  persist  in  exist- 
ence with  the  same  force  wherewith  it  began  to  exist; 
wherefore,  in  this  respect,  all  things  are  equal. 

Definitions. 

I.  By  good  I mean  that  which  we  certainly  know  to  be 
useful  to  us. 

II.  By  evil  I mean  that  which  we  certainly  know  to 
be  a hindrance  to  us  in  the  attainment  of  any  good. 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


193 


( Concerning'  these  terms  see  the  foregoing  preface 
toward  the  end.) 

III.  Particular  things  I call  contingent  in  so  far  as, 
while  regarding  their  essence  only,  we  find  nothing 
therein,  which  necessarily  asserts  their  existence  or  ex- 
cludes it. 

IV.  Particular  things  I call  possible  in  so  far  as,  while 
regarding  the  causes  whereby  they  must  be  produced,  we 
know  not,  whether  such  causes  be  determined  for  pro- 
ducing them. 

( In  I.  xxxiii.  note  i. , I drew  no  distinction  between 
possible  and  contingent,  because  there  was  in  that  place 
no  need  to  distinguish  them  accurately.) 

V.  By  conflicting  emotions  I mean  those  which  draw 
a man  in  different  directions,  though  they  are  of  the 
same  kind,  such  as  luxury  and  avarice,  which  are  both 
species  of  love,  and  are  contraries,  not  by  nature,  but  by 
accident. 

VI.  What  I mean  by  emotion  felt  toward  a thing, 
future,  present,  and  past,  I explained  in  III.  xviii.,  notes 
i.  and  ii.,  which  see. 

( But  I should  here  also  remark,  that  we  can  only  diss 
tinctly  conceive  distance  of  space  or  time  up  to  a certain 
definite  limit;  that  is,  all  objects  distant  from  us  more 
than  two  hundred  feet,  or  whose  distance  from  the  place 
where  we  are  exceeds  that  which  we  can  distinctly 
conceive,  seem  to  be  an  equal  distance  from  us,  and 
all  in  the  same  plane;  so  also  objects,  whose  time 
of  existing  is  conceived  as  removed  from  the  pres- 
ent by  a longer  interval  than  we  can  distinctly  con- 
ceive, seem  to  be  all  equally  distant  from  the  present, 
and  are  set  down,  as  it  were,  to  the  same  moment  of 
time.) 

VII.  By  an  end,  for  the  sake  of  which  we  do  some- 
thing, I mean  a desire. 

VIII.  By  virtue  ( virtus ) and  power  I mean  the  same 
thing;  that  is  (III.  vii.),  virtue,  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred 
to  man,  is  a man’s  nature  or  essence,  in  so  far  as  it  has 
the  power  of  effecting  what  can  only  be  understood  by 
the  laws  of  that  nature. 

13 


194 


THE  ETHICS 


Axiom. 

There  is  no  individual  thing  in  nature,  than  which 
there  is  not  another  more  powerful  and  strong.  Whatso- 
ever thing  be  given,  there  is  something  stronger  whereby 
it  can  be  destroyed. 

Prop.  I.  No  positive  quality  possessed  by  a false  idea 
is  removed  by  the  presence  of  what  is  true,  in  virtue  of 
its  being  true. 

Proof. — Falsity  consists  solely  in  the  privation  of  knowl- 
edge which  inadequate  ideas  involve  (II.  xxxv.),  nor 
have  they  any  positive  quality  on  account  of  which 
they  are  called  false  (II.  xxxiii.);  contrariwise,  in  so 
far  as  they  are  referred  to  God,  they  are  true  ( II.  xxxii.). 
Wherefore,  if  the  positive  quality  possessed  by  a false 
idea  were  removed  by  the  presence  of  what  is  true,  in 
virtue  of  its  being  true,  a true  idea  would  then  be 
removed  by  itself,  which  ( IV.  iii. ) is  absurd.  There- 
fore, no  positive  quality  possessed  by  a false  idea,  etc. 
Q.E.D. 

Note. — This  proposition  is  more  clearly  understood  from 
II.  xvi.  Coroll.  ii.  For  imagination  is  an  idea,  which  indi- 
cates rather  the  present  disposition  of  the  human  body 
than  the  nature  of  the  external  body ; not  indeed  distinctly, 
but  confusedly ; whence  it  comes  to  pass,  that  the  mind  is 
said  to  err.  For  instance,  when  we  look  at  the  sun,  we 
conceive  that  it  is  distant  from  us  about  two  hundred  feet; 
in  this  judgment  we  err,  so  long  as  we  are  in  ignorance  of 
its  true  distance;  when  its  true  distance  is  known,  the 
error  is  removed,  but  not  the  imagination;  or,  in  other 
words,  the  idea  of  the  sun,  which  only  explains  the  nature 
of  that  luminary,  in  so  far  as  the  body  is  affected  thereby: 
wherefore,  though  we  know  the  real  distance,  we  shall  still 
nevertheless  imagine  the  sun  to  be  near  us.  For,  as  we 
said  in  II.  xxxv.  note,  we  do  not  imagine  the  sun  to  be  so 
near  us,  because  we  are  ignorant  of  its  true  distance,  but 
because  the  mind  conceives  the  magnitude  of  the  sun  to 
the  extent  that  the  body  is  affected  thereby.  Thus,  when 
the  rays  of  the  sun  falling  on  the  surface  of  water  are  re- 
flected into  our  eyes,  we  imagine  the  sun  as  if  it  were  in 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


the  water,  though  we  are  aware  of  its  real  position;  and 
similarly  other  imaginations,  wherein  the  mind  is  deceived, 
whether  they  indicate  the  natural  disposition  of  the  body, 
or  that  its  power  of  activity  is  increased  or  diminished,  are 
not  contrary  to  the  truth,  and  do  not  vanish  at  its  pres- 
ence. It  happens  indeed  that,  when  we  mistakenly  fear 
an  evil,  the  fear  vanishes  when  we  hear  the  true  tidings ; 
but  the  contrary  also  happens,  namely,  that  we  fear  an 
evil  which  will  certainly  come,  and  our  fear  vanishes 
when  we  hear  false  tidings;  thus  imaginations  do  not 
vanish  at  the  presence  of  the  truth,  in  virtue  of  its  being 
true  but  because  other  imaginations,  stronger  than  the 
first,  supervene  and  exclude  the  present  existence  of  that 
which  we  imagined,  as  I have  shown  in  II.  xvii. 

Prop.  II.  We  are  only  passive,  in  so  far  as  we  are  a part 
of  Nature,  which  cannot  be  conceived  by  itself  without 
other  parts. 

Proof. — We  are  said  to  be  passive,  when  something 
arises  in  us,  whereof  we  are  only  a partial  cause  (III. 
Def.  ii.),  that  is  (III.  Def.  i.),  something  which  cannot 
be  deduced  solely  from  the  laws  of  our  nature.  We  are 
passive  therefore,  in  so  far  as  we  are  a part  of  Nature, 
which  cannot  be  conceived  by  itself  without  other  parts. 
Q.E.D. 

Prop.  III.  The  force  whereby  a man  persists  in  exist- 
ing is  limited,  and  is  infinitely  surpassed  by  the  power 
of  external  causes. 

Proof. — This  is  evident  from  the  axiom  of  this  part. 
For,  when  man  is  given,  there  is  something  else  — say  a 
— more  powerful;  when  a is  given,  there  is  something 
else  — say  b — more  powerful  than  a,  and  so  on  to  in- 
finity; thus  the  power  of  man  is  limited  by  the  power  of 
some  other  thing,  and  is  infinitely  surpassed  by  the  power 
of  external  causes.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  IV.  It  is  impossible,  that  man  should  not  be  a 
part  of  Nature,  or  that  he  should  be  capable  of  under- 
going no  changes,  save  such  as  can  be  understood  through 
his  nature  only  as  their  adequate  cause. 

Proof. — The  power,  whereby  each  particular  thing,  and 
consequently  man,  preserves  his  being,  is  the  power  of 


196 


THE  ETHICS 


God  or  of  Nature  (I.  xxiv.  Coroll.);  not  in  so  far  as  it  is 
infinite,  but  in  so  far  as  it  can  be  explained  by  the  actual 
human  essence  (III.  vii.).  Thus  the  power  of  man,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  explained  through  his  own  actual  essence,  is 
a part  of  the  infinite  power  of  God  or  Nature,  in  other 
words,  of  the  essence  thereof  (I.  xxxiv.).  This  was  our 
first  point.  Again,  if  it  were  possible,  that  man  should 
undergo  no  changes  save  such  as  can  be  understood 
solely  through  the  nature  of  man,  it  would  follow  that 
he  would  not  be  able  to  die,  but  would  always  necessarily 
exist ; this  would  be  the  necessary  consequence  of  a cause 
whose  power  was  either  finite  or  infinite;  namely,  either 
of  man’s  power  only,  inasmuch  as  he  would  be  capable 
of  removing  from  himself  all  changes  which  could  spring 
from  external  causes  or  of  the  infinite  power  of  Nature, 
whereby  all  individual  things  would  be  so  ordered,  that 
man  should  be  incapable  of  undergoing  any  changes  save 
such  as  tended  toward  his  own  preservation.  But  the 
first  alternative  is  absurd  (by  the  last  Prop.,  the  proof 
of  which  is  universal,  and  can  be  applied  to  all  indi- 
vidual things).  Therefore,  if  it  be  possible,  that  man 
should  not  be  capable  of  undergoing  any  changes,  save 
such  as  can  be  explained  solely  through  his  own  nature, 
and  consequently  that  he  must  always  (as  we  have  shown) 
necessarily  exist;  such  a result  must  follow  from  the  in- 
finite power  of  God,  and  consequently  ( I.  xvi.)  from  the 
necessity  of  the  divine  nature,  in  so  far  as  it  is  regarded 
as  affected  by  the  idea  of  any  given  man,  the  whole 
order  of  nature  as  conceived  under  the  attributes  of  ex- 
tension and  thought  must  be  deducible.  It  would  there- 
fore follow  (I.  xxi.)  that  man  is  infinite,  which  (by  the 
first  part  of  this  proof ) is  absurd.  It  is,  therefore,  im- 
possible that  man  should  not  undergo  any  changes  save 
those  whereof  he  is  the  adequate  cause.  Q.  E.D. 

Corollary. — Hence  it  follows,  that  man  is  necessarily 
always  a prey  to  his  passions,  that  he  follows  and  obeys 
the  general  order  of  nature,  and  that  he  accommodates 
himself  thereto,  as  much  as  the  nature  of  things  demands. 

Prop.  V.  The  power  and  increase  of  every  passion,  and 
its  persistence  in  existing  are  not  defined  by  the  power, 


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197 


whereby  we  ourselves  endeavor  to  persist  in  existing,  but 
by  the  power  of  an  external  cause  compared  with  our  own. 

Proof. — The  essence  of  a passion  cannot  be  explained 
through  our  essence  alone  (III.  Def.  i.  and  ii.),  that  is 
(III.  vii.),  the  power  of  a passion  cannot  be  defined  by 
the  power,  whereby  we  ourselves  endeavor  to  persist  in 
existing,  but  (as  is  shown  in  II.  xvi.)  must  necessarily  be 
defined  by  the  power  of  an  external  cause  compared  with 
our  own.  Q.E.  D. 

Prop.  VI.  The  force  of  any  passion  or  emotion  can  ‘ 
overcome  the  rest  of  a man’s  activities  or  power,  so  that 
the  emotion  becomes  obstinately  fixed  to  him. 

Proof. — The  force  and  increase  of  any  passion  and  its 
persistence  in  existing  are  defined  by  the  power  of  an 
external  cause  compared  with  our  own  (by  the  foregoing 
Prop.);  therefore  (IV.  iii.)  it  can  overcome  a man’s  power, 
etc.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  VII.  An  emotion  can  only  be  controlled  or  de- 
stroyed by  another  emotion  contrary  thereto,  and  with  more 
power  for  controlling  emotion. 

Proof. — Emotion,  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred  to  the  mind, 
is  an  idea,  whereby  the  mind  affirms  of  its  body  a greater 
or  less  force  of  existence  than  before  (cf.  the  General  Defi- 
nition of  the  Emotions  at  the  end  of  Part  III.).  When, 
therefore,  the  mind  is  assailed  by  any  emotion,  the  body 
is  at  the  same  time  affected  with  a modification  whereby 
its  power  of  activity  is  increased  or  diminished.  Now, 
this  modification  of  the  body  (IV.  v.)  receives  from  its 
cause  the  force  for  persistence  in  its  being;  which  force 
can  only  be  checked  or  destroyed  by  a bodily  cause  (II.  vi.), 
in  virtue  of  the  body  being  affected  with  a modifi- 
cation contrary  to  (III.  v.)  and  stronger  than  itself 
(IV.  Ax.);  wherefore  (II.  xii.)  the  mind  is  affected  by  the 
idea  of  a modification  contrary  to  and  stronger  than  the 
former  modification,  in  other  words  (by  the  General  Defi- 
nition of  the  Emotions)  the  mind  will  be  affected  by  an 
emotion  contrary  to  and  stronger  than  the  former  emotion, 
which  will  exclude  or  destroy  the  existence  of  the  former 
emotion;  thus  an  emotion  cannot  be  destroyed  nor  con- 
trolled except  by  a contrary  and  stronger  emotion.  Q.E.D. 


198 


THE  ETHICS 


Corollary. — An  emotion,  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred  to 
the  mind,  can  only  be  controlled  or  destroyed  through 
an  idea  of  a modification  of  the  body  contrary  to,  and 
stronger  than,  that  which  we  are  undergoing.  For  the 
emotion  which  we  undergo  can  only  be  checked  or  de- 
stroyed by  an  emotion  contrary  to,  and  stronger  than, 
itself;  in  other  words  (by  the  General  Definition  of  the 
Emotions),  only  by  an  idea  of  a modification  of  the  body 
contrary  to,  and  stronger  than,  the  modification  which 
we  undergo. 

Prop.  VIII.  The  knowledge  of  good  and  evil  is  nothing 
else  but  the  emotions  of  pleasure  or  pain,  in  so  far  as  we 
are  conscious  thereof. 

Proof. — We  call  a thing  good  or  evil,  when  it  is  of 
service  or  the  reverse  in  preserving  our  being  (IV.  Def.  i. 
and  ii.),  that  is  (III.  vii.),  when  it  increases  or  dimin- 
ishes, helps  or  hinders,  our  power  of  activity.  Thus,  in 
so  far  as  we  perceive  that  a thing  affects  us  with  pleas- 
ure or  pain,  we  call  it  good  or  evil ; wherefore  the  knowl- 
edge of  good  and  evil  is  nothing  else  but  the  idea  of  the 
pleasure  or  pain,  which  necessarily  follows  from  that 
pleasurable  or  painful  emotion  (II.  xxii.).  But  this  idea 
is  united  to  the  emotion  in  the  same  way  as  mind  is 
united  to  body  (II.  xxi.);  that  is,  there  is  no  real  dis- 
tinction between  this  idea  and  the  emotion  or  idea  of 
the  modification  of  the  body,  save  in  conception  only. 
Therefore  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil  is  nothing  else 
but  the  emotion,  in  so  far  as  we  are  conscious  thereof. 
Q.E.D. 

Prop.  IX.  An  emotion  whereof  we  conceive  the  cause 
to  be  with  us  at  the  present  time,  is  stronger  than  if  we 
did  not  conceive  the  cause  to  be  with  us. 

Proof. — Imagination  or  conception  is  the  idea,  by  which 
the  mind  regards  a thing  as  present  (II.  xvii.  note),  but 
which  indicates  the  disposition  of  the  mind  rather  than 
the  nature  of  the  external  thing  (II.  xvi.  Coroll.  ii.).  An 
emotion  is  therefore  a conception,  in  so  far  as  it  indi- 
cates the  disposition  of  the  body.  But  a conception  (by 
II.  xvii.)  is  stronger,  so  long  as  we  conceive  nothing 
which  excludes  the  present  existence  of  the  external 


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199 


object;  wherefore  an  emotion  is  also  stronger  or  more 
intense,  when  we  conceive  the  cause  to  be  with  us  at  the 
present  time,  than  when  we  do  not  conceive  the  cause 
to  be  with  us.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — When  I said  above  in  III.  xviii.  that  we  are 
affected  by  the  image  of  what  is  past  or  future  with  the 
same  emotion  as  if  the  thing  conceived  were  present,  I 
expressly  stated  that  this  is  only  true  in  so  far  as  we 
look  solely  to  the  image  of  the  thing  in  question  itself; 
for  the  thing’s  nature  is  unchanged,  whether  we  have 
conceived  it  or  not;  I did  not  deny  that  the  image 
becomes  weaker,  when  we  regard  as  present  to  us  other 
things  which  exclude  the  present  existence  of  the  future 
object;  I did  not  expressly  call  attention  to  the  fact, 
because  I purposed  to  treat  of  the  strength  of  the  emo- 
tions in  this  part  of  my  work. 

Corollary. — The  image  of  something  past  or  future, 
that  is,  of  a thing  which  we  regard  as  in  relation  to 
time  past  or  time  future,  to  the  exclusion  of  time  pres- 
ent, is,  when  other  conditions  are  equal,  weaker  than 
the  image  of  something  present;  consequently  an  emo- 
tion felt  toward  what  is  past  or  future  is  less  intense, 
other  conditions  being  equal,  than  an  emotion  felt  toward 
something  present. 

Prop.  X.  Toward  something  future,  which  we  conceive 
as  close  at  hand,  we  are  affected  more  intensely,  than  if 
we  conceive  that  its  time  for  existence  is  separated  from 
the  present  by  a longer  interval;  so  too  by  the  remem- 
brance of  what  we  conceive  to  have  not  long  passed 
away  we  are  affected  more  intensely,  than  if  we  conceive 
that  it  has  long  passed  away. 

Proof. — In  so  far  as  we  conceive  a thing  as  close  at 
hand,  or  not  long  passed  away,  we  conceive  that  which 
excludes  the  presence  of  the  object  less,  than  if  its  period 
of  future  existence  were  more  distant  from  the  present, 
or  if  it  had  long  passed  away  ( this  is  obvious ) ; there- 
fore (by  the  foregoing  Prop.)  we  are,  so  far,  more 
intensely  affected  toward  it.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — From  the  remarks  made  in  Def.  vi.  of  this 
part  it  follows  that,  if  objects  are  separated  from  the 


200 


THE  ETHICS 


present  by  a longer  period  than  we  can  define  in 
conception,  though  their  dates  of  occurrence  be  widely 
separated  one  from  the  other,  they  all  affect  us  equally 
faintly. 

Prop.  XI.  An  emotion  toward  that  which  we  conceive 
as  necessary  is,  when  other  conditions  are  equal,  more- 
intense  than  an  emotion  toward  that  which  is  possible, 
or  contingent,  or  non-necessary. 

Proof. — In  so  far  as  we  conceive  a thing  to  be  neces- 
sary,  we,  to  that  extent,  affirm  its  existence;  on  the 
other  hand  we  deny  a thing’s  existence,  in  so  far  as  we 
conceive  it  not  to  be  necessary  (I.  xxxiii.  note  i.);  where- 
fore (IV.  ix.)  an  emotion  toward  that  which  is  necessary 
is,  other  conditions  being  equal,  more  intense  than  an 
emotion  toward  that  which  is  non-necessary.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XII.  An  emotion  toward  a thing,  which  we  know 
not  to  exist  at  the  present  time,  and  which  we  conceive 
as  possible,  is  more  intense,  other  conditions  being  equal, 
than  an  emotion  toward  a thing  contingent. 

Proof. — In  so  far  as  we  conceive  a thing  as  contingent, 
we  are  affected  by  the  conception  of  some  further  thing, 
which  would  assert  the  existence  of  the  former  (IV.  Def. 
iii.) ; but,  on  the  other  hand,  we  (by  hypothesis)  conceive 
certain  things  which  exclude  its  present  existence.  But, 
in  so  far  as  we  conceive  a thing  to  be  possible  in  the 
future,  we  thereby  conceive  things  which  assert  its  exist- 
ence (IV.  iv.),  that  is  (III.  xviii.),  things  which  promote 
hope  or  fear:  wherefore  an  emotion  toward  something 
possible  is  more  vehement.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — An  emotion  toward  a thing,  which  we  know 
not  to  exist  in  the  present,  and  which  we  conceive  as  con- 
tingent, is  far  fainter  than  if  we  conceive  the  thing  to  be 
present  with  us. 

Proof. — Emotion  toward  a thing,  which  we  conceive 
to  exist,  is  more  intense  than  it  would  be,  if  we  con- 
ceived the  thing  as  future  (IV.  ix.  Coroll.),  and  is  much 
more  vehement,  than  if  the  future  time  be  conceived  as 
far  distant  from  the  present  (IV.  x.).  Therefore  an 
emotion  toward  a thing,  whose  period  of  existence  we 
conceive  to  be  far  distant  from  the  present,  is  far  fainter, 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


201 


than  if  we  conceive  the  thing  as  present;  it  is,  neverthe- 
less, more  intense,  than  if  we  conceived  the  thing 
as  contingent,  wherefore  an  emotion  toward  a thing, 
which  we  regard  as  contingent,  will  be  far  fainter, 
than  if  we  conceived  the  thing  to  be  present  with  us. 
Q-E.D. 

Prop.  XIII.  Emotion  toward  a thing  contingent,» 
which  we  know  not  to  exist  in  the  present,  is,  other  con- 
ditions being  equal,  fainter  than  an  emotion  toward  a 
thing  past. 

Proof. — In  so  far  as  we  conceive  a thing  as  contingent, 
we  are  not  affected  by  the  image  of  any  other  thing, 
which  asserts  the  existence  of  the  said  thing  (IV.  Def. 
iff.),  but,  on  the  other  hand  (by  hypothesis),  we  con- 
ceive certain  things  excluding  its  present  existence.  But, 
in  so  far  as  we  conceive  it  in  relation  to  time  past,  W3 
are  assumed  to  conceive  something,  which  recalls  the 
thing  to  memory,  or  excites  the  image  thereof  ( II.  xviii. 
and  note),  which  is  so  far  the  same  as  regarding  it 
as  present  (II.  xvii.  Coroll.).  Therefore  (IV.  ix.)  an 
emotion  toward  a thing  contingent,  which  we  know  does 
not  exist  in  the  present,  is  fainter,  other  conditions  being 
equal,  than  an  emotion  toward  a thing  past.  Q.  E.  D. 

Prop.  XIV.  A true  knowledge  of  good  and  evil  cannot 
check  any  emotion  by  virtue  of  being  true,  but  only  in  so 
far  as  it  is  considered  as  an  emotion. 

Proof. — An  emotion  is  an  idea,  whereby  the  mind 
affirms  of  its  body  a greater  or  less  force  of  existing  than 
before  ( by  the  General  Definition  of  the  Emotions ) ; there- 
fore it  has  no  positive  quality,  which  can  be  destroyed 
by  the  presence  of  what  is  true ; consequently  the  knowl- 
edge of  good  and  evil  cannot,  by  virtue  of  being  true, 
restrain  any  emotion.  But,  in  so  far  as  such  knowledge 
is  an  emotion  (IV.  viii.),  if  it  have  more  strength  for 
restraining  emotion,  it  will  to  that  extent  be  able  to 
restrain  the  given  emotion.  Q.  E.D. 

Prop.  XV.  Desire  arising  from  the  knowledge  of  good 
and  bad  can  be  quenched  or  checked  by  many  of  the 
other  desires  arising  from  the  emotions  whereby  we  are 
assailed.  ^ 


202 


THE  ETHICS 


Proof. — From  the  true  knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  an  emotion,  necessarily  arises  desire  (Def. 
of  the  Emotions,  i.),  the  strength  of  which  is  propor- 
tioned to  the  strength  of  the  emotion  wherefrom  it  arises 
(III.  xxxvii.).  But,  inasmuch  as  this  desire  arises  (by 
hypothesis)  from  the  fact  of  our  truly  understanding 
anything,  it  follows  that  it  is  also  present  with  us,  in  so 
far  as  we  are  active  (III.  i.),  and  must  therefore  be 
understood  through  our  essence  only  (III.  Def.  ii. ) ; con- 
sequently (III.  vii.)  its  force  and  increase  can  be  defined 
solely  by  human  power.  Again,  the  desires  arising  from 
the  emotions  whereby  we  are  assailed  are  stronger,  in 
proportion  as  the  said  emotions  are  more  vehement ; 
wherefore  their  force  and  increase  must  be  defined  solely 
by  the  power  of  external  causes,  which,  when  compared 
with  our  own  power,  indefinitely  surpass  it  (IV.  iii.); 
hence  the  desires  arising  from  like  emotions  may  be  more 
vehement,  than  the  desire  which  arises  from  a true 
knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  and  may,  consequently,  con- 
trol or  quench  it.  Q.  E.D. 

Prop.  XVI.  Desire  arising  from  the  knowledge  of  good 
and  evil,  in  so  far  as  such  knowledge  regards  what  is 
future,  may  be  more  easily  controlled  or  quenched,  than 
the  desire  for  what  is  agreeable  at  the  present  moment. 

Proof. — Emotion  toward  a thing,  which  we  conceive 
as  future,  is  fainter  than  emotion  toward  a thing  that  is 
present  (IV.  ix.  Coroll.).  But  desire,  which  arises  from 
the  true  knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  though  it  be  con- 
cerned with  things  which  are  good  at  the  moment,  can 
be  quenched  or  controlled  by  any  headstrong  desire  (by 
the  last  Prop.,  the  proof  whereof  is  of  universal  applica- 
tion). Wherefore  desire  arising  from  such  knowledge, 
when  concerned  with  the  future,  can  be  more  easily 
controlled  or  quenched,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XVII.  Desire  arising  from  the  true  knowledge 
of  good  and  evil,  in  so  far  as  such  knowledge  is  con- 
cerned with  what  is  contingent,  can  be  controlled  far 
more  easily  still,  than  desire  for  things  that  are  present. 

Proof. — This  proposition  is  proved  in  the  same  way  as 
the  last  proposition  from  IV.  xii.  Coroll. 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


203 


Note. — I think  I have  now  shown  the  reason,  why  men 
are  moved  by  opinion  more  readily  than  by  true  reason, 
why  it  is  that  the  true  knowledge  of  good  and  evil  stirs 
up  conflicts  in  the  soul,  and  often  yields  to  every  kind 
of  passion.  This  state  of  things  gave  rise  to  the  exclama- 
tion of  the  poet : — 

«The  better  path  I gaze  at  and  approve, 

The  worse  — I follow. » 

Ecclesiastes  seems  to  have  had  the  same  thought  in  his 
mind,  when  he  says,  <(  He  who  increaseth  knowledge  in- 
creaseth  sorrow.”  I have  not  written  the  above  with  the 
object  of  drawing  the  conclusion,  that  ignorance  is  more 
excellent  than  knowledge,  or  that  a wise  man  is  on  a par 
with  a fool  in  controlling  his  emotions,  but  because  it  is 
necessary  to  know  the  power  and  the  infirmity  of  our 
nature,  before  we  can  determine  what  reason  can  do  in 
restraining  the  emotions,  and  what  is  beyond  her  power. 
I have  said,  that  in  the  present  part  I shall  merely  treat 
of  human  infirmity.  The  power  of  reason  over  the  emo- 
tions I have  settled  to  treat  separately. 

Prop.  XVIII.  Desire  arising  from  pleasure  is,  other  con- 
ditions being  equal,  stronger  than  desire  arising  from  pain. 

Proof.  — Desire  is  the  essence  of  a man  (Def.  of  the 
Emotions,  i. ),  that  is,  the  endeavor  whereby  a man  en- 
deavors to  persist  in  his  own  being.  Wherefore  desire 
arising  from  pleasure  is,  by  the  fact  of  pleasure  being 
felt,  increased  or  helped;  on  the  contrary,  desire  arising 
from  pain  is,  by  the  fact  of  pain  being  felt,  diminished 
or  hindered ; hence  the  force  of  desire  arising  from  pleas- 
ure must  be  defined  by  human  power  together  with 
the  power  of  an  external  cause,  whereas  desire  arising 
from  pain  must  be  defined  by  human  power  only.  Thus 
the  former  is  the  stronger  of  the  two.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — In  these  few  remarks  I have  explained  the 
causes  of  human  infirmity  and  inconstancy,  and  shown 
why  men  do  not  abide  by  the  precepts  of  reason.  It 
now  remains  for  me  to  show  what  course  is  marked  out 
for  us  by  reason,  which  of  the  emotions  are  in  harmony 
with  the  rules  of  human  reason,  and  which  of  them  are 


204 


THE  ETHICS 


contrary  thereto.  But,  before  I begin  to  prove  my  propo- 
sitions in  detailed  geometrical  fashion,  it  is  advisable  to 
sketch  them  briefly  in  advance,  so  that  every  one  may 
more  readily  grasp  my  meaning. 

As  reason  makes  no  demands  contrary  to  nature,  it 
demands  that  every  man  should  love  himself,  should 
seek  that  which  is  useful  to  him  — I mean,  that  which  is 
really  useful  to  him,  should  desire  everything  which 
really  brings  man  to  greater  perfection,  and  should,  each 
for  himself,  endeavor  as  far  as  he  can  to  preserve  his 
own  being.  This  is  as  necessarily  true,  as  that  a whole 
is  greater  than  its  part.  (Cf.  III.  iv.) 

Again,  as  virtue  is  nothing  else  but  action  in  accord- 
ance with  the  laws  of  one’s  own  nature  (IV.  Def.  viii.), 
and  as  no  one  endeavors  to  preserve  his  own  being,  ex- 
cept in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  his  own  nature,  it 
follows,  first,  that  the  foundation  of  virtue  is  the  en- 
deavor to  preserve  one’s  own  being,  and  that  happiness 
consists  in  man’s  power  of  preserving  his  own  being; 
secondly,  that  virtue  is  to  be  desired  for  its  own  sake,  and 
that  there  is  nothing  more  excellent  or  more  useful  to  us, 
for  the  sake  of  which  we  should  desire  it ; thirdly  and  lastly, 
that  suicides  are  weak-minded,  and  are  overcome  by  exter- 
nal causes  repugnant  to  their  nature.  Further,  it  follows 
from  Postulate  iv,  Part  II.,  that  we  can  never  arrive  at 
doing  without  all  external  things  for  the  preservation  of 
our  being  or  living,  so  as  to  have  no  relations  with 
things  which  are  outside  ourselves.  Again,  if  we  con- 
sider our  mind,  we  see  that  our  intellect  would  be  more 
imperfect,  if  mind  were  alone,  and  could  understand 
nothing  besides  itself.  There  are,  then,  many  things 
outside  ourselves,  which  are  useful  to  us,  and  are,  there- 
fore, to  be  desired.  Of  such  none  can  be  discerned  more 
excellent,  than  those  which  are  in  entire  agreement  with 
our  nature.  For  if,  for  example,  two  individuals  of  en- 
tirely the  same  nature  are  united,  they  form  a combina- 
tion twice  as  powerful  as  either  of  them  singly. 

Therefore,  to  man  there  is  nothing  more  useful  than 
man  — nothing,  I repeat,  more  excellent  for  preserving 
their  being  can  be  wished  for  by  men,  than  that  all  should 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


205 


so  in  all  points  agree,  that  the  minds  and  bodies  of  all 
should  form,  as  it  were,  one  single  mind  and  one  single 
body,  and  that  all  should,  with  one  consent,  as  far  as  they 
are  able,  endeavor  to  preserve  their  being,  and  all  with 
one  consent  seek  what  is  useful  to  them  all.  Hence,  men 
who  are  governed  by  reason  — that  is,  who  seek  what  is 
useful  to  them  in  accordance  with  reason  — desire  for 
themselves  nothing,  which  they  do  not  also  desire  for  the 
rest  of  mankind,  and,  consequently,  are  just,  faithful,  and 
honorable  in  their  conduct. 

Such  are  the  dictates  of  reason,  which  I purposed  thus 
briefly  to  indicate,  before  beginning  to  prove  them  in 
greater  detail.  I have  taken  this  course  in  order,  if  pos- 
sible, to  gain  the  attention  of  those  who  believe,  that  the 
principle  that  every  man  is  bound  to  seek  what  is  useful 
for  himself  is  the  foundation  of  impiety,  rather  than  of 
piety  and  virtue. 

Therefore,  after  briefly  showing  that  the  contrary  is  the 
case,  I go  on  to  prove  it  by  the  same  method,  as  that 
whereby  I have  hitherto  proceeded. 

Prop.  XIX.  Every  man,  by  the  laws  of  his  nature, 
necessarily  desires  or  shrinks  from  that  which  he  deems 
to  be  good  or  bad. 

Proof. — The  knowledge  of  good  and  evil  is  (IV.  viii.) 
the  emotion  of  pleasure  or  pain,  in  so  far  as  we  are  con- 
scious thereof;  therefore,  every  man  necessarily  desires 
what  he  thinks  good,  and  shrinks  from  what  he  thinks 
bad.  Now  this  appetite  is  nothing  else  but  man’s  nature 
or  essence  (cf.  the  Def.  of  Appetite,  III.  ix.  note,  and 
Def.  of  the  Emotions,  i.).  Therefore,  every  man,  solely 
by  the  laws  of  his  nature,  desires  the  one,  and  shrinks 
from  the  other,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XX.  The  more  every  man  endeavors,  and  is  able 
to  seek  what  is  useful  to  him  — in  other  words,  to  pre- 
serve his  own  being — the  more  is  he  endowed  with  vir- 
tue ; on  the  contrary,  in  proportion  as  a man  neglects  to 
seek  what  is  useful  to  him,  that  is,  to  preserve  his  own 
being,  he  is  wanting  in  power. 

Proof. — Virtue  is  human  power,  which  is  defined  solely 
by  man’s  essence  (IV.  Def.  viii.),  that  is,  which  is  defined 


206 


THE  ETHICS 


solely  by  the  endeavor  made  by  man  to  persist  in  his  own 
being-.  Wherefore,  the  more  a man  endeavors,  and  is  able 
to  preserve  his  own  being,  the  more  is  he  endowed  with 
virtue,  and,  consequently  (III.  iv.  and  vi.),  in  so  far  as  a 
man  neglects  to  preserve  his  own  being,  he  is  wanting  in 
power.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — No  one,  therefore,  neglects  seeking  his  own  good 
or  preserving  his  own  being,  unless  he  be  overcome  by 
causes  external  and  foreign  to  his  nature.  No  one,  I say, 
from  the  necessity  of  his  own  nature,  or  otherwise  than 
under  compulsion  from  external  causes,  shrinks  from  food, 
or  kills  himself;  which  latter  may  be  done  in  a variety 
of  ways.  A man,  for  instance,  kills  himself  under  the 
compulsion  of  another  man,  who  twists  round  his  right 
hand,  wherewith  he  happened  to  have  taken  up  a sword, 
and  forces  him  to  turn  the  blade  against  his  own  heart; 
or,  again,  he  may  be  compelled,  like  Seneca,  by  a 
tyrant’s  command,  to  open  his  own  veins  — that  is,  to 
escape  a greater  evil  by  incurring  a lesser;  or,  lastly, 
latent  external  causes  may  so  disorder  his  imagination,  and 
so  affect  his  body,  that  it  may  assume  a nature  contrary 
to  its  former  one,  and  whereof  the  idea  cannot  exist  in 
the  mind  (III.  x.).  But  that  a man,  from  the  necessity 
of  his  own  nature,  should  endeavor  to  become  non-exist- 
ent, is  as  impossible  as  that  something  should  be  made 
out  of  nothing,  as  every  one  will  see  for  himself,  after  a 
little  reflection. 

Prop.  XXI.  No  one  can  desire  to  be  blessed,  to  act 
rightly  and  to  live  rightly,  without  at  the  same  time  wish- 
ing to  be,  to  act,  and  to  live — in  other  words,  to  actually 
exist. 

Proof.  — The  proof  of  this  proposition,  or  rather  the 
proposition  itself,  is  self-evident,  and  is  also  plain  from 
the  definition  of  desire.  For  the  desire  of  living,  acting, 
etc.,  blessedly  or  rightly,  is  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  i.) 
the  essence  of  man  — that  is  (III.  vii.),  the  endeavor 
made  by  every  one  to  preserve  his  own  being.  There- 
fore, no  one  can  desire,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXII.  No  virtue  can  be  conceived  as  prior  to 
this  endeavor  to  preserve  one’s  own  being. 


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207 


Proof. — The  effort  for  self-preservation  is  the  essence 
of  a thing  (III.  vii.);  therefore,  if  any  virtue  could  be 
conceived  as  prior  thereto,  the  essence  of  a thing  would 
have  to  be  conceived  as  prior  to  itself,  which  is  obvi- 
ously absurd.  Therefore  no  virtue,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — The  effort  for  self-preservation  is  the  first 
and  only  foundation  of  virtue.  For  prior  to  this  princi- 
ple nothing  can  be  conceived,  and  without  it  no  virtue 
can  be  conceived. 

Prop.  XXIII.  Man,  in  so  far  as  he  is  determined  to  a 
particular  action  because  he  has  inadequate  ideas,  cannot 
be  absolutely  said  to  act  in  obedience  to  virtue;  he  can 
only  be  so  described,  in  so  far  as  he  is  determined  for 
the  action  because  he  understands. 

Proof. — In  so  far  as  a man  is  determined  to  an  action 
through  having  inadequate  ideas,  he  is  passive  (III.  i.), 
that  is  (III.  Def.  i.  and  iii.),  he  does  something,  which 
cannot  be  perceived  solely  through  his  essence,  that  is 
(by  IV.  Def.  viii.),  which  does  not  follow  from  his  vir- 
tue. But,  in  so  far  as  he  is  determined  for  an  action 
because  he  understands,  he  is  active;  that  is,  he  does 
something,  which  is  perceived  through  his  essence  alone, 
or  which  adequately  follows  from  his  virtue.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXIV.  To  act  absolutely  in  obedience  to  virtue 
is  in  us  the  same  thing  as  to  act,  to  live,  or  to  preserve 
one’s  being  (these  three  terms  are  identical  in  meaning) 
in  accordance  with  the  dictates  of  reason  on  the  basis  of 
seeking  what  is  useful  to  one’s  self. 

Proof. — To  act  absolutely  in  obedience  to  virtue  is 
nothing  else  but  to  act  according  to  the  laws  of  one’s 
own  nature.  But  we  only  act,  in  so  far  as  we  under- 
stand (III.  iii.):  therefore  to  act  in  obedience  to  virtue  is 
in  us  nothing  else  but  to  act,  to  live,  or  to  preserve  one’s 
being  in  obedience  to  reason,  and  that  on  the  basis  of 
seeking  what  is  useful  for  us  (IV.  xxii.  Coroll.).  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXV.  No  one  wishes  to  preserve  his  being  for 
the  sake  of  anything  else. 

Proof. — The  endeavor,  wherewith  everything  endeavors 
to  persist  in  its  being,  is  defined  solely  by  the  essence 
of  the  thing  itself  (III.  vii.);  from  this  alone,  and  not 


208 


THE  ETHICS 


from  the  essence  of  anything  else,  it  necessarily  follows 
(III.  vi.)  that  everyone  endeavors  to  preserve  his  being. 
Moreover,  this  proposition  is  plain  from  IV.  xxii.  Coroll., 
for  if  a man  should  endeavor  to  preserve  his  being  for 
the  sake  of  anything  else,  the  last-named  thing  would 
obviously  be  the  basis  of  virtue,  which,  by  the  foregoing 
corollary,  is  absurd.  Therefore  no  one,  etc.  Q.  E.  D. 

Prop.  XXVI.  Whatsoever  we  endeavor  in  obedience  to 
reason  is  nothing  further  than  to  understand;  neither 
does  the  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  makes  use  of  reason,  judge 
anything  to  be  useful  to  it,  save  such  things  as  are  con- 
ducive to  understanding. 

Proof. — The  effort  for  self-preservation  is  nothing  else 
but  the  essence  of  the  thing  in  question  (III.  vii.), 
which,  in  so  far  as  it  exists  such  as  it  is,  is  conceived  to 
have  force  for  continuing  in  existence  (III.  vi.)  and 
doing  such  things  as  necessarily  follow  from  its  given 
nature  (see  the  Def.  of  Appetite,  III.  ix.  note).  But 
the  essence  of  reason  is  naught  else  but  our  mind,  in 
so  far  as  it  clearly  and  distinctly  understands  (see  the 
definition  in  II.  xl.  note  ii. ) ; therefore  (II.  xl.)  whatso- 
ever we  endeavor  in  obedience  to  reason  is  nothing  else 
but  to  understand.  Again,  since  this  effort  of  the  mind 
wherewith  the  mind  endeavors,  in  so  far  as  it  reasons, 
to  preserve  its  own  being  is  nothing  else  but  under- 
standing; this  effort  at  understanding  is  (IV.  xxii. 
Coroll.)  the  first  and  single  basis  of  virtue,  nor  shall  we 
endeavor  to  understand  things  for  the  sake  of  any 
ulterior  object  (IV.  xxv.);  on  the  other  hand,  the  mind, 
in  so  far  as  it  reasons,  will  not  be  able  to  conceive  any 
good  for  itself,  save  such  things  as  are  conducive  to 
understanding. 

Prop.  XXVII.  We  know  nothing  to  be  certainly  good 
or  evil,  save  such  things  as  really  conduce  to  understand- 
ing, or  such  as  are  able  to  hinder  us  from  understanding. 

Proof. — The  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  reasons,  desires  nothing 
beyond  understanding,  and  judges  nothing  to  be  useful 
to  itself,  save  such  things  as  conduce  to  understanding 
(by  the  foregoing  Prop.).  But  the  mind  (II.  xli.  xliii. 
and  note)  cannot  possess  certainty  concerning  anything, 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


209 


except  in  so  far  as  it  has  adequate  ideas,  or  ( what  by  II. 
xl.  note,  is  the  same  thing)  in  so  far  as  it  reasons. 
Therefore  we  know  nothing  to  be  good  or  evil  save  such 
things  as  really  conduce,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXVIII.  The  mind’s  highest  good  is  the  knowl- 
edge of  God,  and  the  mind’s  highest  virtue  is  to  know 
God. 

Proof. — The  mind  is  not  capable  of  understanding  any- 
thing higher  than  God,  that  is  (I.  Def.  vi.),  than  a Being 
absolutely  infinite,  and  without  which  (I.  xv.)  nothing 
can  either  be  or  be  conceived;  therefore  (IV.  xxvi.  and 
xxvii.),  the  mind’s  highest  utility  or  (IV.  Def.  i.)  good 
is  the  knowledge  of  God.  Again,  the  mind  is  active  only 
in  so  far  as  it  understands,  and  only  to  the  same  extent 
can  it  be  said  absolutely  to  act  virtuously.  The  mind’s 
absolute  virtue  is  therefore  to  understand.  Now,  as  we 
have  already  shown,  the  highest  that  the  mind  can  under- 
stand is  God ; therefore  the  highest  virtue  of  the  mind  is 
to  understand  or  to  know  God.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXIX.  No  individual  thing,  which  is  entirely 
different  from  our  own  nature,  can  help  or  check  our 
power  of  activity,  and  absolutely  nothing  can  do  us  good 
or  harm,  unless  it  has  something  in  common  with  our 
nature. 

Proof. — The  power  of  every  individual  thing,  and  con- 
sequently the  power  of  man,  whereby  he  exists  and 
operates,  can  only  be  determined  by  an  individual  thing 
(I.  xxviii.),  whose  nature  (II.  vi.)  must  be  understood 
through  the  same  nature  as  that,  through  which  human 
nature  is  conceived.  Therefore  our  power  of  activity, 
however  it  be  conceived,  can  be  determined  and  conse- 
quently helped  or  hindered  by  the  power  of  any  other 
individual  thing,  which  has  something  in  common  with 
us,  but  not  by  the  power  of  anything,  of  which  the 
nature  is  entirely  different  from  our  own;  and  since  we 
call  good  or  evil  that  which  is  the  cause  of  pleasure  or 
pain  (IV.  viii.),  that  is  (III.  xi.  note),  which  increases 
or  diminishes,  helps  or  hinders,  our  power  of  activity; 
therefore,  that  which  is  entirely  different  from  our 
nature  can  neither  be  to  us  good  nor  bad.  Q.  E.  D. 

14 


210 


THE  ETHICS 


Prop.  XXX.  A thing  cannot  be  bad  for  us  through 
the  quality  which  it  has  in  common  with  our  nature, 
but  it  is  bad  for  us  in  so  far  as  it  is  contrary  to  our 
nature. 

Proof. — We  call  a thing  bad  when  it  is  the  cause  of 
pain  (IV.  viii.),  that  is  (by  the  Def.,  which  see  in  III. 
xi.  note),  when  it  diminishes  or  checks  our  power  of  action. 
Therefore,  if  anything  were  bad  for  us  through  that 
quality  which  it  has  in  common  with  our  nature,  it 
would  be  able  itself  to  diminish  or  check  that  which  it 
has  in  common  with  our  nature,  which  ( III.  iv.)  is  ab- 
surd. Wherefore  nothing  can  be  bad  for  us  through 
that  quality  which  it  has  in  common  with  us,  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  in  so  far  as  it  is  bad  for  us,  that  is  (as 
we  have  just  shown),  in  so  far  as  it  can  diminish 
or  check  our  power  of  action,  it  is  contrary  to  our  nature. 
Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXI.  In  so  far  as  a thing  is  in  harmony  with 
our  nature,  it  is  necessarily  good. 

Proof. — In  so  far  as  a thing  is  in  harmony  with  our 
nature,  it  cannot  be  bad  for  it.  It  will  therefore  neces- 
sarily be  either  good  or  indifferent.  If  it  be  assumed 
that  it  be  neither  good  nor  bad,  nothing  will  follow  from 
its  nature  (IV.  Def.  i. ),  which  tends  to  the  preservation 
of  our  nature,  that  is  (by  the  hypothesis),  which  tends 
to  the  preservation  of  the  thing  itself;  but  this  (III.  vi.) 
is  absurd;  therefore,  in  so  far  as  a thing  is  in  harmony 
with  our  nature,  it  is  necessarily  good.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — Hence  it  follows,  that,  in  proportion  as  a 
thing  is  in  harmony  with  our  nature,  so  is  it  more  use- 
ful or  better  for  us,  and  vice  versd,  in  proportion  as  a 
thing  is  more  useful  for  us,  so  is  it  more  in  harmony 
with  our  nature.  For,  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  in  harmony 
with  our  nature,  it  will  necessarily  be  different  there- 
from or  contrary  thereto.  If  different,  it  can  neither  be 
good  nor  bad  (IV.  xxix.);  if  contrary,  it  will  be  con- 
trary to  that  which  is  in  harmony  with  our  nature,  that 
is,  contrary  to  what  is  good  — in  short,  bad.  Nothing, 
therefore,  can  be  good,  except  in  so  far  as  it  is  in  har- 
mony with  our  nature;  and  hence  a thing  is  useful,  in 


OP  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


21 1 


proportion  as  it  is  in  harmony  with  our  nature,  and  vice 
versd.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXII.  In  so  far  as  men  are  a prey  to  passion, 
they  cannot,  in  that  respect,  be  said  to  be  naturally  in 
harmony. 

Proof. — Things,  which  are  said  to  be  in  harmony 
naturally,  are  understood  to  agree  in  power  (III.  vii.), 
not  in  want  of  power  or  negation,  and  consequently 
not  in  passion  ( III.  iii.  note) ; wherefore  men,  in  so  far 
as  they  are  a prey  to  their  passions,  cannot  be  said  to 
be  naturally  in  harmony.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — This  is  also  self-evident;  for,  if  we  say  that 
white  and  black  agree  only  in  the  fact  that  neither  is 
red,  we  absolutely  affirm  that  they  do  not  agree  in  any 
respect.  So,  if  we  say  that  a man  and  a stone  agree 
only  in  the  fact  that  both  are  finite  — wanting  in  power, 
not  existing  by  the  necessity  of  their  own  nature,  or, 
lastly,  indefinitely  surpassed  by  the  power  of  external 
causes  — we  should  certainly  affirm  that  a man  and  a stone 
are  in  no  respect  alike;  therefore,  things  which  agree 
only  in  negation,  or  in  qualities  which  neither  pos- 
sess, really  agree  in  no  respect. 

Prop.  XXXIII.  Men  can  differ  in  nature,  in  so  far  as 
they  are  assailed  by  those  emotions,  wdiich  are  passions, 
or  passive  states;  and  to  this  extent  one  and  the  same 
man  is  variable  and  inconstant. 

Proof. — The  nature  or  essence  of  the  emotions  cannot 
be  explained  solely  through  our  essence  or  nature  (III. 
Def.  i.  ii.),  but  it  must  be  defined  by  the  power,  that 
is  (III.  vii.),  by  the  nature  of  external  causes  in  com- 
parison with  our  own;  hence  it  follows,  that  there  are 
as  many  kinds  of  each  emotion  as  there  are  external 
objects  whereby  we  are  affected  (III.  lvi.),  and  that  men 
may  be  differently  affected  by  one  and  the  same  object 
(III.  li.),  and  to  this  extent  differ  in  nature;  lastly,  that 
one  and  the  same  man  may  be  differently  affected  toward 
the  same  object,  and  may  therefore  be  variable  and  in- 
constant. Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXIV.  In  so  far  as  men  are  assailed  by  emotions 
which  are  passions,  they  can  be  contrary  one  to  another. 


212 


THE  ETHICS 


Proof. — A man,  for  instance  Peter,  can  be  the  cause 
of  Paul’s  feeling  pain,  because  he  (Peter)  possesses 
something  similar  to  that  which  Paul  hates  (III.  xvi.), 
or  because  Peter  has  sole  possession  of  a thing  which 
Paul  also  loves  (III.  xxxii.  and  note),  or  for  other  causes 
(of  which  the  chief  are  enumerated  in  III.  lv.  note) ; it 
may  therefore  happen  that  Paul  should  hate  Peter  (Def. 
of  Emotions,  vii.),  consequently  it  may  easily  happen 
also,  that  Peter  should  hate  Paul  in  return,  and  that  each 
should  endeavor  to  do  the  other  an  injury  (III.  xxxix.), 
that  is  (IV.  xxx.),  that  they  should  be  contrary  one  to 
another.  But  the  emotion  of  pain  is  always  a passion 
or  passive  state  (III.  lix.);  hence  men,  in  so  far  as  they 
are  assailed  by  emotions  which  are  passions,  can  be  con- 
trary one  to  another.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — I said  that  Paul  may  hate  Peter,  because  he 
conceives  that  Peter  possesses  something  which  he  ( Paul ) 
also  loves;  from  this  it  seems  at  first  sight,  to  follow, 
that  these  two  men,  through  both  loving  the  same  thing, 
and,  consequently,  through  agreement  of  their  respective 
natures,  stand  in  one  another’s  way;  if  this  were  so, 
Props,  xxx.  and  xxxi.  of  this  Part  would  be  untrue.  But 
if  we  give  the  matter  our  unbiased  attention,  we  shall 
see  that  the  discrepancy  vanishes.  For  the  two  men  are 
not  in  one  another’s  way  in  virtue  of  the  agreement  of 
their  natures,  that  is,  through  both  loving  the  same  thing, 
but  in  virtue  of  one  differing  from  the  other.  For,  in  so 
far  as  each  loves  the  same  thing,  the  love  of  each  is 
fostered  thereby  (III.  xxxi.)  that  is  (Def.  of  the  Emo- 
tions, vi.)  the  pleasure  of  each  is  fostered  thereby. 
Wherefore  it  is  far  from  being  the  case,  that  they  are 
at  variance  through  both  loving  the  same  thing,  and 
through  the  agreement  in  their  natures.  The  cause  for 
their  opposition  lies,  as  I have  said,  solely  in  the  fact 
that  they  are  assumed  to  differ.  For  we  assume  that 
Peter  has  the  idea  of  the  loved  object  as  already  in  his 
possession,  while  Paul  has  the  idea  of  the  loved  object 
as  lost.  Hence  the  one  man  will  be  affected  with  pleas- 
ure, the  other  will  be  affected  with  pain,  and  thus  they 
will  be  at  variance  one  with  another.  We  can  easily 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


213 


show  in  like  manner,  that  all  other  causes  of  hatred  de- 
pend solely  on  differences,  and  not  on  the  agreement 
between  men’s  natures. 

Prop.  XXXV.  In  so  far  only  as  men  live  in  obedience 
to  reason,  do  they  always  necessarily  agree  in  nature. 

Proof. — In  so  far  as  men  are  assailed  by  emotions  that 
are  passions,  they  can  be  different  in  nature  (IV.  xxxiii.), 
and  at  variance  one  with  another.  But  men  are  only 
said  to  be  active,  in  so  far  as  they  act  in  obedience  to 
reason  (III.  iii.) ; therefore,  whatsoever  follows  from 
human  nature  in  so  far  as  it  is  defined  by  reason  must 
(III.  Def.  ii.)  be  understood  solely  through  human  nature 
as  its  proximate  cause.  But,  since  every  man  by  the 
laws  of  his  nature  desires  that  which  he  deems  good, 
and  endeavors  to  remove  that  which  he  deems  bad 
(IV.  xix.);  and  further,  since  that  which  we,  in  accord- 
ance with  reason,  deem  good  or  bad,  necessarily  is  good 
or  bad  (II.  xli.);  it  follows  that  men,  in  so  far  as  they 
live  in  obedience  to  reason,  necessarily  do  only  such 
things  as  are  necessarily  good  for  human  nature,  and 
consequently  for  each  individual  man  (IV.  xxxi.  Coroll.); 
in  other  words,  such  things  as  are  in  harmony  with 
each  man’s  nature.  Therefore,  men  in  so  far  as  they 
live  in  obedience  to  reason,  necessarily  live  always  in 
harmony  one  with  another.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary  I.  — There  is  no  individual  thing  in  nature, 
which  is  more  useful  to  man,  than  a man  who  lives  in 
obedience  to  reason.  For  that  thing  is  to  man  most 
useful,  which  is  most  in  harmony  with  his  nature  ( IV. 
xxxi.  Coroll.);  that  is,  obviously,  man.  But  man  acts 
absolutely  according  to  the  laws  of  his  nature,  when  he 
lives  in  obedience  to  reason  (III.  Def.  ii.),  and  to  this 
extent  only  is  always  necessarily  in  harmony  with  the 
nature  of  another  man  (by  the  last  Prop.);  wherefore 
among  individual  things  nothing  is  more  useful  to  man, 
than  a man  who  lives  in  obedience  to  reason.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary  II. — As  every  man  seeks  most  that  which  is 
useful  to  him,  so  are  men  most  useful  one  to  another. 
For  the  more  a man  seeks  what  is  useful  to  him  and 
endeavors  to  preserve  himself,  the  more  is  he  endowed 


214 


THE  ETHICS 


with  virtue  (IV.  xx.),  or,  what  is  the  same  thing  (IV. 
Def.  viii.),  the  more  is  he  endowed  with  power  to  act 
according  to  the  laws  of  his  own  nature,  that  is  to  live  in 
obedience  to  reason.  But  men  are  most  in  natural  har- 
mony, when  they  live  in  obedience  to  reason  ( by  the  last 
Prop.);  therefore  (by  the  foregoing  Coroll.)  men  will  be 
most  useful  one  to  another,  when  each  seeks  most  that 
which  is  useful  to  him.  Q.  E.D. 

Note. — What  we  have  just  shown  is  attested  by  expe- 
rience so  conspicuously,  that  it  is  in  the  mouth  of  nearly 
everyone:  (<  Man  is  to  man  a God.”  Yet  it  rarely  hap- 

pens that  men  live  in  obedience  to  reason,  for  things  are 
so  ordered  among  them,  that  they  are  generally  envious 
and  troublesome  one  to  another.  Nevertheless  they  are 
scarcely  able  to  lead  a solitary  life,  so  that  the  definition 
of  man  as  a social  animal  has  met  with  general  assent; 
in  fact,  men  do  derive  from  social  life  much  more  con- 
venience than  injury.  Let  satirists  then  laugh  their  fill 
at  human  affairs,  let  theologians  rail,  and  let  misan- 
thropes praise  to  their  utmost  the  life  of  untutored 
rusticity,  let  them  heap  contempt  on  men  and  praises 
on  beasts;  when  all  is  said,  they  will  find  that  men  can 
provide  for  their  wants  much  more  easily  by  mutual 
help,  and  that  only  by  uniting  their  forces  can  they 
escape  from  the  dangers  that  on  every  side  beset  them: 
not  to  say  how  much  more  excellent  and  worthy  of  our 
knowledge  it  is,  to  study  the  actions  of  men  than  the 
actions  of  beasts.  But  I will  treat  of  this  more  at  length 
elsewhere. 

Prop.  XXXVI.  The  highest  good  of  those  who  follow 
virtue  is  common  to  all,  and  therefore  all  can  equally 
rejoice  therein. 

Proof.  — To  act  virtuously  is  to  act  in  obedience  with 
reason  (IV.  xxiv.),  and  whatsoever  we  endeavor  to  do  in 
obedience  to  reason  is  to  understand  (IV.  xxvi.);  there- 
fore (IV.  xxviii.)  the  highest  good  for  those  who  follow 
after  virtue  is  to  know  God;  that  is  (II.  xlvii.  and  note) 
a good  which  is  common  to  all  and  can  be  possessed  by 
all  men  equally,  in  so  far  as  they  are  of  the  same  nature. 
Q.E.D. 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


215 


Note. — Some  one  may  ask  how  it  would  be,  if  the  high- 
est good  of  those  who  follow  after  virtue  were  not  com- 
mon to  all  ? Would  it  not  then  follow,  as  above  (IV. 
xxxiv.),  that  men  living  in  obedience  to  reason,  that  is  (IV. 
xxxv.),  men  in  so  far  as  they  agree  in  nature,  would  be 
at  variance  one  with  another  ? To  such  an  inquiry  I 
make  answer,  that  it  follows  not  accidentally  but  from 
the  very  nature  of  reason,  that  man’s  highest  good  is 
common  to  all,  inasmuch  as  it  is  deduced  from  the  very 
essence  of  man,  in  so  far  as  defined  by  reason ; and  that 
a man  could  neither  be,  nor  be  conceived  without  the 
power  of  taking  pleasure  in  this  highest  good.  For  it 
belongs  to  the  essence  of  the  human  mind  (II.  xlvii.),  to 
have  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  eternal  and  infinite 
essence  of  God. 

Prop.  XXXVII.  The  good  which  every  man,  who  fol- 
lows after  virtue,  desires  for  himself  he  will  also  desire 
for  other  men,  and  so  much  the  more,  in  proportion  as 
he  has  a greater  knowledge  of  God. 

Proof.  — Men,  in  so  far  as  they  live  in  obedience  to 
reason,  are  most  useful  to  their  fellow  men  (IV.  xxxv., 
Coroll,  i.);  therefore  (IV.  xix.),  we  shall  in  obedience  to 
reason  necessarily  endeavor  to  bring  about  that  men 
should  live  in  obedience  to  reason.  But  the  good  which 
every  man,  in  so  far  as  he  is  guided  by  reason,  or,  in 
other  words,  follows  after  virtue,  desires  for  himself,  is 
to  understand  (IV.  xxvi.);  wherefore  the  good,  which 
each  follower  of  virtue  seeks  for  himself,  he  will  desire 
also  for  others.  Again,  desire,  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred 
to  the  mind,  is  the  very  essence  of  the  mind  (Def.  of  the 
Emotions,  i.);  now  the  essence  of  the  mind  consists  in 
knowledge  (II.  xi.),  which  involves  the  knowledge  of  God 
(II.  xlvii.)  and  without  it  (I.  xv.),  can  neither  be,  nor 
be  conceived;  therefore,  in  proportion  as  the  mind’s 
essence  involves  a greater  knowledge  of  God,  so  also 
will  be  greater  the  desire  of  the  follower  of  virtue,  that 
other  men  should  possess  that  which  he  seeks  as  good  for 
himself.  Q.  E.  D. 

Another  Proof. — The  good,  which  a man  desires  for  him- 
self and  loves,  he  will  love  more  constantly,  if  he  sees  that 


THE  ETHICS 


216 

others  love  it  also  (III.  xxxi.);  he  will  therefore  endeavor 
that  others  should  love  it  also ; and  as  the  good  in  question 
is  common  to  all,  and  therefore  all  can  rejoice  therein,  he 
will  endeavor,  for  the  same  reason,  to  bring  about  that 
all  should  rejoice  therein,  and  this  he  will  do  the  more 
(III.  xxxvii.),  in  proportion  as  his  own  enjoyment  of  the 
good  is  greater. 

Note  I. — He  who,  guided  by  emotion  only,  endeavors  to 
cause  others  to  love  what  he  loves  himself,  and  to  make 
the  rest  of  the  world  live  according  to  his  own  fancy,  acts 
solely  by  impulse,  and  is,  therefore,  hateful,  especially  to 
those  who  take  delight  in  something  different,  and  accord- 
ingly study  and,  by  similar  impulse,  endeavor  to  make 
men  live  in  accordance  with  what  pleases  themselves. 
Again,  as  the  highest  good  sought  by  men  under  the 
guidance  of  emotion  is  often  such,  that  it  can  only  be 
possessed  by  a single  individual,  it  follows  that  those  who 
love  it  are  not  consistent  in  their  intentions,  but,  while  they 
delight  to  sing  its  praises,  fear  to  be  believed.  But  he,  who 
endeavors  to  lead  men  by  reason,  does  not  act  by  impulse 
but  courteously  and  kindly,  and  his  intention  is  always 
consistent.  Again,  whatsoever  we  desire  and  do,  whereof 
we  are  the  cause  in  so  far  as  we  possess  the  idea  of  God,  or 
know  God,  I set  down  to  religion.  The  desire  of  well- 
doing, which  is  engendered  by  a life  according  to  reason,  I 
call  piety.  Further,  the  desire,  whereby  a man  living 
according  to  reason  is  bound  to  associate  others  with  him- 
self in  friendship,  I call  honor;  by  honorable  I mean  that 
which  is  praised  by  men  living  according  to  reason,  and  by 
base  I mean  that  which  is  repugnant  to  the  gaining  of 
friendship.  I have  also  shown  in  addition  what  are  the 
foundations  of  a state;  and  the  difference  between  true 
virtue  and  infirmity  may  be  readily  gathered  from  what  I 
have  said;  namely,  that  true  virtue  is  nothing  else  but 
living  in  accordance  with  reason ; while  infirmity  is  noth- 
ing else  but  man’s  allowing  himself  to  be  led  by  things 
which  are  external  to  himself,  and  to  be  by  them  deter- 
mined to  act  in  a manner  demanded  by  the  general  dis- 
position of  things  rather  than  by  his  own  nature  considered 
solely  in  itself. 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


2i  7 


Such  are  the  matters  which  I engaged  to  prove  in  Prop, 
xviii.  of  this  Part,  whereby  it  is  plain  that  the  law  against 
the  slaughtering  of  animals  is  founded  rather  on  vain 
superstition  and  womanish  pity  than  on  sound  reason. 
The  rational  quest  of  what  is  useful  to  us  further  teaches 
us  the  necessity  of  associating  ourselves  with  our  fellow- 
men,  but  not  with  beasts,  or  things,  whose  nature  is 
different  from  our  own ; we  have  the  same  rights  in  respect 
to  them  as  they  have  in  respect  to  us.  Nay,  as  every- 
one’s right  is  defined  by  his  virtue,  or  power,  men  have 
far  greater  rights  over  beasts  than  beasts  have  over  men. 
Still  I no  not  deny  that  beasts  feel:  what  I deny  is,  that 
we  may  not  consult  our  own  advantage  and  use  them  as 
we  please,  treating  them  in  the  way  which  best  suits  us ; 
for  their  nature  is  not  like  ours,  and  their  emotions  are 
naturally  different  from  human  emotions  (III.  lvii.  note). 
It  remains  for  me  to  explain  what  I mean  by  just  and 
unjust,  sin  and  merit.  On  these  points  see  the  following 
note. 

Note  II. — In  the  Appendix  to  Part  I.  I undertook  to 
explain  praise  and  blame,  merit  and  sin,  justice  and  in- 
justice. 

Concerning  praise  and  blame  I have  spoken  in  III. 
xxix.  note;  the  time  has  now  come  to  treat  of  the  re- 
maining terms.  But  I must  first  say  a few  words  con- 
cerning man  in  the  state  of  nature  and  in  society. 

Even  man  exists  by  sovereign  natural  right,  and,  con- 
sequently, by  sovereign  natural  right  performs  those 
actions  which  follow  from  the  necessity  of  his  own  nature ; 
therefore  by  sovereign  natural  right  every  man  judges 
what  is  good  and  what  is  bad,  takes  care  of  his  own  ad- 
vantage according  to  his  own  disposition  ( IV.  xix.  and 
xx.),  avenges  the  wrongs  done  to  him  (III.  xl.  Coroll.  ii. ), 
and  endeavors  to  preserve  that  which  he  loves  and  to 
destroy  that  which  he  hates  (III.  xxviii.).  Now,  if  men 
lived  under  the  guidance  of  reason,  everyone  would  re- 
main in  possession  of  this  his  right,  without  any  injury 
being  done  to  his  neighbor  (IV.  xxxv.  Coroll.  i.).  But 
seeing  that  they  are  a prey  to  their  emotions,  which  far 
surpass  human  power  or  virtue  (IV.  vi.),  they  are  often 


2l8 


THE  ETHICS 


drawn  in  different  directions,  and  being  at  variance  one 
with  another  (IV.  xxxiii.  xxxiv.),  stand  in  need  of  mutual 
help  (IV.  xxxv.  note).  Wherefore,  in  order  that  men 
may  live  together  in  harmony,  and  may  aid  one  another, 
it  is  necessary  that  they  should  forego  their  natural  right, 
and,  for  the  sake  of  security,  refrain  from  all  actions 
which  can  injure  their  fellow-men.  The  way  in  which 
this  end  can  be  attained,  so  that  men  who  are  necessarily 
a prey  to  their  emotions  (IV.  iv.  Coroll.),  inconstant,  and 
diverse,  should  be  able  to  render  each  other  mutually 
secure,  and  feel  mutual  trust,  is  evident  from  IV.  vii. 
and  III.  xxxix.  It  is  there  shown,  that  an  emotion  can 
only  be  restrained  by  an  emotion  stronger  than,  and 
contrary  to  itself,  and  that  men  avoid  inflicting  injury 
through  fear  of  incurring  a greater  injury  themselves. 

On  this  law  society  can  be  established,  so  long  as  it 
keeps  in  its  own  hand  the  right,  possessed  by  everyone, 
of  avenging  injury,  and  pronouncing  on  good  and  evil; 
and  provided  it  also  possesses  the  power  to  lay  down  a 
general  rule  of  conduct,  and  to  pass  laws  sanctioned,  not  by 
reason,  which  is  powerless  in  restraining  emotion,  but  by 
threats  (IV.  xvii.  note).  Such  a society  established  with 
laws  and  the  power  of  preserving  itself  is  called  a State, 
while  those  who  live  under  its  protection  are  called  citi- 
zens. We  may  readily  understand  that  there  is  in  the 
state  of  nature  nothing,  which  by  universal  consent  is 
pronounced  good  or  bad;  for  in  the  state  of  nature  every 
one  thinks  solely  of  his  own  advantage,  and  according 
to  his  disposition,  with  reference  only  to  his  individual 
advantage,  decides  what  is  good  or  bad,  being  bound  by 
no  law  to  anyone  besides  himself. 

In  the  state  of  nature,  therefore,  sin  is  inconceivable; 
it  can  only  exist  in  a state,  where  good  and  evil  are  pro- 
nounced on  by  common  consent,  and  where  everyone  is 
bound  to  obey  the  State  authority.  Sin,  then,  is  nothing 
else  but  disobedience,  which  is  therefore  punished  by  the 
right  of  the  State  only.  Obedience,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
set  down  as  merit,  inasmuch  as  a man  is  thought  worthy 
of  merit,  if  he  takes  delight  in  the  advantages  which  a 
State  provides. 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


219 


Again,  in  the  state  of  nature,  no  one  is  by  common  con- 
sent master  of  anything,  nor  is  there  anything  in  nature, 
which  can  be  said  to  belong  to  one  man  rather  than  an- 
other: all  things  are  common  to  all.  Hence,  in  the  state 
of  nature,  we  can  conceive  no  wish  to  render  to  every 
man  his  own,  or  to  deprive  a man  of  that  which  belongs 
to  him;  in  other  words,  there  is  nothing  in  the  state  of 
nature  answering  to  justice  and  injustice.  Such  ideas  are 
only  possible  in  a social  state,  when  it  is  decreed  by 
common  consent  what  belongs  to  one  man  and  what  to 
another. 

From  all  these  considerations  it  is  evident,  that  justice 
and  injustice,  sin  and  merit,  are  extrinsic  ideas,  and  not 
attributes  which  display  the  nature  of  the  mind.  But  I 
have  said  enough. 

Prop.  XXXVIII.  Whatsoever  disposes  the  human  body, 
so  as  to  render  it  capable  of  being  affected  in  an  increased 
number  of  ways,  or  of  affecting  external  bodies  in  an  in- 
creased number  of  ways,  is  useful  to  man;  and  is  so,  in 
proportion  as  the  body  is  thereby  rendered  more  capable 
of  being  affected  or  affecting  other  bodies  in  an  increased 
number  of  ways;  contrariwise,  whatsoever  renders  the 
body  less  capable  in  this  respect  is  hurtful  to  man. 

Proof.  — Whatsoever  thus  increases  the  capabilities  of 
the  body  increases  also  the  mind’s  capability  of  percep- 
tion ( II.  xiv. ) ; therefore,  whatsoever  thus  disposes  the 
body  and  thus  renders  it  capable,  is  necessarily  good  or 
useful  ( IV.  xxvi.  xxvii. ) ; and  is  so  in  proportion  to  the 
extent  to  which  it  can  render  the  body  capable;  contrari- 
wise (II.  xiv.,  IV.  xxvi.  xxvii.),  it  is  hurtful,  if  it  ren- 
ders the  body  in  this  respect  less  capable.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXXIX.  Whatsoever  brings  about  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  proportion  of  motion  and  rest,  which  the  parts 
of  the  human  body  mutually  possess,  is  good;  contrari- 
wise, whatsoever  causes  a change  in  such  proportion  is 
bad. 

Proof.  — The  human  body  needs  many  other  bodies  for 
its  preservation  ( II.  Post.  iv. ).  But  that  which  consti- 
tutes the  specific  reality  {forma)  of  a human  body  is, 
that  its  parts  communicate  their  several  motions  one  to 


220 


THE  ETHICS 


another  in  a certain  fixed  proportion  ( Def.  before  Lemma 
iv.  after  II.  xiii.  ).  Therefore,  whatsoever  brings  about 
the  preservation  of  the  proportion  between  motion  and 
rest,  which  the  parts  of  the  human  body  mutually  pos- 
sess, preserves  the  specific  reality  of  the  human  body, 
and  consequently  renders  the  human  body  capable  of  being 
affected  in  many  ways  and  of  affecting  external  bodies  in 
many  ways;  consequently  it  is  good  (by  the  last  Prop.). 
Again,  whatsoever  brings  about  a change  in  the  aforesaid 
proportion  causes  the  human  body  to  assume  another 
specific  character,  in  other  words  ( see  Preface  to  this 
Part  toward  the  end,  though  the  point  is  indeed  self- 
evident),  to  be  destroyed,  and  consequently  totally  incapa- 
ble of  being  affected  in  an  increased  number  of  ways; 
therefore  it  is  bad.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — The  extent  to  which  such  causes  can  injure  or 
be  of  service  to  the  mind  will  be  explained  in  the  Fifth 
Part.  But  I would  here  remark  that  I consider  that  a body 
undergoes  death,  when  the  proportion  of  motion  and  rest 
which  obtained  mutually  among  its  several  parts  is  changed. 
For  I do  not  venture  to  deny  that  a human  body,  while 
keeping  the  circulation  of  the  blood  and  other  properties, 
wherein  the  life  of  the  body  is  thought  to  consist,  may 
none  the  less  be  changed  into  another  nature  totally  differ- 
ent from  its  own.  There  is  no  reason,  which  compels  me 
to  maintain  that  a body  does  not  die,  unless  it  becomes  a 
corpse ; nay,  experience  would  seem  to  point  to  the  oppo- 
site conclusion.  It  sometimes  happens,  that  a man  under- 
goes such  changes,  that  I could  hardly  call  him  the  same. 
As  I have  heard  tell  of  a certain  Spanish  poet,  who  had 
been  seized  with  sickness,  and  though  he  recovered  there- 
from yet  remained  so  oblivious  of  his  past  life,  that  he 
would  not  believe  the  plays  and  tragedies  he  had  writ- 
ten to  be  his  own:  indeed,  he  might  have  been  taken 
for  a grown-up  child,  if  he  had  also  forgotten  his  native 
tongue.  If  this  instance  seems  incredible,  what  shall  we 
say  of  infants  ? A man  of  ripe  age  deems  their  nature 
so  unlike  his  own,  that  he  can  only  be  persuaded  that  he  too 
has  been  an  infant  by  the  analogy  of  other  men.  How- 
ever, I prefer  to  leave  such  questions  undiscussed,  lest  I 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


221 


should  give  ground  to  the  superstitious  for  raising  new 
issues. 

Prop.  XL.  Whatsoever  conduces  to  man’s  social  life,  or 
causes  men  to  live  together  in  harmony,  is  useful,  whereas 
whatsoever  brings  discord  into  a State  is  bad. 

Proof. — For  whatsoever  causes  men  to  live  together  in 
harmony  also  causes  them  to  live  according  to  reason 
(IV.  xxxv.),  and  is  therefore  (IV.  xxvi.  and  xxvii.)  good, 
and  ( for  the  same  reason ) whatsoever  brings  about  discord 
is  bad.  Q.  E.D. 

Prop.  XLI.  Pleasure  in  itself  is  not  bad  but  good:  con- 
trariwise, pain  in  itself  is  bad. 

Proof. — Pleasure  ( III.  xi.  and  note)  is  emotion,  whereby 
the  body’s  power  of  activity  is  increased  or  helped;  pain 
is  emotion,  whereby  the  body’s  power  of  activity  is  di- 
minished or  checked;  therefore  (IV.  xxxviii.)  pleasure  in 
itself  is  good,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XLII.  Mirth  cannot  be  excessive,  but  is  always 
good;  contrariwise,  Melancholy  is  always  bad. 

Proof. — Mirth  (see  its  Def.  in  III.  xi.  note)  is  pleas- 
ure, which,  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred  to  the  body,  con- 
sists in  all  parts  of  the  body  being  affected  equally:  that 
is  (III.  xi.),  the  body’s  power  of  activity  is  increased 
or  aided  in  such  a manner,  that  the  several  parts  main- 
tain their  former  proportion  of  motion  and  rest;  there- 
fore Mirth  is  always  good  (IV.  xxxix.),  and  cannot  be 
excessive.  But  Melancholy  (see  its  Def.  in  the  same 
note  to  III.  xi.)  is  pain,  which,  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred 
to  the  body,  consists  in  the  absolute  decrease  or  hind- 
rance of  the  body’s  power  of  activity;  therefore  (IV. 
xxxviii.)  it  is  always  bad.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XLIII.  Stimulation  may  be  excessive  and  bad; 
on  the  other  hand,  grief  may  be  good,  in  so  far  as  stim- 
ulation or  pleasure  is  bad. 

Proof. — Localized  pleasure  or  stimulation  ( titillatio ) is 
pleasure,  which,  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred  to  the  body, 
consists  in  one  or  some  of  its  parts  being  affected  more 
than  the  rest  (see  its  Def.,  III.  xi.  note);  the  power 
of  this  emotion  may  be  sufficient  to  overcome  other 
actions  of  the  body  (IV.  vi.),  and  may  remain  obsti 


222 


THE  ETHICS 


nately  fixed  therein,  thus  rendering  it  incapable  of  being 
affected  in  a variety  of  other  ways : therefore  (IV.  xxxviii. ) 
it  may  be  bad.  Again,  grief,  which  is  pain,  cannot  as 
such  be  good  (IV.  xli.).  But,  as  its  force  and  increase 
is  defined  by  the  power  of  an  external  cause  compared 
with  our  own  (IV.  v.),  we  can  conceive  infinite  degrees 
and  modes  of  strength  in  this  emotion  (IV.  iii. ) ; we  can, 
therefore,  conceive  it  as  capable  of  restraining  stimula- 
tion, and  preventing  its  becoming  excessive,  and  hinder- 
ing the  body’s  capabilities;  thus,  to  this  extent,  it  will 
be  good.  Q.  E.  D. 

Prop.  XLIV.  Love  and  desire  may  be  excessive. 

Proof. — Love  is  pleasure,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of 
an  external  cause  (Def.  of  Emotions,  vi.);  therefore 
stimulation,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  an  external 
cause  is  love  ( III.  xi.  note) ; hence  love  may  be  exces- 
sive. Again,  the  strength  of  desire  varies  in  proportion 
to  the  emotion  from  which  it  arises  (III.  xxxvii.).  Now 
emotion  may  overcome  all  the  rest  of  men’s  actions  (IV. 
vi.);  so,  therefore,  can  desire,  which  arises  from  the 
same  emotion,  overcome  all  other  desires,  and  become 
excessive,  as  we  showed  in  the  last  proposition  concerning 
stimulation. 

Note. — Mirth,  which  I have  stated  to  be  good,  can  be 
conceived  more  easily  than  it  can  be  observed.  For  the 
emotions,  whereby  we  are  daily  assailed,  are  generally 
referred  to  some  part  of  the  body  which  is  affected  more 
than  the  rest;  hence  the  emotions  are  generally  excessive, 
and  so  fix  the  mind  in  the  contemplation  of  one  object, 
that  it  is  unable  to  think  of  others;  and  although  men, 
as  a rule,  are  a prey  to  many  emotions  — and  very  few 
are  found  who  are  always  assailed  by  one  and  the  same 
— yet  there  are  cases,  where  one  and  the  same  emotion 
remains  obstinately  fixed.  We  sometimes  see  men  so  ab- 
sorbed in  one  object,  that,  although  it  be  not  present, 
they  think  they  have  it  before  them;  when  this  is  the 
case  with  a man  who  is  not  asleep,  we  say  he  is  delirious 
or  mad ; nor  are  those  persons  who  are  inflamed  with  love, 
and  who  dream  all  night  and  all  day  about  nothing  but 
their  mistress,  or  some  woman,  considered  as  less  mad, 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


223 


for  they  are  made  objects  of  ridicule.  But  when  a miser 
thinks  of  nothing-  but  gain  or  money,  or  when  an  am- 
bitious man  thinks  of  nothing-  but  glory,  they  are  not 
reckoned  to  be  mad,  because  they  are  generally  harmful, 
and  are  thought  worthy  of  being  hated.  But,  in  reality, 
Avarice,  Ambition,  Lust,  etc.,  are  species  of  madness, 
though  they  may  not  be  reckoned  among  diseases. 

Prop.  XLV.  Hatred  can  never  be  good. 

Proof. — When  we  hate  a man,  we  endeavor  to  destroy 
him  (III.  xxxix.),  that  is  (IV.  xxxvii.),  we  endeavor  to 
do  something  that  is  bad.  Therefore,  etc.  Q.E.  D. 

N.B.  Here,  and  in  what  follows,  I mean  by  hatred 
only  hatred  toward  men. 

Corollary.  I. — Envy,  derision,  contempt,  anger,  revenge, 
and  other  emotions  attributable  to  hatred,  or  arising  there- 
from, are  bad;  this  is  evident  from  III.  xxxix.  and  IV. 
xxxvii. 

Corollary  II. — Whatsoever  we  desire  from  motives  of 
hatred  is  base,  and  in  a state  unjust.  This  also  is  evi- 
dent from  III.  xxxix.,  and  from  the  definitions  of  base- 
ness and  injustice  in  IV.  xxxvii.  note. 

Note. — Between  derision  (which  I have  in  Coroll.  I. 
stated  to  be  bad ) and  laughter  I recognize  a great  differ- 
ence. For  laughter,  as  also  jocularity,  is  merely  pleas- 
ure; therefore,  so  long  as  it  be  not  excessive,  it  is  in 
itself  good  (IV.  xli.).  Assuredly,  nothing  forbids  man  to 
enjoy  himself,  save  grim  and  gloomy  superstition.  For 
why  is  it  more  lawful  to  satiate  one’s  hunger  and  thirst 
than  to  drive  away  one’s  melancholy  ? I reason,  and  have 
convinced  myself  as  follows:  No  deity,  nor  any  one  else, 

save  the  envious,  takes  pleasure  in  my  infirmity  and  dis- 
comfort, nor  sets  down  to  my  virtue  the  tears,  sobs,  fear, 
and  the  like,  which  are  signs  of  infirmity  of  spirit;  on 
the  contrary,  the  greater  the  pleasure  wherewith  we  are 
affected,  the  greater  the  perfection  whereto  we  pass;  in 
other  words,  the  more  must  we  necessarily  partake  of 
the  divine  nature.  Therefore,  to  make  use  of  what  comes 
in  our  way,  and  to  enjoy  it  as  much  as  possible  (not  to 
the  point  of  satiety,  for  that  would  not  be  enjoyment) 
is  the  part  of  a wise  man.  I say  it  is  the  part  of  a wise 


224 


THE  ETHICS 


man  to  refresh  and  recreate  himself  with  moderate  and 
pleasant  food  and  drink,  and  also  with  perfumes,  with  the 
soft  beauty  of  growing-  plants,  with  dress,  with  music, 
with  many  sports,  with  theaters,  and  the  like,  such  as 
every  man  may  make  use  of  without  injury  to  his  neigh- 
bor. For  the  human  body  is  composed  of  very  numer- 
ous parts,  of  diverse  nature,  which  continually  stand  in 
need  of  fresh  and  varied  nourishment,  so  that  the  whole 
body  may  be  equally  capable  of  performing  all  the  actions, 
which  follow  from  the  necessity  of  its  own  nature;  and, 
consequently,  so  that  the  mind  may  also  be  equally  capa- 
ble of  understanding  many  things  simultaneously.  This 
way  of  life,  then,  agrees  best  with  our  principles,  and 
also  with  general  practice;  therefore,  if  there  be  any 
question  of  another  plan,  the  plan  we  have  mentioned 
is  the  best,  and  in  every  way  to  be  commended.  There 
is  no  need  for  me  to  set  forth  the  matter  more  clearly 
or  in  more  detail. 

Prop.  XLVI.  He  who  lives  under  the  guidance  of 
reason,  endeavors,  as  far  as  possible,  to  render  back 
love,  or  kindness,  for  other  men’s  hatred,  anger,  con- 
tempt, etc.,  toward  him. 

Proof. — All  emotions  of  hatred  are  bad  (IV.  xlv.  Cor- 
oll. i.);  therefore  he  who  lives  under  the  guidance  of 
reason  will  endeavor,  as  far  as  possible,  to  avoid  being 
assailed  by  such  emotions  (IV.  xix.);  consequently,  he 
will  also  endeavor  to  prevent  others  being  so  assailed 
(IV.  xxxvii.).  But  hatred  is  increased  by  being 
reciprocated,  and  can  be  quenched  by  love  (III.  xliii.), 
so  that  hatred  may  pass  into  love  (III.  xliv.);  there- 
fore he  who  lives  under  the  guidance  of  reason  will  en- 
deavor to  repay  hatred  with  love,  that  is,  with  kindness. 
Q.E.D. 

Note. — He  who  chooses  to  avenge  wrongs  with  hatred 
is  assuredly  wretched.  But  he,  who  strives  to  conquer 
hatred  with  love,  fights  his  battle  in  joy  and  confidence; 
he  withstands  many  as  easily  as  one,  and  has  very  little 
need  of  fortune’s  aid.  Those  whom  he  vanquishes  yield 
joyfully,  not  through  failure,  but  through  increase  in  their 
powers ; all  these  consequences  follow  so  plainly  from  the 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


225 


mere  definitions  of  love  and  understanding,  that  I have 
no  need  to  prove  them  in  detail. 

Prop.  XLVII.  Emotions  of  hope  and  fear  cannot  be  in 
themselves  good. 

Proof.  — Emotions  of  hope  and  fear  cannot  exist  with- 
out pain.  For  fear  is  pain  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  xiii.), 
and  hope  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  Explanation  xii.  and 
xiii.)  cannot  exist  without  fear;  therefore  (IV.  xli.)  these 
emotions  cannot  be  good  in  themselves,  but  only  in  so 
far  as  they  can  restrain  excessive  pleasure  (IV.  xliii.). 
Q.E.D. 

Note. — We  may  add,  that  these  emotions  show  defect- 
ive knowledge  and  an  absence  of  power  in  the  mind;  for 
the  same  reason  confidence,  despair,  joy,  and  disappoint- 
ment are  signs  of  a want  of  mental  power.  For  although 
confidence  and  joy  are  pleasurable  emotions,  they  never- 
theless imply  a preceding  pain,  namely,  hope  and  fear. 
Wherefore  the  more  we  endeavor  to  be  guided  by  reason, 
the  less  do  we  depend  on  hope ; we  endeavor  to  free  our- 
selves from  fear,  and,  as  far  as  we  can,  to  dominate 
fortune,  directing  our  actions  by  the  sure  counsels  of 
wisdom. 

Prop.  XLVIII.  The  emotions  of  over-esteem  and  dis- 
paragement are  always  bad. 

Proof. — These  emotions  (see  Def.  of  the  Emotions,  xxi. 
xxii.)  are  repugnant  to  reason;  and  are  therefore  (IV. 
xxvi.  xxvii.)  bad.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XLIX.  Over-esteem  is  apt  to  render  its  object 
proud. 

Proof. — If  we  see  that  anyone  rates  us  too  highly,  for 
love’s  sake,  we  are  apt  to  become  elated  (III  xli.),  or  to 
be  pleasurably  affected  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  xxx. ) ; the 
good  which  we  hear  of  ourselves  we  readily  believe  (III. 
xxv.);  and  therefore,  for  love’s  sake,  rate  ourselves  too 
highly;  in  other  words,  we  are  apt  to  become  proud. 
Q.E.D. 

Prop.  L.  Pity,  in  a man  who  lives  under  the  guidance 
of  reason,  is  in  itself  bad  and  useless. 

Proof. — Pity  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  xviii.)  is  a pain, 
and  therefore  (IV.  xli.)  is  in  itself  bad.  The  good  effect 
15 


226 


THE  ETHICS 


which  follows,  namely,  our  endeavor  to  free  the  object 
of  our  pity  from  misery,  is  an  action  which  we  desire  to 
do  solely  at  the  dictation  of  reason  (IV.  xxxvii.);  only 
at  the  dictation  of  reason  are  we  able  to  perform  any 
action,  which  we  know  for  certain  to  be  good  (IV.  xxvii.); 
thus,  in  a man  who  lives  under  the  guidance  of  reason, 
pity  in  itself  is  useless  and  bad.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — He  who  rightly  realizes  that  all  things  follow 
from  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature,  and  come  to  pass 
in  accordance  with  the  eternal  laws  and  rules  of  nature, 
will  not  find  anything  worthy  of  hatred,  derision,  or  con- 
tempt, nor  will  he  bestow  pity  on  anything,  but  to  the 
utmost  extent  of  human  virtue  he  will  endeavor  to  do 
well,  as  the  saying  is,  and  to  rejoice.  We  may  add,  that 
he,  who  is  easily  touched  with  compassion,  and  is  moved 
by  another’s  sorrow  or  tears,  often  does  something  which 
he  afterward  regrets;  partly  because  we  can  never  be 
sure  that  an  action  caused  by  emotion  is  good,  partly 
because  we  are  easily  deceived  by  false  tears.  I am  in 
this  place  expressly  speaking  of  a man  living  under  the 
guidance  of  reason.  He  who  is  moved  to  help  others 
neither  by  reason  nor  by  compassion,  is  rightly  styled 
inhuman,  for  (III.  xxvii.)  he  seems  unlike  a man. 

Prop.  LI.  Approval  is  not  repugnant  to  reason,  but  can 
agree  therewith  and  arise  therefrom. 

Proof. — Approval  is  love  toward  one  who  has  done 
good  to  another  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  xix.);  therefore 
it  may  be  referred  to  the  mind,  in  so  far  as  the  latter 
is  active  (III.  lix.),  that  is  (III.  iii.)  in  so  far  as  it  under- 
stands; therefore,  it  is  in  agreement  with  reason,  etc. 
Q.E.D. 

Another  Proof. — He  who  lives  under  the  guidance  of 
reason,  desires  for  others  the  good  which  he  seeks  for 
himself  (IV.  xxxvii.);  wherefore  from  seeing  someone 
doing  good  to  his  fellow  his  own  endeavor  to  do  good  is 
aided;  in  other  words  he  will  feel  pleasure  (III.  xi.  note) 
accompanied  by  the  idea  of  the  benefactor.  Therefore 
he  approves  of  him.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — Indignation  as  we  defined  it  (Def.  of  the  Emo- 
tions, xx.)  is  necessarily  evil  (IV.  xlv.);  we  may,  how- 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


22  7 


ever,  remark  that,  when  the  sovereign  power  for  the  sake 
of  preserving  peace  punishes  a citizen  who  has  injured 
another,  it  should  not  he  said  to  be  indignant  with  the 
criminal,  for  it  is  not  incited  by  hatred  to  ruin  him,  it 
is  led  by  a sense  of  duty  to  punish  him. 

Prop.  LII.  Self-approval  may  arise  from  reason,  and 
that  which  arises  from  reason  is  the  highest  possible. 

Proof. — Self-approval  is  pleasure  arising  from  a man’s 
contemplation  of  himself  and  his  own  power  of  action 
(Def.  of  the  Emotions,  xxv.).  But  a man’s  true  power 
of  action  or  virtue  is  reason  herself  (III.  iii. ),  as  the  said 
man  clearly  and  distinctly  contemplates  her  (II.  xl.  xliii.); 
therefore  self-approval  arises  from  reason.  Again,  when 
a man  is  contemplating  himself,  he  only  perceives  clearly 
and  distinctly  or  adequately,  such  things  as  follow  from 
his  power  of  action  (III.  Def.  ii.),  that  is  (III.  iii.),  from 
his  power  of  understanding;  therefore  in  such  contem- 
plation alone  does  the  highest  possible  self-approval  arise. 
Q.E.D. 

Note. — Self-approval  is  in  reality  the  highest  object  for 
which  we  can  hope.  For  (as  we  showed  in  IV.  xxv.)  no 
one  endeavors  to  preserve  his  being  for  the  sake  of  any 
ulterior  object,  and,  as  this  approval  is  more  and  more 
fostered  and  strengthened  by  praise  (III.  liii.  Coroll.),  and 
on  the  contrary  (III.  lv.  Coroll.)  is  more  and  more  dis- 
turbed by  blame,  fame  becomes  the  most  powerful  of 
incitements  to  action,  and  life  under  disgrace  is  almost 
unendurable. 

Prop.  LIII.  Humility  is  not  a virtue,  or  does  not  arise 
from  reason. 

Proof. — Humility  is  pain  arising  from  a man’s  contem- 
plation of  his  own  infirmities  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  xxvi.). 
But,  in  so  far  as  a man  knows  himself  by  true  reason,  he 
is  assumed  to  understand  his  essence,  that  is,  his  power 
( III.  vii.).  Wherefore,  if  a man  in  self-contemplation  per- ' 
ceives  any  infirmity  in  himself,  it  is  not  by  virtue  of  his 
understanding  himself,  but  (III.  lv.)  by  virtue  of  his  power 
of  activity  being  checked.  But,  if  we  assume  that  a man 
perceives  his  own  infirmity  by  virtue  of  understanding 
something  stronger  than  himself,  by  the  knowledge  of 


228 


THE  ETHICS 


which  he  determines  his  own  power  of  activity,  this  is  the 
same  as  saying  that  we  conceive  that  a man  understands 
himself  distinctly  (IV.  xxvi.),  because  his  power  of  activity 
is  aided.  Wherefore  humility,  or  the  pain  which  arises 
from  a man’s  contemplation  of  his  own  infirmity,  does  not 
arise  from  the  contemplation  or  reason,  and  is  not  a virtue 
but  a passion.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  LIV.  Repentance  is  not  a virtue,  or  does  not 
arise  from  reason;  but  he  who  repents  of  an  action  is 
doubly  wretched  or  infirm. 

Proof. — The  first  part  of  this  proposition  is  proved 
like  the  foregoing  one.  The  second  part  is  proved  from 
the  mere  definition  of  the  emotion  in  question  ( Def.  of 
the  Emotions,  xxvii.).  For  the  man  allows  himself  to 
be  overcome,  first,  by  evil  desires;  secondly,  by  pain. 

Note. — As  men  seldom  live  under  the  guidance  of 
reason,  these  two  emotions,  namely,  Humility  and  Re- 
pentance, as  also  Hope  and  Fear,  bring  more  good  than 
harm;  hence,  as  we  must  sin,  we  had  better  sin  in  that 
direction.  For,  if  all  men  who  are  a prey  to  emotion 
were  all  equally  proud,  they  would  shrink  from  noth- 
ing, and  would  fear  nothing;  how  then  could  they  be 
joined  or  linked  together  in  bonds  of  union  ? The  crowd 
plays  the  tyrant,  when  it  is  not  in  fear;  hence  we  need 
not  wonder  that  the  prophets,  who  consulted  the  good, 
not  of  a few,  but  of  all,  so  strenuously  commended  Humil- 
ity, Repentance,  and  Reverence.  Indeed,  those  who  are 
a prey  to  these  emotions  may  be  led  much  more  easily 
than  others  to  live  under  the  guidance  of  reason,  that  is, 
to  become  free  and  to  enjoy  the  life  of  the  blessed. 

Prop.  LV.  Extreme  pride  or  dejection  indicates  extreme 
ignorance  of  self. 

Proof. — This  is  evident  from  Def.  of  the  Emotions, 
xxviii.  and  xxix. 

Prop.  LVI.  Extreme  pride  or  dejection  indicates  ex- 
treme infirmity  of  spirit. 

Proof. — The  first  foundation  of  virtue  is  self-preserva- 
tion (IV.  xxii.  Coroll.)  under  the  guidance  of  reason  (IV. 
xxiv.).  He,  therefore,  who  is  ignorant  of  himself,  is 
ignorant  of  the  foundation  of  all  virtues,  and  conse- 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


229 


quently  of  all  virtues.  Again,  to  act  virtuously  is  merely 
to  act  under  the  guidance  of  reason  (IV.  xxiv.):  now  he, 
that  acts  under  the  guidance  of  reason,  must  necessarily 
know  that  he  so  acts  (II.  xliii.).  Therefore,  he  who  is 
in  extreme  ignorance  of  himself,  and  consequently  of  all 
virtues,  acts  least  in  obedience  to  virtue;  in  other  words 
(IV.  Def.  viii.),  is  most  infirm  of  spirit.  Thus  extreme 
pride  or  dejection  indicates  extreme  infirmity  of  spirit. 
Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — Hence  it  most  clearly  follows,  that  the  proud 
and  the  dejected  specially  fall  a prey  to  the  emotions. 

Note. — Yet  dejection  can  be  more  easily  corrected  than 
pride ; for  the  latter  being  a pleasurable  emotion,  and  the 
former  a painful  emotion,  the  pleasurable  is  stronger  than 
the  painful  (IV.  xviii.). 

Prop.  LVII.  The  proud  man  delights  in  the  company 
of  flatterers  and  parasites,  but  hates  the  company  of  the 
high-minded. 

Proof. — Pride  is  pleasure  arising  from  a man’s  over- 
estimation of  himself  ( Def.  of  the  Emotions,  xxviii.  and 
vi.);  this  estimation  the  proud  man  will  endeavor  to 
foster  by  all  the  means  in  his  power  (III.  xiii.  note ) ; he 
will  therefore  delight  in  the  company  of  flatterers  and 
parasites  ( whose  character  is  too  well  known  to  need 
definition  here),  and  will  avoid  the  company  of  high- 
minded  men,  who  value  him  according  to  his  deserts. 
Q.E.D. 

Note. — It  would  be  too  long  a task  to  enumerate  here 
all  the  evil  results  of  pride,  inasmuch  as  the  proud  are  a 
prey  to  all  the  emotions,  though  to  none  of  them  less 
than  to  love  and  pity.  I cannot,  however,  pass  over  in 
silence  the  fact,  that  a man  may  be  called  proud  from 
his  under-estimation  of  other  people ; and,  therefore,  pride 
in  this  sense  may  be  defined  as  pleasure  arising  from  the 
false  opinion,  whereby  a man  may  consider  himself 
superior  to  his  fellows.  The  dejection,  which  is  the 
opposite  quality  to  this  sort  of  pride,  may  be  defined  as 
pain  arising  from  the  false  opinion,  whereby  a man  may 
think  himself  inferior  to  his  fellows.  Such  being  the 
case,  we  can  easily  see  that  a proud  man  is  necessarily 


230 


THE  ETHICS 


envious  (III.  xli.  note),  and  only  takes  pleasure  in  the 
company,  who  fool  his  weak  mind  to  the  top  of  his  bent, 
and  make  him  insane  instead  of  merely  foolish. 

Though  dejection  is  the  emotion  contrary  to  pride,  yet 
is  the  dejected  man  very  near  akin  to  the  proud  man. 
For,  inasmuch  as  his  pain  arises  from  a comparison  be- 
tween his  own  infirmity  and  other  men’s  power  or  virtue, 
it  will  be  removed,  or,  in  other  words,  he  will  feel  pleas- 
ure, if  his  imagination  be  occupied  in  contemplating 
other  men’s  faults ; whence  arises  the  proverb,  <(  The  un- 
happy are  comforted  by  finding  fellow-sufferers.”  Con- 
trariwise, he  will  be  the  more  pained  in  proportion  as 
he  thinks  himself  inferior  to  others;  hence  none  are  so 
prone  to  envy  as  the  dejected,  they  are  specially  keen 
in  observing  men’s  actions,  with  a view  to  fault-finding 
rather  than  correction,  in  order  to  reserve  their  praises 
for  dejection,  and  to  glory  therein,  though  all  the  time 
with  a dejected  air.  These  effects  follow  as  necessarily 
from  the  said  emotion,  as  it  follows  from  the  nature  of 
a triangle,  that  the  three  angles  are  equal  to  two  right 
angles.  I have  already  said  that  I call  these  and  similar 
emotions  bad,  solely  in  respect  to  what  is  useful  to  man. 
The  laws  of  nature  have  regard  to  nature’s  general  or- 
der, whereof  man  is  but  a part.  I mention  this,  in  pass- 
ing, lest  any  should  think  that  I have  wished  to  set  forth 
the  faults  and  irrational  deeds  of  men  rather  than  the 
nature  and  properties  of  things.  For,  as  I said  in  the 
preface  to  the  third  Part,  I regard  human  emotions  and 
their  properties  as  on  the  same  footing  with  other  nat- 
ural phenomena.  Assuredly  human  emotions  indicate 
the  power  and  ingenuity  of  nature,  if  not  of  human 
nature,  quite  as  fully  as  other  things  which  we  admire, 
and  which  we  delight  to  contemplate.  But  I pass  on  to 
note  those  qualities  in  the  emotions,  which  bring  advan- 
tage to  man,  or  inflict  injury  upon  him. 

Prop.  LVIII.  Honor  ( gloria ) is  not  repugnant  to 
reason,  but  may  arise  therefrom. 

Proof. — This  is  evident  from  Def.  of  the  Emotions, 
xxx.,  and  also  from  the  definition  of  an  honorable  man 
(IV.  xxxvii.  note  i.). 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


231 


Note. — Empty  honor,  as  it  is  styled,  is  self -approval 
fostered  only  by  the  good  opinion  of  the  populace;  when 
this  good  opinion  ceases  there  ceases  also  the  self- 
approval, in  other  words,  the  highest  object  of  each  man’s 
love  ( IV.  lii.  note ) ; consequently  he  whose  honor  is 
rooted  in  popular  approval  must,  day  by  day,  anxiously 
strive,  act,  and  scheme  in  order  to  retain  his  reputation. 
For  the  populace  is  variable  and  inconstant,  so  that,  if  a 
reputation  be  not  kept  up,  it  quickly  withers  away. 
Everyone  wishes  to  catch  popular  applause  for  himself, 
and  readily  represses  the  fame  of  others.  The  object  of 
the  strife  being  estimated  as  the  greatest  of  all  good, 
each  combatant  is  seized  with  a fierce  desire  to  put  down 
his  rivals  in  every  possible  way,  till  he  who  at  last  comes 
out  victorious  is  more  proud  of  having  done  harm  to 
others  than  of  having  done  good  to  himself.  This  sort 
of  honor,  then,  is  really  empty,  being  nothing. 

The  points  to  note  concerning  shame  may  easily  be 
inferred  from  what  was  said  on  the  subject  of  mercy  and 
repentance.  I will  only  add  that  shame,  like  compassion, 
though  not  a virtue,  is  yet  good  in  so  far  as  it  shows  that 
the  feeler  of  shame  is  really  imbued  with  the  desire  to 
live  honorably;  in  the  same  way  as  suffering  is  good,  as 
showing  that  the  injured  part  is  not  mortified.  There- 
fore, though  a man  who  feels  shame  is  sorrowful,  he  is 
yet  more  perfect  than  he,  who  is  shameless,  and  has  no 
desire  to  live  honorably. 

Such  are  the  points  which  I undertook  to  remark  upon 
concerning  the  emotions  of  pleasure  and  pain ; as  for  the 
desires,  they  are  good  or  bad  according  as  they  spring 
from  good  or  evil  emotions.  But  all,  in  so  far  as  they 
are  engendered  in  us  by  emotions  wherein  the  mind  is 
passive,  are  blind  (as  is  evident  from  what  was  said  in 
IV.  xliv.  note),  and  would  be  useless,  if  men  could  easily 
be  induced  to  live  by  the  guidance  of  reason  only,  as  I 
will  now  briefly  show. 

Prop.  LIX.  To  all  the  actions,  whereto  we  are  deter- 
mined by  emotion  wherein  the  mind  is  passive,  we  can 
be  determined  without  emotion  by  reason. 

Proof.  — To  act  rationally  is  nothing  else  (III.  iii.  and 


232 


THE  ETHICS 


Def.  ii.)  but  to  perform  those  actions,  which  follow  from 
the  necessity  of  our  nature  considered  in  itself  alone. 
But  pain  is  bad,  in  so  far  as  it  diminishes  or  checks  the 
power  of  action  (IV.  xli.);  wherefore  we  cannot  by  pain 
be  determined  to  any  action,  which  we  should  be  unable 
to  perform  under  the  guidance  of  reason.  Again,  pleas- 
ure is  bad  only  in  so  far  as  it  hinders  a man’s  capability 
for  action  (IV.  xli.  xliii.);  therefore  to  this  extent  we 
could  not  be  determined  by  it  to  any  action,  which  we 
could  not  perform  under  the  guidance  of  reason.  Lastly, 
pleasure,  in  so  far  as  it  is  good,  is  in  harmony  with 
reason  (for  it  consists  in  the  fact  that  a man’s  capability 
for  action  is  increased  or  aided ) ; nor  is  the  mind  passive 
therein,  except  in  so  far  as  a man’s  power  of  action  is 
not  increased  to  the  extent  of  affording  him  an  ade- 
quate conception  of  himself  and  his  actions  ( III.  iii.  and 
note  ). 

Wherefore,  if  a man  who  is  pleasurably  affected  be 
brought  to  such  a state  of  perfection  that  he  gains  an 
adequate  conception  of  himself  and  his  own  actions,  he 
will  be  equally,  nay  more,  capable  of  those  actions,  to 
which  he  is  determined  by  emotion  wherein  the  mind  is 
passive.  But  all  emotions  are  attributable  to  pleasure, 
to  pain,  or  to  desire  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  iv.  explana- 
tion); and  desire  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  i.)  is  nothing 
else  but  the  attempt  to  act;  therefore,  to  all  actions,  etc. 
Q.E.D. 

Another  Proof . — A given  action  is  called  bad,  in  so  far 
as  it  arises  from  one  being  affected  by  hatred  or  any 
evil  emotion.  But  no  action,  considered  in  itself 

alone,  is  either  good  or  bad  ( as  we  pointed  out 

in  the  preface  to  Part  iv.),  one  and  the  same  action 

being  sometimes  good,  sometimes  bad;  wherefore  to 
the  action  which  is  sometimes  bad,  or  arises  from 

some  evil  emotion,  we  may  be  led  by  reason  (IV.  xix.). 
Q.E.D. 

Note. — An  example  will  put  this  point  in  a clearer  light. 
The  action  of  striking,  in  so  far  as  it  is  considered  physi- 
cally, and  in  so  far  as  we  merely  look  to  the  fact  that  a 
man  raises  his  arm,  clenches  his  fist,  and  moves  his  whole 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


233 


arm  violently  downward,  is  a virtue  or  excellence  which 
is  conceived  as  proper  to  the  structure  of  the  human  body. 
If,  then,  a man,  moved  by  anger  or  hatred,  is  led  to  clench 
his  fist  or  to  move  his  arm,  this  result  takes  place  (as  we 
showed  in  Part  II.),  because  one  and  the  same  action  can 
be  associated  with  various  mental  images  of  things ; there- 
fore we  may  be  determined  to  the  performance  of  one  and 
the  same  action  by  confused  ideas,  or  by  clear  and  distinct 
ideas.  Hence  it  is  evident  that  every  desire  which  springs 
from  emotion,  wherein  the  mind  is  passive,  would  become 
useless,  if  men  could  be  guided  by  reason.  Let  us  now  see 
why  desire  which  arises  from  emotion,  wherein  the  mind 
is  passive  is  called  by  us  blind. 

Prop.  LX.  Desire  arising  from  a pleasure  or  pain,  that 
is  not  attributable  to  the  whole  body,  but  only  to  one  or 
certain  parts  thereof,  is  without  utility  in  respect  to  a man 
as  a whole. 

Proof. — Let  it  be  assumed,  for  instance,  that  a,  a part 
of  a body,  is  so  strengthened  by  some  external  cause, 
that  it  prevails  over  the  remaining  parts  (IV.  vi.).  This 
part  will  not  endeavor  to  do  away  with  its  own  powers, 
in  order  that  the  other  parts  of  the  body  may  perform  its 
office ; for  this  it  would  be  necessary  for  it  to  have  a force 
or  power  of  doing  away  with  its  own  powers,  which  (III. 
vi.)  is  absurd.  The  said  part,  and,  consequently,  the  mind 
also,  will  endeavor  to  preserve  its  condition.  Wherefore 
desire  arising  from  a pleasure  of  the  kind  aforesaid  has 
no  utility  in  reference  to  a man  as  a whole.  If  it  be 
assumed,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  part,  a,  be  checked 
so  that  the  remaining  parts  prevail,  it  may  be  proved  in 
the  same  manner  that  desire  arising  from  pain  has  no 
utility  in  respect  to  a man  as  a whole.  Q.  E.  D. 

Note. — As  pleasure  is  generally  (IV.  xliv.  note)  attrib- 
uted to  one  part  of  the  body,  we  generally  desire  to  pre- 
serve our  being  without  taking  into  consideration  our 
health  as  a whole : to  which  it  may  be  added,  that  the  de- 
sires which  have  most  hold  over  us  (IV.  ix.)  take  account 
of  the  present  and  not  of  the  future. 

Prop.  LXI.  Desire  which  springs  from  reason  cannot 
be  excessive. 


234 


THE  ETHICS 


Proof. — Desire  ( Def.  of  the  Emotions,  i.)  considered 
absolutely  in  the  actual  essence  of  man,  in  so  far  as  it 
is  conceived  as  in  any  way  determined  to  a particular 
activity  by  some  given  modification  of  itself.  Hence  de- 
sire, which  arises  from  reason,  that  is,  (III.  iii.),  which 
is  engendered  in  us  in  so  far  as  we  act,  is  the  actual  es- 
sence or  nature  of  man,  in  so  far  as  it  is  conceived  as 
determined  to  such  activites  as  are  adequately  conceived 
through  man’s  essence  only  (III.  Def.  ii.).  Now,  if  such 
desire  could  be  excessive,  human  nature  considered  in 
itself  alone  would  be  able  to  exceed  itself,  or  would  be 
able  to  do  more  than  it  can,  a manifest  contradiction. 
Therefore,  such  desire  cannot  be  excessive.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  LXII.  In  so  far  as  the  mind  conceives  a thing 
under  the  dictates  of  reason,  it  is  affected  equally,  whether 
the  idea  be  of  a thing  future,  past,  or  present. 

Proof. — Whatsoever  the  mind  conceives  under  the 
guidance  of  reason,  it  conceives  under  the  form  of  eter- 
nity or  necessity  (II.  xliv.  Coroll,  ii.),  and  is  therefore 
affected  with  the  same  certitude  (II.  xliii.  and  note). 
Wherefore,  whether  the  thing  be  present,  past,  or  future, 
the  mind  conceives  it  under  the  same  necessity  and  is 
affected  with  the  same  certitude;  and  whether  the  idea 
be  of  something  present,  past,  or  future,  it  will  in  all 
cases  be  equally  true  (II.  xli.);  that  is,  it  will  always 
possess  the  same  properties  of  an  adequate  idea  (II.  Def. 
iv. ) ; therefore,  in  so  far  as  the  mind  conceives  things 
under  the  dictates  of  reason,  it  is  affected  in  the  same 
manner,  whether  the  idea  be  of  a thing  future,  past,  or 
present.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — If  we  could  possess  an  adequate  knowledge  of 
the  duration  of  things,  and  could  determine  by  reason 
their  periods  of  existence,  we  should  contemplate  things 
future  with  the  same  emotion  as  things  present;  and  the 
mind  would  desire  as  though  it  were  present  the  good 
which  it  conceived  as  future ; consequently  it  would  neces- 
sarily neglect  a lesser  good  in  the  present  for  the  sake 
of  a greater  good  in  the  future,  and  would  in  no  wise 
desire  that  which  is  good  in  the  present  but  a source  of 
evil  in  the  future,  as  we  shall  presently  show.  However, 


OF  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


we  can  have  but  a very  inadequate  knowledge  of  the 
duration  of  things  (II.  xxxi.);  and  the  periods  of  their 
existence  ( II.  xliv.  note  ) we  can  only  determine  by  imagi- 
nation, which  is  not  so  powerfully  affected  by  the  future 
as  by  the  present.  Hence  such  true  knowledge  of  good 
and  evil  as  we  possess  is  merely  abstract  or  general,  and 
the  judgment  which  we  pass  on  the  order  of  things  and 
the  connection  of  causes,  with  a view  to  determining 
what  is  good  or  bad  for  us  in  the  present,  is  rather 
imaginary  than  real.  Therefore  it  is  nothing  wonderful, 
if  the  desire  arising  from  such  knowledge  of  good  and 
evil,  in  so  far  as  it  looks  on  into  the  future,  be  more  read- 
ily checked  than  the  desire  of  things  which  are  agreeable 
at  the  present  time.  ( Cf.  IV.  xvi.) 

Prop.  LXIII.  He  who  is  led  by  fear,  and  does  good  in 
order  to  escape  evil,  is  not  led  by  reason. 

Proof. — All  the  emotions  which  are  attributable  to  the 
mind  as  active,  or  in  other  words  to  reason,  are  emotions 
of  pleasure  and  desire  (III.  lix.);  therefore,  he  who  is 
led  by  fear,  and  does  good  in  order  to  escape  evil,  is 
not  led  by  reason. 

Note. — Superstitious  persons,  who  know  better  how  to 
rail  at  vice  than  how  to  teach  virtue,  and  who  strive  not 
to  guide  men  by  reason,  but  so  to  restrain  them  that 
they  would  rather  escape  evil  than  love  virtue,  have  no 
other  aim  but  to  make  others  as  wretched  as  themselves ; 
wherefore  it  is  nothing  wonderful,  if  they  be  generally 
troublesome  and  odious  to  their  fellow-men. 

Corollary.  — Under  desire  which  springs  from  reason, 
we  seek  good  directly,  and  shun  evil  indirectly. 

Proof. — Desire  which  springs  from  reason  can  only 
spring  from  a pleasurable  emotion,  wherein  the  mind  is 
not  passive  (III.  lix.),  in  other  words,  from  a pleasure 
which  cannot  be  excessive  (IV.  lxi.),  and  not  from  pain; 
wherefore  this  desire  springs  from  the  knowledge  of  good, 
not  of  evil  (IV.  viii.);  hence,  under  the  guidance  of  rea- 
son we  seek  good  directly  and  only  by  implication  shun 
evil.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — This  Corollary  may  be  illustrated  by  the  example 
of  a sick  and  a healthy  man.  The  sick  man  through  fear 


236 


THE  ETHICS 


of  death  eats  what  he  naturally  shrinks  from,  but  the 
healthy  man  takes  pleasure  in  his  food,  and  thus  gets  a 
better  enjoyment  out  of  life,  than  if  he  were  in  fear  of 
death,  and  desired  directly  to  avoid  it.  So  a judge,  who 
condemns  a criminal  to  death,  not  from  hatred  or  anger, 
but  from  love  of  the  public  well-being,  is  guided  solely 
by  reason. 

Prop.  LXIV.  The  knowledge  of  evil  is  an  inadequate 
knowledge. 

Proof. — The  knowledge  of  evil  (IV.  viii.)  is  pain,  in  so 
far  as  we  are  conscious  thereof.  Now  pain  is  the  tran- 
sition to  a lesser  perfection  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  iii. ), 
and  therefore  cannot  be  understood  through  man’s  nature 
(III.  vi.  and  vii.) ; therefore  it  is  a passive  state  (III. 
Def.  ii.)  which  (III.  iii.)  depends  on  inadequate  ideas; 
consequently  the  knowledge  thereof  (II.  xxix.),  namely, 
the  knowlege  of  evil,  is  inadequate.  Q.  E.D. 

Corollary. — Hence  it  follows  that,  if  the  human  mind 
possessed  only  adequate  ideas,  it  would  form  no  concep- 
tion of  evil. 

Prop.  LXV.  Under  the  guidance  of  reason  we  should 
pursue  the  greater  of  two  good  and  the  lesser  of  two  evils. 

Proof. — A good  which  prevents  our  enjoyment  of  a 
greater  good  is  in  reality  an  evil ; for  we  apply  the  terms 
good  and  bad  to  things,  in  so  far  as  we  compare  them 
one  with  another  (see  Preface  to  this  Part) ; therefore, 
evil  is  in  reality  a lesser  good;  hence  under  the  guid- 
ance of  reason  we  seek  or  pursue  only  the  greater  good 
and  the  lesser  evil.  Q.  E.  D. 

Corollary. — We  may,  under  the  guidance  of  reason, 
pursue  the  lesser  evil  as  though  it  were  the  greater  good, 
and  we  may  shun  the  lesser  good,  which  would  be  the 
cause  of  the  greater  evil.  For  the  evil,  which  is  here 
called  the  lesser,  is  really  good,  and  the  lesser  good  is 
really  evil,  wherefore  we  may  seek  the  former  and  shun 
the  latter.  Q. E.D. 

Prop.  LX VI.  We  may,  under  the  guidance  of  reason, 
seek  a greater  good  in  the  future  in  preference  to  a lesser 
good  in  the  present,  and  we  may  seek  a lesser  evil  in 
the  present  in  preference  to  a greater  evil  in  the  future. 


OP  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


237 

Proof. — If  the  mind  could  have  an  adequate  knowledge 
of  things  future,  it  would  be  affected  toward  what  is 
' future  in  the  same  way  as  toward  what  is  present  ( IV. 
lxii.) ; wherefore,  looking  merely  to  reason,  as  in  this 
proposition  we  are  assumed  to  do,  there  is  no  difference, 
whether  the  greater  good  or  evil  be  assumed  as  present, 
or  assumed  as  future;  hence  (IV.  lxv.)  we  may  seek  a 
greater  good  in  the  future  in  preference  to  a lesser  good 
in  the  present,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — We  may,  under  the  guidance  of  reason, 
seek  a lesser  evil  in  the  present,  because  it  is  the  cause 
of  a greater  good  in  the  future,  and  we  may  shun  a lesser 
good  in  the  present,  because  it  is  the  cause  of  a greater 
evil  in  the  future.  This  Corollary  is  related  to  the  fore- 
going Proposition  as  the  Corollary  to  IV.  lxv.  is  related 
to  the  said  IV.  lxv. 

Note. — If  these  statements  be  compared  with  what  we 
have  pointed  out  concerning  the  strength  of  the  emotions 
in  this  Part  up  to  Prop,  xviii.,  we  shall  readily  see  the 
difference  between  a man,  who  is  led  solely  by  emotion 
or  opinion,  and  a man,  who  is  led  by  reason.  The  former, 
whether  he  will  or  no,  performs  actions  whereof  he  is 
utterly  ignorant;  the  latter  is  his  own  master  and  only 
performs  such  actions,  as  he  knows  are  of  primary  im- 
portance in  life,  and  therefore  chiefly  desires;  wherefore 
I call  the  former  a slave,  and  the  latter  a free  man, 
concerning  whose  disposition  and  manner  of  life  it  will 
be  well  to  make  a few  observations. 

Prop.  LXVII.  A free  man  thinks  of  death  least  of  all 
things;  and  his  wisdom  is  a meditation  not  of  death  but 
of  life. 

Proof. — A free  man  is  one  who  lives  under  the  guid- 
ance of  reason,  who  is  not  led  by  fear  (IV.  lxiii. ),  but 
who  directly  desires  that  which  is  good  ( IV.  lxiii.  Cor- 
oll.), in  other  words  (IV.  xxiv.),  who  strives  to  act,  to 
live,  and  to  preserve  his  being  on  the  basis  of  seeking 
his  own  true  advantage ; wherefore  such  an  one  thinks  of 
nothing  less  than  of  death,  but  his  wisdom  is  a medita- 
tion of  life.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  LXVIII.  If  men  were  born  free,  they  would,  so 


238 


THE  ETHICS 


long  as  they  remained  free,  form  no  conception  of  good 
and  evil. 

Proof.  — I call  free  him  who  is  led  solely  by  reason; 
he,  therefore,  who  is  born  free,  and  who  remains  free, 
has  only  adequate  ideas;  therefore  (IV.  lxiv.  Coroll.),  he 
has  no  conception  of  evil,  or  consequently  (good  and 
evil  being  correlative ) of  good.  Q.  E.  D. 

Note. — It  is  evident,  from  IV.  iv.,  that  the  hypothesis 
of  this  Proposition  is  false  and  inconceivable,  except  in 
so  far  as  we  look  solely  to  the  nature  of  man,  or  rather 
to  God;  not  in  so  far  as  the  latter  is  infinite,  but  only  in 
so  far  as  he  is  the  cause  of  man’s  existence. 

This,  and  other  matters  which  we  have  already  proved, 
seem  to  have  been  signified  by  Moses  in  the  history  of 
the  first  man.  For  in  that  narrative  no  other  power  of 
God  is  conceived,  save  that  whereby  he  created  man,  that 
is,  the  power  wherewith  he  provided  solely  for  man’s  ad- 
vantage; it  is  stated  that  God  forbade  man,  being  free, 
to  eat  of  the  tree  of  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil, 
and  that,  as  soon  as  man  should  have  eaten  of  it,  he 
would  straightway  fear  death  rather  than  desire  to  live. 
Further,  it  is  written  that  when  man  had  found  a wife, 
who  was  in  entire  harmony  with  his  nature,  he  knew 
that  there  could  be  nothing  in  nature  which  could  be 
more  useful  to  him ; but  that  after  he  believed  the  beasts 
to  be  like  himself,  he  straightway  began  to  imitate  their 
emotions  (III.  xxvii.),  and  to  lose  his  freedom;  this  free- 
dom was  afterward  recovered  by  the  patriarchs,  led  by 
the  spirit  of  Christ ; that  is,  by  the  idea  of  God,  whereon 
alone  it  depends,  that  man  may  be  free,  and  desire 
for  others  the  good  which  he  desires  for  himself,  as  we 
have  shown  above  (IV.  xxxvii.). 

Prop.  LXIX.  The  virtue  of  a free  man  is  seen  to  be 
as  great,  when  it  declines  dangers,  as  when  it  overcomes 
them. 

Proof. — Emotion  can  only  be  checked  or  removed  by  an 
emotion  contrary  to  itself,  and  possessing  more  power  in 
restraining  emotion  (IV.  vii.).  But  blind  daring  and  fear 
are  emotions,  which  can  be  conceived  as  equally  great 
( IV.  v.  and  iii.) : hence,  no  less  virtue  or  firmness  is  required 


ON  HUMAN  BONDAGE 


239 


in  checking  daring  than  in  checking  fear  ( III.  lix.  note) ; in 
other  words  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  xl.  and  xli.),  the  free 
man  shows  as  much  virtue,  when  he  declines  dangers,  as 
when  he  strives  to  overcome  them.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — The  free  man  is  as  courageous  in  timely 
retreat  as  in  combat;  or,  a free  man  shows  equal  cour- 
age or  presence  of  mind,  whether  he  elect  to  give  battle 
or  to  retreat. 

Note. — What  courage  ( animositas ) is,  and  what  I mean 
thereby,  I explained  in  III.  lix.  note.  By  danger  I mean 
everything,  which  can  give  rise  to  any  evil,  such  as  pain, 
hatred,  discord,  etc. 

Prop.  LXX.  The  free  man,  who  lives  among  the  igno- 
rant, strives,  as  far  as  he  can,  to  avoid  receiving  favors 
from  them. 

Proof. — Everyone  judges  what  is  good  according  to  his 
disposition  ( III.  xxxix.  note ) ; wherefore  an  ignorant  man, 
who  has  conferred  a benefit  on  another,  puts  his  own  esti- 
mate upon  it,  and,  if  it  appears  to  be  estimated  less  highly 
by  the  receiver,  will  feel  pain  (III.  xlii.).  But  the  free 
man  only  desires  to  join  other  men  to  him  in  friendship 
(IV.  xxxvii.),  not  repaying  their  benefits  with  others 
reckoned  as  of  like  value,  but  guiding  himself  and  others 
by  the  free  decision  of  reason,  and  doing  only  such  things 
as  he  knows  to  be  of  primary  importance.  Therefore 
the  free  man,  lest  he  should  become  hateful  to  the  igno- 
rant, or  follow  their  desires  rather  than  reason,  will 
endeavor,  as  far  as  he  can,  to  avoid  receiving  their  favors. 

Note. — I say,  as  far  as  he  can.  For  though  men  be 
ignorant,  yet  are  they  men,  and  in  cases  of  necessity 
could  afford  us  human  aid,  the  most  excellent  of  all 
things:  therefore  it  is  often  necessary  to  accept  favors 
from  them,  and  consequently  to  repay  such  favors  in 
kind;  we  must,  therefore,  exercise  caution  in  declining 
favors,  lest  we  should  have  the  appearance  of  despising 
those  who  bestow  them,  or  of  being,  from  avaricious 
motives,  unwilling  to  requite  them,  and  so  give  ground 
for  offense  by  the  very  fact  of  striving  to  avoid  it.  Thus, 
in  declining  favors,  we  must  look  to  the  requirements  of 
utility  and  courtesy. 


240 


THE  ETHICS 


Prop.  LXXI.  Only  free  men  are  thoroughly  grateful 
one  to  another. 

Proof. — Only  free  men  are  thoroughly  useful  one  to 
another,  and  associated  among  themselves  by  the  closest 
necessity  of  friendship  (IV.  xxxv.  and  Coroll,  i.)  only 
such  men  endeavor,  with  mutual  zeal  of  love,  to  confer 
benefits  on  each  other  (IV.  xxxvii.),  and,  therefore,  only 
they  are  thoroughly  grateful  one  to  another.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — The  good  will,  which  men  who  are  led  by  blind 
desire  have  for  one  another,  is  generally  a bargaining  or 
enticement,  rather  than  pure  good  will.  Moreover,  in- 
gratitude is  not  an  emotion.  Yet  it  is  base,  inasmuch  as 
it  generally  shows,  that  a man  is  affected  by  excessive 
hatred,  anger,  pride,  avarice,  etc.  He  who,  by  reason  of 
his  folly,  knows  not  how  to  return  benefits,  is  not  un- 
grateful, much  less  he  who  is  not  gained  over  by  the 
gifts  of  a courtesan  to  serve  her  lust,  or  by  a thief  to 
conceal  his  thefts,  or  by  any  similar  persons.  Contrari- 
wise, such  an  one  shows  a constant  mind,  inasmuch  as 
he  cannot  by  any  gifts  be  corrupted,  to  his  own  or  the 
general  hurt. 

Prop.  LXXII.  The  free  man  never  acts  fraudulently, 
but  always  in  good  faith. 

Proof- — If  it  be  asked:  What  should  a man’s  conduct 
be  in  a case  where  he  could  by  breaking  faith  free  him- 
self from  the  danger  of  present  death  ? Would  not  his 
plan  of  self-preservation  completely  persuade  him  to  de- 
ceive ? this  may  be  answered  by  pointing  out  that,  if 
reason  persuaded  him  to  act  thus,  it  would  persuade  all 
men  to  act  in  a similar  manner,  in  which  case  reason 
would  persuade  men  not  to  agree  in  good  faith  to  unite 
their  forces,  or  to  have  laws  in  common,  that  is,  not  tc 
have  any  general  laws,  which  is  absurd. 

Prop.  LXXIII.  The  man  who  is  guided  by  reason,  is 
more  free  in  a State,  where  he  lives  under  a general 
system  of  law,  than  in  solitude,  where  he  is  independent. 

Proof. — The  man  who  is  guided  by  reason,  does  not 
obey  through  fear  (IV.  lxiii.):  but,  in  so  far  as  he  en- 
deavors to  preserve  his  being  according  to  the  dictates 
of  reason,  that  is  (IV.  lxvi.  note),  in  so  far  as  he 


APPENDIX 


241 


endeavors  to  live  in  freedom,  he  desires  to  order  his  life 
according  to  the  general  good  (IV.  xxxvii.),  and  conse- 
quently (as  we  showed  in  IV.  xxxvii.  note  ii.),  to  live  ac- 
cording to  the  laws  of  his  country.  Therefore  the  free 
man,  in  order  to  enjoy  greater  freedom,  desires  to  possess 
the  general  rights  of  citizenship.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — These  and  similar  observations,  which  we  have 
made  on  man’s  true  freedom,  may  be  referred  to  strength, 
that  is,  to  courage  and  nobility  of  character  (III.  lix. 
note).  I do  not  think  it  worth  while  to  prove  separately 
all  the  properties  of  strength;  much  less  need  I show, 
that  he  that  is  strong  hates  no  man,  is  angry  with  no 
man,  envies  no  man,  is  indignant  with  no  man,  despises 
no  man,  and  least  of  all  things  is  proud.  These  propo- 
sitions, and  all  that  relate  to  the  true  way  of  life  and 
religion,  are  easily  proved  from  IV.  xxxvii.  and  xlvi. , 
namely,  that  hatred  should  be  overcome  with  love,  and 
that  every  man  should  desire  for  others  the  good  which 
he  seeks  for  himself.  We  may  also  repeat  what  we  drew 
attention  to  in  the  note  to  IV.  1.,  and  in  other  places; 
namely,  that  the  strong  man  has  ever  first  in  his  thoughts, 
that  all  things  follow  from  the  necessity  of  the  divine 
nature;  so  that  whatsoever  he  deems  to  be  hurtful  and 
evil,  and  whatsoever,  accordingly,  seems  to  him  impious, 
horrible,  unjust,  and  base,  assumes  that  appearance  owing 
his  own  disordered,  fragmentary,  and  confused  view  of 
the  universe.  Wherefore  he  strives  before  all  things  to 
conceive  things  as  they  really  are,  and  to  remove  the 
hindrances  to  true  knowledge,  such  as  are  hatred,  anger, 
envy,  derision,  pride,  and  similar  emotions,  which  I have 
mentioned  above.  Thus  he  endeavors,  as  we  said  before, 
as  far  as  in  him  lies,  to  do  good,  and  to  go  on  his  way 
rejoicing.  How  far  human  virtue  if  capable  of  attaining 
to  such  a condition,  and  what  its  powers  may  be,  I will 
prove  in  the  following  Part. 

Appendix. 

What  I have  said  in  this  Part  concerning  the  right 
way  of  life  has  not  been  arranged,  so  as  to  admit  of 
being  seen  at  one  view,  but  has  been  set  forth  piece- 


242 


THE  ETHICS 


meal,  according  as  I thought  each  proposition  could  most 
readily  be  deduced  from  what  preceded  it.  I propose, 
therefore,  to  rearrange  my  remarks  and  to  bring  them 
under  leading  heads. 

I.  All  our  endeavors  or  desires  so  follow  from  the  ne- 
cessity of  our  nature,  that  they  can  be  understood  either 
through  it  alone,  as  their  proximate  cause,  or  by  virtue 
of  our  being  a part  of  nature,  which  cannot  be  adequately 
conceived  through  itself  without  other  individuals. 

II.  Desires,  which  follow  from  our  nature  in  such  a 
manner,  that  they  can  be  understood  through  it  alone, 
are  those  which  are  referred  to  the  mind,  in  so  far  as 
the  latter  is  conceived  to  consist  of  adequate  ideas:  the 
remaining  desires  are  only  referred  to  the  mind,  in  so 
far  as  it  conceives  things  inadequately,  and  their  force 
and  increase  are  generally  defined  not  by  the  power  of 
man,  but  by  the  power  of  things  external  to  us:  where- 
fore the  former  are  rightly  called  actions,  the  latter  pas- 
sions, for  the  former  always  indicate  our  power,  the 
latter,  on  the  other  hand,  show  our  infirmity  and  frag- 
mentary knowledge. 

III.  Our  actions,  that  is,  those  desires  which  are  defined 
by  man’s  power  or  reason,  are  always  good.  The  rest 
may  be  either  good  or  bad. 

IV.  Thus  in  life  it  is  before  all  things  useful  to  per- 
fect the  understanding,  or  reason,  as  far  as  we  can, 
and  in  this  alone  man’s  highest  happiness  or  blessed- 
ness consists,  indeed  blessedness  is  nothing  else  but 
the  contentment  of  spirit,  which  arises  from  the  intuitive 
knowledge  of  God:  now,  to  perfect  the  understanding 
is  nothing  else  but  to  understand  God,  God’s  attributes, 
and  the  actions  which  follow  from  the  necessity  of 
his  nature.  Wherefore  of  a man,  who  is  led  by  rea- 
son, the  ultimate  aim  or  highest  desire,  whereby  he 
seeks  to  govern  all  his  fellows,  is  that  whereby  he  is 
brought  to  the  adequate  conception  of  himself  and  of 
all  things  within  the  scope  of  his  intelligence. 

V.  Therefore,  without  intelligence  there  is  not  rational 
life : and  things  are  only  good  in  so  far  as  they  aid  man 
in  his  enjoyment  of  the  intellectual  life,  which  is  defined 


APPENDIX 


243 


by  intelligence.  Contrariwise,  whatsoever  things  hinder 
man’s  perfecting  of  his  reason,  and  capability  to  enjoy 
the  rational  life,  are  alone  called  evil. 

VI.  As  all  things  whereof  man  is  the  efficient  cause  are 
necessarily  good,  no  evil  can  befall  man  except  through 
external  causes;  namely,  by  virtue  of  man  being  a part 
of  universal  nature,  whose  laws  human  nature  is  compelled 
to  obey,  and  to  conform  to  in  almost  infinite  ways. 

VII.  It  is  impossible,  that  man  should  not  be  a part  of 
nature,  or  that  he  should  not  follow  her  general  order; 
but  if  he  be  thrown  among  individuals  whose  nature  is 
in  harmony  with  his  own,  his  power  of  action  will  thereby 
be  aided  and  fostered,  whereas,  if  he  be  thrown  among 
such  as  are  but  very  little  in  harmony  with  his  nature, 
he  will  hardly  be  able  to  accommodate  himself  to  them 
without  undergoing  a great  change  himself. 

VIII.  Whatsoever  in  nature  we  deem  to  be  evil,  or  to 
be  capable  of  injuring  our  faculty  for  existing  and  enjoy- 
ing the  rational  life,  we  may  endeavor  to  remove  in 
whatever  way  seems  safest  to  us ; on  the  other  hand,  what- 
soever we  deem  to  be  good  or  useful  for  preserving  our 
being,  and  enabling  us  to  enjoy  the  rational  life,  we  may 
appropriate  to  our  use  and  employ  as  we  think  best. 
Every  one  without  exception  may,  by  sovereign  right  of  na- 
ture, do  whatsoever  he  thinks  will  advance  his  own  interest. 

IX.  Nothing  can  be  in  more  harmony  with  the  nature 
of  any  given  thing  than  other  individuals  of  the  same 
species;  therefore  ( cf.  vii.)  for  man  in  the  preservation 
of  his  being  and  the  enjoyment  of  the  rational  life  there 
is  nothing  more  useful  than  his  fellow-man  who  is  led 
by  reason.  Further,  as  we  know  not  anything  among 
individual  things  which  is  more  excellent  than  a man  led 
by  reason,  no  man  can  better  display  the  power  of  his 
skill  and  disposition,  than  in  so  training  men,  that  they 
come  at  last  to  live  under  the  dominion  of  their  own 
reason. 

X.  In  so  far  as  men  are  influenced  by  envy  or  any 
kind  of  hatred,  one  toward  another,  they  are  at  vari- 
ance, and  are  therefore  to  be  feared  in  proportion,  as 
they  are  more  powerful  than  their  fellows. 


244 


THE  ETHICS 


XI.  Yet  minds  are  not  conquered  by  force,  but  by  love 
and  high-mindedness. 

XII.  It  is  before  all  things  useful  to  men  to  associate 
their  ways  of  life,  to  bind  themselves  together  with  such 
bonds  as  they  think  most  fitted  to  gather  them  all  into 
unity,  and  generally  to  do  whatsoever  serves  to  strengthen 
friendship. 

XIII.  But  for  this  there  is  need  of  skill  and  watchful- 
ness. For  men  are  diverse  (seeing  that  those  who  live 
under  the  guidance  of  reason  are  few),  yet  are  they  gen- 
erally envious  and  more  prone  to  revenge  than  to  sym- 
pathy. No  small  force  of  character  is  therefore  required 
to  take  every  one  as  he  is,  and  to  restrain  one’s  self  from 
imitating  the  emotions  of  others.  But  those  who  carp 
at  mankind,  and  are  more  skilled  in  railing  at  vice  than 
in  instilling  virtue,  and  who  break  rather  than  strengthen 
men’s  dispositions,  are  hurtful  both  to  themselves  and 
others.  Thus  many  from  too  great  impatience  of  spirit, 
or  from  misguided  religious  zeal,  have  preferred  to  live 
among  brutes  rather  than  among  men ; as  boys  or  youths, 
who  cannot  peaceably  endure  the  chidings  of  their  parents, 
will  enlist  as  soldiers  and  choose  the  hardships  of  war 
and  the  despotic  discipline  in  preference  to  the  comforts 
of  home  and  the  admonitions  of  their  father:  suffering 
any  burden  to  be  put  upon  them,  so  long  as  they  may 
spite  their  parents. 

XIV.  Therefore,  although  men  are  generally  governed 
in  everything  by  their  own  lusts,  yet  their  association  in 
common  brings  many  more  advantages  than  drawbacks. 
Wherefore  it  is  better  to  bear  patiently  the  wrongs  they 
may  do  us,  and  to  strive  to  promote  whatsoever  serves 
to  bring  about  harmony  and  friendship. 

XV.  Those  things,  which  beget  harmony,  are  such  as  are 
attributable  to  justice,  equity,  and  honorable  living. 
For  men  brook  ill  not  only  what  is  unjust  or  iniquitous, 
but  also  what  is  reckoned  disgraceful,  or  that  a man 
should  slight  the  received  customs  of  their  society.  For 
winning  love  those  qualities  are  especially  necessary  which 
have  regard  to  religion  and  piety  ( cf . IV.  xxxvii.  notes, 
i.  ii. ; xlvi.  note;  and  lxxiii.  note). 


APPENDIX 


245 


XVI.  Further,  harmony  is  often  the  result  of  fear;  but 
such  harmony  is  insecure.  Further,  fear  arises  from 
infirmity  of  spirit,  and  moreover  belongs  not  to  the  exer- 
cise of  reason:  the  same  is  true  of  compassion,  though 
this  latter  seems  to  bear  a certain  resemblance  to 
piety. 

XVII.  Men  are  also  gained  over  by  liberality,  especially 
such  as  have  not  the  means  to  buy  what  is  necessary  to 
sustain  life.  However,  to  give  aid  to  every  poor  man  is 
far  beyond  the  power  and  the  advantage  of  any  private 
person.  For  the  riches  of  any  private  person  are  wholly 
inadequate  to  meet  such  a call.  Again,  an  individual 
man’s  resources  of  character  are  too  limited  for  him  to 
be  able  to  make  all  men  his  friends.  Hence  providing 
for  the  poor  is  a duty,  which  falls  on  the  State  as  a 
whole,  and  has  regard  only  to  the  general  advantage. 

XVIII.  In  accepting  favors,  and  in  returning  gratitude 
our  duty  must  be  wholly  different  {cf.  IV.  lxx.  note; 
lxxi.  note). 

XIX.  Again,  meretricious  love,  that  is,  the  lust  of  gen- 
eration arising  from  bodily  beauty,  and  generally  every 
sort  of  love,  which  owns  anything  save  freedom  of  soul 
as  its  cause,  readily  passes  into  hate ; unless  indeed,  what 
is  worse,  it  is  a species  of  madness ; and  then  it  promotes 
discord  rather  than  harmony  {cf.  III.  xxxi.  Coroll.). 

XX.  As  concerning  marriage,  it  is  certain  that  this  is 
in  harmony  with  reason,  if  the  desire  for  physical  union 
be  not  engendered  solely  by  bodily  beauty,  but  also  by 
the  desire  to  beget  children  and  to  train  them  up  wisely; 
and  moreover,  if  the  love  of  both,  to  wit,  of  the  man  and 
of  the  woman,  is  not  caused  by  bodily  beauty  only,  but 
also  by  freedom  of  soul. 

XXI.  Furthermore,  flattery  begets  harmony;  but  only 
by  means  of  the  vile  offense  of  slavishness  or  treachery. 
None  are  more  readily  taken  with  flattery  than  the  proud, 
who  wish  to  be  first,  but  are  not. 

XXII.  There  is  in  abasement  a spurious  appearance  of 
piety  and  religion.  Although  abasement  is  the  opposite 
to  pride,  yet  is  he  that  abases  himself  most  akin  to  the 
proud  (IV.  lvii.  note). 


246 


THE  ETHICS 


XXIII.  Shame  also  brings  about  harmony,  but  only 
in  such  matters  as  cannot  be  hid.  Further,  as  shame  is 
a species  of  pain,  it  does  not  concern  the  exercise  of 
reason. 

XXIV.  The  remaining  emotions  of  pain  toward  men 
are  directly  opposed  to  justice,  equity,  honor,  piety,  and 
religion ; and,  although  indignation  seems  to  bear  a certain 
resemblance  to  equity,  yet  is  life  but  lawless,  where  every 
man  may  pass  judgment  on  another’s  deeds,  and  vindi- 
cate his  own  or  other  men’s  rights. 

XXV.  Correctness  of  conduct  {modestia),  that  is,  the 
desire  of  pleasing  men  which  is  determined  by  reason,  is 
attributable  to  piety  (as  we  said  in  IV.  xxxvii,  note  i.). 
But,  if  it  spring  from  emotion,  it  is  ambition,  or  the  desire 
whereby  men,  under  the  false  cloak  of  piety,  generally 
stir  up  discords  and  seditions.  For  he  who  desires  to  aid 
his  fellows  either  in  word  or  in  deed  so  that  they  may 
together  enjoy  the  highest  good,  he,  I say,  will  before  all 
things,  strive  to  win  them  over  with  love:  not  to  draw 
them  into  admiration,  so  that  a system  may  be  called 
after  his  name,  nor  to  give  any  cause  for  envy.  Further, 
in  his  conversation,  he  will  shrink  from  talking  of  men’s 
faults,  and  will  be  careful  to  speak  but  sparingly  of  human 
infirmity;  but  he  will  dwell  at  length  on  human  virtue 
or  power,  and  the  way  whereby  it  may  be  perfected. 
Thus  will  men  be  stirred  not  by  fear,  nor  by  aversion, 
but  only  by  the  emotion  of  joy,  to  endeavor,  so  far  as  in 
them  lies,  to  live  in  obedience  to  reason. 

XXVI.  Besides  men,  we  know  of  no  particular  thing 
in  nature  in  whose  mind  we  may  rejoice,  and  whom  we 
can  associate  with  ourselves  in  friendship  or  any  sort  of  fel- 
lowship ; therefore,  whatsoever  there  be  in  nature  besides 
man,  a regard  for  our  advantage  does  not  call  on  us  to 
preserve,  but  to  preserve  or  destroy  according  to  its 
various  capabilities,  and  to  adapt  to  our  use  as  best  we 
may. 

XXVII.  The  advantage  which  we  derive  from  things 
external  to  us,  besides  the  experience  and  knowledge 
which  we  acquire  from  observing  them,  and  from  recom- 
bining their  elements  in  different  forms,  is  principally  the 


APPENDIX 


247 


preservation  of  the  body;  from  this  point  of  view,  those 
things  are  most  useful  which  can  so  feed  and  nourish 
the  body,  that  all  its  parts  may  rightly  fulfil  their  func- 
tions. For,  in  proportion  as  the  body  is  capable  of  being 
affected  in  a greater  variety  of  ways,  and  of  affecting 
external  bodies  in  a great  number  of  ways,  so  much  the 
more  is  the  mind  capable  of  thinking  ( IV.  xxxviii.  xxxix.). 
But  there  seem  to  be  very  few  things  of  this  kind  in 
nature;  wherefore  for  the  due  nourishment  of  the  body 
we  must  use  many  foods  of  diverse  nature.  For  the 
human  body  is  composed  of  very  many  parts  of  dif- 
ferent nature,  which  stand  in  continual  need  of  va- 
ried nourishment,  so  that  the  whole  body  may  be  equally 
capable  of  doing  everything  that  can  follow  from 
its  own  nature,  and  consequently  that  the  mind  also 
may  be  equally  capable  of  forming  many  percep- 
tions. 

XXVIII.  Now  for  providing  these  nourishments  the 
strength  of  each  individual  would  hardly  suffice,  if  men 
did  not  lend  one  another  mutual  aid.  But  money  has 
furnished  us  with  a token  for  everything:  hence  it  is 
with  the  notion  of  money,  that  the  mind  of  the  multitude 
is  chiefly  engrossed : nay,  it  can  hardly  conceive  any  kind 
of  pleasure,  which  is  not  accompanied  with  the  idea  of 
money  as  cause. 

XXIX.  This  result  is  the  fault  only  of  those,  who  seek 
money,  not  from  poverty  or  to  supply  their  necessary 
wants,  but  because  they  have  learned  the  arts  of  gain, 
wherewith  they  bring  themselves  to  great  splendor.  Cer- 
tainly they  nourish  their  bodies,  according  to  custom, 
but  scantily,  believing  that  they  lose  as  much  of  their 
wealth  as  they  spend  on  the  preservation  of  their  body. 
But  they  who  know  the  true  use  of  money,  and  who  fix 
the  measure  of  wealth  solely  with  regard  to  their  actual 
needs,  live  content  with  little. 

XXX.  As,  therefore,  those  things  are  good  which  assist 
the  various  parts  of  the  body,  and  enable  them  to  per- 
form their  functions ; and  as  pleasure  consists  in  an 
increase  of,  or  aid  to,  man’s  power,  in  so  far  as  he  is 
composed  of  mind  and  body;  it  follows  that  all  those 


248 


THE  ETHICS 


things  which  bring  pleasure  are  good.  But  seeing  that 
things  do  not  work  with  the  object  of  giving  us  pleasure, 
and  that  their  power  of  action  is  not  tempered  to  suit 
our  advantage,  and  lastly,  that  pleasure  is  generally 
referred  to  one  part  of  the  body  more  than  to  the  other 
parts;  therefore  most  emotions  of  pleasure  (unless 
reason  and  watchfulness  be  at  hand),  and  conse- 
quently the  desires  arising  therefrom,  may  become 
excessive.  Moreover  we  may  add  that  emotion 
leads  us  to  pay  most  regard  to  what  is  agreeable  in 
the  present,  nor  can  we  estimate  what  is  future 
with  emotions  equally  vivid.  (IV.  xliv.  note,  and  lx. 
note.) 

XXXI.  Superstition,  on  the  other  hand,  seems  to  ac- 
count as  good  all  that  brings  pain,  and  as  bad  all  that 
brings  pleasure.  However,  as  we  have  said  above  (IV.  xlv. 
note),  none  but  the  envious  take  delight  in  my  infirmity 
and  trouble.  For  the  greater  the  pleasure  whereby  we 
are  affected,  the  greater  is  the  perfection  whereto  we 
pass,  and  consequently  the  more  do  we  partake  of  the 
divine  nature;  no  pleasure  can  ever  be  evil,  which  is 
regulated  by  a true  regard  for  our  advantage.  But  con- 
trariwise he,  who  is  led  by  fear  and  does  good  only  to  avoid 
evil,  is  not  guided  by  reason. 

XXXII.  But  human  power  is  extremely  limited,  and  is 
infinitely  surpassed  by  the  power  of  external  causes;  we 
have  not,  therefore,  an  absolute  power  of  shaping  to  our 
use  those  things  which  are  without  us.  Nevertheless,  we 
shall  bear  with  an  equal  mind  all  that  happens  to  us  in 
contravention  to  the  claims  of  our  own  advantage,  so  long 
as  we  are  conscious,  that  we  have  done  our  duty,  and  that 
the  power  which  we  possess  is  not  sufficient  to  enable 
us  to  protect  ourselves  completely ; remembering  that  we 
are  a part  of  universal  nature,  and  that  we  follow  her 
order.  If  we  have  a clear  and  distinct  understanding  of 
this,  that  part  of  our  nature  which  is  defined  by  intelli- 
gence, in  other  words  the  better  part  of  ourselves,  will 
assuredly  acquiesce  in  what  befalls  us,  and  in  such 
acquiescence  will  endeavor  to  persist.  For,  in  so 
far  as  we  are  intelligent  beings,  we  cannot  desire 


APPENDIX 


249 


anything-  save  that  which  is  necessary,  nor  yield  ab- 
solute acquiescence  to  anything,  save  to  that  which  is 
true;  wherefore,  in  so  far  as  we  have  a right  under- 
standing of  these  things,  the  endeavor  of  the  better  part 
of  ourselves  is  in  harmony  with  the  order  of  nature  as  a 
whole. 


PART  V. 


OF  THE  POWER  OF  THE  UNDERSTANDING, 
OR  OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM. 

Preface. 

At  length  I pass  to  the  remaining  portion  of  my  Ethics, 
which  is  concerned  with  the  way  leading  to  freedom,  I 
shall  therefore  treat  therein  of  the  power  of  the  reason, 
showing  how  far  the  reason  can  control  the  emotions,  and 
what  is  the  nature  of  Mental  Freedom  or  Blessedness;  we 
shall  then  be  able  to  see,  how  much  more  powerful  the 
wise  man  is  than  the  ignorant.  It  is  no  part  of  my  de- 
sign to  point  out  the  method  and  the  means  whereby  the 
understanding  may  be  perfected,  nor  to  show  the  skill 
whereby  the  body  may  be  so  tended  as  to  be  capable  of 
the  due  performance  of  its  functions.  The  latter  question 
lies  in  the  province  of  Medicine,  the  former  in  the  prov- 
ince of  Logic.  Here,  therefore,  I repeat,  I shall  treat  only 
of  the  power  of  the  mind,  or  of  reason ; and  I shall  mainly 
show  the  extent  and  nature  of  its  dominion  over  the 
emotions,  for  their  control  and  moderation.  That  we  do 
not  possess  absolute  dominion  over  them,  I have  already 
shown.  Yet  the  Stoics  have  thought,  that  the  emotions  de- 
pended absolutely  on  our  will,  and  that  we  could  absolutely 
govern  them.  But  these  philosophers  were  compelled,  by 
the  protest  of  experience,  not  from  their  own  principles, 
to  confess,  that  no  slight  practice  and  zeal  is  needed  to 
control  and  moderate  them : and  this  someone  endeavored 
to  illustrate  by  the  example  (if  I remember  rightly)  of  two 
dogs,  the  one  a house  dog  and  the  other  a hunting  dog. 
For  by  long  training  it  could  be  brought  about,  that  the 
house  dog  should  become  accustomed  to  hunt,  and  the 
hunting  dog  to  cease  from  running  after  hares.  To  this 
(250) 


OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM 


251 


opinion  Descartes  not  a little  inclines.  For  he  maintained, 
that  the  sonl  or  mind  is  specially  united  to  a particular 
part  of  the  brain,  namely,  to  that  part  called  the  pineal 
gland,  by  the  aid  of  which  the  mind  is  enabled  to  feel 
all  the  movements  which  are  set  going  in  the  body,  and 
also  external  objects,  and  which  the  mind  by  a simple 
act  of  volition  can  put  in  motion  in  various  ways.  He 
asserted,  that  this  gland  is  so  suspended  in  the  midst 
of  the  brain,  that  it  could  be  moved  by  the  slightest 
motion  of  the  animal  spirits : further,  that  this  gland 
is  suspended  in  the  midst  of  the  brain  in  as  many 
different  manners,  as  the  animal  spirits  can  impinge 
thereon  ; and,  again,  that  as  many  different  marks 
are  impressed  on  the  said  gland,  as  there  are  different 
external  objects  which  impel  the  animal  spirits  toward 
it;  whence  it  follows,  that  if  the  will  of  the  soul  sus- 
pends the  gland  in  a position,  wherein  it  has  already 
been  suspended  once  before  by  the  animal  spirits  driven 
in  one  way  or  another,  the  gland  in  its  turn  reacts  on 
the  said  spirits,  driving  and  determining  them  to  the 
condition  wherein  they  were,  when  repulsed  before  by  a 
similar  position  of  the  gland.  He  further  asserted,  that 
every  act  of  mental  volition  is  united  in  nature  to  a cer- 
tain given  motion  of  the  gland.  For  instance,  whenever 
anyone  desires  to  look  at  a remote  object,  the  act  of 
volition  causes  the  pupil  of  the  eye  to  dilate,  whereas,  if 
the  person  in  question  had  only  thought  of  the  dilatation 
of  the  pupil,  the  mere  wish  to  dilate  it  would  not  have 
brought  about  the  result,  inasmuch  as  the  motion  of  the 
gland,  which  serves  to  impel  the  animal  spirits  toward 
the  optic  nerve  in  a way  which  would  dilate  or  contract 
the  pupil,  is  not  associated  in  nature  with  the  wish  to 
dilate  or  contract  the  pupil,  but  with  the  wish  to  look 
at  remote  or  very  near  objects.  Lastly,  he  maintained 
that,  although  every  motion  of  the  aforesaid  gland  seems 
to  have  been  united  by  nature  to  one  particular  thought 
out  of  the  whole  number  of  our  thoughts  from  the  very 
beginning  of  our  life,  yet  it  can  nevertheless  become 
through  habituation  associated  with  other  thoughts;  this 
he  endeavors  to  prove  in  the  <(  Passions  de  Fame,®  I.  50. 


252 


THE  ETHICS 


He  thence  concludes,  that  there  is  no  soul  so  weak,  that  it 
cannot,  under  proper  directions,  acquire  absolute  power 
over  its  passions.  For  passions  as  defined  by  him  are 
“perceptions,  or  feelings,  or  disturbances  of  the  soul, 
which  are  referred  to  the  soul  as  species,  and  which  (mark 
the  expression)  are  produced,  preserved,  and  strengthened 
through  some  movement  of  the  spirits.  * (“  Passions  de 

l’ame,®  I.  27.)  But  seeing  that  we  can  join  any  motion 
of  the  gland,  or  consequently  of  the  spirits,  to  any  voli- 
tion, the  determination  of  the  will  depends  entirely  on 
our  own  powers;  if,  therefore,  we  determine  our  will 
with  sure  and  firm  decisions  in  the  direction  to  which 
we  wish  our  actions  to  tend,  and  associate  the  motions  of  the 
passions  which  we  wish  to  acquire  with  the  said  decisions, 
we  shall  acquire  an  absolute  dominion  over  our  passions. 
Such  is  the  doctrine  of  this  illustrious  philosopher  (in  so 
far  as  I gather  it  from  his  own  words) ; it  is  one  which, 
had  it  been  less  ingenious,  I could  hardly  believe  to 
have  proceeded  from  so  great  a man.  Indeed,  I am 
lost  in  wonder,  that  a philosopher,  who  had  stoutly  as- 
serted, that  he  would  draw  no  conclusions  which  do  not 
follow  from  self-evident  premises,  and  would  affirm  noth- 
ing which  he  did  not  clearly  and  distinctly  perceive,  and 
who  had  go  often  taken  to  task  the  scholastics  for  wishing 
to  explain  obscurities  through  occult  qualities,  could 
maintain  a hypothesis,  beside  which  occult  qualities  are 
commonplace.  What  does  he  understand,  I ask,  by  the 
union  of  the  mind  and  the  body  ? What  clear  and  dis- 
tinct conception  has  he  got  of  thought  in  most  intimate 
union  with  a certain  particle  of  extended  matter  ? Truly 
I should  like  him  to  explain  this  union  through  its  prox- 
imate cause.  But  he  had  so  distinct  a conception  of 
mind  being  distinct  from  body,  that  he  could  not  assign 
any  particular  cause  of  the  union  between  the  two,  or 
of  the  mind  itself,  but  was  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  the 
cause  of  the  whole  universe,  that  is  to  God.  Further,  I 
should  much  like  to  know  what  degree  of  motion  the  mind 
can  impart  to  this  pineal  gland  and  with  what  force  can  it 
hold  it  suspended  ? For  I am  in  ignorance,  whether  this 
gland  can  be  agitated  more  slowly  or  more  quickly  by 


OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM 


253 


the  mind  than  by  the  animal  spirits,  and  whether  the 
motions  of  the  passions,  which  we  have  closely  united 
with  firm  decisions,  cannot  be  again  disjoined  therefrom 
by  physical  causes;  in  which  case  it  would  follow  that, 
although  the  mind  firmly  intended  to  face  a given  danger, 
and  had  united  to  this  decision  the  motions  of  boldness, 
yet  at  the  sight  of  the  danger  the  gland  might  become 
suspended  in  a way,  which  would  preclude  the  mind 
thinking  of  anything  except  turning  away.  In  truth,  as 
there  is  no  common  standard  of  volition  and  motion,  so 
is  there  no  comparison  possible  between  the  powers  of 
the  mind  and  the  power  or  strength  of  the  body;  conse- 
quently the  strength  of  one  cannot  in  anywise  be  deter- 
mined by  the  strength  of  the  other.  We  may  also  add, 
that  there  is  no  gland  discoverable  in  the  midst  of  the 
brain,  so  placed  that  it  can  thus  easily  be  set  in  motion 
in  so  many  ways,  and  also  that  all  the  nerves  are  not 
prolonged  so  far  as  the  cavities  of  the  brain.  Lastly,  I 
omit  all  the  assertions  which  he  makes  concerning  the  will 
and  its  freedom,  inasmuch  as  I have  abundantly  proved 
that  his  premises  are  false.  Therefore,  since  the  power 
of  the  mind,  as  I have  shown  above,  is  defined  by  the 
understanding  only,  we  shall  determine  solely  by  the 
knowledge  of  the  mind  the  remedies  against  the  emo- 
tions, which  I believe  all  have  had  experience  of,  but 
do  not  accurately  observe  or  distinctly  see,  and  from  the 
same  basis  we  shall  deduce  all  those  conclusions,  which 
have  regard  to  the  mind’s  blessedness. 

Axioms. 

I.  If  two  contrary  actions  be  started  in  the  same  sub- 
ject, a change  must  necessarily  take  place,  either  in  both, 
or  in  one  of  the  two,  and  continue  until  they  cease  to 
be  contrary. 

II.  The  power  of  an  affect  is  defined  by  the  power  of 
its  cause,  in  so  far  as  its  essence  is  explained  or  defined 
by  the  essence  of  its  cause. 

(This  axiom  is  evident  from  III.  vii.) 

Prop.  I.  Even  as  thoughts  and  the  ideas  of  things  are 
arranged  and  associated  in  the  mind,  so  are  the  modifi- 


254 


THE  ETHICS 


cations  of  the  body  or  the  images  of  things  precisely 
in  the  same  way  arranged  and  associated  in  the  body. 

Proof.  — The  order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same 
(II.  vii.)  as  the  order  and  connection  of  things,  and  vice 
versd  the  order  and  connection  of  things  is  the  same 
(II.  vi.  Coroll,  and  vii.)  as  the  order  and  connection  of 
ideas.  Wherefore,  even  as  the  order  and  connection  of 
ideas  in  the  mind  takes  place  according  to  the  order  and 
association  of  modifications  of  the  body  (II.  xviii.),  so 
vice  versd  (III.  ii.)  the  order  and  connection  of  modifica- 
tions of  the  body  takes  place  in  accordance  with  the 
manner,  in  which  thoughts  and  the  ideas  of  things  are 
arranged  and  associated  in  the  mind.  Q.  E.D. 

Prop.  II.  If  we  remove  a disturbance  of  the  spirit, 
or  emotion,  from  the  thought  of  an  external  cause,  and 
unite  it  to  the  other  thoughts,  then  will  the  love  or 
hatred  toward  that  external  cause,  and  also  the  vacilla- 
tions of  spirit  which  arise  from  these  emotions,  be 
destroyed. 

Proof. — That,  which  constitutes  the  reality  of  love  or 
hatred,  is  pleasure  or  pain,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of 
an  external  cause  ( Def . of  the  Emotions,  vi.  vii. ) ; where- 
fore, when  this  cause  is  removed,  the  reality  of  love  or 
hatred  is  removed  with  it;  therefore  these  emotions  and 
those  which  arise  therefrom  are  destroyed.  Q. E.D. 

Prop.  III.  An  emotion,  which  is  a passion,  ceases  to 
be  a passion,  as  soon  as  we  form  a clear  and  distinct 
idea  thereof. 

Proof. — An  emotion,  which  is  a passion,  is  a confused 
idea  (by  the  general  Def.  of  the  Emotions.).  If,  there- 
fore, we  form  a clear  and  distinct  idea  of  a given  emo- 
tion, that  idea  will  only  be  distinguished  from  the  emotion, 
in  so  far  as  it  is  referred  to  the  mind  only,  by  reason 
(II.  xxi.  and  note);  therefore  (III.  iii.)  the  emotion  will 
cease  to  be  a passion.  Q. E.D. 

Corollary. — An  emotion  therefore,  becomes  more  under 
our  control,  and  the  mind  is  less  passive  in  respect  to 
it,  in  proportion  as  it  is  mere  known  to  us. 

Prop.  IV.  There  is  no  modification  of  the  body,  whereof 
we  cannot  form  some  clear  and  distinct  conception. 


OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM 


255 


Proof. — Properties  which  are  common  to  all  things  can 
only  be  conceived  adeqately  (II.  xxxviii.);  therefore  (II. 
xii.  and  Lemma  ii.  after  II.  xiii.)  there  is  no  modification 
of  the  body,  whereof  we  cannot  form  some  clear  and 
distinct  conception.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — Hence  it  follows  that  there  is  no  emotion, 
whereof  we  cannot  form  some  clear  and  distinct  concep- 
tion. For  an  emotion  is  the  idea  of  a modification  of 
the  body  (by  the  general  Def.  of  the  Emotions),  and 
must  therefore  (by  the  preceding  Prop.)  involve  some 
clear  and  distinct  conception. 

Note. — Seeing  that  there  is  nothing  which  is  not  fol- 
lowed by  an  effect  (I.  xxxvi.),  and  that  we  clearly  and 
distinctly  understand  whatever  follows  from  an  idea, 
which  in  us  is  adequate  (II.  xl.),  it  follows  that  every- 
one has  the  power  of  clearly  and  distinctly  understanding 
himself  and  his  emotions,  if  not  absolutely,  at  any  rate 
in  part,  and  consequently  of  bringing  it  about,  that  he 
should  become  less  subject  to  them.  To  attain  this 
result,  therefore,  we  must  chiefly  direct  our  efforts  to 
acquiring,  as  far  as  possible,  a clear  and  distinct  knowl- 
edge of  every  emotion,  in  order  that  the  mind  may  thus, 
through  emotion,  be  determined  to  think  of  those  things 
which  it  clearly  and  distinctly  perceives,  and  wherein  it 
fully  acquiesces : and  thus  that  the  emotion  itself  may  be 
separated  from  the  thought  of  an  external  cause,  and 
may  be  associated  with  true  thoughts;  whence  it  will 
come  to  pass,  not  only  that  love,  hatred,  etc.,  will  be 
destroyed  (V.  ii.),  but  also  that  the  appetites  or  desires, 
which  are  wont  to  arise  from  such  emotion,  will  become 
incapable  of  being  excessive  (IV.  lxi.).  For  it  must  be 
especially  remarked,  that  the  appetite  through  which  a 
man  is  said  to  be  active,  and  that  through  which  he  is 
said  to  be  passive  is  one  and  the  same.  For  instance, 
we  have  shown  that  human  nature  is  so  constituted,  that 
everyone  desires  his  fellow-men  to  live  after  his  own 
fashion  ( III.  xxxi.  note );  in  a man,  who  is  not  guided 
by  reason,  this  appetite  is  a passion  which  is  called  am- 
bition, and  does  not  greatly  differ  from  pride;  whereas 
in  a man,  who  lives  by  the  dictates  of  reason,  it  is  an 


THE  ETHICS 


256 

activity  or  virtue  which  is  called  piety  (IV.  xxxvii.  note 
i.  and  second  proof).  In  like  manner  all  appetites  or 
desires  are  only  passions,  in  so  far  as  they  spring  from 
inadequate  ideas;  the  same  results  are  accredited  to  virtue, 
when  they  are  aroused  or  generated  by  adequate  ideas. 
For  all  desires,  whereby  we  are  determined  to  any 
given  action,  may  arise  as  much  from  adequate  as  from 
inadequate  ideas  (IV.  lix.).  Than  this  remedy  for  the 
emotions  (to  return  to  the  point  from  which  I started), 
which  consists  in  a true  knowledge  thereof,  nothing 
more  excellent,  being  within  our  power,  can  be  devised. 
For  the  mind  has  no  other  power  save  that  of  thinking 
and  of  forming  adequate  ideas,  as  we  have  shown  above 
(III.  iii.). 

Prop.  V.  An  emotion  toward  a thing,  which  we  con- 
ceive simply,  and  not  as  necessary,  or  as  contingent,  or 
as  possible,  is,  other  conditions  being  equal,  greater  than 
any  other  emotion. 

Proof. — An  emotion  toward  a thing,  which  we  conceive 
to  be  free,  is  greater  than  one  toward  what  we  conceive  to 
be  necessary  (III.  xlix.),  and,  consequently,  still  greater 
than  one  toward  what  we  conceive  as  possible,  or  con- 
tingent (IV.  xi.).  But  to  conceive  a thing  as  free  can  be 
nothing  else  than  to  conceive  it  simply,  while  we  are  in 
ignorance  of  the  causes  whereby  it  has  been  determined 
to  action  (II.  xxxv.  note) ; therefore,  an  emotion  toward 
a thing  which  we  conceive  simply  is,  other  conditions 
being  equal,  greater  than  one,  which  we  feel  toward 
what  is  necessary,  possible,  or  contingent,  and,  conse- 
quently, it  is  the  greatest  of  all.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  VI.  The  mind  has  greater  power  over  the  emo- 
tions and  is  less  subject  thereto,  in  so  far  as  it  under- 
stands all  things  as  necessary. 

Proof. — The  mind  understands  all  things  to  be  neces- 
sary (I.  xxix.)  and  to  be  determined  to  existence  and 
operation  by  an  infinite  chain  of  causes;  therefore  (by 
the  foregoing  Proposition),  it  thus  far  brings  it  about, 
that  it  is  less  subject  to  the  emotions  arising  therefrom, 
and  (III.  xlviii.)  feels  less  emotion  toward  the  things 
themselves.  Q.E.D. 


OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM 


257 


Note. — The  more  this  knowledge,  that  things  are  nec- 
essary, is  applied  to  particular  things,  which  we  conceive 
more  distinctly  and  vividly,  the  greater  is  the  power  of 
the  mind  over  the  emotions,  as  experience  also  testifies. 

( For  we  see,  that  the  pain  arising  from  the  loss  of  any 
good  is  mitigated,  as  soon  as  the  man  who  has  lost  it 
perceives,  that  it  could  not  by  any  means  have  been 
preserved.  So  also  we  see  that  no  one  pities  an  infant, 
because  it  cannot  speak,  walk,  or  reason,  or  lastly,  be- 
cause it  passes  so  many  years,  as  it  were,  in  unconscious- 
ness. Whereas,  if  most  people  were  born  full-grown 
and  only  one  here  and  there  as  an  infant,  every  one 
would  pity  the  infants;  because  infancy  would  not  then 
be  looked  on  as  a state  natural  and  necessary,  but  as  a 
fault  or  delinquency  in  Nature)  and  we  may  note  several 
other  instances  of  the  same  sort. 

Prop.  VII.  Emotions  which  are  aroused  or  spring  from 
reason,  if  we  take  account  of  time,  are  stronger  than 
those,  which  are  attributable  to  particular  objects  that 
we  regard  as  absent. 

Proof. — We  do  not  regard  a thing  as  absent,  by  reason 
of  the  emotion  wherewith  we  conceive  it,  but  by  reason 
of  the  body  being  affected  by  another  emotion  excluding 
the  existence  of  the  said  thing  (II.  xvii.).  Wherefore, 
the  emotion,  which  is  referred  to  the  thing  which  we 
regard  as  absent,  is  not  of  a nature  to  overcome  the  rest 
of  a man’s  activities  and  power  (IV.  vi.),  but  is,  on  the 
contrary,  of  a nature  to  be  in  some  sort  controlled  by 
the  emotions,  which  exclude  the  existence  of  its  external 
cause  (IV.  ix.).  But  an  emotion  which  springs  from 
reason  is  necessarily  referred  to  the  common  properties 
of  things  (see  the  Def.  of  Reason  in  II.  xl.  note  ii.), 
which  we  always  regard  as  present  (for  there  can  be 
nothing  to  exclude  their  present  existence),  and  which 
we  always  conceive  in  the  same  manner  (II.  xxxviii.). 
Wherefore  an  emotion  of  this  kind  always  remains  the 
same;  and  consequently  (V.  Ax.  i.)  emotions,  which  are 
contrary  thereto  and  are  not  kept  going  by  their  external 
causes,  will  be  obliged  to  adapt  themselves  to  it  more 
and  more  until  they  are  no  longer  contrary  to  it ; to  this 
17 


258 


THE  ETHICS 


extent  the  emotion  which  springs  from  reason  is  more 
powerful.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  VIII.  An  emotion  is  stronger  in  proportion  to 
the  number  of  simultaneous  concurrent  causes  whereby 
it  is  aroused. 

Proof. — Many  simultaneous  causes  are  more  powerful 
than  a few  (III.  vii.):  therefore  (IV.  v.),  in  proportion 
to  the  increased  number  of  simultaneous  causes  whereby 
it  is  aroused,  an  emotion  becomes  stronger.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — This  proposition  is  also  evident  from  V.  Ax.  ii. 

Prop.  IX.  An  emotion,  which  is  attributable  to  many 
and  diverse  causes  which  the  mind  regards  as  simulta- 
neous with  the  emotion  itself,  is  less  hurtful,  and  we  are 
less  subject  thereto  and  less  affected  toward  each  of  its 
causes,  than  if  it  were  a different  and  equally  powerful 
emotion  attributable  to  fewer  causes  or  to  a single  cause. 

Proof.  — An  emotion  is  only  bad  or  hurtful,  in  so  far 
as  it  hinders  the  mind  from  being  able  to  think  ( IV. 
xxvi.  xxvii.);  therefore,  an  emotion,  whereby  the  mind 
is  determined  to  the  contemplation  of  several  things  at 
once,  is  less  hurtful  than  another  equally  powerful  emo- 
tion, which  so  engrosses  the  mind  in  the  single  contem- 
plation of  a few  objects  or  of  one,  that  it  is  unable  to 
think  of  anything  else;  this  was  our  first  point.  Again, 
as  the  mind’s  essence  in  other  words,  its  power  (III.  vii.), 
consists  solely  in  thought  (II.  xi.),  the  mind  is  less  pas- 
sive in  respect  to  an  emotion,  which  causes  it  to  think 
of  several  things  at  once,  than  in  regard  to  an  equally 
strong  emotion,  which  keeps  it  engrossed  in  the  contem- 
plation of  a few  or  of  a single  object:  this  was  our 
second  point.  Lastly,  this  emotion  (III.  xlviii.),  in  so  far 
as  it  is  attributable  to  several  causes,  is  less  powerful  in 
regard  to  each  of  them.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  X.  So  long  as  we  are  not  assailed  by  emotions 
contrary  to  our  nature,  we  have  the  power  of  arranging 
and  associating  the  modifications  of  our  body  according 
to  the  intellectual  order. 

Proof.  — The  emotions,  which  are  contrary  to  our  nature, 
that  is  (IV.  xxx.),  which  are  bad,  are  bad  in  so  far  as 
they  impede  the  mind  from  understanding  (IV.  xxvii.). 


OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM 


259 


So  long,  therefore,  as  we  are  not  assailed  by  emotions 
contrary  to  our  nature,  the  mind’s  power,  whereby  it 
endeavors  to  understand  things  (IV.  xxvi. ),  is  not  im- 
peded, and  therefore  it  is  able  to  form  clear  and  distinct 
ideas  and  to  deduce  them  one  from  another  ( II.  xl.  note 
ii.  and  xlvii.  note ) ; consequently  we  have  in  such  cases 
the  power  of  arranging  and  associating  the  modifications 
of  the  body  according  to  the  intellectual  order.  Q.E.  D. 

Note.  — By  this  power  of  rightly  arranging  and  asso- 
ciating the  bodily  modifications  we  can  guard  ourselves 
from  being  easily  affected  by  evil  emotions.  For  (V.  vii.) 
a greater  force  is  needed  for  controlling  the  emotions, 
when  they  are  arranged  and  associated  according  to  the 
intellectual  order,  than  when  they  are  uncertain  and 
unsettled.  The  best  we  can  do,  therefore,  so  long  as  we 
do  not  possess  a perfect  knowledge  of  our  emotions,  is  to 
frame  a system  of  right  conduct,  or  fixed  practical  pre- 
cepts, to  commit  it  to  memory,  and  to  apply  it  forthwith 
to  the  particular  circumstances  which  now  and  again  meet 
us  in  life,  so  that  our  imagination  may  become  fully 
imbued  therewith,  and  that  it  may  be  always  ready  to 
our  hand.  For  instance,  we  have  laid  down  among  the 
rules  of  life  (IV.  xlvi.  and  note),  that  hatred  should  be 
overcome  with  love  or  high-mindedness,  and  not  requited 
with  hatred  in  return.  Now,  that  this  precept  of  reason 
may  be  always  ready  to  our  hand  in  time  of  need,  we 
should  often  think  over  and  reflect  upon  the  wrongs 
generally  committed  by  men,  and  in  what  manner  and 
way  they  may  be  best  warded  off  by  high-mindedness: 
we  shall  thus  associate  the  idea  of  wrong  with  the  idea 
of  this  precept,  which  accordingly  will  always  be  ready 
for  use  when  a wrong  is  done  to  us  (II.  xviii.).  If  we 
keep  also  in  readiness  the  notion  of  our  true  advantage, 
and  of  the  good  which  follows  from  mutual  friendships, 
and  common  fellowships;  further,  if  we  remember  that 
complete  acquiescence  is  the  result  of  the  right  way  of 
life  (IV.  lii.),  and  that  men,  no  less  than  everything  else, 
act  by  the  necessity  of  their  nature : in  such  case  I say  the 
wrong,  or  the  hatred,  which  commonly  arises  therefrom, 
will  engross  a very  small  part  of  our  imagination  and  will 


26o 


THE  ETHICS 


be  easily  overcome ; or,  if  the  anger  which  springs  from  a 
grievous  wrong  be  not  overcome  easily,  it  will  neverthe- 
less be  overcome,  though  not  without  a spiritual  conflict, 
far  sooner  than  if  we  had  not  thus  reflected  on  the  sub- 
ject beforehand.  As  is  indeed  evident  from  V.  vi.  vii. 
viii.  We  should,  in  the  same  way,  reflect  on  courage  as 
a means  of  overcoming  fear ; the  ordinary  dangers  of  life 
should  frequently  be  brought  to  mind  and  imagined,  to- 
gether with  the  means  whereby  through  readiness  of 
resource  and  strength  of  mind  we  can  avoid  and  over- 
come them.  But  we  must  note,  that  in  arranging 
our  thoughts  and  conceptions  we  should  always  bear  in 
mind  that  which  is  good  in  every  individual  thing  ( IV. 
lxiii.  Coroll,  and  III.  lix.),  in  order  that  we  may  always 
be  determined  to  action  by  an  emotion  of  pleasure.  For 
instance,  if  a man  sees  that  he  is  too  keen  in  the  pursuit 
of  honor,  let  him  think  over  its  right  use,  the  end  for 
which  it  should  be  pursued,  and  the  means  whereby  he 
may  attain  it.  Let  him  not  think  of  its  misuse,  and 
its  emptiness,  and  the  fickleness  of  mankind,  and  the  like, 
whereof  no  man  thinks  except  through  a morbidness  of 
disposition;  with  thoughts  like  these  do  the  most  ambi- 
tious most  torment  themselves,  when  they  despair  of 
gaining  the  distinctions  they  hanker  after,  and  in  thus 
giving  vent  to  their  anger  would  fain  appear  wise. 
Wherefore  it  is  certain  that  those,  who  cry  out  the  loud- 
est against  the  misuse  of  honor  and  the  vanity  of  the 
world,  are  those  who  most  greedily  covet  it.  This  is  not 
peculiar  to  the  ambitious,  but  is  common  to  all  who  are 
ill-used  by  fortune,  and  who  are  infirm  in  spirit.  For  a 
poor  man  also,  who  is  miserly,  will  talk  incessantly  of  the 
misuse  of  wealth  and  of  the  vices  of  the  rich;  whereby 
he  merely  torments  himself,  and  shows  the  world  that  he 
is  intolerant,  not  only  of  his  own  poverty,  but  also  of 
other  people’s  riches.  So,  again,  those  who  have  been 
ill  received  by  a woman  they  love  think  of  nothing  but 
the  inconstancy,  treachery  and  other  stock  faults  of  the 
fair  sex;  all  of  which  they  consign  to  oblivion,  directly 
they  are  again  taken  into  favor  by  their  sweetheart. 
Thus  he  who  would  govern  his  emotions  and  appetite 


OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM 


261 


solely  by  the  love  of  freedom  strives,  as  far  as  he  can, 
to  gain  a knowledge  of  the  virtues  and  their  causes,  and 
to  fill  his  spirit  with  the  joy  which  arises  from  the  true 
knowledge  of  them : he  will  in  no  wise  desire  to  dwell  on 
men’s  faults,  or  to  carp  at  his  fellows,  or  to  revel  in  a 
false  show  of  freedom.  Whosoever  will  diligently  observe 
and  practice  these  precepts  (which  indeed  are  not  diffi- 
cult) will  verily,  in  a short  space  of  time,  be  able  for  the 
most  part  to  direct  his  actions  according  to  the  command- 
ments of  reason. 

Prop.  XI.  In  proportion  as  a mental  image  is  referred 
to  more  ob j e cts,  ^so__is~it-'-more~frequent , or  more  often 
vivid,  and" 'occupies  the  mind  more.  ' ________ 

Prtiof. — In  proportion  as  a mental  image  or  an  emotion 
ys  referred  to  more  objects,  so  are  there  more  causes 
whereby  it  can  be  aroused  and  fostered,  all  of  which  ( by 
hypothesis ) the  mind  contemplates  simultaneously  in  as- 
sociation with  the  given  emotion;  therefore  the  emotion 
is  mofe  frequent,  or  is  more  often  in  full  vigor,  and 
( V.  occupies  the  mind  more.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XII.  The  mental  images  of  things  are  more 
easily  associated  with  the  images  referred  to  things 
which  we  clearly  and  distinctly  understand,  than  with 
others. 

Proof. — Things,  which  we  clearly  and  distinctly  under- 
stand, are  either  the  common  properties  of  things  or  de- 
ductions therefrom  (see  Def.  of  Reason,  II.  xl.  note 
ii.),  and  are  consequently  (by  the  last  Prop.)  more 
often  aroused  in  us.  Wherefore  it  may  more  readily 
happen,  that  we  should  contemplate  other  things  in  con- 
junction with  these  than  in  conjunction  with  something 
else,  and  consequently  (II.  xviii.)  that  the  images  of  the 
said  things  should  be  more  often  associated  with  the 
images  of  these  than  with  the  images  of  something  else. 
Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XIII.  A mental  image  is  more  often  vivid,  in 
proportion  as  it  is  associated  with  a greater  number  of 
other  images. 

Proof.  — In  proportion  as  an  image  is  associated  with 
a greater  number  of  other  images,  so  ( II.  xviii.) 


262 


THE  ETHICS 


are  there  more  causes  whereby  it  can  be  aroused. 
Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XIV.  The  mind  can  bring  it  about,  that  all 
bodily  modifications  or  images  of  things  may  be  referred 
to  the  idea  of  God. 

Proof.  — There  is  no  modification  of  the  body,  whereof 
the  mind  may  not  form  some  clear  and  distinct  concep- 
tion (V.  iv.);  wherefore  it  can  bring  it  about,  that  they 
should  all  be  referred  to  the  idea  of  God  (I.  xv.).  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XV.  He  who  clearly  and  distinctly  understands 
himself  and  his  emotions  loves  God,  and  so  much  the 
more  in  proportion  as  he  more  understands  himself  and 
his  emotions. 

Proof. — He  who  clearly  and  distinctly  understands  him- 
self and  his  emotions  feels  pleasure  (III.  liii.),  and  this 
pleasure  is  (by  the  last  Prop.)  accompanied  by  the  idea 
of  God;  therefore  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  vi.)  such  an  one 
loves  God,  and  (for  the  same  reason)  so  much  the  more 
in  proportion  as  he  more  understands  himself  and  his 
emotions.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XVI.  This  love  toward  God  must  hold  the  chief 
place  in  the  mind. 

Proof.  — For  this  love  is  associated  with  all  the  modifi- 
cations of  the  body  (V.  xiv.)  and  is  fostered  by  them  all 
(V.  xv.);  therefore  (V.  xi.),  it  must  hold  the  chief  place 
in  the  mind.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XVII.  God  is  without  passions,  neither  is  he 
affected  by  any  emotion  of  pleasure  or  pain. 

Proof. — All  ideas,  in  so  far  as  they  are  referred  to  God, 
are  true  (II.  xxxii.),  that  is  (II.  Def.  iv.)  adequate;  and 
therefore  ( by  the  General  Def.  of  the  Emotions ) God  is 
without  passions.  Again,  God  cannot  pass  either  to  a 
greater  or  to  a lesser  perfection  (I.  xx.  Coroll.  ii. ) ; there- 
fore (by  Def.  of  the  Emotions,  ii.  iii.),  he  is  not  affected 
by  any  emotion  of  pleasure  or  pain. 

Corollary. — Strictly  speaking,  God  does  not  love  or  hate 
anyone.  For  God  (by  the  foregoing  Prop.)  is  not  affected 
by  any  emotion  of  pleasure  or  pain,  consequently  ( Def.  of 
the  Emotions,  vi.  vii.)  he  does  not  love  or  hate  anyone. 

Prop.  XVIII.  No  one  can  hate  God. 


OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM 


263 


Proof.  — The  idea  of  God  which  is  in  us  is  adequate  and 
perfect  (II.  xlvi.  xlvii.);  wherefore,  in  so  far  as  we  con- 
template God,  we  are  active  ( III.  iii.) ; consequently 
(III.  lix.)  there  can  be  no  pain  accompanied  by  the  idea 
of  God,  in  other  words  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  vii.),  no 
one  can  hate  God.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — Love  toward  God  cannot  be  turned  into 
hate. 

Npte. — It  maybe  objected  that,  as  we  understand  God -as 
the  cause  of  all  things,  we  by  that  very  fact  regard  God 
/ as  the  cause  of  pain.  But  I make  answer,  that,  in  so  fa^ 
as  we  understand  the  causes  of  pain,  it  to  that  extent 
(V.  iii)  ceases  to  be  a passion,  that  is,  it  ceases  to  be 
pain  (III.  lix.);  therefore,  in  so  far  as  we  understand  God 
to  be  the  cause  of  pain,  we  to  that  extent  feel  pleasure. 

Prop.  XIX.  He,  who  loves  God,  cannot  endeavor  that 
God  should^Iove-Jiim  in  return. ___ 

Proof .—  ¥ or  if  a man  should  so  endeavor,  he  would 
^^de'sire  (V.  xvii.  Coroll.)  that  God,  whom  he  loves,  should 
not  be  God,  and  consequently  he  would  desire  to  feel 
pain  (III.  xix.);  which  is  absurd  (III.  xxviii. ).  There- 
fore, he  who  loves  God,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XX.  This  love  toward  God  cannot  be  stained  by 
by  the  emotion  of  envy  or  jealousy:  contrariwise,  it  is 
the  more  fostered,  in  proportion  as  we  conceive  a greater 
number  of  men  to  be  joined  to  God  by  the  same  bond 
of  love. 

Proof.  — This  love  toward  God  is  the  highest  good 
which  we  can  seek  for  under  the  guidance  of  reason 
(IV.  xxviii.),  it  is  common  to  all  men  (IV.  xxxvi.),  and 
we  desire  that  all  should  rejoice  therein  (IV.  xxxvii.); 
therefore  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  xxiii.),  it  cannot  be 
stained  by  the  emotion  of  envy,  nor  by  the  emotion  of 
jealousy  (V.  xviii.  see  Def.  of  Jealousy,  III.  xxxv.  note); 
but,  contrariwise,  it  must  needs  be  the  more  fostered, 
in  proportion  as  we  conceive  a greater  number  of  men 
to  rejoice  therein.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — We  can  in  the  same  way  show,  that  there  is 
no  emotion  directly  contrary  to  this  love,  whereby  this 
love  can  be  destroyed;  therefore  we  may  conclude,  that 


264 


THE  ETHICS 


this  love  toward  God  is  the  most  constant  of  all  the  emo- 
tions, and  that,  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred  to  the  body, 
it  cannot  be  destroyed  unless  the  body  be  destroyed  also. 
As  to  its  nature,  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred  to  the  mind 
only,  we  shall  presently  inquire. 

I have  now  gone  through  all  the  remedies  against  the 
emotions,  or  all  that  the  mind,  considered  in  itself  alone, 
can  do  against  them.  Whence  it  appears  that  the  mind’s 
power  over  the  emotions  consists: 

I.  In  the  actual  knowledge  of  the  emotions  (V.  iv. 
note). 

II.  In  the  fact  that  it  separates  the  emotions  from  the 
thought  of  an  external  cause,  which  we  conceive  con- 
fusedly (V.  ii.  and  iv.  note). 

III.  In  the  fact,  that,  in  respect  to  time,  the  emotions 
referred  to  things,  which  we  distinctly  understand,  sur- 
pass those  referred  to  what  we  conceive  in  a confused 
and  fragmentary  manner  (V.  vii.). 

IV.  In  the  number  of  causes  whereby  those  modifica- 
tions* are  fostered,  which  have  regard  to  the  common 
properties  of  things  or  to  God  (V.  ix.  xi.). 

V.  Lastly,  in  the  order  wherein  the  mind  can  arrange 
and  associate,  one  with  another,  its  own  emotions  (V.  x. 
note  and  xii.  xiii.  xiv.). 

But  in  order  that  this  power  of  the  mind  over  the 
emotions  may  be  better  understood,  it  should  be  specially 
observed  that  the  emotions  are  called  by  us  strong,  when 
we  compare  the  emotion  of  one  man  with  the  emotion  of 
another,  and  see  that  one  man  is  more  troubled  than 
another  by  the  same  emotion;  or  when  we  are  comparing 
the  various  emotions  of  the  same  man  one  with  another, 
and  find  that  he  is  more  affected  or  stirred  by  one  emo- 
tion than  by  another.  For  the  strength  of  every  emotion 
is  defined  by  a comparison  of  our  own  power  with  the 
power  of  an  external  cause.  Now  the  power  of  the  mind 
is  defined  by  knowledge  only,  and  its  infirmity  or  passion 
is  defined  by  the  privation  of  knowledge  only:  it  there- 
fore follows,  that  that  mind  is  most  passive,  whose  great- 
est part  is  made  up  of  inadequate  ideas,  so  that  it  may 

* Affectiones.  Camerer  reads  affectus — emotions. 


OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM 


265 


be  characterized  more  readily  by  its  passive  states  than 
by  its  activities:  on  the  other  hand,  that  mind  is  most 
active,  whose  greatest  part  is  made  up  of  adequate  ideas, 
so  that,  although  it  may  contain  as  many  inadequate 
ideas  as  the  former  mind,  it  may  yet  be  more  easily 
characterized  by  ideas  attributable  to  human  virtue,  than 
by  ideas  which  tell  of  human  infirmity.  Again,  it  must 
be  observed,  that  spiritual  unhealthiness  and  misfortunes 
can  generally  be  traced  to  excessive  love  for  something 
which  is  subject  to  many  variations,  and  which  we  can 
never  become  masters  of.  For  no  one  is  solicitous 
or  anxious  about  anything,  unless  he  loves  it;  neither 
do  wrongs,  suspicions,  enmities,  etc.,  arise,  except  in 
regard  to  things  whereof  no  one  can  be  really  mas- 
ter. 

\^e  may  thus  readily  conceive  the  power  which  clear 
^and  distinct  knowledge,  and  especially  that  third  kind  of 
knowledge  (II.  xlvii.  note),  founded  on  the  actual  knowl- 
edge of  God,  possesses  over  the  emotions;  if  it  does  not 
absolutely  destroy  them,  in  so  far  as  they  are  passions 
(V.  iii.  and  iv.  note);  at  any  rate,  it  causes  .them  to 
occupy  a very  small  part  of  the  mind  .(V.  xiv.).  Fur- 
ther, it  begets  a love  toward  a thing  immutable  and 
eternal  (V.  xv.),  whereof  we  may  really  enter  into  pos- 
session (II.  xlv. ) ; neither  can  it  be  defiled  with  those 
faults  which  are  inherent  in  ordinary  love;  but  it  may 
grow  from  strength  to  strength,  and  may  engross  the 
greater  part  of  the  mind,  and  deeply  penetrate  it. 

And  now  I have  finished  with  all  that  concerns  this 
present  life ; for,  as  I said  in  the  beginning  of  this  note, 
I have  briefly  described  all  the  remedies  against  the  emo- 
tions. And  this  every  one  may  readily  have  seen  for  him- 
self, if  he  has  attended  to  what  is  advanced  in  the  pres- 
ent note,  and  also  to  the  definitions  of  the  mind  and  its 
emotions,  and,  lastly  to  Propositions  i.  and  iii.  of  Part 
III.  It  is  now,  therefore,  time  to  pass  on  to  those  mat- 
ters, which  appertain  to  the  duration  of  the  mind,  with- 
out relation  to  the  body. 

Prop.  XXI.  The  mind  can  only  imagine  anything,  or 
remember  what  is  passed,  while  the  body  endures. 


266 


THE  ETHICS 


Proof. — The  mind  does  not  express  the  actual  exist- 
ence of  its  body,  nor  does  it  imagine  the  modifications 
of  the  body  as  actual,  except  while  the  body  endures 
(II.  viii.  Coroll.);  and,  consequently,  (II.  xxvi.),  it  does 
not  imagine  anybody  as  actually  existing,  except  while 
its  own  body  endures.  Thus  it  cannot  imagine  anything 
(for  Def.  of  Imagination,  see  II.  xvii.  note),  or  re- 
member things  past,  except  while  the  body  endures  (see 
Def.  of  Memory,  II.  xviii.  note).  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXII.  Nevertheless  in  God  there  is  necessarily 
an  idea,  which  expresses  the  essence  of  this  or  that 
human  body  under  the  form  of  eternity. 

Proof. — God  is  the  cause,  not  only  of  the  existence  of 
this  or  that  human  body,  but  also  of  its  essence  ( I. 
xxv.).  This  essence,  therefore,  must  necessarily  be  con- 
ceived through  the  very  essence  of  God  (I.  Ax.  iv.),  and 
be  thus  conceived  by  a certain  eternal  necessity  (I.  xvi.); 
and  this  conception  must  necessarily  exist  in  God  (II. 

in.).  Q^E^B.'" ' ~ 

Prop.  XXIII.  The  human  mind  cannot  be  absolutely 
destroyed. _with  the  body,  but  there  remains  of  if  somg^- 

thing1  which  is  eternal.  ""  — 

Proof. — There  is  necessarily  in  God  a concept  or  idea, 
which  expresses-  The  essence  of  the  human  bo^.y^  ( last 
Prop.),  which,  therefore," -is~neGessarily---sometfiing  apper- 
taining to  the  essence  of  the  human  mind  (II.  xiii.). 
But  we  have  not  assigned  to  the  human  mind  any 
duration,  definable  by  time,  except  in  so  far  as  it 
expresses  the  actual  existence  of  the  body,  which  is 
explained  through  duration,  and  may  be  defined  by  time 
• — that  is  (II.  viii.  Coroll.),  we  do  not  assign  to  it  dura- 
tion, except  while  the  body  endures.  Yet,  as  there  is 
something,  notwithstanding,  which  is  conceived  by  a 
certain  eternal  necessity  through  the  very  essence  of  God 
(last  Prop.);  this  something,  which  appertains  to  the 
essence  of  the  mind,  will  necessarily  be  eternal.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — This  idea,  which  expresses  the  essence  of  the 
body  under  the  form  of  eternity,  is,  as  we  have  said,  a 
certain  mode  of  thinking,  which  belongs  to  the  essence 
of  the  mind,  and  is  necessarily  eternal.  Yet  it  is  not 


OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM 


267 


pos&tMe  that  we  should  remember  that  we  existed  before 
j'ur  body,  for  our  body  can  bear  no  trace  of  such  exist- 
ence, neither  can  eternity  be  defined  in  terms  of  time, 
or  have  any  relation  to  time.  But,  notwithstanding,  we 
feel  and  know  that  we  are  eternal.  For  the  mind  feels 
.those  things  that  it  conceives  by  understanding^  no  less 
than' "those  things  that  it  remembers.  For  the  eyes  of 
the  mind,  whereby  it  sees  and  observes  things,  are  none 
other  than  proofs.  Thus,  although  we  do  not  remember 
that  we  existed  before  the  body,  yet  we  feel  that  our 
mind,  in  so  far  as  it  involves  the  essence  of  the  body, 
under  the  form  of  eternity,  is  eternal,  and  that  thus  its 
existence  cannot  be  defined  in  terms  of  time,  or  explained 
through  duration.  Thus  our  mind  can  only  be  said  to 
endure,  and  its  existence  can^  onTy  TJU  defirred  ^by  a fixed 
time,  ItT^rfar  as  it  involves  the  actual  existence  of  the 
body.  Thus  far  only  has  it  the  power  of  determining 
the  existence  of  things  by  time,  and  conceiving  them 
under  the  category  of  duration. 

Prop.  XXIV.  The  more  we  understand  particular 
things,  the  more  do  we  understand  God. 

Proof. — This  is  evident  from  I.  xxv.  Coroll. 

Prop.  XXV.  The  highest  endeavor  of  the  mind,  and  the 
highest  virtue  is  to  understand  things  by  the  third  kind 
of  knowledge. 

Proof. — The  third  kind  of  knowledge  proceeds  from  an 
adequate  idea  of  certain  attributes  of  God  to  an  ade- 
quate knowledge  of  the  essence  of  things  (see  its  defini- 
tion II.  xl.  note  ii.) ; and,  in  proportion  as  we  understand 
things  more  in  this-,  wav,  we  better  understand  God  (by 
the"  last  "Prop. ) ; therefore  ( IV.  xxviii.)  -the  highesVvirttie 
of  the  mind,  that  is  (IV.  Def.  viii.)  the  power,  or 
nature,  or  (III.  vii.)  highest  endeavor  of  the  mind, 
is  to  understand  things  by  the  third  kind  of  knowledge. 
Q.E.D. 

jrop.  XXVI.  In  proportion  as  the  mind  is  more 
capable  of  understanding  things  by  the  third  kind  of 
knowledge,  it  desires  more  to  understand  things  by  that  kind. 

Proof.  — This  is  evident.  For,  in  so  far  as  we  conceive 
the  mind  to  be  capable  of  conceiving  things  by  this  kind 


268 


THE  ETHICS 


of  knowledge,  we,  to  that  extent,  conceive  it  as  deter- 
mined thus  to  conceive  things;  and  consequently  (Def. 
of  the  Emotions,  i.),  the  mind  desires  so  to  do,  in  pro- 
portion as  it  is  more  capable  thereof.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXVII.  From  this  third  kind  of  knowledge 
arises  the  highest  possible  mental  acquiescence. 

Proof. — The  highest  virtue  of  the  mind  is  to  know 
God  (IV.  xxviii.),  or  to  understand  things  by  the  third 
kind  of  knowledge  (V.  xxv.),  and  this  virtue  is  greater 
in  proportion  as  the  mind  knows  things  more  by  the 
said  kind  of  knowledge  (V.  xxiv.):  consequently,  he  who 
knows  things  by  this  kind  of  knowledge  passes  to  the 
summit  of  human  perfection,  and  is  therefore  (Def.  of 
the  Emotions,  ii.)  affected  by  the  highest  pleasure,  such 
pleasure  being  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  himself  and 
his  own  virtue:  thus  (Def.  of  the  Emotions,  xxv.),  from 
this  kind  of  knowledge  arises  the  highest  possible 
acquiescence.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXVIII.  The  endeavor  or  desire  to  know  things 
by  the  third  kind  of  knowledge  cannot  arise  from  the 
first,  but  from  the  second  kind  of  knowledge. 

Proof. — This  proposition  is  self-evident.  For  whatso- 
ever we  understand  clearly  and  distinctly,  we  understand 
either  through  itself,  or  through  that  which  is  conceived 
through  itself ; that  is,  ideas  which  are  clear  and  distinct 
in  us,  or  which  are  referred  to  the  third  kind  of  knowl- 
edge (II.  xl.  noteii.)  cannot  follow  from  ideas  that  are 
' fragmentary  aud  confused,  and  are  referred  to  knowledge 
of  the  first  kind,  but  must  follow  froltf  adequate  ideas, 
or  ideas  o£  the  second  and  third  kind  of  knowledge; 
therefore  .(Def.  of  the  Emotions,  i.),  the  desire  of  know- 
ing things  by  the  third  kind  of  knowledge  cannot  arise 
from  the  first,  but  from  the  second  kind.  Q.E.D. 

Prop.  XXIX.  Whatsoever  the  mind  understands  under 
the  form  of  eternity,  it  does  not  understand  by  virtue  of 
conceiving  the  present  actual  existence  of  the  body,  but 
by  virtue  of  conceiving  the  essence  of  the  body  under 
the  form  of  eternity. 

Proof. — In  so  far  as  the  mind  conceives  the  present 
existence  of  its  body,  it  to  that  extent  conceives  duration 


OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM 


269 


which  can  be  determined  by  time,  and  to  that  extent 
only  has  it  the  power  of  conceiving  things  in  relation  to 
time  (V.  xxi.  II.  xxvi.).  But  eternity  cannot  be  explained  in 
terms  of  duration  (I.  Def.  viii.  and  explanation).  There- 
fore to  this  extent  the  mind  has  not  the  power  of  con- 
ceiving things  under  the  form  of  eternity,  but  it  possesses 
such  power,  because  it  is  of  the  nature  of  reason  to  con- 
ceive things  under  the  form  of  eternity  (II.  xliv.  Coroll, 
ii. ),  and  also  because  it  is  of  the  nature  of  the  mind  to 
conceive  the  essence  of  the  body  under  the  form  of 
eternity  (V.  xxiii.),  for  besides  these  two  there  is  nothing 
which  belongs  to  the  essence  of  mind  (II.  xiii.).  There- 
fore this  power  of  conceiving  things  under  the  form  of 
eternity  only  belongs  to  the  mind  in  virtue  of  the  mind’s 
conceiving  the  essence  of  the  body  under  the  form  of 
eternity.  Q.  E.  D. 

Note.  — Things  are  conceived  by  us  as  actual  in  two 
ways:  either  as  existing  in  relation  to  a given  time  and 
place,  or  as  contained  in  God  and  following  from  the 
necessity  of  the  divine  nature.  Whatsoever  we  conceive 
in  this  second  way  as  true  or  real,  we  conceive  under  the 
form  of  eternity,  and  their  ideas  involve  the  eternal  and 
infinite  essence  of  God,  as  we  showed  in  II.  xlv.  and  note, 
which  see. 

Prop.  XXX.  Our  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  knows  itself  and 
the  body  under  the  form  of  eternity,  has  to  that  extent 
necessarily 'a  knowledge  of  God,  and  knows  that  it  is  in 
God,  and  is  conceived  through  God. 

Proof. — Eternity  is  the  very  essence  of  God,  in  so  far 
as  this  involves  necessary  existence  (I.  Def.  viii.).  There- 
fore to  conceive  things  under  the  form  of  eternity,  is  to 
conceive  things  in  so  far  as  they  are  conceived  through 
the  essence  of  God  as  real  entities,  or  in  so  far  as  they 
involve  existence  through  the  essence  of  God;  wherefore 
our  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  conceives  itself  and  the  body 
under  the  form  of  eternity,  has  to  that  extent  necessarily 
a knowledge,  of  God,  and  knows,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Pk6p.  XXXI.  The  third  kind  of  knowledge  depends  on 
the  mind,  as  its  formal  cause,  in  so  far  as  the  mind  , 
itself  is  eternal. 


270 


THE  ETHICS 


Proof. — The  mind  does  not  conceive  anything  under 
the  form  of  eternity,  except  in  so  far  as  it  conceives  its 
own  body  under  the  form  of  eternity  ( V.  xxix. ) ; that  is, 
except  in  so  far  as  it  is  eternal  ( V.  xxi.  xxiii. ) ; therefore 
(by  the  last  Prop.),  in  so  far  as  it  is  eternal,  it  possesses 
the  knowledge  of  God,  which  knowledge  is  necessarily 
adequate  (II.  xlvi.);  hence  the  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
eternal,  is  capable  of  knowing  everything  which  can 
follow  from  this  given  knowledge  of  God  (II.  xl.),  in 
other  words,  of  knowing  things  by  the  third  kind  of 
knowledge  (see  Def.  in  II.  xl.  note  ii. ),  whereof  accord- 
ingly the  mind  (III.  Def.  i.),  in  so  far  as  it  is  eternal, 
is  the  adequate  or  formal  cause  of  such  knowledge. 
Q.E.D. 

Note. — In  proportion,  therefore,  as  a man  is  more 
potent  in  this  kind  of  knowledge,  he  will  be  more  com- 
pletely conscious  of  himself  and  of  God ; in  other  words, 
he  will  be  more  perfect  and  blessed,  as  will  appear 
more  clearly  in  the  sequel.  But  we  must  here  observe 
that,  although  we  are  already  certain  that  the  mind  is 
eternal,  in  so  far  as  it  conceives  things  under  the  form 
of  eternity,  yet,  in  order  that  what  we  wish  to  show 
may  be  more  readily  explained  and  better  understood, 
we  will  consider  the  mind  itself,  as  though  it  had  just 
begun  to  exist  and  to  understand  things  under  the 
form  of  eternity,  as  indeed  we  have  done  hitherto;  this 
we  may  do  without  any  danger  of  error,  so  long  as  we 
are  careful  not  to  draw  any  conclusion,  unless  our 
premises  are  plain. 

Prop.  XXXII.  Whatsoever  we  understand  by  the  third 
kind  of  knowledge,  we  take  delight  in,  and  our  delight  is 
accompanied  by  the  idea  of  God  as  cause. 

Proof.  — From  this  kind  of  knowledge  arises  the  highest 
possible  mental  acquiescence,  that  is  (Def.  of  the  Emotions, 
xxv.),  pleasure,  and  this  acquiescence  is  accompanied  by 
the  idea  of  the  mind  itself  (V.  xxvii.),  and  consequently 
(V.  xxx.)  the  idea  also  of  God  as  cause.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary. — From  the  third  kind  of  knowledge  neces- 
sarily arises  the  intellectual  love  of  God.  From  this  kind 
of  knowledge  arises  pleasure  accompanied  by  the  idea  of 


r 


OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM 


271 


God  jas  cause,  that  is  ( Def.  of  the  Emotions,  vi.),  the  love 
of  God;  not  in  so  far  as  we  imagine  him  as  present  (V. 
xxix.),  but  in  so  far  as  we  understand  him  to  be  eternal; 
this  is  what  I call  the  intellectual  love  of  God. 

Prop.  XXXIII.  The  intellectual  love  of  God,  which 
arises  from  the  third  kind  of  knowledge,  is  eternal. 

Proof. — The  third  kind  of  knowledge  is  eternal  (V. 
xxxi.  I.  Ax.  iii. ) ; therefore  (by  the  same  Axiom),  the  love 
which  arises  therefrom  is  also  necessarily  eternal.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — Although  this  love  toward  God  has  (by  the  fore- 
going Prop.)  no  beginning,  it  yet  possesses  all  the  per- 
fections of  love,  just  as  though  it  had  arisen  as  we  feigned 
in  the  Corollary  of  the  last  Proposition.  Nor  is  there 
here  any  difference,  except  that  the  mind  possesses  as 
eternal  those  same  perfections  which  we  feigned  to  ac- 
crue to  it,  and  they  are  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  God 
as  eternal  cause.  If  pleasure  consists  in  the  transition 
to  a greater  perfection,  assuredly  blessedness  must  con- 
sist in  the  mind  being  endowed  with  perfection  itself. 

Prop.  XXXIV.  The  mind  is,  only  while  the  body  en- 
dures, subject  to  those  emotions  which  are  attributable  to 
passions.  ” — — 

Proof. — Imagination  is  the  idea  wherewith  the  mind 
contemplates  a thing  as  present  ( II.  xvii.  note ) ; yet  this 
idea  indicates  rather  the  present  disposition  of  the  human 
body  than  the  nature  of  the  external  thing  ( II.  xvi.  Coroll, 
ii.).  Therefore  emotion  (see  General  Def.  of  Emotions) 
is  imagination,  in  so  far  as  it  indicates  the  present  dis- 
position of  the  body;  therefore  (V.  xxi.)  the  mind  is, 
only  while  the  body  endures,  subject  to  emotions  which 
are  attributable  to  passions.  Q.E.D.  __ 

Corollary. -^HmTce~~i  t f oTiows"~tffat  no  love  save  intel- 
lectual love  is  eternal. 

Note. — If  we  look  to  men’s  general  opinion,  we  shall 
see  that  they  are  indeed  conscious  of  the  eternity  of 
their  mind,  but  that  they  confuse  eternity  with  duration, 
and  ascribe  it  to  the  imagination  or  the  memory  which  they 
believe  to  remain  after  death. 

Prop.  XXXV.  God  loves  himself  with  an  infinite  intel- 
lectual love, 


27* 


THE  ETHICS 


Proof. — God  is  absolutely  infinite  (I.  Def.  vi.),  that  is 
(II.  Def.  vi.),  the  nature  of  God  rejoices  in  infinite  per- 
fection; and  such  rejoicing  is  (II.  iii.)  accompanied  by 
the  idea  of  himself,  that  is  (I.  xi.  and  Def.  i.),  the  idea 
of  his  own  cause : now  this  is  what  we  have  ( in  V.  xxxii. 
Coroll  ) described  as  intellectual  love. 

Prop.  XXXVI.  The  intellectual  love  of  the  mind  toward 
God  is  that  very  love  of  God  whereby  God  loves  himself, 
not  in  so  far  as  he  is  infinite,  but  in  so  far  as  he  can 
be  explained  through  the  essence  of  the  human  mind 
regarded  under  the  form  of  eternity ; in  other  words,  the 
intellectual  love  of  the  mind  toward  God  is  part  of  the 
infinite  love  wherewith  God  loves  himself. 

Proof.  — This  love  of  the  mind  must  be  referred  to  the 
activities  of  the  mind  (V.  xxxii.  Coroll,  and  III.  iii.);  it 
is  itself,  indeed,  an  activity  whereby  the  mind  regards 
itself  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  God  as  cause  (V.  xxxii. 
and  Coroll.);  that  is  (I.  xxv.  Coroll,  and  II.  xi.  Coroll.) 
an  activity  whereby  God,  in  so  far  as  he  can  be  explained 
through  the  human  mind,  regards  himself  accompanied 
by  the  idea  of  himself;  therefore  (by  the  last  Prop.), 
this  love  of  the  mind  is  part  of  the  infinite  love  where- 
with God  loves  himself.  Q.E.D. 

Corollary — Hence  it  follows  that  God,  in  so  far  as  he 
loves  himself,  loves  man,  and  consequently,  that  the 
love  of  God  toward  men,  and  the  intellectual  love  of  the 
mmdr' toward  God  are  identical , — \ 

Note.  — From  what  has  been  said  we  clearly  understand, 
wherein  our  salvation,  or  blessedness,  or  freedom,  con- 
sists: namely,  in  the  constant  and  eternal  love  toward 
God,  or  in  God’s  love  toward  men.  This  love  or  blessed- 
ness is,  in  the  Bible,  called  Glory,  and  not  undeservedly. 
For  whether  this  love  be  referred  to  God  or  to  the  mind,  it 
may  rightly  be  called  acquiescence  of  spirit,  which  (Def. 
of  the  Emotions,  xxv.  xxx.)  is  not  really  distinguished 
from  glory.  In  so  far  as  it  is  referred  to  God,  it  is  (V. 
xxxv  ) pleasure,  if  we  may  still  use  that  term,  accom- 
panied by  the  idea  of  itself,  and,  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred 
to  the  mind,  it  is  the  same  (V.  xxvii.). 

Again,  since  the  essence  of  our  mind  consists  solely  in 


OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM 


273 


knowledge,  whereof  the  beginning  and  the  foundation  is 
God  (I.  xv.  and  II.  xlvii.  note),  it  becomes  clear  to  us, 
in  what  manner  and  way  our  mind,  as  to  its  essence  and 
existence,  follows  from  the  divine  nature  and  constantly 
depends  on  God.  I have  thought  it  worth  while  here  to 
call  attention  to  this,  in  order  to  show  by  this  example 
how  the  knowledge  of  particular  things,  which  I have 
railed  intuitive  or  of  the  third  kind  (II.  xl.  note  ii.),  is 
potent,  and  more  powerful  than  the  universal  knowledge, 
which  I have  styled  knowledge  of  the  second  kind.  For, 
although  in  Part  I.  I showed  in  general  terms,  that  all 
things  (and  consequently,  also,  the  human  mind)  depend 
as  to  their  essence  and  existence  on  God,  yet  that  demon- 
stration, though  legitimate  and  placed  beyond  the  chances 
of  doubt,  does  not  affect  our  mind  so  much,  as  when  the 
same  conclusion  is  derived  from  the  actual  essence  of 
some  particular  thing,  which  we  say  depends  on  God. 

Prop.  XXXVII.  There  is  nothing  in  nature,  which  is 
contrary  to  this  intellectual  love,  or  which  can  take  it 
away. 

Proof.  — This  intellectual  love  follows  necessarily  from 
the  nature  of  the  mind,  in  so  far  as  the  latter  is  regarded 
through  the  nature  of  God  as  an  eternal  truth  (V.  xxxiii. 
and  xxix.).  If,  therefore,  there  should  be  anything 
which  would  be  contrary  to  this  love,  that  thing  would 
be  contrary  to  that  which  is  true;  consequently,  that, 
which  should  be  able  to  take  away  this  love,  would  cause 
that  which  is  true  to  be  false;  an  obvious  absurdity. 
Therefore  there  is  nothing  in  nature  which,  etc.  Q.E.D. 

Note. — The  Axiom  of  Part  IV.  has  reference  to  partic- 
ular things,  in  so  far  as  they  are  regarded  in  relation 
to  a given  time  and  place:  of  this,  I think,  no  one  can 
doubt. 

Prop.  XXXVIII.  In  proportion  as  the  mind  understands 
more  things  by  the  second  and  third  kind  of  knowledge, 
it  is  less  subject  to  those  emotions  which  are  evil,  and 
stands  in  less  fear  of  death. 

Proof.  — The  mind's  essence  consists  in  knowledge  (II. 
xi.)-,  therefore,  in  proportion  as  the  mind  understands 
more  things  by  the  second  and  third  kinds  of  knowledge, 


274 


THE  ETHICS 


the  greater  will  be  the  part  of  it  that  endures  (V.  xxix. 
and  xxiii.),  and,  consequently  (by  the  last  Prop.),  the 
greater  will  be  the  part  that  is  not  touched  by  the  emo- 
tions, which  are  contrary  to  our  nature,  or  in  other  words, 
evil  (IV.  xxx.).  Thus,  in  proportion  as  the  mind  under- 
stands more  things  by  the  second  and  third  kinds  of 
knowledge,  the  greater  will  be  the  part  of  it,  that  remains 
unimpaired,  and,  consequently,  less  subject  to  emotions, 
etc.  Q.E.D. 

X/  Note. — Hence  we  understand  that  point  which  I touched 

on  in  IV.  xxxix.  note,  and  which  I promised  to  explain 
in  this  Part;  namely,  that  death  becomes  less  hurtful,  in 
proportion  as  the  mind’s  clear  and  distinct  knowledge  is 
greater,  and,  consequently,  in  proportion  as  the  mind 
loves  God  more.  Again,  since  from  the  third  kind  of 
knowledge  arises  the  highest  possible  acquiescence  (V. 
xxvii.),  it  follows  that  the  human  mind  can  attain  to 
being  of  such  a nature,  that  the  part  thereof  which  we., 
have  shown  to  perish  with  the  body  (V.  x:si.)  should  be 
of  little  importance  when  compared  with  the  part  which 
endures.  But  I will  soon  treat  of  the  subject  at  greater 
length.  i — 1 ~ 

Prop.  XXXIX.  He,  who  possesses  a body  capable  of 
the  greatest  number  of  activities,  possesses  a mind  whereof 
the  greatest  part  is  eternal. 

Proof. — He,  who  possesses  a body  capable  of  the  great- 
est number  of  activities,  is  least  agitated  by  those  emo- 
tions which  are  evil  (IV.  xxxviii.)  — that.js  (IV.  xxx.),  by 
those  emotions  which  are  contrary  to  our  natur»  f There- 
fore (V.  x.),  he  possesses  the  power  of  arranging  and 
associating  the  modifications  of  the  body  according  to  the 
intellectual  order,  and,  consequently,  of  bringing  it  about, 
that  all  the  modifications  of  the  body  should  be  referred 
to  the  idea  of  God;  whence  it  will  come  to  pass  that  (V. 
xv.)  he  will  be  affected  with  love  toward  God,  which 
(V.  xvi.)  must  occupy  or  constitute  the  chief  part  of  the  ; 
mind;  therefore  (V.  xxxiii.),  such  a man  will  possess  a 
mind  whereof  the  chief  " " 1 ^ ™ ^ 


number  of  activities,  there  is  no  doubt  but  that  they 


Note.  — Since  human 


OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM 


275 


may  be  of  such  a nature,  that  they  may  be  referred  to 
minds  possessing  a great  knowledge  of  themselves  and 
of  God,  and  whereof  the  greatest  or  chief  part  is  eternal, 
and,  therefore,  that  they  should  scarcely  fear  death.  But, 
in  order  that  this  may  be  understood  more  clearly,  we 
must  here  call  to  mind,  that  we  live  in  a state  of  per- 
petual variation,  and,  according  as  we  are  changed  for 
the  better  or  the  worse,  we  are  called  happy  or  un- 
happy. 

For  he,  who,  from  being  an  infant  or  a child,  becomes 
a corpse,  is  called  unhappy;  whereas  it  is  set  down  to 
happiness,  if  we  have  been  able  to  live  through  the 
whole  period  of  life  with  a sound  mind  in  a sound  body. 
And,  in  reality,  he,  who,  as  in  the  case  of  an  infant  or 
a child,  has  a body  capable  of  very  few  activities,  and 
depending,  for  the  most  part,  on  external  causes,  has  a 
mind  which,  considered  in  itself  alone,  is  scarcely  con- 
scious of  itself,  or  of  God,  or  of  things ; whereas,  he,  who 
has  a body  capable  cf  very  many  activities,  has  a mind 
which,  considered  in  itself  alone,  is  highly  conscious  of 
itself,  of  God,  and  of  things.  In  this  life,  therefore,  we 
primarily  endeavor  to  bring  it  about,  that  the  body  of  a 
child,  in  so  far  as  its  nature  allows  and  conduces  thereto, 
may  be  changed  into  something  else  capable  of  very 
many  activities,  and  referable  to  a mind  which  is  highly 
conscious  of  itself,  of  God,  and  of  things;  and  we  desire 
so  to  change  it,  that  what  is  referred  to  its  imagination 
and  memory  may  become  insignificant,  in  comparison 
with  its  intellect,  as  I have  already  said  in  the  note  to 
the  last  Proposition. 

Prop.  XL.  In  proportion  as  each  thing  possesses  more 
of  perfection,  so  is  it  more  active,  and  less  passive ; and, 
vice  versd,  in  proportion  as  it  is  more  active,  so  is  it  more 
perfect. 

Proof.  — In  proportion  as  each  thing  is  more  perfect, 
it  possesses  more  of  reality  (II.  Def.  vi.),  and,  conse- 
quently (III.  iii.  and  note),  it  is  to  that  extent  more 
active  and  less  passive.  This  demonstration  may  be  re- 
versed, and  thus  prove  that,  in  proportion  as  a thing  is 
more  active,  so  is  it  more  perfect.  Q.E.D. 


276 


THE  ETHICS 


Corollary.  — Hence  it  follows  that  the  part  of  the  mind 
which  endures,  be  it  great  or  small,  is  more  perfect  than 
the  rest.  For  the  eternal  part  of  the  mind  (V.  xxiii. 
xxix. ) is  the  understanding,  through  which  alone  we  are 
said  to  act  (III.  iii. ) ; the  part  which  we  have  shown  to 
perish  is  the  imagination  (V.  xxi.),  through  which  only 
we  are  said  to  be  passive  (-IIL  iii.  and  general  Def.  of 
the  Emotions) ; therefore,  the  former,  be  it  great  or 
small,  is  more  perfect  than  the  latter.  Q.  E.  D. 

Note.  — Such  are  the  doctrines  which  I had  purposed 
to  set  forth  concerning  the  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  is  re- 
garded without  relation  to  the  body;  whence,  as  also  from 
I.  xxi.  and  other  places,  it  is  plain  that  our  mind,  in  so 
far  as  it  understands,  is  an  eternal  mode  of  thinking, 
which  is  determined  by  another  eternal  mode  of  thinking, 
and  this  other  by  a third,  and  so  on  to  infinity;  so  that 
all  taken  together  at  once  constitute  the  eternal  and  in- 
finite intellect  of  God. 

Prop.  XLI.  Even  if  we  did  not  know  that  our  mind  is 
eternal,  we  should  still  consider  as  of  primary  importance 
piety  and  religion,  and  generally  all  things  which,  in 
Part.  IV.,  we  showed  to  be  attributable  to  courage  and 
high-mindedness. 

Proof.  — The  first  and  only  foundation  of  virtue,  or  the 
rule  of  right  living  is  (IV.  xxii.  Coroll,  and  xxiv.)  seek- 
ing one’s  own  true  interest.  N ow^.. white"  we  'determ ined 
what  reason  prescribes' as'  liseful,  we  took  no  account  of 
the  mind’s  eternity,  which  has  only  become  known  to  us 
in  this  Fifth  Part.  Although  we  were  ignorant  at  that 
time  that  the  mind  is  eternal,  we  nevertheless  stated  that 
the  qualities  attributable  to  . courage  and  high-minded- 
ness are  of  primary  importance.  Therefore,  even  if  we 
were  still  ignorant  of  this  doctrine,  we  should  yet  put 
the  aforesaid  precepts  of  reason  in  the  first  place.  Q.E.  D. 

Note.  — The  general  belief  of  the  multitude  seems  to 
be  different.  Most  people  seem  to  believe  that  they  are 
free,  in  so  far  as  they  may  obey  their  lusts,  and  that 
they  cede  their  rights,  in  so  far  as  they  are  bound  to 
live  according  to  the  commandments  of  the  divine  law. 
They  therefore  believe  that  piety,  religion,  and  generally, 


OF  HUMAN  FREEDOM 


277 


all  things  attributable  to  firmness  of  mind,  are  burdens, 
which,  after  death,  they  hope  to  lay  aside,  and  to  re- 
ceive the  reward  for  their  bondage,  that  is,  for  their 
piety  and  religion;  it  is  not  only  by  this  hope,  but  also, 
and  chiefly,  by  the  fear  of  being  horribly  punished  after 
death,  that  they  are  induced  to  live  according  to  the  di- 
vine commandments,  so  far  as  their  feeble  and  infirm 
spirit  will  carry  them. 

If  men  had  not  this  hope  and  this  fear,  but  believed 
that  the  mind  perishes  with  the  body,  and  that  no  hope 
of  prolonged  life  remains  for  the  wretches  who  are 
broken  down  with  the  burden  of  piety,  they  would  re- 
turn to  their  own  inclinations,  controlling  everything  in 
accordance  with  their  lusts,  and  desiring  to  obey  fortune 
rather  than  themselves.  Such  a course  appears  to  me 
not  less  absurd  than  if  a man,  because  he  does  not  be- 
lieve that  he  can  by  wholesome  food  sustain  his  body 
for  ever,  should  wish  to  cram  himself  with  poisons  and 
deadly  fare;  or  if,  because  he  sees  that  the  mind  is  not 
eternal  or  immortal,  he  should  prefer  to  be  out  of  his 
mind  altogether,  and  to  live  without  the  use  of  reason; 
these  ideas  are  so  absurd  as  to  be  scarcely  worth  refuting. 

Prop.  XLII.  Blessedness  is  not  the  reward  of  virtue, 
but  virtue  itself;  neither  do  we  rejoice  therein,  because 
we  control  our  lusts,  but  contrariwise,  because  we  rejoice 
therein,  we  are  able  to  control'  our  lusts. 

Proof.  — Blessedness  consists  in  love  toward  God  (V. 
xxxvi.  and  note),  which  love  springs  from  the  third  kind 
of  knowledge  (V.  xxxii.  Coroll. );  therefore  this  love  (III. 
iii.  lix. ) must  be  referred  to  the  mind,  in  so  far  as  the 
latter  is  active ; therefore  ( IV.  Def . viii. ) it  is  virtue  it- 
self. This  was  our  first  point.  Again,  in  proportion  as 
the  mind  rejoices  more  in  this  divine  love  or  blessedness, 
so  does  it  the  more  understand  ( V.  xxxii. ) ; that  is  ( V. 
iii.  Coroll. ),  so  much  the  more  power  has  it  over  the 
emotions,  and  ( V.  xxxviii. ) so  much  the  less  is  it  sub- 
ject to  those  emotions  which  are  evil;  therefore,  in  pro- 
portion as  the  mind  rejoices  in  this  divine  love  or 
blessedness,  so  has  it  the  power  of  controlling  lusts.  And, 
since  human  power  in  controlling  the  emotions  consists 


278 


THE  ETHICS 


solely  in  the  understanding,  it  follows  that  no  one  re- 
joices in  blessedness,  because  he  has  controlled  his  lusts, 
but,  contrariwise,  his  power  of  controlling  his  lusts  arises 
from  this  blessedness  itself.  Q.E.D. 

Note.  — I have  thus  completed  all  I wished  to  set  forth 
touching  the  mind’s  power  over  the  emotions  and  the 
mind’s  freedom.  Whence  it  appears,  how  potent  is  the 
wise  man,  and  how  much  he  surpasses  the  ignorant  man, 
who  is  driven  only  by  his  lusts.  For  the  ignorant  man 
is  not  only  distracted  in  various  ways  by  external  causes 
without  ever  gaining  the  true  acquiescence  of  his  spirit, 
but  moreover  lives,  as  it  were  unwitting  of  himself,  and 
of  God,  and  of  things,  and  as  soon  as  he  ceases  to  suffer, 
ceases  also  to  be. 

Whereas  the  wise  man,  in  so  far  as  he  is  regarded  as 
such,  is  scarcely  at  all  disturbed  in  spirit,  but,  being 
conscious  of  himself,  and  of  God,  and  of  things,  by  a 
certain  eternal  necessity,  never  ceases  to  be,  but  always 
possesses  true  acquiescence  of  his  spirit. 

If  the  way  which  I have  pointed  out  as  leading  to  this 
result  seems  exceedingly  hard,  it  may  nevertheless  be 
discovered.  Needs  must  it  be  hard,  since  it  is  so  seldom 
found.  How  would  it  be  possible,  if  salvation  were  ready 
to  our  hand,  and  could  without  great  labor  be  found, 
that  it  should  be  by  almost  all  men  neglected  ? But  all 
things  excellent  are  as  difficult  as  they  are  rare. 

/V  obit 


CORRESPONDENCE 


LETTER  I.  (I.*) 

Henry  Oldenburg  to  B.  de  Spinoza. 

[Oldenburg,  after  complimenting  Spinoza,  asks  him  to  enter  into  a 
philosophical  correspondence.] 

Illustrious  Sir,  and  Most  Worthy  Friend, — So  pain- 
ful to  me  was  the  separation  from  you  the  other  day 
after  our  meeting  in  your  retreat  at  Rhijnsburg,  that  it 
is  my  first  endeavor,  now  that  I am  returned  to  Eng- 
land, to  renew,  as  far  as  is  possible  by  correspondence, 
my  intercourse  with  you.  Solid  learning,  conjoined  with 
courtesy  and  refinement  of  manners  ( wherewith  both 
nature  and  art  have  most  amply  endowed  you),  carries 
with  it  such  charms  as  to  command  the  love  of  every 
honorable  and  liberally-educated  man.  Let  us  then,  most 
excellent  sir,  join  hands  in  sincere  friendship,  and  let  us 
foster  the  feeling  with  every  zealous  endeavor  and  kind 
office  in  our  power.  Whatever  my  poor  means  can  fur- 
nish I beg  you  to  look  on  as  your  own.  Allow  me  in 
return  to  claim  a share  in  the  riches  of  your  talents,  as 
I may  do  without  inflicting  any  loss  on  yourself. 

We  conversed  at  Rhijnsburg  of  God,  of  extension,  of 
infinite  thought,  of  the  differences  and  agreements  be- 
tween these,  of  the  nature  of  the  connection  between  the 
human  soul  and  body,  and  further,  of  the  principles  of 
the  Cartesian  and  Baconian  philosophies. 

But,  as  we  then  spoke  of  these  great  questions  merely 
cursorily  and  by  the  way,  and  as  my  mind  has  been  not 
a little  tormented  with  them  since,  I will  appeal  to  the 

*The  number  of  each  letter  as  arranged  in  Van  Vloten’s  edition  is 
given  in  parentheses. 


(279) 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  II. 


280 

rights  of  our  newly  cemented  friendship,  and  most 
affectionately  beg  you  to  give  me  at  somewhat  greater 
length  your  opinion  on  the  subjects  I have  mentioned. 
On  two  points  especially  I ask  for  enlightenment,  if  I 
may  presume  so  far;  first:  In  what  do  you  place  the 
true  distinction  between  thought  and  matter  ? secondly  : 
What  do  you  consider  to  be  the  chief  defects  in  the  Car- 
tesian and  Baconian  philosophies,  and  how  do  you  think 
they  might  best  be  removed,  and  something  more  sound 
substituted  ? The  more  freely  you  write  to  me  on  these 
and  similar  subjects,  the  more  closely  will  you  tie  the 
bonds  of  our  friendship,  and  the  stricter  will  be  the  obli- 
gation laid  on  me  to  repay  you,  as  far  as  possible,  with 
similar  services. 

There  is  at  present  in  the  press  a collection  of  physio- 
logical discourses  written  by  an  Englishman  of  noble 
family  and  distinguished  learning.*  They  treat  of  the 
nature  and  elasticity  of  the  air,  as  proved  by  forty-three 
experiments ; also  of  its  fluidity,  solidity,  and  other  anal- 
ogous matters.  As  soon  as  the  work  is  published,  I 
shall  make  a point  of  sending  it  to  you  by  any  friend 
who  may  be  crossing  the  sea.  Meanwhile,  farewell,  and 
remember  your  friend,  who  is 

Yours,  in  all  affection  and  zeal, 

Henry  Oldenburg. 

London,  16-26  Aug.,  1661. 


LETTER  II.  (II.) 

Spinoza  to  Oldenburg. 

[Answer  to  Letter  I.  Spinoza  defines  «God,®  and  «attribute,®  and 
sends  definitions,  axioms,  and  first  four  propositions  of  Book  I. 
of  Ethics.  Some  errors  of  Bacon  and  Descartes  discussed.] 

Illustrious  Sir,  — How  pleasant  your  friendship  is  to 
me,  you  may  yourself  judge,  if  your  modesty  will  allow 
you  to  reflect  on  the  abundance  of  your  own  excellences. 


* Robert  Boyle. 


LETTER  II.] 


CORRESPONDENCE 


281 


Indeed  the  thought  of  these  makes  me  seem  not  a little 
bold  in  entering  into  such  a compact,  the  more  so  when 
I consider  that  between  friends  all  things,  and  especially 
things  spiritual,  ought  to  be  in  common.  However,  this 
must  lie  at  the  charge  of  your  modesty  and  kindness 
rather  than  of  myself.  You  have  been  willing  to  lower 
yourself  through  the  former  and  to  fill  me  with  the 
abundance  of  the  latter,  till  I am  no  longer  afraid  to 
accept  the  close  friendship,  which  you  hold  out  to  me, 
and  which  you  deign  to  ask  of  me  in  return;  no  effort 
on  my  part  shall  be  spared  to  render  it  lasting. 

As  for  my  mental  endowments,  such  as  they  are,  I 
would  willingly  allow  you  to  share  them,  even  though  I 
knew  it  would  be  to  my  own  great  hindrance.  But  this 
is  not  meant  as  an  excuse  for  denying  to  you  what  you 
ask  by  the  rights  of  friendship.  I will  therefore  en- 
deavor to  explain  my  opinions  on  the  topics  you  touched 
on;  though  I scarcely  hope,  unless  your  kindness  inter- 
vene, that  I shall  thus  draw  the  bonds  of  our  friendship 
closer. 

I will  then  begin  by  speaking  briefly  of  God,  whom 
I define  as  a Being  consisting  in  infinite  attributes, 
whereof  each  is  infinite  or  supremely  perfect,  after  its 
kind.  You  must  observe  that  by  attribute  I mean  every- 
thing, which  is  conceived  through  itself  and  in  itself,  so 
that  the  conception  of  it  does  not  involve  the  conception 
of  anything  else.  For  instance,  extension  is  conceived 
through  itself  and  in  itself,  but  motion  is  not.  The  lat- 
ter is  conceived  through  something  else,  for  the  conception 
of  it  implies  extension. 

That  the  definition  above  given  of  God  is  true  appears 
from  the  fact,  that  by  God  we  mean  a Being  supremely 
perfect  and  absolutely  infinite.  That  such  a Being  exists 
may  easily  be  proved  from  the  definition;  but  as  this  is 
not  the  place  for  such  proof,  I will  pass  it  over.  What  I 
am  bound  here  to  prove,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  first  inquiry 
of  my  distinguished  questioner,  are  the  following  conse- 
quences : first,  that  in  the  universe  there  cannot  exist  two 
substances  without  their  differing  utterly  in  essence ; 
secondly,  that  substance  cannot  be  produced  or  created — 


282 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  II. 


existence  pertains  to  its  actual  essence;  thirdly,  that  all 
substance  must  be  infinite  or  supremely  perfect  after  its  kind. 

When  these  points  have  been  demonstrated,  my  dis- 
tinguished questioner  will  readily  perceive  my  drift,  if  he 
reflects  at  the  same  time  on  the  definition  of  God.  In 
order  to  prove  them  clearly  and  briefly,  I can  think  of 
nothing  better  than  to  submit  them  to  the  bar  of  your 
judgment  proved  in  the  geometrical  method.*  I therefore 
enclose  them  separately  and  await  your  verdict  upon 
them. 

Again,  you  ask  me  what  errors  I detect  in  the  Carte- 
sian and  Baconian  philosophies.  It  is  not  my  custom  to 
expose  the  errors  of  others,  nevertheless  I will  yield  to 
your  request.  The  first  and  the  greatest  error  is,  that 
these  philosophers  have  strayed  so  far  from  the  knowledge 
of  the  first  cause  and  origin  of  all  things;  the  second  is, 
that  they  did  not  know  the  true  nature  of  the  human 
mind;  the  third,  that  they  never  grasped  the  true  cause 
of  error.  The  necessity  for  correct  knowledge  on  these 
three  points  can  only  be  ignored  by  persons  completely 
devoid  of  learning  and  training. 

That  they  have  wandered  astray  from  the  knowledge 
of  the  first  cause,  and  of  the  human  mind,  may  easily  be 
gathered  from  the  truth  of  the  three  propositions  given 
above;  I therefore  devote  myself  entirely  to  the  demon- 
stration of  the  third  error.  Of  Bacon  I shall  say  very 
little,  for  he  speaks  very  confusedly  on  the  point,  and 
works  out  scarcely  any  proofs:  he  simply  narrates.  In 
the  first  place  he  assumes  that  the  human  intellect  is 
liable  to  err,  not  only  through  the  fallibility  of  the  senses, 
but  also  solely  through  its  own  nature,  and  that  it  frames 
its  conceptions  in  accordance  with  the  analogy  of  its  own 
nature,  not  with  the  analogy  of  the  universe,  so  that  it  is 
like  a mirror  receiving  rays  from  external  objects  un- 
equally, and  mingling  its  own  nature  with  the  nature  of 
things,  etc. 

Secondly,  that  the  human  intellect  is,  by  reason  of  its 
own  nature,  prone  to  abstractions ; such  things  as  are  in 
flux  it  feigns  to  be  constant,  etc. 

* The  allusion  is  to  Eth.  I.,  Beginning — Prop.  iv. 


LETTER  III.] 


CORRESPONDENCE 


283 


Thirdly,  that  the  human  intellect  continually  aug- 
ments, and  is  unable  to  come  to  a stand  or  to  rest  con- 
tent. The  other  causes  which  he  assigns  may  all  be 
reduced  to  the  one  Cartesian  principle,  that  the  human 
will  is  free  and  more  extensive  than  the  intellect,  or,  as 
Verulam  himself  more  confusedly  puts  it,  that  (<the 
understanding  is  not  a dry  light,  but  receives  infusion 
from  the  will.®  (We  may  here  observe  that  Verulam 
often  employs  ® intellect  ® as  synonymous  with  mind, 
differing  in  this  respect  from  Descartes.)  This  cause, 
then,  leaving  aside  the  others  as  unimportant,  I shall 
show  to  be  false;  indeed  its  falsity  would  be  evident  to 
its  supporters,  if  they  would  consider,  that  will  in  general 
differs  from  this  or  that  particular  volition  in  the  same 
way  as  whiteness  differs  from  this  or  that  white  object, 
or  humanity  from  this  or  that  man.  It  is,  therefore,  as 
impossible  to  conceive,  that  will  is  the  cause  of  a given 
volition,  as  to  conceive  that  humanity  is  the  cause  of 
Peter  and  Paul. 

Hence,  as  will  is  merely  an  entity  of  the  reason,  and 
cannot  be  called  the  cause  of  particular  volitions,  and  as 
some  cause  is  needed  for  the  existence  of  such  volitions, 
these  latter  cannot  be  called  free,  but  are  necessarily  such 
as  they  are  determined  by  their  causes ; lastly,  according 
to  Descartes,  errors  are  themselves  particular  volitions; 
hence  it  necessarily  follows  that  errors,  or,  in  other  words, 
particular  volitions,  are  not  free,  but  are  determined  by 
external  causes,  and  in  nowise  by  the  will.  This  is  what 
I undertook  to  prove. 


LETTER  III.  (III.) 

Oldenburg  to  Spinoza. 

[Oldenburg  propounds  several  questions  concerning  God  and  his 
existence,  thought,  and  the  axioms  of  Eth.  I.  He  also  informs 
Spinoza  of  a philosophical  society,  and  promises  to  send  Boyle’s 
book.] 

Most  excellent  Friend, — Your  learned  letter  has  been 
delivered  to  me,  and  read  with  great  pleasure. 


284 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  III. 


I highly  approve  of  your  geometrical  method  of  proof, 
but  I must  set  it  down  to  my  dullness,  that  I cannot 
follow  with  readiness  what  you  set  forth  with  such 
accuracy.  Suffer  me,  then,  I beg,  to  expose  the  slow- 
ness of  my  understanding,  while  I put  the  following 
questions,  and  beg  of  you  to  answer  them. 

First.  Do  you  clearly  and  indisputably  understand 
solely  from  the  definition  you  have  given  of  God,  that 
such  a Being  exists  ? For  my  part,  when  I reflect  that 
definitions  contain  only  the  conceptions  formed  by  our 
minds,  and  that  our  mind  forms  many  conceptions  of 
things  which  do  not  exist,  and  is  very  fertile  in  multi- 
plying and  amplifying  what  it  has  conceived,  I do  not 
yet  see,  that  from  the  conception  I have  of  God  I can 
infer  God’s  existence.  I am  able  by  a mental  combina- 
tion of  all  the  perfections  I perceive  in  men,  in  animals, 
in  vegetables,  in  minerals,  etc.,  to  conceive  and  to  form 
an  idea  of  some  single  substance  uniting  in  itself  all 
such  excellences ; indeed  my  mind  is  able  to  multiply  and 
augment  such  excellences  indefinitely ; it  may  thus  figure 
forth  for  itself  a most  perfect  and  excellent  Being,  but 
there  would  be  no  reason  thence  to  conclude  that  such  a 
Being  actually  exists. 

Secondly.  I wish  to  ask,  whether  you  think  it  unques- 
tionable, that  body  cannot  be  limited  by  thought,  or 
thought  by  body;  seeing  that  it  still  remains  undecided, 
what  thought  is,  whether  it  be  a physical  motion  or  a 
spiritual  act  quite  distinct  from  body  ? 

Thirdly.  Do  you  reckon  the  axioms,  which  you  have 
sent  to  me,  as  indemonstrable  principles  known  by  the 
light  of  nature  and  needing  no  proof  ? Perhaps  the  first 
is  of  this  nature,  but  I do  not  see  how  the  other  three 
can  be  placed  in  a like  category.  The  second  assumes 
that  nothing  exists  in  the  universe  save  substances  and 
accidents,  but  many  persons  would  say  that  time  and 
place  cannot  be  classed  either  as  one  or  the  other.  Your 
third  axiom,  that  things  having  different  attributes 
have  no  quality  in  common,  is  so  far  from  being  clear  to 
me,  that  its  contrary  seems  to  be  shown  in  the  whole  uni- 
verse. All  things  known  to  us  agree  in  certain  respects 


LETTER  III.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


285 


and  differ  in  others.  Lastly,  your  fourth  axiom,  that 

WHEN  THINGS  HAVE  NO  QUALITY  IN  COMMON,  ONE  CANNOT  BE 

produced  by  another,  is  not  so  plain  to  my  groping  in- 
telligence as  to  stand  in  need  of  no  further  illumination. 
God  has  nothing  actually  in  common  with  created  things, 
yet  nearly  all  of  us  believe  him  to  be  their  cause. 

As  you  see  that  in  my  opinion  your  axioms  are  not 
established  beyond  all  the  assaults  of  doubt,  you  will 
readily  gather  that  the  propositions  you  have  based  upon 
them  do  not  appear  to  me  absolutely  firm.  The  more  I 
reflect  upon  them,  the  more  are  doubts  suggested  to  my 
mind  concerning  them. 

As  to  the  first,  I submit  that  two  men  are  two  sub- 
stances with  the  same  attribute,  inasmuch  as  both  are 
rational ; whence  I infer  that  there  can  be  two  substances 
with  the  same  attribute. 

As  to  the  second,  I opine  that,  as  nothing  can  be  its 
own  cause,  it  is  hardly  within  the  scope  of  our  intellect 
to  pronounce  on  the  truth  of  the  proposition,  that  sub- 
stance CANNOT  BE  PRODUCED  EVEN  BY  ANY  OTHER  SUBSTANCE. 

Such  a proposition  asserts  all  substances  to  be  self-caused, 
and  all  and  each  to  be  independent  of  one  another,  thus 
making  so  many  gods,  and  therefore  denying  the  first 
cause  of  all  things.  This,  I willingly  confess,  I cannot 
understand,  unless  you  will  be  kind  enough  to  explain  your 
theory  on  this  sublime  subject  somewhat  more  fully  and 
simply,  informing  me  what  may  be  the  origin  and  mode 
of  production  of  substances,  and  the  mutual  interdepend- 
ence and  subordination  of  things.  I most  strenuously  beg 
and  conjure  you  by  that  friendship  which  we  have  entered 
into,  to  answer  me  freely  and  faithfully  on  these  points; 
you  may  rest  assured,  that  everything  which  you  think  fit 
to  communicate  to  me  will  remain  untampered  with  and 
safe,  for  I will  never  allow  anything  to  become  public 
through  me  to  your  hurt  or  disadvantage.  In  our  philo- 
sophical society  we  proceed  diligently  as  far  as  opportu- 
nity offers  with  our  experiments  and  observations,  lingering 
over  the  compilation  of  the  history  of  mechanic  arts,  with 
the  idea  that  the  forms  and  qualities  of  things  can  best 
be  explained  from  mechanical  principles,  and  that  all 


286 


SPINOZA'S 


[LETTER  IV. 


natural  effects  can  be  produced  through  motion,  shape, 
and  consistency,  without  reference  to  inexplicable  forms 
or  occult  qualities,  which  are  but  the  refuge  of  ignorance. 

I will  send  the  book  I promised,  whenever  the  Dutch 
Ambassadors  send  (as  they  frequently  do)  a messenger  to 
the  Hague,  or  whenever  some  other  friend  whom  I can 
trust  goes  your  way.  I beg  you  to  excuse  my  prolixity 
and  freedom,  and  simply  ask  you  to  take  in  good  part,  as 
one  friend  from  another,  the  straightforward  and  unpol- 
ished reply  I have  sent  to  your  letter,  believing  me  to  be 
without  deceit  or  affectation, 

Yours  most  faithfully, 

Henry  Oldenburg. 

London,  27  Sept.,  1661. 


LETTER  IV.  (IV.) 

Spinoza  to  Oldenburg. 

[Spinoza  answers  some  of  Oldenburg’s  questions  and  doubts,  but  has 
not  time  to  reply  to  all,  as  he  is  just  setting  out  for  Amsterdam.] 

Illustrious  Sir: — As  I was  starting  for  Amsterdam, 
where  I intend  staying  for  a week  or  two,  I received  your 
most  welcome  letter,  and  noted  the  objections  you  raise 
to  the  three  propositions  I sent  you.  Not  having  time  to 
reply  fully,  I will  confine  myself  to  these  three. 

To  the  first  I answer,  that  not  from  every  definition 
does  the  existence  of  the  thing  defined  follow,  but  only 
(as  I showed  in  a note  appended  to  the  three  proposi- 
tions) from  the  definition  or  idea  of  an  attribute,  that  is 
(as  I explained  fully  in  the  definition  given  of  God)  of 
a thing  conceived  through  and  in  itself.  The  reason  for 
this  distinction  was  pointed  out,  if  I mistake  not,  in  the 
above-mentioned  note  sufficiently  clear  at  any  rate  for 
a philosopher,  who  is  assumed  to  be  aware  of  the  differ- 
ence between  a fiction  and  a clear  and  distinct  idea,  and 
also  of  the  truth  of  the  axiom  that  every  definition  or 
clear  and  distinct  idea  is  true.  When  this  has  been  duly 


LETTER  IV.] 


CORRESPONDENCE 


287 


noted,  I do  not  see  what  more  is  required  for  the  solu- 
tion of  your  first  question. 

I therefore  proceed  to  the  solution  of  the  second, 
wherein  you  seem  to  admit  that,  if  thought  does  not 
belong  to  the  nature  of  extension,  then  extension  will 
not  he  limited  by  thought;  your  doubt  only  involves  the 
example  given.  But  observe,  I beg,  if  we  say  that  exten- 
sion is  not  limited  by  extension  but  by  thought,  is  not 
this  the  same  as  saying  that  extension  is  not  infinite 
absolutely,  but  only  as  far  as  extension  is  concerned,  in 
other  words,  infinite  after  its  kind  ? But  you  say : per- 
haps thought  is  a corporeal  action:  be  it  so,  though  I by 
no  means  grant  it:  you,  at  any  rate,  will  not  deny  that 
extension,  in  so  far  as  it  is  extension,  is  not  thought,  and 
this  is  all  that  is  required  for  explaining  my  definition 
and  proving  the  third  proposition. 

Thirdly.  You  proceed  to  object,  that  my  axioms  ought 
not  to  be  ranked  as  universal  notions.  I will  not  dispute 
this  point  with  you;  but  you  further  hesitate  as  to  their 
truth,  seeming  to  desire  to  show  that  their  contrary  is 
more  probable.  Consider,  I beg,  the  definition  which  I 
gave  of  substance  and  attribute,  for  on  that  they  all 
depend.  When  I say  that  I mean  by  substance  that 
which  is  conceived  through  and  in  itself;  and  that  I 
mean  by  modification  or  accident  that,  which  is  in  some- 
thing else,  and  is  conceived  through  that  wherein  it  is, 
evidently  it  follows  that  substance  is  by  nature  prior  to 
its  accidents.  For  without  the  former  the  latter  can 
neither  be  nor  be  conceived.  Secondly,  it  follows  that, 
besides  substances  and  accidents,  nothing  exists  really  or 
externally  to  the  intellect.  For  everything  is  conceived 
either  through  itself  or  through  something  else,  and  the 
conception  of  it  either  involves  or  does  not  involve  the 
conception  of  something  else.  Thirdly,  it  follows  that 
things  which  possess  different  attributes  have  nothing  in 
common.  For  by  attribute  I have  explained  that  I mean 
something,  of  which  the  conception  does  not  involve  the 
conception  of  anything  else.  Fourthly,  and  lastly,  it  fol- 
lows that,  if  two  things  have  nothing  in  common,  one 
cannot  be  the  cause  of  the  other.  For,  as  there  would 


288 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  V. 


be  nothing  in  common  between  the  effect  and  the  cause, 
the  whole  effect  would  spring  from  nothing.  As  for  your 
contention  that  God  has  nothing  actually  in  common  with 
created  things,  I have  maintained  the  exact  opposite  in 
my  definition.  I said  that  God  is  a being  consisting  of  in- 
finite attributes,  whereof  each  one  is  infinite  or  supremely 
perfect  after  its  kind.  With  regard  to  what  you  say  con- 
cerning my  first  proposition,  I beg  you,  my  friend,  to 
bear  in  mind,  that  men  are  not  created,  but  bom,  and 
that  their  bodies  already  exist  before  birth,  though 
under  different  forms.  You  draw  the  conclusion,  wherein 
I fully  concur,  that,  if  one  particle  of  matter  be  annihi- 
lated, the  whole  of  extension  would  forthwith  vanish. 
My  second  proposition  does  not  make  many  gods  but 
only  one,  to  wit,  a Being  consisting  of  infinite  attributes; 
etc. 


LETTER  V.  (V.) 

Oldenburg  to  Spinoza. 

[Oldenburg  sends  Boyle’s  book,  and  laments  that  Spinoza  has  not 
been  able  to  answer  all  his  doubts.] 

Most  respected  Friend:  — Please  accept  herewith  the 
book  I promised  you,  and  write  me  in  answer  your 
opinion  on  it,  especially  on  the  remarks  about  nitre,  and 
about  fluidity,  and  solidity.  I owe  you  the  warmest 
thanks  for  your  learned  second  letter,  which  I received 
to-day,  but  I greatly  grieve  that  your  journey  to  Amster- 
dam prevented  you  from  answering  all  my  doubts.  I beg 
you  will  supply  the  omission,  as  soon  as  you  have  leisure. 
You  have  much  enlightened  me  in  your  last  letter,  but 
have  not  yet  dispelled  all  my  darkness;  this  result  will, 
I believe,  be  happily  accomplished,  when  you  send  me 
clear  and  distinct  information  concerning  the  first  origin 
of  things.  Hitherto  I have  been  somewhat  in  doubt  as 
to  the  cause  from  which,  and  the  manner  in  which  things 
took  their  origin;  also,  as  to  what  is  the  nature  of  their 
connection  with  the  first  cause,  if  such  there  be.  All 


LETTER  VII.] 


CORRESPONDENCE 


289 


that  I hear  or  read  on  the  subject  seems  inconclusive. 
Do  you  then,  my  very  learned  master,  act,  as  it  were,  as 
my  torch-bearer  in  the  matter.  You  will  have  no  reason 
to  doubt  my  confidence  and  gratitude.  Such  is  the  earn- 
est petition  of  Yours  most  faithfully, 

Henry  Oldenburg. 


LETTER  VI.  (VI.) 

Spinoza  to  Oldenburg. 

[Containing  detailed  criticisms  by  Spinoza  of  Robert  Boyle’s  book.] 

Omitted. 


LETTER  VII.  (VII.) 

Oldenburg  to  Spinoza. 

[After  thanking  Spinoza,  in  the  name  of  himself  and  Boyle,  Olden- 
burg mentions  the  foundation  of  the  Royal  Society,  and  begs  his 
correspondent  to  publish  his  theological  and  philosophical  works.] 

* * * * * * * 

The  body  of  philosophers  which  I formerly  mentioned 
to  you  has  now,  by  the  king’s  grace,  been  constituted  as 
a Royal  Society,  and  furnished  with  a public  charter, 
whereby  distinguished  privileges  are  conferred  upon  it, 
and  an  excellent  prospect  afforded  of  endowing  it  with 
the  necessary  revenues. 

I would  by  all  means  advise  you  not  to  begrudge  to 
the  learned  those  works  in  philosophy  and  theology, 
which  you  have  composed  with  the  talent  that  distin- 
guishes you.  Publish  them,  I beg,  whatever  be  the  ver- 
dict of  petty  theologians.  Your  country  is  free;  the 
course  of  philosophy  should  there  be  free  also.  Your  own 
prudence  will,  doubtless  suggest  to  you,  that  your  ideas 
and  opinions  should  be  put  forth  as  quietly  as  possible. 

*9 


290 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  VIII. 


For  the  rest,  commit  the  issue  to  fortune.  Come,  then, 
good  sir,  cast  away  all  fear  of  exciting  against  you  the 
pigmies  of  our  time.  Long  enough  have  we  sacrificed 
to  ignorance  and  pedantry.  Let  us  spread  the  sails  of 
true  knowledge,  and  explore  the  recesses  of  nature  more 
thoroughly  than  heretofore.  Your  meditations  can,  I take 
it,  be  printed  in  your  country  with  impunity;  nor  need 
any  scandal  among  the  learned  be  dreaded  because  of 
them.  If  these  be  your  patrons  and  supporters  (and  I 
warrant  me  you  will  find  them  so),  why  should  you 
dread  the  carping  of  ignorance  ? I will  not  let  you  go, 
my  honored  friend,  till  I have  gained  my  request;  nor 
will  I ever,  so  far  as  in  me  lies,  allow  thoughts  of  such 
importance  as  yours  to  rest  in  eternal  silence.  I earn- 
estly beg  you  to  communicate  to  me,  as  soon  as  you 
conveniently  can,  your  decision  in  the  matter.  Perhaps 
events  will  occur  here  not  unworthy  of  your  knowledge. 
The  Society  I have  mentioned  will  now  proceed  more 
strenuously  on  its  course,  and,  if  peace  continues  on  our 
shores,  will  possibly  illustrate  the  republic  of  letters 
with  some  extraordinary  achievement.  Farewell,  excel- 
lent sir,  and  believe  me, 

Your  most  zealous  and  friendly, 

Henry  Oldenburc. 


LETTER  VIII.  (XI.) 

Oldenburg  to  Spinoza. 

[After  further  replying  to  Spinoza’s  criticisms  on  Boyle’s  book,  Olden 
burg  again  exhorts  his  correspondent  to  publish.] 

******* 

I now  proceed  to  the  question  which  has  arisen  between 
us.  First,  permit  me  to  ask  you  whether  you  have 
finished  the  important  little  work,  in  which  you  treat 
<(  of  the  origin  of  things  and  their  dependence  on  the 
first  cause,  and  of  the  improvement  of  our  understanding.  * 
Truly,  my  dear  sir,  I believe  nothing  more  pleasing  or 


LETTER  IX.] 


CORRESPONDENCE 


291 


acceptable  to  men  of  true  learning  and  discrimination 
could  possibly  be  published  than  such  a treatise.  This 
is  what  a man  of  your  talent  and  disposition  should  look 
to,  far  more  than  the  gratification  of  theologians  of  our 
time  and  fashion.  The  latter  have  less  regard  for 
truth  than  for  their  own  convenience.  I,  therefore, 
conjure  you,  by  the  bond  of  our  friendship,  by  every 
duty  of  increasing  and  proclaiming  the  truth,  not  to 
begrudge  us,  or  withhold  from  us  your  writings  on  these 
subjects.  If  anything  of  greater  importance  than  I can 
foresee  prevents  you  from  publishing  the  work,  I earnestly 
charge  you  to  give  me  a summary  of  it  by  letter. 

Another  book  is  soon  to  be  published  by  the  learned 
Boyle,  which  I will  send  you  as  an  exchange.  I will  add 
papers,  which  will  acquaint  you  with  the  whole  constitu- 
tion of  our  Royal  Society,  whereof  I,  with  twenty  others, 
am  on  the  Council,  and,  with  one  other,  am  Secretary. 
I have  no  time  to  discourse  of  any  further  subjects. 
All  the  confidence  which  honest  intentions  can  inspire, 
all  the  readiness  to  serve,  which  the  smallness  of  my 
powers  will  permit,  I pledge  to  you,  and  am  heartily, 

Dear  sir,  yours  wholly, 

H.  Oldenburg. 

London,  3 April,  1663. 


LETTER  IX.  (XIII.) 

Spinoza  to  Oldenburg. 

[Spinoza  informs  Oldenburg  that  he  has  removed  to  Rhijnsburg,  and 
has  spent  some  time  at  Amsterdam  for  the  purpose  of  publishing  the 
«Principles  of  Cartesian  Philosophy.»  He  then  replies  to  Boyle’s 
objections.] 

Distinguished  Sir, — I have  at  length  received  your 
long  wished  for  letter,  and  am  at  liberty  to  answer  it. 
But,  before  I do  so,  I will  briefly  tell  you,  what  has  pre- 
vented my  replying  before.  When  I removed  my  house- 
hold goods  here  in  April,  I set  out  for  Amsterdam. 
While  there  certain  friends  asked  me  to  impart  to  them 
a treatise  containing,  in  brief,  the  second  part  of  the 


292 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  IX. 


principles  of  Descartes  treated  geometrically,  together 
with  some  of  the  chief  points  treated  of  in  metaphysics, 
which  I had  formerly  dictated  to  a youth,  to  whom  I 
did  not  wish  to  teach  my  own  opinions  openly.  They 
further  requested  me,  at  the  first  opportunity,  to  compose 
a similar  treatise  on  the  first  part.  Wishing  to  oblige 
my  friends,  I at  once  set  myself  to  the  task,  which  I 
finished  in  a fortnight,  and  handed  over  to  them.  They 
then  asked  for  leave  to  print  it,  which  I readily  granted 
on  the  condition  that  one  of  them  should,  under  my 
supervision,  clothe  it  in  more  elegant  phraseology,  and 
add  a little  preface  warning  readers  that  I do  not 
acknowledge  all  the  opinions  there  set  forth  as  my  own, 
inasmuch  as  I hold  the  exact  contrary  to  much  that  is 
there  written,  illustrating  the  fact  by  one  or  two  exam- 
ples. All  this  the  friend  who  took  charge  of  the  treatise 
promised  to  do,  and  this  is  the  cause  for  my  prolonged 
stay  in  Amsterdam.  Since  I returned  to  this  village,  I 
have  hardly  been  able  to  call  my  time  my  own,  because 
of  the  friends  who  have  been  kind  enough  to  visit  me. 
At  last,  my  dear  friend,  a moment  has  come,  when  I 
can  relate  these  occurrences  to  you,  and  inform  you  why 
I allow  this  treatise  to  see  the  light.  It  may  be  that  on 
this  occasion  some  of  those,  who  hold  the  foremost 
positions  in  my  country,  will  be  found  desirous  of  seeing 
the  rest  of  my  writings,  which  I acknowledge  as  my 
own ; they  will  thus  take  care  that  I am  enabled  to  pub- 
lish them  without  any  danger  of  infringing  the  laws  of 
the  land.  If  this  be  as  I think,  I shall  doubtless  publish 
at  once;  if  things  fall  out  otherwise,  I would  rather  be 
silent  than  obtrude  my  opinions  on  men,  in  defiance  of 
my  country,  and  thus  render  them  hostile  to  me.  I 
therefore  hope,  my  friend,  that  you  will  not  chafe  at 
having  to  wait  a short  time  longer ; you  shall  then  receive 
from  me  either  the  treatise  printed,  or  the  summary  of 
it  which  you  ask  for.  If  meanwhile  you  would  like  to 
have  one  or  two  copies  of  the  work  now  in  the  press,  I 
will  satisfy  your  wish,  as  soon  as  I know  of  it  and  of 
means  to  send  the  book  conveniently. 

[The  rest  of  the  letter  is  taken  up  with  criticisms  on  Boyle’s  book.] 


LETTER  XIII. A.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


293 


LETTERS  X.— XIV.* 

[Contain  further  correspondence  concerning  Boyle’s  book,  and  kin- 
dred subjects.] 


LETTER  XIII. a. 

Oldenburg  to  Spinoza. 

[The  place  of  this  letter  is  between  Letters  XIII.  and  XIV.  It  was 
written  apparently  in  September,  1665.  It  mentions  the  plague,  which 
was  then  at  its  height,  the  war,  and  the  labors  of  the  Royal  Society, 
and  especially  of  Boyle.  Then  comes  the  passage  here  given.  The 
letter  terminates  with  references  to  the  comets,  and  to  Huyghens.] 

******* 

I see  that  you  are  engaged  not  so  much  in  philosophy 
as  in  theology,  if  I may  say  so.  That  is,  you  are  record- 
ing your  thoughts  about  angels,  prophecy,  and  miracles, 
but  you  are  doing  this,  perhaps,  in  a philosophical  man- 
ner ; however  that  may  be,  I am  certain  that  the  work  f 
is  worthy  of  you,  and  that  I am  most  anxious  to  have  it. 
Since  these  most  difficult  times  prevent  free  intercourse, 
I beg  at  least  that  you  will  not  disdain  to  signify  to  me 
in  your  next  letter  \ your  design  and  aim  in  this  writing 
of  yours. 

Here  we  are  daily  expecting  news  of  a second  ||  naval 
battle,  unless  indeed  your  fleet  has  retired  into  port. 
Virtue,  the  nature  of  which  you  hint  is  being  discussed 
among  your  friends,  belongs  to  wild  beasts  not  to  men. 
For  if  men  acted  according  to  the  guidance  of  reason, 
they  would  not  so  tear  one  another  in  pieces,  as  they 

* These  letters  are  numbered  by  Van  Vloten,  XIV.,  XVI.,  XXV., 
XXVI.,  XXXI. 

f The  (<  Tractatus  Theologico- Politicus.® 

t Spinoza’s  answer  to  this  letter  is  not  extant. 

I The  English  fleet  twice  defeated  the  Dutch  in  1665,  on  June  3d. 
and  Sept  4th.  Secundo  perhaps  means  «successful,®  but  this  hardly 
agrees  with  Oldenburg’s  politeness. — [ Tr.] 


294 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XV. 


evidently  do.  But  what  is  the  good  of  my  complaining  ? 
Vices  will  exist  while  men  do;  but  yet  they  are  not 
continuous,  but  compensated  by  the  interposition  of  better 
things. 

* + * * * * * 


LETTER  XV.  (XXXII.) 

Spinoza  to  Oldenburg. 

[Spinoza  writes  to  his  friend  concerning  the  reasons  which  lead  us 
to  believe,  that  «every  part  of  nature  agrees  with  the  whole,  and 
is  associated  with  all  other  parts. » He  also  makes  a few  remarks 
about  Huyghens.  ] 

Distinguished  Sir, — For  the  encouragement  to  pursue 
my  speculations  given  me  by  yourself  and  the  distin- 
guished R.  Boyle,  I return  you  my  best  thanks.  I pro- 
ceed as  far  as  my  slender  abilities  will  allow  me,  with 
full  confidence  in  your  aid  and  kindness.  When  you  ask 
me  my  opinion  on  the  question  raised  concerning  our 
knowledge  of  the  means,  whereby  each  part  of  nature 
agrees  with  its  whole,  and  the  manner  in  which  it  is  as- 
sociated with  the  remaining  parts,  I presume  you  are 
asking  for  the  reasons  which  induce  us  to  believe,  that 
each  part  of  nature  agrees  with  its  whole,  and  is  asso- 
ciated with  the  remaining  parts.  For  as  to  the  means 
whereby  the  parts  are  really  associated,  and  each  part 
agrees  with  its  whole,  I told  you  in  my  former  letter  that 
I am  in  ignorance.  To  answer  such  a question,  we  should 
have  to  know  the  whole  of  nature  and  its  several  parts. 
I will  therefore  endeavor  to  show  the  reason,  which  led 
me  to  make  the  statement;  but  I will  premise  that  I do 
not  attribute  to  nature  either  beauty  or  deformity,  order 
or  confusion.  Only  in  relation  to  our  imagination  can 
things  be  called  beautiful  or  deformed,  ordered  or  con- 
fused. 

By  the  association  of  parts,  then,  I merely  mean  that 
the  laws  or  nature  of  one  part  adapt  themselves  to  the 
laws  or  nature  of  another  part,  so  as  to  cause  the  least 


LETTER  XV.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


295 


possible  inconsistency.  As  to  the  whole  and  the  parts, 
I mean  that  a given  number  of  things  are  parts  of  a 
whole,  in  so  far  as  the  nature  of  each  of  them  is  adapted 
to  the  nature  of  the  rest,  so  that  they  all,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, agree  together.  On  the  other  hand,  in  so  far  as 
they  do  not  agree,  each  of  them  forms,  in  our  mind,  a 
separate  idea,  and  is  to  that  extent  considered  as  a whole, 
not  as  a part.  For  instance,  when  the  parts  of  lymph, 
chyle,  etc.,  combine,  according  to  the  proportion  of  the 
figure  and  size  of  each,  so  as  to  evidently  unite,  and 
form  one  fluid,  the  chyle,  lymph,  etc.,  considered  under 
this  aspect,  are  part  of  the  blood;  but,  in  so  far  as  we 
consider  the  particles  of  lymph  as  differing  in  figure 
and  size  from  the  particles  of  chyle,  we  shall  consider 
each  of  the  two  as  a whole,  not  as  a part. 

Let  us  imagine,  with  your  permission,  a little  worm, 
living  in  the  blood,  able  to  distinguish  by  sight  the  par- 
ticles of  blood,  lymph,  etc.,  and  to  reflect  on  the  manner 
in  which  each  particle,  on  meeting  with  another  particle, 
either  is  repulsed  or  communicates  a portion  of  its  own 
motion.  This  little  worm  would  live  in  the  blood,  in  the 
same  way  as  we  live  in  a part  of  the  universe,  and  would 
consider  each  particle  of  blood,  not  as  a part,  but  as  a 
whole.  He  would  be  unable  to  determine  how  all  the  parts 
are  modified  by  the  general  nature  of  blood,  and  are  com- 
pelled by  it  to  adapt  themselves,  so  as  to  stand  in  a fixed 
relation  to  one  another.  For,  if  we  imagine  that  there 
are  no  causes  external  to  the  blood,  which  could  com- 
municate fresh  movements  to  it,  nor  any  space  beyond 
the  blood,  nor  any  bodies  whereto  the  particles  of  blood 
could  communicate  their  motion,  it  is  certain  that  the 
blood  would  always  remain  in  the  same  state,  and  its 
particles  would  undergo  no  modifications,  save  those  which 
may  be  conceived  as  arising  from  the  relations  of  motion 
existing  between  the  lymph,  the  chyle,  etc.  The  blood 
would  then  always  have  to  be  considered  as  a whole,  not 
as  a part.  But,  as  there  exist,  as  a matter  of  fact,  very 
many  causes  which  modify,  in  a given  manner,  the  nature 
of  the  blood,  and  are,  in  turn,  modified  thereby,  it  follows 
that  other  motions  and  other  relations  arise  in  the  blood, 


296 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XV. 


springing  not  from  the  mutual  relations  of  its  parts  only, 
but  from  the  mutual  relations  between  the  blood  as  a whole 
and  external  causes.  Thus  the  blood  comes  to  be  re- 
garded as  a part,  not  as  a whole.  So  much  for  the  whole 
and  the  part. 

All  natural  bodies  can  and  ought  to  be  considered  in  the 
same  way  as  we  have  here  considered  the  blood,  for  all 
bodies  are  surrounded  by  others,  and  are  mutually  deter- 
mined to  exist  and  operate  in  a fixed  and  definite  propor- 
tion, while  the  relations  between  motion  and  rest  in  the 
sum  total  of  them,  that  is,  in  the  whole  universe,  remain 
unchanged.  Hence  it  follows  that  each  body,  in  so  far 
as  it  exists  as  modified  in  a particular  manner,  must  be 
considered  as  a part  of  the  whole  universe,  as  agreeing  with 
the  whole,  and  associated  with  the  remaining  parts.  As 
the  nature  of  the  universe  is  no'  limited,  like  the  nature  of 
blood,  but  is  absolutely  infinite,  its  parts  are  by  this  nature 
of  infinite  power  infinitely  modified,  and  compelled  to 
undergo  infinite  variations.  But,  in  respect  to  substance, 
I conceive  that  each  part  has  a more  close  union  with  its 
whole.  For,  as  I said  in  my  first  letter*  (addressed  to 
you  while  I was  still  at  Rhijnsburg),  substance  being 
infinite  in  its  nature, f it  follows,  as  I endeavored  to  show, 
that  each  part  belongs  to  the  nature  of  substance,  and 
without  it,  can  neither  be  nor  be  conceived. 

You  see,  therefore,  how  and  why  I think  that  the  human 
body  is  a part  of  nature.  As  regards  the  human  mind,  I 
believe  that  it  also  is  a part  of  nature;  for  I maintain 
that  there  exists  in  nature  an  infinite  power  of  thinking, 
which,  in  so  far  as  it  is  infinite,  contains  subjectively  the 
whole  of  nature,  and  its  thoughts  proceed  in  the  same 
manner  as  nature — that  is,  in  the  sphere  of  ideas.  Further, 
I take  the  human  mind  to  be  identical  with  this  said 
power,  not  in  so  far  as  it  is  infinite  and  perceives  the 
whole  nature,  but  in  so  far  as  it  is  finite,  and  per- 
ceives only  the  human  body;  in  this  manner,  I maintain 
that  the  human  mind  is  a part  of  an  infinite  under- 
standing. 

* Letter  1 1. 

f Ethics,  I.  viii. 


LETTER  XVI.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


297 


But  to  explain,  and  accurately  prove,  all  these  and  kin- 
dred questions,  would  take  too  long;  and  I do  not  think 
you  expect  as  much  of  me  at  present.  I am  afraid  that  I 
may  have  mistaken  your  meaning,  and  given  an  answer 
to  a different  question  from  that  which  you  asked.  Please 
inform  me  on  this  point. 

You  write  in  your  last  letter,  that  I hinted  that  nearly 
all  the  Cartesian  laws  of  motion  are  false.  What  I said 
was,  if  I remember  rightly,  that  Huyghens  think  so  ; I 
myself  do  not  impeach  any  of  the  laws  except  the  sixth, 
concerning  which  I think  Huyghens  is  also  in  error.  I 
ask  you  at  the  same  time  to  communicate  to  me  the 
experiment  made  according  to  that  hypothesis  in  your 
Royal  Society;  as  you  have  not  replied,  I infer  that  you 
are  not  at  liberty  to  do  so.  The  above-mentioned  Huy- 
ghens is  entirely  occupied  in  polishing  lenses.  He  has 
fitted  up  for  the  purpose  a handsome  workshop,  in  which 
he  can  also  construct  molds.  What  will  be  the  result  I 
know  not,  nor,  to  speak  the  truth,  do  I greatly  care. 
Experience  has  sufficiently  taught  me,  that  the  free  hand 
is  better  and  more  sure  than  any  machine  for  polishing 
spherical  molds.  I can  tell  you  nothing  certain  as  yet 
about  the  success  of  the  clocks  or  the  date  of  Huyghens’s 
journey  to  France. 


LETTER  XVI.  (XXXIII.) 

Oldenburg  to  Spinoza. 

[After  some  remarks  on  Spinoza’s  last  letter,  and  an  account  ol 
experiments  at  the  Royal  Society  and  at  Oxford,  Oldenburg  men- 
tions a report  about  the  return  of  the  Jews  to  Palestine.] 

******* 

But  I pass  on  to  politics.  Every  one  here  is  talking  of 
a report  that  the  Jews,  after  remaining  scattered  for 
more  than  two  thousand  years,  are  about  to  return  to 
their  country.  Few  here  believe  in  it,  but  many  desire 


298 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XVII. 


it.  Please  tell  your  friend  what  you  hear  and  think  on 
the  matter.  For  my  part,  unless  the  news  is  confirmed 
from  trustworthy  sources  at  Constantinople,  which  is  the 
place  chiefly  concerned,  I shall  not  believe  it.  I should 
like  to  know,  what  the  Jews  of  Amsterdam  have  heard 
about  the  matter,  and  how  they  are  affected  by  such 
important  tidings  which,  if  true,  would  assuredly  seem  to 
harbinger  the  end  of  the  world.  . . . Believe  me  to  be 

Yours  most  zealously, 

Henry  Oldenburg. 

London,  8 Dec.,  1665. 

P.S.  I will  shortly  ( D.v .)  tell  you  the  opinion  of  our 
philosophers  on  the  recent  comets. 


LETTER  XVII.  (LXI.) 

Oldenburg  to  Spinoza. 

[Oldenburg  thanks  Spinoza  for  the  «Tractatus  Theoligico- Politicus  * 
dispatched  but  not  received,  and  modifies  an  adverse  verdict 
expressed  in  a former  letter  (now  lost).] 

I was  unwilling  to  let  pass  the  convenient  opportunity 
offered  me  by  the  journey  to  Holland  of  the  learned  Dr. 
Bourgeois,  an  adherent  of  the  Reformed  religion,  for 
expressing  my  thanks  a few  weeks  ago  for  your  treatise 
forwarded  to  me,  but  not  yet  arrived.  But  I am  doubt- 
ful whether  my  letter  was  duly  delivered.  I indicated  in 
them  my  opinion  on  the  treatise ; but  on  deeper  and  more 
careful  inspection  I now  think  that  my  verdict  was  hasty. 
Certain  arguments  seemed  to  me  to  be  urged  at  the  ex- 
pense of  religion,  as  measured  by  the  standard  supplied 
by  the  common  run  of  theologians  and  the  received 
formulas  of  creeds  which  are  evidently  biased.  But  a 
closer  consideration  of  the  whole  subject  convinced  me, 
that  you  are  far  from  attempting  any  injury  to  true 
religion  and  sound  philosophy,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
strive  to  exalt  and  establish  the  true  object  of  the 


LETTER  XVIII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


299 


Christian  religion  and  the  divine  loftiness  of  fruitful 
philosophy. 

Now  that  I believe  that  this  is  your  fixed  purpose,  I 
would  most  earnestly  beg  you  to  have  the  kindness  to 
write  frequently  and  explain  the  nature  of  what  you  are 
now  preparing  and  considering  with  this  object  to  your 
old  and  sincere  friend,  who  is  all  eager  for  the  happy 
issue  of  so  lofty  a design.  I sacredly  promise  you  that 
I will  not  divulge  a syllable  to  any  one,  if  you  enjoin 
silence ; I will  only  endeavor  gently  to  prepare  the  minds 
of  good  and  wise  men  for  the  reception  of  those  truths, 
which  you  will  some  day  bring  before  a wider  public, 
and  I will  try  to  dispel  the  prejudices,  which  have  been 
conceived  against  your  doctrines.  Unless  I am  quite  mis- 
taken, you  have  an  insight  deeper  than  common  into  the 
nature  and  powers  of  the  human  mind,  and  its  union 
with  the  human  body.  I earnestly  beg  you  to  favor 
me  with  your  reflections  on  this  subject.  Farewell,  most 
excellent  sir,  and  favor  the  devoted  admirer  of  your 
teaching  and  virtue.  Henry  Oldenburg. 

London,  8 June,  1675.* 


LETTER  XVIII.  (LXII.) 

Oldenburg  to  Spinoza. 

[Oldenburg  rejoices  at  the  renewal  of  correspondence,  and  alludes  to 
the  five  books  of  the  Ethics  which  Spinoza  ( in  a letter  now  lost ) had 
announced  his  intention  of  publishing.] 

Our  correspondence  being  thus  happily  renewed,  I 
should  be  unwilling  to  fall  short  of  a friend’s  duty  in 
the  exchange  of  letters.  I understand  from  your  answer 
delivered  to  me  on  July  5,  that  you  intend  to  publish 
your  treatise  in  five  parts.  Allow  me,  I beg,  to  warn 

*The  old  edition  gives  the  date  8 Oct.,  1665,  but  this  is  obviously 
incorrect,  as  the  a Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus w was  not  published 
till  1670. 


3oo 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XIX. 


you  by  the  sincerity  of  your  affection  for  me,  not  to  in- 
sert any  passages  which  may  seem  to  discourage  the 
practice  of  religion  and  virtue:  especially  as  nothing  is 
more  sought  after  in  this  degenerate  and  evil  age  than 
doctrines  of  the  kind,  which  seem  to  give  countenance  to 
rampant  vice. 

However,  I will  not  object  to  receiving  a few  copies 
of  the  said  treatise.  I will  only  ask  you  that,  when  the 
time  arrives,  they  may  be  intrusted  to  a Dutch  mer- 
chant living  in  London,  who  will  see  that  they  are  for- 
warded to  me.  There  is  no  need  to  mention,  that  books 
of  the  kind  in  question  have  been  sent  to  me:  if  they 
arrive  safely  to  my  keeping,  I do  not  doubt  that  I can 
conveniently  dispose  of  some  copies  to  my  friends  here 
and  there,  and  can  obtain  a just  price  for  them.  Fare- 
well, and  when  you  have  leisure  write  to 

Yours  most  zealously, 

Henry  Oldenburg. 

London,  22  July,  1675. 


LETTER  XIX.  (LXVIII.) 

Spinoza  to  Oldenburg. 

[Spinoza  relates  his  journey  to  Amsterdam  for  the  purpose  of  pub- 
lishing his  (<  Ethics  ®;  he  was  deterred  by  the  dissuasions  of  theolo- 
gians and  Cartesians.  He  hopes  that  Oldenburg  will  inform  him 
of  some  of  the  objections  to  the  (<  Tractatus  Theologico- Politicus,® 
made  by  learned  men,  so  that  they  may  be  answered  in  notes.] 

Distinguished  and  Illustrious  Sir, — When  I received 
your  letter  of  the  22nd  July,  I had  set  out  to  Amster- 
dam for  the  purpose  of  publishing  the  book  I had  men- 
tioned to  you.  While  I was  negotiating,  a rumor  gained 
currency  that  I had  in  the  press  a book  concerning  God, 
wherein  I endeavored  to  show  that  there  is  no  God. 
This  report  was  believed  by  many.  Hence  certain  theo- 
logians, perhaps  the  authors  of  the  rumor,  took  occasion 
to  complain  of  me  before  the  prince  and  the  magistrates; 


LETTER  XX.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


301 


moreover,  the  stupid  Cartesians,  being  suspected  of 
favoring  me,  endeavored  to  remove  the  aspersion  by- 
abusing  everywhere  my  opinions  and  writings,  a course 
which  they  still  pursue.  When  I became  aware  of  this 
through  trustworthy  men,  who  also  assured  me  that  the 
theologians  were  everywhere  lying  in  wait  for  me,  I 
determined  to  put  off  publishing  till  I saw  how  things 
were  going,  and  I proposed  to  inform  you  of  my  inten- 
tions. But  matters  seem  to  get  worse  and  worse,  and  I 
am  still  uncertain  what  to  do.  Meanwhile  I do  not  like 
to  delay  any  longer  answering  your  letter.  I will  first 
thank  you  heartily  for  your  friendly  warning,  which  I 
should  be  glad  to  have  further  explained,  so  that  I may 
know,  which  are  the  doctrines  which  seem  to  you  to  be 
aimed  against  the  practice  of  religion  and  virtue.  If 
principles  agree  with  reason,  they  are,  I take  it,  also 
most  serviceable  to  virtue.  Further,  if  it  be  not  troub- 
ling you  too  much  I beg  you  to  point  out  the  passages 
in  the  (<  Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus  ® which  are  objected 
to  by  the  learned,  for  I want  to  illustrate  that  treatise 
with  notes,  and  to  remove  if  possible  the  prejudices 
conceived  against  it.  Farewell. 


LETTER  XX.  (LXXI.) 

Oldenburg  to  Spinoza. 

As  I see  from  your  last  letter,  the  book  you  propose 
to  publish  is  in  peril.  It  is  impossible  not  to  approve 
your  purpose  of  illustrating  and  softening  down  those  pas- 
sages in  the  Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus,  ® which  have 
given  pain  to  its  readers.  First  I would  call  attention  to 
the  ambiguities  in  your  treatment  of  God  and  Nature:  a 
great  many  people  think  you  have  confused  the  one  with 
the  other.  Again,  you  seem  to  many  to  take  away  the 
authority  and  value  of  miracles,  whereby  alone,  as  nearly 


SPINOZA’S 


302 


[LETTER  XXL 


all  Christians  believe,  the  certainty  of  the  divine  revelation 
can  be  established. 

Again,  people  say  that  you  conceal  your  opinion  con- 
cerning Jesus  Christ,  the  Redeemer  of  the  world,  the 
only  Mediator  for  mankind,  and  concerning  his  incarna- 
tion and  redemption : they  would  like  you  to  give  a clear 
explanation  of  what  you  think  on  these  three  subjects. 
If  you  do  this  and  thus  give  satisfaction  to  prudent  and 
rational  Christians,  I think  your  affairs  are  safe.  Fare- 
well. 

London,  15  Nov.,  1675. 

P.S. — Send  me  a line,  I beg,  to  inform  me  whether 
this  note  has  reached  you  safely. 


LETTER  XXI.  (LXXIII.) 

Spinoza  to  Oldenburg. 

Distinguished  Sir, — I received  on  Saturday  last  your 
very  short  letter  dated  15th  Nov.  In  it  you  merely  indi- 
cate the  points  in  the  theological  treatise,  which  have 
given  pain  to  readers,  whereas  I had  hoped  to  learn  from 
it,  what  were  the  opinions  which  militated  against  the 
practice  of  religious  virtue,  and  which  you  formerly 
mentioned.  However,  I will  speak  on  the  three  subjects 
on  which  you  desire  me  to  disclose  my  sentiments,  and 
tell  you,  first,  that  my  opinion  concerning  God  differs 
widely  from  that  which  is  ordinarily  defended  by  modern 
Christians.  For  I hold  that  God  is  of  all  things  the 
cause  immanent,  as  the  phrase  is,  not  transient.  I say 
that  all  things  are  in  God  and  move  in  God,  thus  agree- 
ing with  Paul,  and,  perhaps,  with  all  the  ancient  philos- 
ophers, though  the  phraseology  may  be  different;  I will 
even  venture  to  affirm  that  I agree  with  all  the  ancient 
Hebrews,  in  so  far  as  one  may  judge  from  their  tradi- 
tions, though  these  are  in  many  ways  corrupted.  The 
supposition  of  some,  that  I endeavor  to  prove  in  the 


LETTER  XXI.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


3°3 


* Tractatus  Theologico- Politicus  ® the  unity  of  God  and 
Nature  (meaning  by  the  latter  a certain  mass  or  corpo- 
real matter),  is  wholly  erroneous. 

As  regards  miracles,  I am  of  opinion  that  the  revela- 
tion of  God  can  only  be  established  by  the  wisdom  of 
the  doctrine,  not  by  miracles,  or  in  other  words,  by  igno- 
rance. This  I have  shown  at  sufficient  length  in  Chapter 
VI.  concerning  miracles.  I will  here  only  add,  that  I 
make  this  chief  distinction  between  religion  and  super- 
stition, that  the  latter  is  founded  on  ignorance,  the 
former  on  knowledge;  this,  I take  it,  is  the  reason  why 
Christians  are  distinguished  from  the  rest  of  the  world, 
not  by  faith,  nor  by  charity,  nor  by  the  other  fruits  of 
the  Holy  Spirit,  but  solely  by  their  opinions,  inasmuch 
as  they  defend  their  cause,  like  everyone  else,  by  mira- 
cles, that  is,  by  ignorance,  which  is  the  source  of  all 
malice;  thus  they  turn  a faith,  which  may  be  true,  into 
superstition.  Lastly,  in  order  to  disclose  my  opinions  on 
the  third  point,  I will  tell  you  that  I do  not  think  it 
necessary  for  salvation  to  know  Christ  according  to  the 
flesh : but  with  regard  to  the  Eternal  Son  of  God,  that  is, 
the  Eternal  Wisdom  of  God,  which  has  manifested  itself 
in  all  things  and  especially  in  the  human  mind,  and  above 
all  in  Christ  Jesus,  the  case  is  far  otherwise.  For  with- 
out this  no  one  can  come  to  a state  of  blessedness, 
inasmuch  as  it  alone  teaches,  what  is  true  or  false,  good 
or  evil.  And,  inasmuch  as  this  wisdom  was  made  espe- 
cially manifest  through  Jesus  Christ,  as  I have  said,  his 
disciples  preached  it,  in  so  far  as  it  was  revealed  to  them 
through  him,  and  thus  showed  that  they  could  rejoice  in 
that  spirit  of  Christ  more  than  the  rest  of  mankind. 
The  doctrines  added  by  certain  churches,  such  as  that 
God  took  upon  himself  human  nature,  I have  expressly 
said  that  I do  not  understand ; in  fact,  to  speak  the  truth, 
they  seem  to  me  no  less  absurd  than  would  a statement, 
that  a circle  had  taken  upon  itself  the  nature  of  a square. 
This  I think  will  be  sufficient  explanation  of  my  opin- 
ions concerning  the  three  points  mentioned.  Whether  it 
will  be  satisfactory  to  Christians  you  will  know  better 
than  I.  Farewell. 


3°4 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXII. 


LETTER  XXII.  (LXXIV.) 

Oldenburg  to  Spinoza. 

[Oldenburg  wishes  to  be  enlightened  concerning  the  doctrine  of  fatal- 
ism, of  which  Spinoza  has  been  accused.  He  discourses  on  man’s 
limited  intelligence  and  on  the  incarnation  of  the  Son  of  God.] 

As  you  seem  to  accuse  me  of  excessive  brevity,  I will 
this  time  avoid  the  charge  by  excessive  prolixity.  You 
expected,  I see,  that  I should  set  forth  those  opinions  in 
your  writings,  which  seem  to  discourage  the  practice  of 
religious  virtue  in  your  readers.  I will  indicate  the  mat- 
ter which  especially  pains  them.  You  appear  to  set  up  a 
fatalistic  necessity  for  all  things  and  actions ; if  such  is  con- 
ceded and  asserted,  people  aver,  that  the  sinews  of  all 
laws,  of  virtue,  and  of  religion,  are  severed,  and  that  all  re- 
wards and  punishment  are  vain.  Whatsoever  can  compel, 
or  involves  necessity,  is  held  also  to  excuse;  therefore 
no  one,  they  think,  can  be  without  excuse  in  the  sight 
of  God.  If  we  are  driven  by  fate,  and  all  things  follow 
a fixed  and  inevitable  path  laid  down  by  the  hard  hand 
of  necessity,  they  do  not  see  where  punishment  can  come 
in.  What  wedge  can  be  brought  for  the  untying  of  this 
knot,  it  is  very  difficult  to  say.  I should  much  like  to 
know  and  learn  what  help  you  can  supply  in  the  matter. 

As  to  the  opinions  which  you  have  kindly  disclosed  to 
me  on  the  three  points  I mentioned,  the  following  in- 
quiries suggest  themselves.  First,  In  what  sense  do  you 
take  miracles  and  ignorance  to  be  synonymous  and 
equivalent  terms,  as  you  appear  to  think  in  your  last 
letter  ? 

The  bringing  back  of  Lazarus  from  the  dead,  and  the 
resurrection  from  death  of  Jesus  Christ  seem  to  surpass 
all  the  power  of  created  nature,  and  to  fall  within  the 
scope  of  divine  power  only;  it  would  not  be  a sign  of 
culpable  ignorance,  that  it  was  necessary  to  exceed  the 
limits  of  finite  intelligence  confined  within  certain  bounds. 
But  perhaps  you  do  not  think  it  in  harmony  with  the 


LETTER  XXIII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


3<>S 

created  mind  and  science,  to  acknowledge  in  the  uncre- 
ated mind  and  supreme  Deity  a science  and  power  capa- 
ble of  fathoming,  and  bringing  to  pass  events,  whose 
reason  and  manner  can  neither  be  brought  home  nor  ex- 
plained to  us  poor  human  pigmies?  (<We  are  men”;  it 
appears,  that  we  must  “think  everything  human  akin  to 
ourselves.  * 

Again,  when  you  say  that  you  cannot  understand  that 
God  really  took  upon  himself  human  nature,  it  becomes 
allowable  to  ask  you,  how  you  understand  the  texts  in 
the  Gospel  and  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  whereof  the 
first  says,  “The  Word  was  made  flesh,”*  and  the  other, 
* For  verily  he  took  not  on  him  the  nature  of  angels ; 
but  he  took  on  him  the  seed  of  Abraham.  ” f Moreover, 
the  whole  tenor  of  the  Gospel  infers,  as  I think,  that 
the  only  begotten  Son  of  God,  the  Word  (who  both  was 
God  and  was  with  God),  showed  himself  in  human  na- 
ture, and  by  his  passion  and  death  offered  up  the  sacri- 
fice for  our  sins,  the  price  of  the  atonement.  What  you 
have  to  say  concerning  this  without  impugning  the  truth 
of  the  Gospel  and  the  Christian  religion,  which  I think 
you  approve  of,  I would  gladly  learn. 

I had  meant  to  write  more,  but  am  interrupted  by 
friends  on  a visit,  to  whom  I cannot  refuse  the  duties 
of  courtesy.  But  what  I have  already  put  on  paper  is 
enough,  and  will  perhaps  weary  you  in  your  philosophiz- 
ing. Farewell,  therefore,  and  believe  me  to  be  ever  an 
admirer  of  your  learning  and  knowledge. 

London,  16  Dec.,  1675. 


LETTER  XXIII.  (LXXV.) 

Spinoza  to  Oldenburg. 

[ Spinoza  expounds  to  Oldenburg  his  views  on  fate  and  necessity, 
discriminates  between  miracles  and  ignorance,  takes  the  resurrection  of 

*John  i.  14. 
fHeb.  ii.  16. 

20 


SPINOZA’S 


306 


[LETTER  XXIII. 


Christ  as  spiritual,  and  deprecates  attributing  to  the  sacred  writers 
western  modes  of  speech.] 

Distinguished  Sir:  — At  last  I see  what  it  was  that 
you  begged  me  not  to  publish.  However,  as  it  forms 
the  chief  foundation  of  everything  in  the  treatise  which 
I intended  to  bring  out,  I should  like  briefly  to  explain 
here  in  what  sense  I assert  that  a fatal  necessity  presides 
over  all  things  and  actions.  God  I in  no  wise  subject  to 
fate:  I conceive  that  all  things  follow  with  inevitable 
necessity  from  the  nature  of  God,  in  the  same  way  as 
every  one  conceives  that  it  follows  from  God’s  nature  that 
God  understands  himself.  This  latter  consequence  all 
admit  to  follow  necessarily  from  the  divine  nature,  yet 
no  one  conceives  that  God  is  under  the  compulsion  of  any 
fate,  but  that  he  understands  himself  quite  freely,  though 
necessarily. 

Further,  this  inevitable  necessity  in  things  does  away 
neither  with  divine  nor  human  laws.  The  principles  of 
morality,  whether  they  receive  from  God  himself  the 
form  of  laws  or  institutions,  or  whether  they  do  not,  are 
still  divine  and  salutary;  whether  we  receive  the  good, 
which  flows  from  virtue  and  the  divine  love,  as  from 
God  in  the  capacity  of  a judge,  or  as  from  the  necessity 
of  the  divine  nature,  it  will  in  either  case  be  equally 
desirable;  on  the  other  hand,  the  evils  following  from 
wicked  actions  and  passions  are  not  less  to  be  feared  be- 
cause they  are  necessary  consequences.  Lastly,  in  our 
actions,  whether  they  be  necessary  or  contingent,  we  are 
led  by  hope  and  fear. 

Men  are  only  without  excuse  before  God,  because  they 
are  in  God’s  power,  as  clay  is  in  the  hands  of  the  potter, 
who  from  the  same  lump  makes  vessels,  some  to  honor, 
some  to  dishonor.  If  you  will  reflect  a little  on  this, 
you  will,  I doubt  not,  easily  be  able  to  reply  to  any  ob- 
jections which  may  be  urged  against  my  opinion,  as  many 
of  my  friends  have  already  done. 

I have  taken  miracles  and  ignorance  as  equivalent  terms, 
because  those,  who  endeavor  to  establish  God’s  existence 
and  the  truth  of  religion  by  means  of  miracles,  seek  to 
prove  the  obscure  by  what  is  more  obscure  and  completely 


LETTER  XXIII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


3°7 


unknown,  thus  introducing  a new  sort  of  argument,  the 
reduction,  not  to  the  impossible,  as  the  phrase  is,  but  to 
ignorance.  But,  if  I mistake  not,  I have  sufficiently  ex- 
plained my  opinion  on  miracles  in  the  ” Theologico- Political ® 
treatise.  I will  only  add  here,  that  if  you  will  reflect  on 
the  facts;  that  Christ  did  not  appear  to  the  council,  nor 
to  Pilate,  nor  to  any  unbeliever,  but  only  to  the  faithful ; 
also  that  God  has  neither  right  hand  nor  left,  but  is  by 
his  essence  not  in  a particular  spot,  but  everywhere ; that 
matter  is  everywhere  the  same ; that  God  does  not  mani- 
fest himself  in  the  imaginary  space  supposed  to  be  outside 
the  world;  and  lastly,  that  the  frame  of  the  human  body 
is  kept  within  due  limits  solely  by  the  weight  of  the  air ; 
you  will  readily  see  that  this  apparition  of  Christ  is  not 
unlike  that  wherewith  God  appeared  to  Abraham,  when 
the  latter  saw  men  whom  he  invited  to  dine  with  him. 
But,  you  will  say,  all  the  Apostles  thoroughly  believed, 
that  Christ  rose  from  the  dead  and  really  ascended  to 
heaven:  I do  not  deny  it.  Abraham,  too,  believed  that 
God  had  dined  with  him,  and  all  the  Israelites  believed 
that  God  descended,  surrounded  with  fire,  from  heaven  to 
Mount  Sinai,  and  there  spoke  directly  with  them ; whereas, 
these  apparitions  or  revelations,  and  many  others  like 
them,  were  adapted  to  the  understanding  and  opinions  of 
those  men,  to  whom  God  wished  thereby  to  reveal  his 
will.  I therefore  conclude,  that  the  resurrection  of  Christ 
from  the  dead  was  in  reality  spiritual,  and  that  to  the 
faithful  alone,  according  to  their  understanding,  it  was 
revealed  that  Christ  was  endowed  with  eternity,  and  had 
risen  from  the  dead  (using  dead  in  the  sense  in  which 
Christ  said,  “let  the  dead  bury  their  dead”*),  giving  by 
his  life  and  death  a matchless  example  of  holiness. 
Moreover,  he  to  this  extent  raises  his  disciples  from  the 
dead,  in  so  far  as  they  follow  the  example  of  his  own  life 
and  death.  It  would  not  be  difficult  to  explain  the  whole 
Gospel  doctrine  on  this  hypothesis.  Nay,  1 Cor.  ch.  xv. 
cannot  be  explained  on  any  other,  nor  can  Paul’s  argu- 
ments be  understood : if  we  follow  the  common  interpre- 
tation, they  appear  weak  and  can  easily  be  refuted:  not 
*Matt.  viii.  22;  Luke  ix.  60. 


3°8 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXIV. 


to  mention  the  fact,  that  Christians  interpret  spiritually 
all  those  doctrines  which  the  Jews  accepted  literally.  I 
join  with  you  in  acknowledging  human  weakness.  But  on 
the  other  hand,  I venture  to  ask  you  whether  we  ® human 
pigmies  * possess  sufficient  knowledge  of  nature  to  be  able 
to  lay  down  the  limits  of  its  force  and  power,  or  to  say 
that  a given  thing  surpasses  that  power?  No  one  could 
go  so  far  without  arrogance.  We  may,  therefore,  without 
presumption  explain  miracles  as  far  as  possible  by  natural 
causes.  When  we  cannot  explain  them,  nor  even  prove 
their  impossibility,  we  may  well  suspend  our  judgment 
about  them,  and  establish  religion,  as  I have  said,  solely 
by  the  wisdom  of  its  doctrines.  You  think  that  the  texts 
in  John’s  Gospel  and  in  Hebrews  are  inconsistent  with 
what  I advance,  because  you  measure  oriental  phrases  by 
the  standards  of  European  speech;  though  John  wrote  his 
gospel  in  Greek,  he  wrote  it  as  a Hebrew.  However  this 
may  be,  do  you  believe,  when  Scripture  says  that  God 
manifested  himself  in  a cloud,  or  that  he  dwelt  in  the 
tabernacle,  or  the  temple,  that  God  actually  assumed  the 
nature  of  a cloud,  a tabernacle,  or  a temple  ? Yet  the  ut- 
most that  Christ  says  of  himself,  that  he  is  the  Temple 
of  God,*  because,  as  I said  before,  God  had  specially  man- 
ifested himself  in  Christ.  John,  wishing  to  express  the 
same  truth  more  forcibly,  said  that  <(  the  Word  was  made 
flesh.®  But  I have  said  enough  on  the  subject. 


LETTER  XXIV.  (LXXVII.) 

Oldenburg  to  Spinoza. 

[Oldenburg  returns  to  the  questions  of  universal  necessity,  of  miracles, 
and  of  the  literal  and  allegorical  interpretation  of  Scripture.] 

e5  irparrecv. 

You  hit  the  point  exactly,  in  perceiving  the  cause  why 
I did  not  wish  the  doctrine  of  the  fatalistic  necessity  of 
# John  ii.  19.  Cf.  Matt  xxvi.  60;  Mark  xiv.  58. 


LETTER  XXIV.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


3°9 


all  things  to  be  promulgated,  lest  the  practice  of  virtue 
should  thereby  be  aspersed,  and  rewards  and  punishments 
become  ineffectual.  The  suggestions  in  your  last  letter 
hardly  seem  sufficient  to  settle  the  matter,  or  to  quiet  the 
human  mind.  For  if  we  men  are,  in  all  our  actions, 
moral  as  well  as  natural,  under  the  power  of  God,  like 
clay  in  the  hands  of  the  potter,  with  what  face  can  any 
of  us  be  accused  of  doing  this  or  that,  seeing  that  it  was 
impossible  for  him  to  do  otherwise  ? Should  we  not  be 
able  to  cast  all  responsibility  on  God?  Your  inflexible 
fate,  and  your  irresistible  power,  compel  us  to  act  in  a 
given  manner,  nor  can  we  possibly  act  otherwise.  Why, 
then,  and  by  what  right  do  you  deliver  us  up  to  terrible 
punishments,  which  we  can  in  no  way  avoid,  since  you 
direct  and  carry  on  all  things  through  supreme  necessity, 
according  to  your  good  will  and  pleasure  ? When  you  say 
that  men  are  only  inexcusable  before  God,  because  they 
are  in  the  power  of  God,  I should  reverse  the  argument, 
and  say,  with  more  show  of  reason,  that  men  are  evi- 
dently excusable,  since  they  are  in  the  power  of  God. 
Everyone  may  plead,  <(Thy  power  cannot  be  escaped 
from,  O God;  therefore,  since  I could  not  act  otherwise, 
I may  justly  be  excused.  ® 

Again,  in  taking  miracles  and  ignorance  as  equivalent 
terms,  you  seem  to  bring  within  the  same  limits  the 
power  of  God  and  the  knowledge  of  the  ablest  men; 
for  God  is,  according  to  you,  unable  to  do  or  pro- 
duce anything,  for  which  men  cannot  assign  a 
reason,  if  they  employ  all  the  strength  of  their  facul- 
ties. 

Again,  the  history  of  Christ’s  passion,  death,  burial, 
and  resurrection  seems  to  be  depicted  in  such  lively  and 
genuine  colors,  that  I venture  to  appeal  to  your  con- 
science, whether  you  can  believe  them  to  be  allegorical, 
rather  than  literal,  while  preserving  your  faith  in  the 
narrative  ? The  circumstances  so  clearly  stated  by  the 
Evangelists  seem  to  urge  strongly  on  our  minds,  that 
the  history  should  be  understood  literally.  I have  ven- 
tured to  touch  briefly  on  these  points,  and  I earnestly 
beg  you  to  pardon  me,  and  answer  me  as  a friend  with 


3io 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXV. 


your  usual  candor.  Mr.  Boyle  sends  you  his  kind 
regards.  I will,  another  time,  tell  you  what  the  Royal 
Society  is  doing.  Farewell,  and  preserve  me  in  your 
affection. 

London,  14  Jan.,  1676. 


LETTER  XXV.  (LXXVIII.) 

Written  7 Feb.,  1676. 

Spinoza  to  Oldenburg. 

[ Spinoza  again  treats  of  fatalism.  He  repeats  that  he  accepts  Christ’s 
passion,  death,  and  burial  literally,  but  his  resurrection  spiritually.] 

Distinguished  Sir, — When  I said  in  my  former  letter 
that  we  are  inexcusable,  because  we  are  in  the  power  of 
God,  like  clay  in  the  hands  of  the  potter,  I meant  to  be 
understood  in  the  sense  that  no  one  can  bring  a com- 
plaint against  God  for  having  given  him  a weak  nature, 
or  infirm  spirit.  A circle  might  as  well  complain  to  God 
of  not  being  endowed  with  the  properties  of  a sphere,  or 
a child  who  is  tortured,  say,  with  stone,  for  not  being 
given  a healthy  body,  as  a man  of  feeble  spirit,  because 
God  has  denied  to  him  fortitude,  and  the  true  knowledge 
and  love  of  the  Deity,  or  because  he  is  endowed  with  so 
weak  a nature  that  he  cannot  check  or  moderate  his 
desires.  For  the  nature  of  each  thing  is  only  competent 
to  do  that  which  follows  necessarily  from  its  given  cause. 
That  every  man  cannot  be  brave,  and  that  we  can  no 
more  command  for  ourselves  a healthy  body  than  a 
healthy  mind,  nobody  can  deny,  without  giving  the  lie 
to  experience,  as  well  as  to  reason.  <{  But,  * you  urge, 
<(  if  men  sin  by  nature,  they  are  excusable  }> ; but  you  do 
not  state  the  conclusion  you  draw,  whether  that  God  can- 
not be  angry  with  them  or  that  they  are  worthy  of 
blessedness  — that  is,  of  the  knowledge  and  love  of  God. 
If  you  say  the  former,  I fully  admit  that  God  cannot  be 


LETTER  XXV.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


3“ 


angry,  and  that  all  things  are  done  in  accordance  with 
his  will;  but  I deny  that  all  men  ought,  therefore,  to  be 
blessed  — men  may  be  excusable,  and,  nevertheless,  be 
without  blessedness  and  afflicted  in  many  ways.  A horse 
is  excusable  for  being  a horse  and  not  a man ; but,  never- 
theless, he  must  needs  be  a horse  and  not  a man.  He 
who  goes  mad  from  the  bite  of  a dog  is  excusable,  yet 
he  is  rightly  suffocated.  Lastly,  he  who  cannot  govern 
his  desires,  and  keep  them  in  check  with  the  fear  of  the 
laws,  though  his  weakness  may  be  excusable,  yet  he  can- 
not enjoy  with  contentment  the  knowledge  and  love  of 
God,  but  necessarily  perishes.  I do  not  think  it  neces- 
sary here  to  remind  you,  that  Scripture,  when  it  says 
that  God  is  angry  with  sinners,  and  that  he  is  a Judge 
who  takes  cognizance  of  human  actions,  passes  sentence 
on  them,  and  judges  them,  is  speaking  humanely,  and 
in  a way  adapted  to  the  received  opinion  of  the 
masses,  inasmuch  as  its  purpose  is  not  to  teach  phi- 
losophy, nor  to  render  men  wise,  but  to  make  them 
obedient. 

How,  by  taking  miracles  and  ignorance  as  equiva- 
lent terms,  I reduce  God’s  power  and  man’s  knowl- 
edge within  the  same  limits,  I am  unable  to  discern. 

For  the  rest,  I accept  Christ’s  passion,  death  and  burial 
literally,  as  you  do,  but  his  resurrection  I understand 
allegorically.  I admit,  that  it  is  related  by  the  Evangelists 
in  such  detail,  that  we  cannot  deny  that  they  themselves 
believed  Christ’s  body  to  have  risen  from  the  dead  and 
ascended  to  heaven,  in  order  to  sit  at  the  right  hand  of 
God,  or  that  they  believed  that  Christ  might  have  been 
seen  by  unbelievers,  if  they  had  happened  to  be  at  hand, 
in  the  places  where  he  appeared  to  his  Disciples;  but  in 
these  matters  they  might,  without  injury  to  Gospel  teach- 
ing, have  been  deceived,  as  was  the  case  with  other 
prophets  mentioned  in  my  last  letter.  But  Paul,  to  whom 
Christ  afterward  appeared,  rejoices  that  he  knew  Christ 
not  after  the  flesh,  but  after  the  spirit.*  Farewell,  hon- 
orable Sir,  and  believe  me  yours  in  all  affection  and 
zeal 

* 2 Cor.  v.  16 


312 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXV.  a. 


LETTER  XXV.  a. 

Oldenburg  to  Spinoza. 

[Oldenburg  adduces  further  objections  against  Spinoza’s  doctrine 
of  necessity  and  miracles,  and  exposes  the  inconsistency  of  a partial 
allegorization  of  Scripture.] 

To  the  most  illustrious  Master  Benedict  de  Spinoza 
Henry  Oldenburg  sends  greetings. 

In  your  last  letter,*  written  to  me  on  the  7th  of  Feb- 
ruary, there  are  some  points  which  seem  to  deserve  criti- 
cism. You  say  that  a man  cannot  complain,  because 
God  has  denied  him  the  true  knowledge  of  himself,  and 
strength  sufficient  to  avoid  sins ; forasmuch  as  to  the  na- 
ture of  everything  nothing  is  competent,  except  that 
which  follows  necessarily  from  its  cause.  But  I say,  that 
inasmuch  as  God,  the  Creator  of  men  formed  them  after 
his  own  image,  which  seems  to  imply  in  its  concept  wis- 
dom, goodness  and  power,  it  appears  quite  to  follow,  that 
it  is  more  within  the  sphere  of  man’s  power  to  have  a 
sound  mind  than  to  have  a sound  body.  For  physical 
soundness  of  body  follows  from  mechanical  causes,  but 
soundness  of  mind  depends  on  purpose  and  design.  You 
add,  that  men  may  be  inexcusable,!  and  yet  suffer  pain 
in  many  ways.  This  seems  hard  at  first  sight,  and  what 
you  add  by  way  of  proof,  namely,  that  a dog  \ mad  from 
having  been  bitten  is  indeed  to  be  excused,  but  yet  is 
rightly  killed,  does  not  seem  to  settle  the  question.  For 
the  killing  of  such  a dog  would  argue  cruelty,  were  it 
not  necessary  in  order  to  preserve  other  dogs  and  ani- 
mals, and  indeed  men,  from  a maddening  bite  of  the 
same  kind. 

But  if  God  implanted  in  man  a sound  mind,  as  he  is 
able  to  do,  there  would  be  no  contagion  of  vices  to  be 
* Letter  XXV. 

f Surely  this  is  a mistake  for  «excusable.» — [Tr.] 
t See  Letter  XXV.  Oldenburg  misunderstands  Spinoza’s  illustra- 
tion to  mean  «a  dog  which  goes  mad  from  a bite,»  instead  of  «he  who 
goes  mad  from  the  bite  of  a dog.» 


LETTER  XXV. a.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


313 


feared.  And,  surely,  it  seems  very  cruel,  that  God 
should  devote  men  to  eternal,  or  at  least  terrible  tempo- 
rary, torments,  for  sins  which  by  them  could  be  no 
wise  avoided.  Moreover,  the  tenor  of  all  Holy  Scripture 
seems  to  suppose  and  imply,  that  man  can  abstain  from 
sins.  For  it  abounds  in  denunciations,  and  promises,  in 
declarations  of  rewards  and  punishments,  all  of  which 
seem  to  militate  against  the  necessity  of  sinning,  and 
infer  the  possibility  of  avoiding  punishment.  And  if 
this  were  denied,  it  would  have  to  be  said  that  the 
human  mind  acts  no  less  mechanically  than  the  human 
body. 

Next,  when  you  proceed  to  take  miracles  and  ignorance 
to  be  equivalent,  you  seem  to  rely  on  this  foundation, 
that  the  creature  can  and  should  have  perfect  insight 
into  the  power  and  wisdom  of  the  Creator:  and  that  the 
fact  is  quite  otherwise,  I have  hitherto  been  firmly  per- 
suaded. 

Lastly,  where  you  affirm  that  Christ’s  passion,  death, 
and  burial  are  to  be  taken  literally,  but  his  resurrection 
allegorically,  you  rely,  as  far  as  I can  see,  on  no  proof 
at  all.  Christ’s  resurrection  seems  to  be  delivered  in  the 
Gospel  as  literally  as  the  rest.  And  on  this  article  of 
the  Resurrection  the  whole  Christian  religion  and  its 
truth  rest,  and  with  its  removal  Christ’s  mission  and 
heavenly  doctrine  collapse.  It  cannot  escape  you,  how 
Christ,  after  he  was  raised  from  the  dead,  labored  to 
convince  his  Disciples  of  the  truth  of  the  Resurrection 
properly  so  called.  To  want  to  turn  all  these  things 
into  allegories  is  the  same  thing,  as  if  one  were  to  busy 
one’s  self  in  plucking  up  the  whole  truth  of  the  Gospel 
history. 

These  few  points  I wished  again  to  submit  in  the 
interest  of  my  liberty  of  philosophizing,  which  I earnestly 
beg  you  not  to  take  amiss. 

Written  in  London,  ii  Feb.,  1676. 

I will  communicate  with  you  shortly  on  the  present 
studies  and  experiments  of  the  Royal  Society,  if  God 
grant  me  life  and  health. 


3*4 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXVI. 


LETTER  XXVI.  (VIII.) 

Simon  de  Vries  to  Spinoza. 

[Simon  de  Vries,  a diligent  student  of  Spinoza’s  writings  and  philoso- 
phy, describes  a club  formed  for  the  study  of  Spinoza’s  MS.  con. 
taining  some  of  the  matter  afterward  worked  into  the  Ethics, 
and  asks  questions  about  the  difficulties  felt  by  members  of  the 
club.] 

Most  Honorable  Friend: — I have  for  a long  time 
wished  to  be  present  with  you;  but  the  weather  and  the 
hard  winter  have  not  been  propitious  to  me.  I sometimes 
complain  of  my  lot,  in  that  we  are  separated  from  each 
other  by  so  long  a distance.  Happy,  yes  most  happy,  is 
the  fellow-lodger,  abiding  under  the  same  roof  with  you, 
who  can  talk  with  you  on  the  best  of  subjects,  at  dinner, 
at  supper,  and  during  your  walks.  However,  though  I 
am  far  apart  from  you  in  body,  you  have  been  very  fre- 
quently present  to  my  mind,  especially  in  your  writings, 
while  I read  and  turn  them  over.  But  as  they  are  not  all 
clear  to  the  members  of  our  club,  for  which  reason  we  have 
begun  a fresh  series  of  meetings,  and  as  I would  not  have 
you  think  me  unmindful  of  you,  I have  applied  my  mind 
to  writing  this  letter. 

As  regards  our  club,  the  following  is  its  order.  One 
of  us  (that  is  every  one  by  turn)  reads  through  and,  as 
far  as  he  understands  it,  expounds  and  also  demonstrates 
the  whole  of  your  work,  according  to  the  sequence  and 
order  of  your  propositions.  Then,  if  it  happens  that  on 
any  point  we  cannot  satisfy  one  another,  we  have  resolved 
to  make  a note  of  it  and  write  to  you,  so  that,  if  possi- 
ble, it  may  be  made  clearer  to  us,  and  that  we  may  be 
able  under  your  guidance  to  defend  the  truth  against 
those  who  are  superstitiously  religious  and  against  the 
Christians,  and  to  withstand  the  attack  of  the  whole 
world.  Well  then,  since,  when  we  first  read  through 
and  expounded  them,  the  definitions  did  not  all  seem 
clear  to  us,  we  differed  about  the  nature  of  definition. 
Next,  in  your  absence  we  consulted  as  our  authority  a 


LETTER  XXVI.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


3IS 

celebrated  mathematician,  named  Borel:  for  he  makes 
mention  of  the  nature  of  definition,  axiom,  and  postu- 
late, and  adduces  the  opinions  of  others  on  the  subject. 
But  his  opinion  is  as  follows : <(  Definitions  are  cited  in 

a demonstration  as  premises.  Wherefore  it  is  necessary, 
that  they  should  be  accurately  known ; otherwise  scientific 
or  accurate  knowledge  cannot  be  attained  by  their  means. n 
And  elsewhere  he  says.  <(  The  primary  and  most  known 
construction  or  passive  quality  of  a given  subject  should 
not  be  chosen  rashly,  but  with  the  greatest  care;  if  the 
construction  or  passive  quality  be  an  impossibility,  no 
scientific  definition  can  be  obtained.  For  instance,  if 
any  one  were  to  say,  let  two  straight  lines  enclosing  a 
space  be  called  figurals,  the  definition  would  be  of  non- 
existences and  impossible:  hence  ignorance  rather  than 
knowledge  would  be  deduced  therefrom.  Again,  if  the 
construction  or  passive  quality  be  possible  and  true,  but 
unknown  or  doubtful  to  us,  the  definition  will  not  be 
good.  For  conclusions  arising  from  what  is  unknown  or 
doubtful  are  themselves  uncertain  or  doubtful ; they  there- 
fore bring  about  conjecture  or  opinion,  but  not  certain 
knowledge.  ® 

Jacquet  seems  to  dissent  from  this  opinion,  for  he 
thinks  that  one  may  proceed  from  a false  premise  directly 
to  a true  conclusion,  as  you  are  aware.  Clavius,  how- 
ever, whose  opinion  he  quotes,  thinks  as  follows : ® Defi- 

nitions, ® he  says,  <(  are  artificial  phrases,  nor  is  there  any 
need  in  reasoning  that  a thing  should  be  defined  in  a 
particular  way;  but  it  is  sufficient  that  a thing  defined 
should  never  be  said  to  agree  with  another  thing,  until 
it  has  been  shown  that  its  definition  also  agrees  there- 
with. » 

Thus,  according  to  Borel,  the  definition  of  a given 
thing  should  consist,  as  regards  its  construction  or  passive 
quality,  in  something  thoroughly  known  to  us  and  true. 
Clavius,  on  the  other  hand,  holds  that  it  is  a matter  of 
indifference,  whether  the  construction  or  passive  quality 
be  well  known  and  true,  or  the  reverse;  so  long  as  we 
do  not  assert,  that  our  definition  agrees  with  anything, 
before  it  has  been  proved. 


3i6 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXVI. 


I should  prefer  Borel’s  opinion  to  that  of  Clavius.  I 
know  not  which  you  would  assent  to,  if  to  either.  As 
these  difficulties  have  occurred  to  me  with  regard  to  the 
nature  of  definition,  which  is  reckoned  among  the  car- 
dinal points  of  demonstration,  and  as  I cannot  free  my 
mind  from  them,  I greatly  desire,  and  earnestly  beg 
you,  when  you  have  leisure  and  opportunity,  to  be  kind 
enough  to  send  me  your  opinion  on  the  matter,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  tell  me  the  distinction  between  axioms 
and  definitions.  Borel  says  that  the  difference  is  merely 
nominal,  but  I believe  you  decide  otherwise. 

Further,  we  cannot  make  up  our  minds  about  the  third 
definition.*  I adduced  to  illustrate  it,  what  my  master 
said  to  me  at  the  Hague,  to  wit,  that  a thing  may  be 
regarded  in  two  ways,  either  as  it  is  in  itself,  or  as  it  is  in 
relation  to  something  else ; as  in  the  case  of  the  intellect, 
for  that  can  be  regarded  either  under  the  head  of 
thought  or  as  consisting  in  ideas.  But  we  do  not  see 
the  point  of  the  distinction  thus  drawn.  For  it  seems  to 
us,  that,  if  we  rightly  conceive  thought,  we  must  range 
it  under  the  head  of  ideas;  as,  if  all  ideas  were  removed 
from  it,  we  should  destroy  thought.  As  we  find  the 
illustration  of  the  matter  not  sufficiently  clear,  the  mat- 
ter itself  remains  somewhat  obscure,  and  we  need  further 
explanation. 

Lastly,  in  the  third  note  to  the  eighth  proposition,  the 
beginning  runs  thus : w Hence  it  is  plain  that,  although 
two  attributes  really  distinct  be  conceived,  that  is,  one 
without  the  aid  of  the  other,  we  cannot  therefore  infer, 
that  they  constitute  two  entities  or  two  different  sub- 
stances. For  it  belongs  to  the  nature  of  substance,  that 
each  of  its  attributes  should  be  conceived  through  itself, 
though  all  the  attributes  it  possesses  exist  simultaneously 
in  it.  ® Here  our  master  seems  to  assume,  that  the  nature 
of  substance  is  so  constituted,  that  it  may  have  several 
attributes.  But  this  doctrine  has  not  yet  been  proved, 
unless  you  refer  to  the  sixth  definition,  of  absolutely 
infinite  substance  or  God.  Otherwise,  if  it  be  asserted 
that  each  substance  has  only  one  attribute,  and  I have 

* The  third  definition  of  the  «Ethics”,  as  they  now  exist 


LETTER  XXVII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


317 


two  ideas  of  two  attributes.  I may  rightly  infer  that, 
where  there  are  two  different  attributes,  there  are  also 
different  substances.  On  this  point  also  we  beg  you  to 
give  a further  explanation.  Besides  I thank  you  very 
much  for  your  writings  communicated  to  me  by  P. 
Balling,  which  have  greatly  delighted  me,  especially 
your  note  on  Proposition  XIX.*  If  I can  do  you  any 
service  here  in  anything  that  is  within  my  power,  I am 
at  your  disposal.  You  have  but  to  let  me  know.  I have 
begun  a course  of  anatomy,  and  am  nearly  half  through 
with  it;  when  it  is  finished,  I shall  begin  a course  of 
chemistry,  and  thus  under  your  guidance  I shall  go 
through  the  whole  of  medicine.  I leave  off,  and  await 
your  answer.  Accept  the  greeting  of 

Your  most  devoted 

S.  J.  de  Vries. 

Amsterdam,  24  Feb.,  1663. 


LETTER  XXVII.  (IX.) 

Spinoza  to  Simon  de  Vries. 

[Spinoza  deprecates  his  correspondent’s  jealousy  of  Albert  Burgh ; and 
answers  that  distinction  must  be  made  between  different  kinds  of 
definitions.  He  explains  his  opinions  more  precisely.] 

Respected  Friend, — I have  received  your  long  wished- 
for  letter,  for  which,  and  for  your  affection  toward  me, 
I heartily  thank  you.  Your  long  absence  has  been  no 
less  grievous  to  me  than  to  you;  yet  in  the  meantime  I 
rejoice  that  my  trifling  studies  are  of  profit  to  you  and 
our  friends.  For  thus  while  you  are  away,  I in  my 
absence  speak  to  you.  You  need  not  envy  my  fellow- 
lodger.  There  is  no  one  who  is  more  displeasing  to  me, 
nor  against  whom  I have  been  more  anxiously  on  my 
guard;  and  therefore  I would  have  you  and  all  my  ac- 
quaintance warned  not  to  communicate  my  opinions  to 

* There  is  no  note  to  (<  Ethics,»  I.  xix.  As  there  is  nothing  to  show 
what  proposition  is  intended,  the  old  version  suppressed  the  whole  pas- 
sage from  « Besides  I thank  you » to  « medicine.» 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXVII. 


3*8 

him,  except  when  he  has  come  to  maturer  years.  So  far 
he  is  too  childish  and  inconstant,  and  is  fonder  of 
novelty  than  of  truth.  But  I hope,  that  in  a few  years 
he  will  amend  these  childish  faults.  Indeed  I am  almost 
sure  of  it,  as  far  as  I can  judge  from  his  nature.  And 
so  his  temperament  bids  me  like  him. 

As  for  the  questions  propounded  in  your  club,  which 
is  wisely  enough  ordered,  I see  that  your  difficulties  arise 
from  not  distinguishing  between  kinds  of  definition : that 
is,  between  a definition  serving  to  explain  a thing,  of 
which  the  essence  only  is  sought  and  in  question,  and  a 
definition  which  is  put  forward  only  for  purposes  of  inquiry. 
The  former  having  a definite  object  ought  to  be  true,  the 
latter  need  not.  For  instance,  if  some  one  asks  me  for  a 
description  of  Solomon’s  temple,  I am  bound  to  give  him 
a true  description,  unless  I want  to  talk  nonsense  with 
him.  But  if  I have  constructed,  in  my  mind,  a temple 
which  I desire  to  build,  and  infer  from  the  description 
of  it  that  I must  buy  such  and  such  a site  and  so  many 
thousand  stones  and  other  materials,  will  any  sane  person 
tell  me  that  I have  drawn  a wrong  conclusion  because 
my  definition  is  possibly  untrue  ? or  will  anyone  ask  me 
to  prove  my  definition  ? Such  a person  would  simply  be 
telling  me,  that  I had  not  conceived  that  which  I had 
conceived,  or  be  requiring  me  to  prove,  that  I had  con- 
ceived that  which  I had  conceived;  in  fact,  evidently 
trifling.  Hence  a definition  either  explains  a thing,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  external  to  the  intellect,  in  which  case  it 
ought  to  be  true  and  only  to  differ  from  a proposition  or 
an  axiom  in  being  concerned  merely  with  the  essences  of 
things,  or  the  modifications  of  things,  whereas  the  latter 
has  a wider  scope  and  extends  also  to  eternal  truths.  Or 
else  it  explains  a thing,  as  it  is  conceived  or  can  be  con- 
ceived by  us ; and  then  it  differs  from  an  axiom  or  prop- 
osition, inasmuch  as  it  only  requires  to  be  conceived 
absolutely,  and  not  like  an  axiom  as  true.  Hence  a bad 
definition  is  one  which  is  not  conceived.  To  explain  my 
meaning,  I will  take  Borel’s  example  — a man  saying  that 
two  straight  lines  enclosing  a space  shall  be  called 
* figurals.  ” If  the  man  means  by  a straight  line  the  same 


LETTER  XXVII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


319 


as  the  rest  of  the  world  means  by  a curved  line,  his 
definition  is  good  (for  by  the  definition  would  be  meant 
some  such  figure  as  (),  or  the  like ) ; so  long  as  he  does 
not  afterward  mean  a square  or  other  kind  of  figure. 
But,  if  he  attaches  the  ordinary  meaning  to  the  words 
straight  line,  the  thing  is  evidently  inconceivable,  and 
therefore  there  is  no  definition.  These  considerations  are 
plainly  confused  by  Borel,  to  whose  opinion  you  incline. 
I give  another  example,  the  one  you  cite  at  the  end  of 
your  letter.  If  I say  that  each  substance  has  only  one 
attribute,  this  is  an  unsupported  statement  and  needs 
proof.  But,  if  I say  that  I mean  by  substance  that  which 
consists  in  only  one  attribute,  the  definition  will  be  good, 
so  long  as  entities  consisting  of  several  attributes  are 
afterward  styled  by  some  name  other  than  substance. 
When  you  say  that  I do  not  prove,  that  substance  (or 
being)  may  have  several  attributes,  you  do  not  perhaps 
pay  attention  to  the  proofs  given.  I adduced  two : First, 
® that  nothing  is  plainer  to  us,  than  that  every  being  may 
be  conceived  by  us  under  some  attribute,  and  that  the 
more  reality  or  essence  a given  being  has,  the  more  attri- 
butes may  be  attributed  to  it.  Hence  a being  absolutely 
infinite  must  be  defined,  etc.®  Secondly,  and  I think  this 
is  the  stronger  proof  of  the  two,  “the  more  attributes  I 
assign  to  any  being,  the  more  am  I compelled  to  assign 
to  it  existence ; ® in  other  words,  the  more  I conceive  it 
as  true.  The  contrary  would  evidently  result  if  I were 
feigning  a chimera  or  some  such  being. 

Your  remark  that  you  cannot  conceive  thought  except 
as  consisting  in  ideas,  because,  when  ideas  are  removed, 
thought  is  annihilated,  springs,  I think,  from  the  fact 
that  while  you  a thinking  thing,  do  as  you  say,  you  ab- 
stract all  your  thoughts  and  conceptions.  It  is  no  mar- 
vel that,  when  you  have  abstracted  all  your  thoughts  and 
conceptions,  you  have  nothing  left  for  thinking  with.  On 
the  general  subject,  I think  I have  shown  sufficiently 
clearly  and  plainly,  that  the  intellect,  although  infinite, 
belongs  to  nature  regarded  as  passive  rather  than  nature 
regarded  as  active  ( ad  naturam  naturatam,  non  vero  ad 
naturam  naturantem ). 


320 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXVIIL 


However,  I do  not  see  how  this  helps  toward  under- 
standing the  third  definition,  nor  what  difficulty  the  lat- 
ter presents.  It  runs,  if  I mistake  not,  as  follows : <(  By 
substance  I mean  that,  which  is  in  itself  and  is  con- 
ceived through  itself ; that  is,  of  which  the  conception  does 
not  involve  the  conception  of  anything  else.  By  attribute  I 
mean  the  same  thing;  except  that  it  is  called  attribute 
with  respect  to  the  understanding,  which  attributes  to 
substance  the  particular  nature  aforesaid.®  This  defini- 
tion, I repeat,  explains  with  sufficient  clearness  what  I 
wish  to  signify  by  substance  or  attribute.  You  desire, 
though  there  is  no  need,  that  I should  illustrate  by  an 
example,  how  one  and  the  same  thing  can  be  stamped 
with  two  names.  In  order  not  to  seem  miserly,  I will 
give  you  two.  First,  I say  that  by  Israel  is  meant  the 
third  patriarch;  I mean  the  same  by  Jacob,  the  name 
Jacob  being  given,  because  the  patriarch  in  question  had 
caught  hold  of  the  heel  of  his  brother.  Secondly,  by  a 
colorless  surface  I mean  a surface,  which  reflects  all 
rays  of  light  without  altering  them.  I mean  the  same 
by  a white  surface,  with  this  difference,  that  a surface 
is  called  white  in  reference  to  a man  looking  at  it,  etc. 


LETTER  XXVIII.  (X.) 

Spinoza  to  Simon  de  Vries. 

[Spinoza,  in  answer  to  a letter  from  De  Vries  now  lost,  speaks  of  the 
experience  necessary  for  proving  a definition,  and  also  of  eternal 
truths.] 

Respected  Friend, — You  ask  me  if  we  have  need  of 
experience,  in  order  to  know  whether  the  definition  of 
a given  attribute  is  true.  To  this  I answer  that  we  never 
need  experience,  except  in  cases  when  the  existence  of 
the  thing  cannot  be  inferred  from  its  definition,  as,  for 
instance,  the  existence  of  modes  (which  cannot  be  inferred 
from  their  definition) ; experience  is  not  needed,  when  the 
existence  of  the  things  in  question  is  not  distinguished  from 


LETTER  XXIX.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


321 


their  essence,  and  is  therefore  inferred  from  their  defini- 
tion. This  can  never  be  taught  us  by  any  experience, 
for  experience  does  not  teach  us  any  essences  of  things ; 
the  utmost  it  can  do  is  to  set  our  mind  thinking  about 
definite  essences  only.  Wherefore,  when  the  existence  of 
attributes  does  not  differ  from  their  essence,  no  experi- 
ence is  capable  of  attaining  it  for  us. 

To  your  further  question,  whether  things  and  their 
modifications  are  eternal  truths,  I answer;  Certainly.  If 
you  ask  me,  why  I do  not  call  them  eternal  truths,  I 
answer,  in  order  to  distinguish  them,  in  accordance  with 
general  usage,  from  those  propositions,  which  do  not  make 
manifest  any  particular  thing  or  modification  of  a thing; 
for  example,  nothing  comes  from  nothing.  These  and 
such  like  propositions  are,  I repeat,  called  eternal  truths 
simply,  the  meaning  merely  being,  that  they  have  no 
standpoint  external  to  the  mind,  etc. 


LETTER  XXIX.  (XII.) 

Spinoza  to  L.  M.  (Lewis  Meyer). 

Dearest  Friend, — I have  received  two  letters  from 
you,  one  dated  Jan.  n,  delivered  to  me  by  our  friend, 
N.  N.,  the  other  dated  March  26,  sent  by  some  unknown 
friend  to  Leyden.  They  were  both  most  welcome  to  me, 
especially  as  I gathered  from  them,  that  all  goes  well 
with  you,  and  that  you  are  often  mindful  of  me.  I also 
owe  and  repay  you  the  warmest  thanks  for  the  courtesy 
and  consideration,  with  which  you  have  always  been  kind 
enough  to  treat  me:  I hope  you  will  believe,  that  I am 
in  no  less  degree  devoted  to  you,  as,  when  occasion  offers, 
I will  always  endeavor  to  prove,  as  far  as  my  poor  powers 
will  admit.  As  a first  proof,  I will  do  my  best  to  answer 
the  questions  you  ask  in  your  letters.  You  request  me 
to  tell  you,  what  I think  about  the  Infinite;  I will  most 
readily  do  so. 

21 


322 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXIX. 


Everyone  regards  the  question  of  the  Infinite  as  most 
difficult,  if  not  insoluble,  through  not  making  a distinc- 
tion between  that  which  must  be  infinite  from  its  very 
nature,  or  in  virtue  of  its  definition,  and  that  which  has 
no  limits,  not  in  virtue  of  its  essence,  but  in  virtue  of 
its  cause;  and  also  through  not  distinguishing  between 
that  which  is  called  infinite,  because  it  has  no  limits,  and 
that,  of  which  the  parts  cannot  be  equalled  or  expressed 
by  any  number,  though  the  greatest  and  least  magnitude 
of  the  whole  may  be  known;  and,  lastly,  through  not 
distinguishing  between  that,  which  can  be  understood 
but  not  imagined,  and  that  which  can  also  be  imagined. 
If  these  distinctions,  I repeat,  had  been  attended  to, 
inquirers  would  not  have  been  overwhelmed  with  such 
a vast  crowd  of  difficulties.  They  would  then  clearly 
have  understood,  what  kind  of  infinite  is  indivisible  and 
possesses  no  parts;  and  what  kind,  on  the  other  hand, 
may  be  divided  without  involving  a contradiction  in 
terms.  They  would  further  have  understood,  what  kind 
of  infinite  may,  without  solecism,  be  conceived  greater 
than  another  infinite,  and  what  kind  cannot  be  so  con- 
ceived. All  this  will  plainly  appear  from  what  I am 
about  to  say. 

However,  I will  first  briefly  explain  the  terms  substance, 

MODE,  ETERNITY,  and  DURATION. 

The  points  to  be  noted  concerning  substance  are  these: 
First,  that  existence  appertains  to  its  essence;  in  other 
words,  that  solely  from  its  essence  and  definition  its 
existence  follows.  This,  if  I remember  rightly,  I have 
already  proved  to  you  by  word  of  mouth,  without  the 
aid  of  any  other  propositions.  Secondly,  as  a conse- 
quence of  the  above,  that  substance  is  not  manifold, 
but  single:  there  cannot  be  two  of  the  same  nature. 
Thirdly,  every  substance  must  be  conceived  as  in- 
finite. 

The  modifications  of  substance  I call  modes.  Their  defi- 
nition, in  so  far  as  it  is  not  identical  with  that  of  sub- 
stance, cannot  involve  any  existence.  Hence,  though  they 
exist,  we  can  conceive  them  as  non-existent.  From  this 
it  follows,  that,  when  we  are  regarding  only  the  essence 


LETTER  XXIX.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


323 


of  modes,  and  not  the  order  of  the  whole  of  nature,  we 
cannot  conclude  from  their  present  existence,  that  they 
will  exist  or  not  exist  in  the  future,  or  that  they  have 
existed  or  not  existed  in  the  past;  whence  it  is  abund- 
antly clear,  that  we  conceive  the  existence  of  substance 
as  entirely  different  from  the  existence  of  modes. 
From  this  difference  arises  the  distinction  between 
eternity  and  duration.  Duration  is  only  applicable  to 
the  existence  of  modes;  eternity  is  applicable  to  the 
existence  of  substance,  that  is,  the  infinite  faculty  of  ex- 
istence or  being  ( infinitum  existendi  sive — invitd  Latini- 
tate— essendi  fruitionem ). 

From  what  has  been  said  it  is  quite  clear  that  when, 
as  is  most  often  the  case,  we  are  regarding  only  the  es- 
sence of  modes  and  not  the  order  of  nature,  we  may 
freely  limit  the  existence  and  duration  of  modes  without 
destroying  the  conception  we  have  formed  of  them;  we 
may  conceive  them  as  greater  or  less,  or  may  divide 
them  into  parts.  Eternity  and  substance,  being  only 
conceivable  as  infinite,  cannot  be  thus  treated  without  our 
conception  of  them  being  destroyed.  Wherefore  it  is  mere 
foolishness,  or  even  insanity,  to  say  that  extended  sub- 
stance is  made  up  of  parts  or  bodies  really  distinct  from 
one  another.  It  is  as  though  one  should  attempt  by  the 
aggregation  and  addition  of  many  circles  to  make  up  a 
square,  or  a triangle,  or  something  of  totally  different  es- 
sence. Wherefore  the  whole  heap  of  arguments,  by  which 
philosophers  commonly  endeavor  to  show  that  extended 
substance  is  finite,  falls  to  the  ground  by  its  own  weight. 
For  all  such  persons  suppose,  that  corporeal  substance  is 
made  up  of  parts.  In  the  same  way,  others  who  have 
persuaded  themselves  that  a line  is  made  up  of  points, 
have  been  able  to  discover  many  arguments  to  show  that 
a line  is  not  infinitely  divisible.  If  you  ask,  why  we  are 
by  nature  so  prone  to  attempt  to  divide  extended  sub- 
stance, I answer,  that  quantity  is  conceived  by  us  in  two 
ways,  namely,  by  abstraction  or  superficially,  as  we 
imagine  it  by  the  aid  of  the  senses,  or  as  substance, 
which  can  only  be  accomplished  through  the  understand- 
ing. So  that,  if  we  regard  quantity  as  it  exists  in  the 


324 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXIX. 


imagination  (and  this  is  the  more  frequent  and  easy 
method),  it  will  be  found  to  be  divisible,  finite,  com- 
posed of  parts,  and  manifold.  But,  if  we  regard  it  as  it 
is  in  the  understanding,  and  the  thing  be  conceived  as  it  is 
in  itself  (which  is  very  difficult),  it  will  then,  as  I have 
sufficiently  shown  you  before,  be  found  to  be  infinite,  in- 
divisible, and  single. 

Again,  from  the  fact  that  we  can  limit  duration  and 
quantity  at  our  pleasure,  when  we  conceive  the  latter 
abstractedly  as  apart  from  substance,  and  separate  the 
former  from  the  manner  whereby  it  flows  from  things 
eternal,  there  arise  time  and  measure;  time  for  the  pur- 
pose of  limiting  duration,  measure  for  the  purpose  of 
limiting  quantity,  so  that  we  may,  as  far  as  is  possible, 
the  more  readily  imagine  them.  Further,  inasmuch  as 
we  separate  the  modifications  of  substance  from  substance 
itself,  and  reduce  them  to  classes,  so  that  we  may,  as 
far  as  is  possible,  the  more  readily  imagine  them,  there 
arises  number,  whereby  we  limit  them.  Whence  it  is 
clearly  to  be  seen,  that  measure,  time,  and  number,  are 
merely  modes  of  thinking,  or,  rather,  of  imagining.  It 
is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  therefore,  that  all  who  have 
endeavored  to  understand  the  course  of  nature,  by  means 
of  such  notions,  and  without  fully  understanding  even 
them,  have  entangled  themselves  so  wondrously,  that  they 
have  at  last  only  been  able  to  extricate  themselves  by 
breaking  through  every  rule  and  admitting  absurdities 
even  of  the  grossest  kind.  For  there  are  many  things 
which  cannot  be  conceived  through  the  imagination  but 
only  through  the  understanding,  for  instance,  substance, 
eternity,  and  the  like;  thus,  if  any  one  tries  to  explain 
such  things  by  means  of  conceptions  which  are  mere  aids 
to  the  imagination,  he  is  simply  assisting  his  imagination 
to  run  away  with  him.  Nor  can  even  the  modes  of  sub- 
stance ever  be  rightly  understood,  if  we  confuse  them 
with  entities  of  the  kind  mentioned,  mere  aids  of  the 
reason  or  imagination.  In  so  doing  we  separate  them 
from  substance,  and  the  mode  of  their  derivation  from 
eternity,  without  which  they  can  never  be  rightly  under- 
stood. To  make  the  matter  yet  more  clear,  take  the 


LETTER  XXIX.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


325 


following  example:  when  a man  conceives  of  duration 
abstractedly,  and,  confusing  it  with  time,  begins  to  divide 
it  into  parts,  he  will  never  be  able  to  understand  how 
an  hour,  for  instance,  can  elapse.  For  in  order  that  an 
hour  should  elapse,  it  is  necessary  that  its  half  should 
elapse  first,  and  afterward  half  of  the  remainder,  and 
again  half  of  the  half  of  the  remainder,  and  if  you  go 
on  thus  to  infinity,  subtracting  the  half  of  the  residue, 
you  will  never  be  able  to  arrive  at  the  end  of  the  hour. 
Wherefore  many,  who  are  not  accustomed  to  distinguish 
abstractions  from  realities,  have  ventured  to  assert  that 
duration  is  made  up  of  instants,  and  so  in  wishing  to 
avoid  Charybdis  have  fallen  into  Scylla.  It  is  the  same 
thing  to  make  up  duration  out  of  instants,  as  it  is  to 
make  number  simply  by  adding  up  naughts. 

Further,  as  it  is  evident  from  what  has  been  said,  that 
neither  number,  nor  measure,  nor  time,  being  mere  aids 
to  the  imagination,  can  be  infinite  (for,  otherwise,  num- 
ber would  not  be  number,  nor  measure  measure,  nor 
time  time ) ; it  is  hence  abundantly  evident,  why  many 
who  confuse  these  three  abstractions  with  realities,  through 
being  ignorant  of  the  true  nature  of  things,  have  actu- 
ally denied  the  Infinite. 

The  wretchedness  of  their  reasoning  may  be  judged  by 
mathematicians,  who  have  never  allowed  themselves  to 
be  delayed  a moment  by  arguments  of  this  sort,  in  the 
case  of  things  which  they  clearly  and  distinctly  perceive. 
For  not  only  have  they  come  across  many  things,  which 
cannot  be  expressed  by  number  (thus  showing  the  in- 
adequacy of  number  for  determining  all  things ) ; but  also 
they  have  found  many  things,  which  cannot  be  equalled 
by  any  number,  but  surpass  every  possible  number.  But 
they  infer  hence,  that  such  things  surpass  enumeration, 
not  because  of  the  multitude  of  their  component  parts, 
but  because  their  nature  cannot,  without  manifest  con- 
tradiction, be  expressed  in  terms  of  number.  As,  for 
instance,  in  the  case  of  two  circles,  non-concentric, 
whereof  one  incloses  the  other,  no  number  can  express 
the  inequalities  of  distance  which  exist  between  the  two 
circles,  nor  all  the  variations  which  matter  in  motion  in 


326 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXIX. 


the  intervening  space  may  undergo.  This  conclusion  is 
not  based  on  the  excessive  size  of  the  intervening  space. 
However  small  a portion  of  it  we  take,  the  inequalities 
of  this  small  portion  will  surpass  all  numerical  expression. 
Nor,  again,  is  the  conclusion  based  on  the  fact,  as  in 
other  cases,  that  we  do  not  know  the  maximum  and  the 
minimum  of  the  said  space.  It  springs  simply  from  the 
fact,  that  the  nature  of  the  space  between  two  non-con- 
centric  circles  cannot  be  expressed  in  number.  There- 
fore, he  who  would  assign  a numerical  equivalent  for  the 
inequalities  in  question,  would  be  bound,  at  the  same 
time,  to  bring  about  that  a circle  should  not  be  a cir- 
cle. 

The  same  result  would  take  place  — to  return  to  my 
subject  — if  one  were  to  wish  to  determine  all  the  motions 
undergone  by  matter  up  to  the  present,  by  reducing  them 
and  their  duration  to  a certain  number  and  time.  This 
would  be  the  same  as  an  attempt  to  deprive  corporeal  sub- 
stance, which  we  cannot  conceive  except  as  existent,  of 
its  modifications,  and  to  bring  about  that  it  should  not 
possess  the  nature  which  it  does  possess.  All  this  I could 
clearly  demonstrate  here,  together  with  many  other  points 
touched  on  in  this  latter,  but  I deem  it  superfluous. 

From  all  that  has  been  said,  it  is  abundantly  evident 
that  certain  things  are  in  their  nature  infinite,  and  can 
by  no  means  be  conceived  as  finite;  whereas  there  are 
other  things,  infinite  in  virtue  of  the  cause  from  which 
they  are  derived,  which  can,  when  conceived  abstractedly, 
be  divided  into  parts,  and  regarded  as  finite.  Lastly, 
there  are  some  which  are  called  infinite  or,  if  you  prefer, 
indefinite,  because  they  cannot  be  expressed  in  number, 
which  may  yet  be  conceived  as  greater  or  less.  It  does 
not  follow  that  such  are  equal,  because  they  are  alike 
incapable  of  numerical  expression.  This  is  plain  enough, 
from  the  example  given,  and  many  others. 

Lastly,  I have  put  briefly  before  you  the  causes  of  error 
and  confusion,  which  have  arisen  concerning  the  question 
of  the  infinite.  I have,  if  I mistake  not,  so  explained 
them  that  no  question  concerning  the  infinite  remains 
untreated,  or  cannot  readily  be  solved  from  what  I have 


LETTER  XXIX. A.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


327 


said;  wherefore,  I do  not  think  it  worth  while  to  detain 
you  longer  on  the  matter. 

But  I should  like  it  first  to  be  observed  here,  that  the 
later  Peripatetics  have,  I think,  misunderstood  the  proof 
given  by  the  Ancients  who  sought  to  demonstrate  the 
existence  of  God.  This,  as  I find  it  in  a certain  Jew 
named  Rabbi  Ghasdai,  runs  as  follows : (<  If  there  be  an 
infinite  series  of  causes,  all  things  which  are,  are  caused. 
But  nothing  which  is  caused  can  exist  necessarily  in  virtue 
of  its  own  nature.  Therefore,  there  is  nothing  in  nature, 
to  whose  essence  existence  necessarily  belongs.  But  this 
is  absurd.  Therefore,  the  premise  is  absurd  also. » Hence 
the  force  of  the  argument  lies  not  in  the  impossibility 
of  an  actual  infinite  or  an  infinite  series  of  causes;  but 
only  in  the  absurdity  of  the  assumption  that  things,  which 
do  not  necessarily  exist  by  nature,  are  not  conditioned 
for  existence  by  a thing,  which  does  by  its  own  nature 
necessarily  exist. 

I would  now  pass  on,  for  time  presses,  to  your 
second  letter:  but  I shall  be  able  more  conveniently  to 
reply  to  its  contents,  when  you  are  kind  enough  to  pay 
me  a visit.  I therefore  beg  that  you  will  come  as  soon 
as  possible;  the  time  for  traveling  is  at  hand.  Enough. 
Farewell,  and  keep  in  remembrance, 

Yours,  etc. 

Rhijnsburg,  20  April,  1663. 


LETTER  XXIX.  a. 

Spinoza  to  Lewis  Meyer. 

Dear  Friend, — The  preface  you  sent  me  by  our  friend 
De  Vries,  I now  send  back  to  you  by  the  same  hand. 
Some  few  things,  as  you  will  see,  I have  marked  in  the 
margin;  but  yet  a few  remain,  which  I have  judged  it 
better  to  mention  to  you  by  letter.  First,  where  on  page 
4 you  give  the  reader  to  know  on  what  occasion  I com- 
posed the  first  part;  I would  have  you  likewise  explain 


328 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXIX.  a. 


there,  or  where  you  please,  that  I composed  it  within  a 
fortnight.  For  when  this  is  explained  none  will  suppose 
the  exposition  to  be  so  clear  as  that  it  cannot  be  bet- 
tered, and  so  they  will  not  stick  at  obscurities  in  this 
and  that  phrase  on  which  they  may  chance  to  stumble. 
Secondly,  I would  have  you  explain,  that  when  I prove 
many  points  otherwise  than  they  be  proved  by  Descartes, 
’tis  not  to  amend  Descartes,  but  the  better  to  preserve 
my  order,  and  not  to  multiply  axioms  overmuch:  and 
that  for  this  same  reason  I prove  many  things  which  by 
Descartes  are  barely  alleged  without  any  proof,  and  must 
needs  add  other  matters  which  Descartes  let  alone. 
Lastly,  I will  earnestly  beseech  you,  as  my  especial 
friend,  to  let  be  everything  you  have  written  toward 
the  end  against  that  creature,  and  wholly  strike  it  out. 
And  though  many  reasons  determine  me  to  this  request, 
I will  give  but  one.  I would  fain  have  all  men  readily 
believe  that  these  matters  are  published  for  the  common 
profit  of  the  world,  and  that  your  sole  motive  in  bring- 
ing out  the  book  is  the  love  of  spreading  the  truth;  and 
that  it  is  accordingly  all  your  study  to  make  the  work 
acceptable  to  all,  to  bid  men,  with  all  courtesy  to  the 
pursuit  of  genuine  philosophy,  and  to  consult  their  com- 
mon advantage.  Which  every  man  will  be  ready  to 
think  when  he  sees  that  no  one  is  attacked,  nor  anything 
advanced  where  any  man  can  find  the  least  offense. 
Notwithstanding,  if  afterward  the  person  you  know  of, 
or  any  other,  be  minded  to  display  his  ill-will,  then  you 
may  portray  his  life  and  character,  and  gain  applause  by 
it.  So  I ask  that  you  will  not  refuse  to  be  patient  thus 
far,  and  suffer  yourself  to  be  entreated,  and  believe  me 
wholly  bounden  to  you,  and 

Yours  with  all  affection 

B.  de  Spinoza. 

VOORBURG,  Aug.  3,  1663. 

Our  friend  De  Vries  had  promised  to  take  this  with  him; 
but  seeing  he  knows  not  when  he  will  return  to  you,  I 
send  it  by  another  hand. 

Along  with  this  I send  you  part  of  the  scholium  to 
Prop,  xxvii.  Part  II.  where  page  75  begins,  that  you 


LETTER  XXX. J CORRESPONDENCE  329 

may  hand  it  to  the  printer  to  be  reprinted.  The  matter 
I send  you  must  of  necessity  be  reprinted,  and  fourteen 
or  fifteen  lines  added,  which  may  easily  be  inserted. 


LETTER  XXX.  (XVII.) 

Spinoza  to  Peter  Balling. 

[Concerning  omens  and  phantoms.  The  mind  may  have  a confused 
presentiment  of  the  future.] 

Beloved  Friend, — Your  last  letter,  written,  if  I mistake 
not,  on  the  26th  of  last  month,  has  duly  reached  me.  It 
caused  me  no  small  sorrow  and  solicitude,  though  the 
feeling  sensibly  diminished  when  I reflected  on  the  good 
sense  and  fortitude,  with  which  you  have  known  how  to 
despise  the  evils  of  fortune,  or  rather  of  opinion,  at  a 
time  when  they  most  bitterly  assailed  you.  Yet  my 
anxiety  increases  daily;  I therefore  beg  and  implore  you 
by  the  claims  of  our  friendship,  that  you  will  rouse  your- 
self to  write  me  a long  letter.  With  regard  to  Omens, 
of  which  you  make  mention  in  telling  me  that,  while 
your  child  was  still  healthy  and  strong,  you  heard  groans 
like  those  he  uttered  when  he  was  ill  and  shortly  after- 
ward died,  I should  judge  that  these  were  not  real 
groans,  but  only  the  effect  of  your  imagination;  for  you 
say  that,  when  you  got  up  and  composed  yourself  to  listen, 
you  did  not  hear  them  so  clearly  either  as  before  or  as 
afterward,  when  you  had  fallen  asleep  again.  This,  I 
think,  shows  that  the  groans  were  purely  due  to  the  im- 
agination, which,  when  it  was  unfettered  and  free,  could 
imagine  groans  more  forcibly  and  vividly  than  when  you 
sat  up  in  order  to  listen  in  a particular  direction.  I think  I 
can  both  illustrate  and  confirm  what  I say  by  another  oc- 
currence, which  befell  me  at  Rhijnsburg  last  winter.  When 
one  morning,  after  the  day  had  dawned,  I woke  up  from  a 
very  unpleasant  dream,  the  images,  which  had  presented 
themselves  to  me  in  sleep,  remained  before  my  eyes  just 
as  vividly  as  though  the  things  had  been  real,  especially 


330 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXX. 


the  image  of  a certain  black  and  leprous  Brazilian  whom 
I had  never  seen  before.  This  image  disappeared  for 
the  most  part  when,  in  order  to  divert  my  thoughts,  I 
cast  my  eyes  on  a book,  or  something  else.  But,  as  soon 
as  I lifted  my  eyes  again  without  fixing  my  attention  on 
any  particular  object,  the  same  image  of  this  same  negro 
appeared  with  the  same  vividness  again  and  again,  until 
the  head  of  it  gradually  vanished.  I say  that  the  same 
thing  which  occurred  with  regard  to  my  inward  sense 
of  sight,  occurred  with  your  hearing;  but  as  the  causes 
were  very  different,  your  case  was  an  omen  and  mine 
was  not.  The  matter  may  be  clearly  grasped  by  means 
of  what  I am  about  to  say.  The  effects  of  the  imagina- 
tion arise  either  from  bodily  or  mental  causes.  I will 
proceed  to  prove  this,  in  order  not  to  be  too  long,  solely 
from  experience.  We  know  that  fevers  and  other  bodily 
ailments  are  the  causes  of  delirium,  and  that  persons  of 
stubborn  disposition  imagine  nothing  but  quarrels,  brawls, 
slaughterings,  and  the  like.  We  also  see  that  the  imagin- 
ation is  to  a certain  extent  determined  by  the  character 
of  the  disposition,  for,  as  we  know  by  experience,  it 
follows  in  the  tracks  of  the  understanding  in  every 
respect,  and  arranges  its  images  and  words,  just  as  the 
understanding  arranges  its  demonstrations  and  connects 
one  with  another;  so  that  we  are  hardly  at  all  able  to 
say  what  will  not  serve  the  imagination  as  a basis  for 
some  image  or  other.  This  being  so,  I say  that  no 
effects  of  imagination  springing  from  physical  causes  can 
ever  be  omens  of  future  events ; inasmuch  as  their  causes 
do  not  involve  any  future  events.  But  the  effects  of 
imagination,  or  images  originating  in  the  mental  dispo- 
sition, may  be  omens  of  some  future  event;  inasmuch  as 
the  mind  may  have  a confused  presentiment  of  the 
future.  It  may,  therefore,  imagine  a future  event  as 
forcibly  and  vividly,  as  though  it  were  present ; for 
instance  a father  (to  take  an  example  resembling  your 
own ) loves  his  child  so  much  that  he  and  the  beloved 
child  are,  as  it  were,  one  and  the  same.  And  since  (like 
that  which  I demonstrated  on  another  occasion)  there 
must  necessarily  exist  in  thought  the  idea  of  the  essence 


LETTER  XXXI.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


331 


of  the  child’s  states  and  their  results,  and  since  the 
father,  through  his  union  with  his  child,  is  a part  of  the 
said  child,  the  soul  of  the  father  must  necessarily  par- 
ticipate in  the  ideal  essence  of  the  child  and  his  states, 
and  in  their  results,  as  I have  shown  at  greater  length 
elsewhere. 

Again,  as  the  soul  of  the  father  participates  ideally  in 
the  consequences  of  his  child’s  essence,  he  may  (as  I 
have  said)  sometimes  imagine  some  of  the  said  conse- 
quences as  vividly  as  if  they  were  present  with  him, 
provided  that  the  following  conditions  are  fulfilled:  I. 
If  the  occurrence  in  his  son’s  career  be  remarkable.  II. 
If  it  be  capable  of  being  readily  imagined.  III.  If  the 
time  of  its  happening  be  not  too  remote.  IV.  If  his 
body  be  sound,  in  respect  not  only  of  health  but  of  free- 
dom from  every  care  or  business  which  could  outwardly 
trouble  the  senses.  It  may  also  assist  the  result,  if  we 
think  of  something  which  generally  stimulates  similar 
ideas.  For  instance,  if  while  we  are  talking  with  this  or 
that  man  we  hear  groans,  it  will  generally  happen  that, 
when  we  think  of  the  man  again,  the  groans  heard  when 
we  spoke  with  him  will  recur  to  our  mind.  This,  dear 
friend,  is  my  opinion  on  the  question  you  ask  me.  I 
have,  I confess,  been  very  brief,  but  I have  furnished 
you  with  material  for  writing  to  me  on  the  first  oppor- 
tunity, etc. 

Voorburg,  20  July,  1664. 


LETTER  XXXI.  (XVIII.) 

William  de  Blyenbergh  to  Spinoza. 

Unknown  Friend  and  Sir, — I have  already  read  sev- 
eral times  with  attention  your  treatise  and  its  appendix 
recently  published.  I should  narrate  to  others  more  be- 
comingly than  to  yourself  the  extreme  solidity  I found 


332 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXXI. 


in  it,  and  the  pleasure  with  which  I perused  it.  But  I 
am  unable  to  conceal  my  feelings  from  you,  because  the 
more  frequently  I study  the  work  with  attention,  the 
more  it  pleases  me,  and  I am  constantly  observing  some- 
thing which  I had  not  before  remarked.  However,  I 
will  not  too  loudly  extol  its  author,  lest  I should  seem 
in  this  letter  to  be  a flatterer.  I am  aware  that  the  gods 
grant  all  things  to  labor.  Not  to  detain  you  too  long 
with  wondering  who  I may  be,  and  how  it  comes  to  pass 
that  one  unknown  to  you  takes  the  great  liberty  of  writ- 
ing to  you,  I will  tell  you  that  he  is  a man  who  is  im- 
pelled by  his  longing  for  pure  and  unadulterated  truth, 
and  desires  during  this  brief  and  frail  life  to  fix  his  feet 
in  the  ways  of  science,  so  far  as  our  human  faculties 
will  allow;  one  who  in  the  pursuit  of  truth  has  no  goal 
before  his  eyes  save  truth  herself;  one  who  by  his  sci- 
ence seeks  to  obtain  as  the  result  of  truth  neither  honor 
nor  riches,  but  simple  truth  and  tranquillity;  one  who, 
out  of  the  whole  circle  of  truths  and  sciences,  takes  de- 
light in  none  more  than  in  metaphysics,  if  not  in  all 
branches  at  any  rate  in  some;  one  who  places  the  whole 
delight  of  his  life  in  the  fact,  that  he  can  pass  in  the 
study  of  them  his  hours  of  ease  and  leisure.  But  no  one, 
I rest  assured,  is  so  blessed  as  yourself,  no  one  has  car- 
ried his  studies  so  far,  and  therefore  no  one  has  arrived 
at  the  pitch  of  perfection  which,  as  I see  from  your  work, 
you  have  attained.  To  add  a last  word,  the  present  writer 
is  one  with  whom  you  may  gain  a closer  acquaintance, 
if  you  choose  to  attach  him  to  you  by  enlightening 
and  interpenetrating,  as  it  were,  his  halting  medita- 
tions. 

But  I return  to  your  treatise.  While  I found  in  it  many 
things  which  tickled  my  palate  vastly,  some  of  them 
proved  difficult  to  digest.  Perhaps  a stranger  ought  not 
to  report  to  you  his  objections,  the  more  so  as  I know 
not  whether  they  will  meet  with  your  approval.  This  is 
the  reason  for  my  making  these  prefatory  remarks,  and 
asking  you,  if  you  can  find  leisure  in  the  winter  evenings, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  will  be  willing  to  answer  the  diffi- 
culties which  I still  find  in  your  book,  and  to  forward  me 


LETTER  XXXI.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


333 


the  result,  always  under  the  condition  that  it  does  not 
interrupt  any  occupation  of  greater  importance  or  pleas- 
ure; for  I desire  nothing  more  earnestly  than  to  see  the 
promise  made  in  your  book  fulfilled  by  a more  detailed 
exposition  of  your  opinions.  I should  have  communicated 
to  you  by  word  of  mouth  what  I now  commit  to  paper; 
but  my  ignorance  of  your  address,  the  infectious  disease,* 
and  my  duties  here,  prevented  me.  I must  defer  the 
pleasure  for  the  present. 

However,  in  order  that  this  letter  may  not  be  quite 
empty,  and  in  the  hope  that  it  will  not  be  displeasing  to 
you,  I will  ask  you  one  question.  You  say  in  various 
passages  in  the  <(  Principia, B and  in  the  <(  Metaphysical 
Reflections,  ® either  as  your  own  opinion,  or  as  explain- 
ing the  philosophy  of  Descartes,  that  creation  and  pre- 
servation are  identical  (which  is,  indeed,  so  evident  to 
those  who  have  considered  the  question  as  to  be  a 
primary  notion) ; secondly,  that  God  has  not  only  created 
substances,  but  also  motions  in  substances  — in  other 
words,  that  God,  by  a continuous  act  of  creation  preserves, 
not  only  substances  in  their  normal  state,  but  also  the 
motion  and  the  endeavors  of  substances.  God,  for  in- 
stance, not  only  brings  about  by  his  immediate  will  and 
working  (whatever  be  the  term  employed),  that  the  soul 
should  last  and  continue  in  its  normal  state;  but  he  is 
also  the  cause  of  his  will  determining,  in  some  way,  the 
movement  of  the  soul  — in  other  words,  as  God,  by  a 
continuous  act  of  creation,  brings  about  that  things 
should  remain  in  existence,  so  is  he  also  the  cause  of 
the  movements  and  endeavors  existing  in  things.  In 
fact,  save  God,  there  is  no  cause  of  motion.  It  therefore 
follows  that  God  is  not  only  the  cause  of  the  substance 
of  mind,  but  also  of  every  endeavor  or  motion  of  mind, 
which  we  call  volition,  as  you  frequently  say.  From  this 
statement  it  seems  to  follow  necessarily,  either  that  there 
is  no  evil  in  the  motion  or  volition  of  the  mind,  or  else 

* The  plague,  which  had  prevailed  on  the  Continent  during  1664, 
was  introduced  into  London  in  the  very  month  in  which  this  letter 
was  written,  perhaps  from  Holland. 


334 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXXI. 


that  God  directly  brings  about  that  evil.  For  that  which 
we  call  evil  comes  to  pass  through  the  soul,  and,  conse- 
quently, through  the  immediate  influence  and  concurrence 
of  God.  For  instance,  the  soul  of  Adam  wishes  to  eat 
of  the  forbidden  fruit.  It  follows  from  what  has  been 
said  above,  not  only  that  Adam  forms  his  wish  through 
the  influence  of  God,  but  also,  as  will  presently  be  shown, 
that  through  that  influence  he  forms  it  in  that  particular 
manner.  Hence,  either  the  act  forbidden  to  Adam  is  not 
evil,  inasmuch  as  God  himself  not  only  caused  the  wish, 
but  also  the  manner  of  it,  or  else  God  directly  brought 
about  that  which  we  call  evil.  Neither  you  nor  Descartes 
seem  to  have  solved  this  difficulty  by  saying  that  evil  is 
a negative  conception,  and  that,  as  such,  God  cannot 
bring  it  about.  Whence,  we  may  ask,  came  the  wish  to 
eat  the  forbidden  fruit,  or  the  wish  of  devils  to  be  equal 
with  God  ? 

For  since  (as  you  justly  observe)  the  will  is  not  some- 
thing different  from  the  mind,  but  is  only  an  endeavor 
or  movement  of  the  mind,  the  concurrence  of  God  is  as 
necessary  to  it  as  to  the  mind  itself.  Now  the  concur- 
rence of  God,  as  I gather  from  your  writings,  is  merely 
the  determining  of  a thing  in  a particular  manner  through 
the  will  of  God.  It  follows  that  God  concurs  no  less  in 
an  evil  wish,  in  so  far  as  it  is  evil,  than  in  a good  wish 
in  so  far  as  it  is  good,  in  other  words  he  determines  it. 
For  the  will  of  God  being  the  absolute  cause  of  all  that 
exists,  either  in  substance  or  in  effort,  seems  to  be  also 
the  primary  cause  of  an  evil  wish,  in  so  far  as  it  is  evil. 
Again,  no  exercise  of  volition  takes  place  in  us,  that  God 
has  not  known  from  all  eternity.  If  we  say  that  God 
does  not  know  of  a particular  exercise  of  volition,  we 
attribute  to  him  imperfection.  But  how  could  God  gain 
knowledge  of  it  except  from  his  decrees  ? Therefore 
his  decrees  are  the  cause  of  our  volitions,  and  hence  it 
seems  also  to  follow  that  either  an  evil  wish  is  not  evil, 
or  else  that  God  is  the  direct  cause  of  the  evil  and  brings 
it  about.  There  is  no  room  here  for  the  theological  dis- 
tinction between  an  act  and  the  evil  inherent  in  that  act. 
For  God  decrees  the  mode  of  the  act  no  less  than  the 


LETTER  XXXII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


335 


act,  that  is,  God  not  only  decreed  that  Adam  should  eat, 
but  also  that  he  should  necessarily  eat  contrary  to  the 
command  given.  Thus  it  seems  on  all  sides  to  follow, 
either  that  Adam’s  eating  contrary  to  the  command  was 
not  an  evil,  or  else  that  God  himself  brought  it  to 
pass. 

These,  illustrious  sir,  are  the  questions  in  your  treatise, 
which  I am  unable  at  present,  to  elucidate.  Either  alter- 
native seems  to  me  difficult  of  acceptance.  However,  I 
await  a satisfactory  answer  from  your  keen  judgment 
and  learning,  hoping  to  show  you  hereafter  how  deeply 
indebted  I shall  be  to  you.  Be  assured,  illustrious  sir, 
that  I put  these  questions  from  no  other  motive  than  the 
desire  for  truth.  T am  a man  of  leisure,  not  tied  to  any 
profession,  gaining  my  living  by  honest  trade,  and  devot- 
ing my  spare  time  to  questions  of  this  sort.  I humbly 
hope  that  my  difficulties  will  not  be  displeasing  to  you. 
If  you  are  minded  to  send  an  answer,  as  I most  ardently 
hope,  write  to,  etc,  William  de  Blyenbergh. 

Dordrecht,  12  Dec.,  1664. 


LETTER  XXXII.  (XIX.) 

Spinoza  to  Blyenbergh. 

[Spinoza  answers  with  his  usual  courtesy  the  question  propounded  by 

Blyenbergh.] 

Unknown  Friend, — I received,  at  Schiedam,  on  the 
26th  of  December,  your  letter  dated  the  12th  of  Decem- 
ber, inclosed  in  another  written  on  the  24th  of  the  same 
month.  I gather  from  it  your  fervent  love  of  truth,  and 
your  making  it  the  aim  of  all  your  studies.  This  com- 
pelled me,  though  by  no  means  otherwise  unwilling,  not 
only  to  grant  your  petition  by  answering  all  the  questions 
you  have  sent,  or  may  in  future  send,  to  the  best  of 
my  ability,  but  also  to  impart  to  you  everything  in  my 
power,  which  can  conduce  to  further  knowledge  and  sincere 


336 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXXII. 


friendship.  So  far  as  in  me  lies,  I value,  above  all  other 
things  out  of  my  own  control,  the  joining  hands  of  friend- 
ship with  men  who  are  sincere  lovers  of  truth.  I believe 
that  nothing  in  the  world,  of  things  outside  our  own  con- 
trol, brings  more  peace  than  the  possibility  of  affectionate 
intercourse  with  such  men;  it  is  just  as  impossible  that 
the  love  we  bear  them  can  be  disturbed  (inasmuch  as  it 
is  founded  on  the  desire  each  feels  for  the  knowledge  of 
truth),  as  that  truth  once  perceived  should  not  be  assented 
to.  It  is,  moreover,  the  highest  and  most  pleasing  source 
of  happiness  derivable  from  things  not  under  our  own 
control.  Nothing  save  truth  has  power  closely  to  unite 
different  feelings  and  dispositions.  I say  nothing  of  the 
very  great  advantages  which  it  brings,  lest  I should  detain 
you  too  long  on  a subject  which,  doubtless,  you  know 
already.  I have  said  thus  much,  in  order  to  show  you 
better  how  gladly  I shall  embrace  this  and  any  future 
opportunity  of  serving  you. 

In  order  to  make  the  best  of  the  present  opportunity, 
I will  at  once  proceed  to  answer  your  question.  This 
seems  to  turn  on  the  point  “that  it  seems  to  be  clear, 
not  only  from  God’s  providence,  which  is  identical  with 
his  will,  but  also  from  God’s  co-operation  and  continu- 
ous creation  of  things,  either  that  there  are  no  such 
things  as  sin  or  evil,  or  that  God  directly  brings  sin  and 
evil  to  pass.”  You  do  not,  however,  explain  what  you 
mean  by  evil.  As  far  as  one  may  judge  from  the  ex- 
ample you  give  in  the  predetermined  act  of  volition  of 
Adam,  you  seem  to  mean  by  evil  the  actual  exercise  of 
volition,  in  so  far  as  it  is  conceived  as  predetermined  in 
a particular  way,  or  in  so  far  as  it  is  repugnant  to  the 
command  of  God.  Hence  you  conclude  ( and  I agree  with 
you  if  this  be  what  you  mean ) that  it  is  absurd  to  adopt 
either  alternative,  either  that  God  brings  to  pass  any. 
thing  contrary  to  his  own  will,  or  that  what  is  contrary 
to  God’s  will  can  be  good. 

For  my  own  part,  I cannot  admit  that  sin  and  evil 
have  any  positive  existence,  far  less  that  anything  can 
exist,  or  come  to  pass,  contrary  to  the  will  of  God.  On  the 
Contrary,  not  only  do  I assert  that  sin  has  no  positive 


LETTER  XXXII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


337 


existence,  I also  maintain  that  only  in  speaking  improperly, 
or  humanly,  can  we  say  that  we  sin  against  God,  as  in 
the  expression  that  men  offend  God. 

As  to  the  first  point,  we  know  that  whatsoever  is,  when 
considered  in  itself  without  regard  to  anything  else,  pos- 
sesses perfection,  extending  in  each  thing  as  far  as  the 
limits  of  that  thing’s  essence : for  essence  is  nothing  else. 
I take  for  an  illustration  the  design  or  determined  will 
of  Adam  to  eat  the  forbidden  fruit.  This  design  or 
determined  will,  considered  in  itself  alone,  includes  per- 
fection in  so  far  as  it  expresses  reality ; hence  it  may  be 
inferred  that  we  can  only  conceive  imperfection  in  things, 
when  they  are  viewed  in  relation  to  other  things  possess- 
ing more  reality:  thus  in  Adam’s  decision,  so  long  as  we 
view  it  by  itself  and  do  not  compare  it  with  other  things 
more  perfect  or  exhibiting  a more  perfect  state,  we  can 
find  no  imperfection:  nay,  it  may  be  compared  with  an 
infinity  of  other  things  far  less  perfect  in  this  respect 
than  itself,  such  as  stones,  stocks,  etc.  This,  as  a matter 
of  fact,  everyone  grants.  For  we  all  admire  in  animals 
qualities  which  we  regard  with  dislike  and  aversion  in 
men,  such  as  the  pugnacity  of  bees,  the  jealousy  of  doves, 
etc. ; these  in  human  beings  are  despised  but  are  never- 
theless considered  to  enhance  the  value  of  animals.  This 
being  so,  it  follows  that  sin,  which  indicates  nothing  save 
imperfection,  cannot  consist  in  anything  that  expresses 
reality,  as  we  see  in  the  case  of  Adam’s  decision  and  its 
execution. 

Again,  we  cannot  say  that  Adam’s  will  is  at  variance 
with  the  law  of  God,  and  that  it  is  evil  because  it  is 
displeasing  to  God;  for  besides  the  fact  that  grave  im- 
perfection would  be  imputed  to  God,  if  we  say  that  any- 
thing happens  contrary  to  his  will,  or  that  he  desires 
anything  which  he  does  not  obtain,  or  that  his  nature 
resembled  that  of  his  creatures  in  having  sympathy 
with  some  things  more  than  others;  such  an  occurrence 
would  be  at  complete  variance  with  the  nature  of  the 
divine  will. 

The  will  of  God  is  identical  with  his  intellect;  hence 
the  former  can  no  more  be  contravened  than  the  latter, 


22 


33» 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXXII. 


in  other  words,  anything  which  should  come  to  pass 
against  his  will  must  be  of  a nature  to  be  contrary  to 
his  intellect,  such,  for  instance,  as  a round  square. 
Hence  the  will  or  decision  of  Adam  regarded  in  itself 
was  neither  evil  nor,  properly  speaking,  against  the  will 
of  God:  it  follows  that  God  may  — or  rather,  for  the 
reason  you  call  attention  to,  must  — be  its  cause;  not  in 
so  far  as  it  was  evil,  for  the  evil  in  it  consisted  in  the 
loss  of  the  previous  state  of  being  which  it  entailed  on 
Adam,  and  it  is  certain  that  loss  has  no  positive  exist- 
ence, and  is  only  so  spoken  of  in  respect  to  our  and  not 
God’s  understanding.  The  difficulty  arises  from  the  fact 
that  we  give  one  and  the  same  definition  to  all  the  indi- 
viduals of  a genus,  as  for  instance,  all  who  have  the  out- 
ward appearance  of  men : we  accordingly  assume  all 
things  which  are  expressed  by  the  same  definition  to  be 
equally  capable  of  attaining  the  highest  perfection  possi- 
ble for  the  genus;  when  we  find  an  individual  whose 
actions  are  at  variance  with  such  perfection,  we  suppose 
him  to  be  deprived  of  it,  and  to  fall  short  of  his  nature. 
We  should  hardly  act  in  this  way,  if  we  did  not  hark 
back  to  the  definition  and  ascribe  to  the  individual  a 
nature  in  accordance  with  it.  But  as  God  does  not  know 
things  through  abstraction,  or  form  general  definitions 
of  the  kind  above  mentioned,  and  as  things  have  no 
more  reality  than  the  divine  understanding  and  power 
have  put  into  them  and  actually  endowed  them  with,  it 
clearly  follows  that  a state  of  privation  can  only  be 
spoken  of  in  relation  to  our  intellect,  not  in  relation  to 
God. 

Thus,  as  it  seems  to  me,  the  difficulty  is  completely 
solved.  However,  in  order  to  make  the  way  still  plainer, 
and  remove  every  doubt,  I deem  it  necessary  to  answer 
the  two  following  difficulties:  First,  why  Holy  Scripture 
says  that  God  wishes  for  the  conversion  of  the  wicked, 
and  also  why  God  forbade  Adam  to  eat  of  the  fruit  when 
he  had  ordained  the  contrary  ? Secondly,  that  it  seems 
to  follow  from  what  I have  said,  that  the  wicked,  by 
their  pride,  avarice,  and  deeds  of  desperation,  worship 
God  in  no  less  degree  than  the  good  do  by  their  noble- 


LETTER  XXXII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


339 


ness,  patience,  love,  etc.,  inasmuch  as  both  execute  God’s 
will. 

In  answer  to  the  first  question,  I observe  that  Scrip- 
ture, being  chiefly  fitted  for  and  beneficial  to  the  multi- 
tude, speaks  popularly  after  the  fashion  of  men.  For  the 
multitude  are  incapable  of  grasping  sublime  conceptions. 
Hence  I am  persuaded  that  all  matters,  which  God  re- 
vealed to  the  prophets  as  necessary  to  salvation,  are  set 
down  in  the  form  of  laws.  With  this  understanding,  the 
prophets  invented  whole  parables,  and  represented  God 
as  a king  and  a lawgiver,  because  he  had  revealed  the 
means  of  salvation  and  perdition,  and  was  their  cause; 
the  means  which  were  simply  causes  they  styled  laws 
and  wrote  them  down  as  such;  salvation  and  perdition, 
which  are  simply  effects  necessarily  resulting  from  the 
aforesaid  means,  they  described  as  reward  and  punish- 
ment; framing  their  doctrines  more  in  accordance  with 
such  parables  than  with  actual  truth.  They  constantly 
speak  of  God  as  resembling  a man,  as  sometimes  angry, 
sometimes  merciful,  now  desiring  what  is  future,  now 
jealous  and  suspicious,  even  as  deceived  by  the  devil; 
so  that  philosophers  and  all  who  are  above  the  law,  that 
is,  who  follow  after  virtue,  not  in  obedience  to  law, 
but  through  love,  because  it  is  the  most  excellent  of  all 
things,  must  not  be  hindered  by  such  expressions. 

Thus  the  command  given  to  Adam  consisted  solely  in 
this,  that  God  revealed  to  Adam,  that  eating  of  the  fruit 
brought  about  death;  as  he  reveals  to  us,  through  our 
natural  faculties,  that  poison  is  deadly.  If  you  ask,  for 
what  object  did  he  make  this  revelation,  I answer  in 
order  to  render  Adam  to  that  extent  more  perfect  in 
knowledge.  Hence,  to  ask  God  why  he  had  not  bestowed 
on  Adam  a more  perfect  will,  is  just  as  absurd  as  to  ask, 
why  the  circle  has  not  been  endowed  with  all  the  proper- 
ties of  a sphere.  This  follows  clearly  from  what  has  been 
said,  and  I have  also  proved  it  in  my  <(  Principles  of  Carte- 
sian Philosophy,®  I.  15. 

As  to  the  second  difficulty,  it  is  true  that  the  wicked 
execute  after  their  manner  the  will  of  God:  but  they 
cannot,  therefore,  be  in  any  respect  compared  with  the 


34° 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXXIII. 


good.  The  more  perfection  a thing  has,  the  more  does 
it  participate  in  the  Deity,  and  the  more  does  it  express 
perfection.  Thus,  as  the  good  have  incomparably  more 
perfection  than  the  bad,  their  virtue  cannot  be  likened 
to  the  virtue  of  the  wicked,  inasmuch  as  the  wicked 
lack  the  love  of  God,  which  proceeds  from  the  knowl- 
edge of  God,  and  by  which  alone  we  are,  according  to 
our  human  understanding,  called  the  servants  of  God. 
The  wicked,  knowing  not  God,  are  but  as  instruments 
in  the  hand  of  the  workman,  serving  unconsciously,  and 
perishing  in  the  using;  the  good,  on  the  other  hand, 
serve  consciously,  and  in  serving  become  more  perfect. 

This,  Sir,  is  all  I can  now  contribute  to  answering 
your  question,  and  I have  no  higher  wish  than  that  it  may 
satisfy  you.  But  in  case  you  still  find  any  difficulty,  I 
beg  you  to  let  me  know  of  that  also,  to  see  if  I may  be 
able  to  remove  it.  You  have  nothing  to  fear  on  your  side, 
but  so  long  as  you  are  not  satisfied,  I like  nothing  better 
than  to  be  informed  of  your  reasons,  so  that  finally  the 
truth  may  appear.  I could  have  wished  to  write  in  the 
tongue  in  which  I have  been  brought  up.  I should,  per- 
haps, have  been  able  to  express  my  thoughts  better.  But 
be  pleased  to  take  it  as  it  is,  amend  the  mistakes  yourself, 
and  believe  me, 

Your  sincere  friend  and  servant. 

Long  Orchard,  near  Amsterdam, 

Jan.  5,  1665. 


LETTER  XXXIII.  (XX.) 

Blyenbergh  to  Spinoza. 

(A  summary  only  of  this  letter  is  here  given. — Tr.) 

I have  two  rules  in  my  philosophic  inquiries:  I.  Con- 
formity to  reason;  II.  Conformity  to  Scripture.  I consider 
the  second  the  most  important.  Examining  your  letter 
by  the  first,  I observe  that  your  identification  of  God’s 
creative  power  with  his  preservative  power  seems  to 


LETTER  XXXIV.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


341 


involve,  either  that  evil  does  not  exist,  or  else  that  God 
brings  about  evil.  If  evil  be  only  a term  relative  to  our 
imperfect  knowledge,  how  do  you  explain  the  state  of  a 
man  who  falls  from  a state  of  grace  into  sin  ? If  evil 
be  a negation,  how  can  we  have  the  power  to  sin  ? If 
God  causes  an  evil  act,  he  must  cause  the  evil  as  well 
as  the  act.  You  say  that  every  man  can  only  act,  as  he, 
in  fact  does  act.  This  removes  all  distinction  between 
the  good  and  the  wicked.  Both,  according  to  you,  are 
perfect.  You  remove  all  the  sanctions  of  virtue  and  re- 
duce us  to  automata.  Your  doctrine,  that  strictly  speak- 
ing, we  cannot  sin  against  God,  is  a hard  saying. 

[The  rest  of  the  letter  is  taken  up  with  an  examina- 
tion of  Spinoza’s  arguments  in  respect  to  their  conformity 
to  Scripture.] 

Dordrecht,  16  Jan.,  1665. 


LETTER  XXXIV.  (XXI.) 

Spinoza  to  Blyenbergh. 

[Spinoza  complains  that  Blyenbergh  has  misunderstood  him:  he  sets 
forth  his  true  meaning.] 

Voorburg,  28  Jan.,  1665. 

Friend  and  Sir: — When  I read  your  first  letter,  I 
thought  that  our  opinions  almost  coincided.  But  from 
the  second,  which  was  delivered  to  me  on  the  21st  of 
this  month,  I see  that  the  matter  stands  far  otherwise, 
for  I perceive  that  we  disagree,  not  only  in  remote  in- 
ferences from  first  principles,  but  also  in  first  principles 
themselves ; so  that  I can  hardly  think  that  we  can  derive 
any  mutual  instruction  from  further  correspondence.  I 
see  that  no  proof,  though  it  be  by  the  laws  of  proof  most 
sound,  has  any  weight  with  you,  unless  it  agrees  with 
the  explanation,  which  either  you  yourself,  or  other  the- 
ologians known  to  you,  attribute  to  Holy  Scripture.  How- 
ever, if  you  are  convinced  that  God  speaks  more  clearly 


342 


SPINOZA'S 


[LETTER  XXXIV. 


and  effectually  through  Holy  Scripture  than  through  the 
natural  understanding,  which  he  also  has  bestowed  upon 
us,  and  with  his  divine  wisdom  keeps  continually  stable 
and  uncorrupted,  you  have  valid  reasons  for  making  your 
understanding  bow  before  the  opinions  which  you  attrib- 
ute to  Holy  Scripture ; I myself  could  adopt  no  different 
course.  For  my  own  part,  as  I confess  plainly,  and  with- 
out circumlocution,  that  I do  not  understand  the  Script- 
ures, though  I have  spent  some  years  upon  them,  and 
also  as  I feel  that  when  I have  obtained  a firm  proof,  I 
cannot  fall  into  a state  of  doubt  concerning  it,  I acquiesce 
entirely  in  what  is  commended  to  me  by  my  understand- 
ing, without  any  suspicion  that  I am  being  deceived  in 
the  matter,  or  that  Holy  Scripture,  though  I do  not 
search,  could  gainsay  it : for  (<  truth  is  not  at  variance 
with  truth, ® as  I have  already  clearly  shown  in  my  ap- 
pendix to  “The  Principles  of  Cartesian  Philosophy®  (I 
cannot  give  the  precise  reference,  for  I have  not  the  book 
with  me  here  in  the  country).  But  if  in  any  instance  I 
found  that  a result  obtained  through  my  natural  under- 
standing was  false,  I should  reckon  myself  fortunate,  for 
I enjoy  life,  and  try  to  spend  it  not  in  sorrow  and  sigh- 
ing, but  in  peace,  joy,  and  cheerfulness,  ascending  from 
time  to  time  a step  higher.  Meanwhile  I know  (and  this 
knowledge  gives  me  the  highest  contentment  and  peace 
of  mind),  that  all  things  come  to  pass  by  the  power 
and  unchangeable  decree  of  a Being  supremely  perfect. 

To  return  to  your  letter,  I owe  you  many  and  sincere 
thanks  for  having  confided  to  me  your  philosophical 
opinions;  but  for  the  doctrines,  which  you  attribute  to 
me,  and  seek  to  infer  from  my  letter,  I return  you  no 
thanks  at  all.  What  ground,  I should  like  to  know,  has 
my  letter  afforded  you  for  ascribing  to  me  the  opinions: 
that  men  are  like  beasts,  that  they  die  and  perish  after 
the  manner  of  beasts,  that  our  actions  are  displeasing  to 
God,  etc.?  Perhaps  we  are  most  of  all  at  variance  on 
this  third  point.  You  think,  as  far  as  I can  judge,  that 
God  takes  pleasure  in  our  actions,  as  though  he  were  a 
man,  who  has  attained  his  object,  when  things  fall  out 
as  he  desired.  For  my  part,  have  I not  said  plainly 


LETTER  XXXIV.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


343 


enough,  that  the  good  worship  God,  that  in  continually 
serving  him  they  become  more  perfect,  and  that  they 
love  God  ? Is  this,  I ask,  likening  them  to  beasts,  or 
saying  that  they  perish  like  beasts,  or  that  their  actions 
are  displeasing  to  God  ? If  you  had  read  my  letter 
with  more  attention,  you  would  have  clearly  perceived, 
that  our  whole  dissension  lies  in  the  following  alternative  : 
Either  the  perfections  which  the  good  receive  are  im- 
parted to  them  by  God  in  his  capacity  of  God,  that  is 
absolutely  without  any  human  qualities  being  ascribed  to 
him  — this  is  what  I believe;  or  else  such  perfections  are 
imparted  by  God  as  a judge,  which  is  what  you  main- 
tain. For  this  reason  you  defend  the  wicked,  saying  that 
they  carry  out  God’s  decrees  as  far  as  in  them  lies,  and 
therefore  serve  God  no  less  than  the  good.  But  if  my 
doctrine  be  accepted,  this  consequence  by  no  means 
follows;  I do  not  bring  in  the  idea  of  God  as  a judge, 
and,  therefore  I estimate  an  action  by  its  intrinsic  merits, 
not  by  the  powers  of  its  performer;  the  recompense  which 
follows  the  action  follows  from  it  as  necessarily  as  from 
the  nature  of  a triangle  it  follows,  that  the  three  angles 
are  equal  to  two  right  angles.  This  may  be  understood 
by  every  one  who  reflects  on  the  fact,  that  our  highest 
blessedness  consists  in  love  toward  God,  and  that  such 
love  flows  naturally  from  the  knowledge  of  God,  which 
is  so  strenuously  enjoined  on  us.  The  question  may  very 
easily  be  proved  in  general  terms,  if  we  take  notice  of 
the  nature  of  God’s  decrees,  as  explained  in  my  appendix. 
However,  I confess  that  all  those,  who  confuse  the  divine 
nature  with  human  nature,  are  gravely  hindered  from 
understanding  it. 

I had  intended  to  end  my  letter  at  this  point,  lest  I 
should  prove  troublesome  to  you  in  these  questions,  the 
discussion  of  which  (as  I discover  from  the  extremely 
pious  postscript  added  to  your  letter)  serves  you  as  a 
pastime  and  a jest,  but  for  no  serious  use.  However, 
that  I may  not  summarily  deny  your  request,  I will  pro- 
ceed to  explain  further  the  words  privation  and  negation, 
and  briefly  point  out  what  is  necessary  for  the  elucida- 
tion of  my  former  letter. 


344 


SPINOZA’S  [LETTER  XXXIV. 


I say  then,  first,  that  privation  is  not  the  act  of  de- 
priving, but  simply  and  merely  a state  of  want,  which  is 
in  itself  nothing:  it  is  a mere  entity  of  the  reason,  a 
mode  of  thought  framed  in  comparing  one  thing  with 
another.  We  say,  for  example,  that  a blind  man  is  de- 
prived of  sight,  because  we  readily  imagine  him  as  see- 
ing, or  else  because  we  compare  him  with  others  who 
can  see,  or  compare  his  present  condition  with  his  past 
condition  when  he  could  see;  when  we  regard  the  man 
in  this  way,  comparing  his  nature  either  with  the  nature 
of  others  or  with  his  own  past  nature,  we  affirm  that 
sight  belongs  to  his  nature,  and  therefore  assert  that  he 
has  been  deprived  of  it.  But  when  we  are  considering 
the  nature  and  decree  of  God,  we  cannot  affirm  privation 
of  sight  in  the  case  of  the  aforesaid  man  any  more  than 
in  the  case  of  a stone;  for  at  the  actual  time  sight  lies 
no  more  within  the  scope  of  the  man  than  of  the  stone; 

SINCE  THERE  BELONGS  TO  MAN  AND  FORMS  PART  OF  HIS  NA- 
TURE ONLY  THAT  WHICH  IS  GRANTED  TO  HIM  BY  THE  UNDER- 
STANDING and  will  of  God.  Hence  it  follows  that  God 
is  no  more  the  cause  of  a blind  man  not  seeing,  than  he 
is  of  a stone  not  seeing.  Not  seeing  is  a pure  negation. 

So  ALSO,  WHEN  WE  CONSIDER  THE  CASE  OF  A MAN  WHO  IS 
LED  BY  LUSTFUL  DESIRES,  WE  COMPARE  HIS  PRESENT  DESIRES 
WITH  THOSE  WHICH  EXIST  IN  THE  GOOD,  OR  WHICH  EXISTED 
IN  HIMSELF  AT  SOME  OTHER  TIME;  WE  THEN  ASSERT  THAT  HE 
IS  DEPRIVED  OF  THE  BETTER  DESIRES,  BECAUSE  WE  CONCEIVE 
THAT  VIRTUOUS  DESIRES  LIE  WITHIN  THE  SCOPE  OF  HIS  NA- 
TURE. This  we  cannot  do,  if  we  consider  the  nature 
AND  DECREE  OF  God.  For,  FROM  THIS  POINT  OF  VIEW,  VIR- 
TUOUS DESIRES  LIE  AT  THAT  TIME  NO  MORE  WITHIN  THE 
SCOPE  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  LUSTFUL  MAN,  THAN  WITHIN 
THE  SCOPE  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  DEVIL  OR  A STONE. 

Hence,  from  the  latter  standpoint  the  virtuous  desire  is 
not  a privation  but  a negation. 

Thus  privation  is  nothing  else  than  denying  of  a 
thing  something,  which  we  think  belongs  to  its  nature; 
negation  is  denying  of  a thing  something,  which  we  do 
not  think  belongs  to  its  nature. 

We  may  now  see,  how  Adam’s  desire  for  earthly  things 


LETTER  XXXIV.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


345 


was  evil  from  our  standpoint,  but  not  from  God’s. 
Although  God  knew  both  the  present  and  the  past  state 
of  Adam,  he  did  not,  therefore,  regard  Adam  as 

DEPRIVED  OF  HIS  PAST  STATE,  THAT  IS,  HE  DID  NOT  REGARD 

Adam’s  past  state  as  within  the  scope  of  Adam  s pres- 
ent nature.  Otherwise  God  would  have  apprehended 
something  contrary  to  his  own  will,  that  is,  contrary  to 
his  own  understanding.  If  you  quite  grasp  my  meaning 
here  and  at  the  same  time  remember,  that  I do  not 
grant  to  the  mind  the  same  freedom  as  Descartes  does 
— L[ewis]  M[eyer]  bears  witness  to  this  in  his  preface 
to  my  book  — you  will  preceive  that  there  is  not  the 
smallest  contradiction  in  what  I have  said.  But  I see 
that  I should  have  done  far  better  to  have  answered  you 
in  my  first  letter  with  the  words  of  Descartes,  to  the 
effect  that  we  cannot  know  how  our  freedom  and  its  con- 
sequences agree  with  the  foreknowledge  and  freedom  of 
God  (see  several  passages  in  my  appendix),  that,  there- 
fore, we  can  discover  no  contradiction  between  creation 
by  God  and  our  freedom,  because  we  cannot  understand 
how  God  created  the  universe,  nor  (what  is  the  same 
thing)  how  he  preserves  it.  I thought  that  you  had  read 
the  preface,  and  that  by  not  giving  you  my  real  opinions 
in  reply,  I should  sin  against  those  duties  of  friendship 
which  I cordially  offered  you.  But  this  is  of  no  con- 
sequence. 

Still,  as  I see  that  you  have  not  hitherto  thoroughly 
grasped  Descartes’s  meaning,  I will  call  your  attention  to 
the  two  following  points:  First,  that  neither  Descartes 

nor  I have  ever  said,  that  it  appertains  to  our  nature  to 
confine  the  will  within  the  limits  of  the  understanding; 
we  have  only  said,  that  God  has  endowed  us  with  a de- 
termined understanding  and  an  undetermined  will,  so 
that  we  know  not  the  object  for  which  he  has  created 
us.  Further,  that  an  undetermined  or  perfect  will  of 
this  kind  not  only  makes  us  more  perfect,  but  also,  as  I 
will  presently  show  you,  is  extremely  necessary  for  us. 

Secondly:  that  our  freedom  is  not  placed  in  a certain 
contingency  nor  in  a certain  indifference,  but  in  the 
method  of  affirmation  or  denial;  so  that,  in  proportion 


346 


SPINOZA’S  [LETTER  XXXIV. 


as  we  are  less  indifferent  in  affirmation  or  denial,  so  are 
we  more  free.  For  instance,  if  the  nature  of  God  be 
known  to  us,  it  follows  as  necessarily  from  our  nature  to 
affirm  that  God  exists,  as  from  the  nature  of  a triangle 
it  follows,  that  the  three  angles  are  equal  to  two  right 
angles;  we  are  never  more  free  than  when  we  affirm  a 
thing  in  this  way.  As  this  necessity  is  nothing  else  but 
the  decree  of  God  (as  I have  clearly  shown  in  my  appen- 
dix), we  may  hence,  after  a fashion,  understand  how  we 
act  freely  and  are  the  cause  of  our  action,  though  all  the 
time  we  are  acting  necessarily  and  according  to  the  de- 
cree of  God.  This,  I repeat,  we  may,  after  a fashion, 
understand,  whenever  we  affirm  something,  which  we 
clearly  and  distinctly  perceive,  but  when  we  assert  some- 
thing which  we  do  not  clearly  and  distinctly  understand, 
in  other  words,  when  we  allow  our  will  to  pass  beyond 
the  limits  of  our  understanding,  we  no  longer  perceive 
the  necessity  nor  the  decree  of  God,  we  can  only  see  our 
freedom  which  is  always  involved  in  our  will;  in  which 
respect  only  our  actions  are  called  good  or  evil.  If  we 
then  try  to  reconcile  our  freedom  with  God’s  decree  and 
continuous  creation,  we  confuse  that  which  we  clearly 
and  distinctly  understand  with  that  which  we  do  not 
perceive,  and  therefore,  our  attempt  is  vain.  It  is,  there- 
fore, sufficient  for  us  to  know  that  we  are  free,  and  that 
we  can  be  so  notwithstanding  God’s  decree,  and  further 
that  we  are  the  cause  of  evil,  because  an  act  can  only 
be  called  evil  in  relation  to  our  freedom.  I have  said 
thus  much  for  Descartes  in  order  to  show  that,  in  the 
question  we  are  considering,  his  words  exhibit  no  con- 
tradiction. 

I will  now  turn  to  what  concerns  myself,  and  will  first 
briefly  call  attention  to  the  advantage  arising  from  my 
opinion,  inasmuch  as,  according  to  it,  our  understanding 
offers  our  mind  and  body  to  God  freed  from  all  super- 
stition. Nor  do  I deny  that  prayer  is  extremely  useful 
to  us.  For  my  understanding  is  too  small  to  determine 
all  the  means  whereby  God  leads  men  to  the  love  of 
himself,  that  is,  to  salvation.  So  far  is  my  opinion  from 
being  hurtful,  that  it  offers  to  those  who  are  not  taken 


LETTER  XXXIV.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


347 


up  with  prejudices  and  childish  superstitions,  the  only 
means  for  arriving  at  the  highest  stage  of  blessedness. 

When  you  say  that,  by  making  men  so  dependent  on 
God,  I reduce  them  to  the  likeness  of  the  elements, 
plants  or  stones,  you  sufficiently  show  that  you  have 
thoroughly  misunderstood  my  meaning,  and  have  con- 
fused things  which  regard  the  understanding  with  things 
which  regard  the  imagination.  If  by  your  intellect  only 
you  had  perceived  what  dependence  on  God  means,  you 
certainly  would  not  think  that  things,  in  so  far  as  they 
depend  on  God  are  dead,  corporeal,  and  imperfect  (who 
ever  dared  to  speak  so  meanly  of  the  Supremely  Perfect 
Being  ?) ; on  the  contrary,  you  would  understand  that  for 
the  very  reason  that  they  depend  on  God  they  are  per- 
fect; so  that  this  dependence  and  necessary  operation 
may  best  be  understood  as  God’s  decree,  by  considering, 
not  stocks  and  plants,  but  the  most  reasonable  and  per- 
fect creatures.  This  sufficiently  appears  from  my  second 
observation  on  the  meaning  of  Descartes,  which  you 
ought  to  have  looked  to. 

I cannot  refrain  from  expressing  my  extreme  astonish- 
ment at  your  remarking,  that  if  God  does  not  punish 
wrong-doing  (that  is,  as  a judge  does,  with  a punish- 
ment not  intrinsically  connected  with  the  offense,  for 
our  whole  difference  lies  in  this),  what  reason  prevents 
me  from  rushing  headlong  into  every  kind  of  wickedness  ? 
Assuredly  he,  who  is  only  kept  from  vice  by  the  fear 
of  punishment  (which  I do  not  think  of  you),  is  in  no 
wise  acted  on  by  love,  and  by  no  means  embraces  virtue. 
For  my  own  part,  I avoid  or  endeavor  to  avoid  vice, 
because  it  is  at  direct  variance  with  my  proper  nature  and 
would  lead  me  astray  from  the  knowledge  and  love  of  God. 

Again,  if  you  had  reflected  a little  on  human  nature 
and  the  nature  of  God’s  decree  ( as  explained  in  my 
appendix),  and  perceived,  and  known  by  this  time,  how 
a consequence  should  be  deduced  from  its  premises, 
before  a conclusion  is  arrived  at ; you  would  not  so  rashly 
have  stated  that  my  opinion  makes  us  like  stocks,  etc. : 
nor  would  you  have  ascribed  to  me  the  many  absurdities 
you  conjure  up. 


348 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXXIV. 


As  to  the  two  points  which  you  say,  before  passing  on 
to  your  second  rule,  that  you  cannot  understand ; I answer, 
that  the  first  may  be  solved  through  Descartes,  who  says 
that  in  observing  your  own  nature  you  feel  that  you  can 
suspend  your  judgment.  If  you  say  that  you  do  not  feel 
that  you  have  at  present  sufficient  force  to  keep  your 
judgment  suspended,  this  would  appear  to  Descartes  to  be 
the  same  as  saying  that  we  cannot  at  present  see,  that 
so  long  as  we  exist  we  shall  always  be  thinking  things, 
or  retain  the  nature  of  thinking  things;  in  fact  it  would 
imply  a contradiction. 

As  to  your  second  difficulty,  I say  with  Descartes, 
that  if  we  cannot  extend  our  will  beyond  the  bounds  of 
our  extremely  limited  understanding,  we  shall  be  most 
wretched  — it  will  not  be  in  our  power  to  eat  even  a crust 
of  bread,  or  to  walk  a step,  or  to  go  on  living,  for  all 
things  are  uncertain  and  full  of  peril. 

I now  pass  on  to  your  second  rule,  and  assert  that  I 
believe,  though  I do  not  ascribe  to  Scripture  that  sort  of 
truth  which  you  think  you  find  in  it,  I nevertheless  assign 
to  it  as  great  if  not  greater  authority  than  you  do.  I am 
far  more  careful  than  others  not  to  ascribe  to  Scripture 
any  childish  and  absurd  doctrines,  a precaution  which  de- 
mands either  a thorough  acquaintance  with  philosophy 
or  the  possession  of  divine  revelations.  Hence  I pay  very 
little  attention  to  the  glosses  put  upon  Scripture  by  ordinary 
theologians,  especially  those  of  the  kind  who  always  inter- 
pret Scripture  according  to  the  literal  and  outward  mean- 
ing: I have  never,  except  among  the  Socinians,  found  any 
theologian  stupid  enough  to  ignore  that  Holy  Scripture 
very  often  speaks  in  human  fashion  of  God  and  expresses 
its  meaning  in  parables;  as  for  the  contradiction  which 
you  vainly  (in  my  opinion)  endeavor  to  show,  I think 
you  attach  to  the  word  parable  a meaning  different  from 
that  usually  given.  For  who  ever  heard,  that  a man, 
who  expressed  his  opinions  in  parables,  had  therefore 
taken  leave  of  his  senses  ? When  Micaiah  said  to  King 
Ahab,  that  he  had  seen  God  sitting  on  a throne,  with 
the  armies  of  heaven  standing  on  the  right  hand  and  the 
left,  and  that  God  asked  his  angels  which  of  them  would 


LETTER  XXXIV.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


349 


deceive  Ahab,  this  was  assuredly  a parable  employed  by 
the  prophet  on  that  occasion  (which  was  not  fitted  for  the 
inculcation  of  sublime  theological  doctrines),  as  sufficiently 
setting  forth  the  message  he  had  to  deliver  in  the  name 
of  God.  We  cannot  say  that  he  had  in  anywise  taken 
leave  of  his  senses.  So  also  the  other  prophets  of  God 
made  manifest  God’s  commands  to  the  people  in  this 
fashion  as  being  the  best  adapted,  though  not  expressly 
enjoined  by  God,  for  leading  the  people  to  the  primary 
object  of  Scripture,  which,  as  Christ  himself  says,  is  to 
bid  men  love  God  above  all  things,  and  their  neighbor 
as  themselves.  Sublime  speculations  have,  in  my  opin- 
ion, no  bearing  on  Scripture.  As  far  as  I am  concerned 
I have  never  learned  or  been  able  to  learn  any  of  God’s 
eternal  attributes  from  Holy  Scripture. 

As  to  your  fifth  argument  (that  the  prophets  thus  made 
manifest  the  word  of  God,  since  truth  is  not  at  variance 
with  truth),  it  merely  amounts,  for  those  who  understand 
the  method  of  proof,  to  asking  me  to  prove,  that  Scrip- 
ture, as  it  is,  is  the  true  revealed  word  of  God.  The 
mathematical  proof  of  this  proposition  could  only  be  at- 
tained by  divine  revelation.  I,  therefore,  expressed  my- 
self as  follows:  (<  I believe,  but  I no  not  mathematic- 

ally KNOW,  THAT  ALL  THINGS  REVEALED  BY  GOD  TO  THE 

prophets,  ® etc.  Inasmuch  as  I firmly  believe  but  do  not 
mathematically  know,  that  the  prophets  were  the  most 
trusted  counsellors  and  faithful  ambassadors  of  God.  So 
that  in  all  I have  written  there  is  no  contradiction, 
though  several  such  may  be  found  among  holders  of  the 
opposite  opinion. 

The  rest  of  your  letter  (to  wit  the  passage  where  you 
say,  <( Lastly,  the  supremely  perfect  Being  knew  before- 
hand,® etc;  and  again,  your  objections  to  the  illustration 
from  poison,  and  lastly,  the  whole  of  what  you  say  of 
the  appendix  and  what  follows)  seems  to  me  beside  the 
question. 

As  regards  Lewis  Meyer’s  preface,  the  points  which 
were  still  left  to  be  proved  by  Descartes  before  establishing 
his  demonstration  of  free  will,  are  certainly  there  set 
forth ; it  is  added  that  I hold  a contrary  opinion,  my  reasons 


35° 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXXV. 


for  doing  so  being  given.  I shall,  perhaps,  in  due  time, 
give  further  explanations.  For  the  present  I have  no  such 
intention. 

I have  never  thought  about  the  work  on  Descartes,  nor 
given  any  further  heed  to  it,  since  it  has  been  translated 
into  Dutch.  I have  my  reasons,  though  it  would  be  tedious 
to  enumerate  them  here.  So  nothing  remains  for  me  but 
to  subscribe  myself,  etc. 


LETTER  XXXV.  (XXII.) 

Blyenbergh  to  Spinoza. 

[This  letter  (extending  over  five  pages)  is  only  given  here  in  brief 

summary.  ] 

The  tone  of  your  last  letter  is  very  different  from  that 
of  your  first.  If  our  essence  is  equivalent  to  our  state  at 
a given  time,  we  are  as  perfect  when  sinning  as  when 
virtuous:  God  would  wish  for  vice  as  much  as  virtue. 
Both  the  virtuous  and  the  vicious  execute  God’s  will  — 
What  is  the  difference  between  them  ? You  say  some 
actions  are  more  perfect  than  others;  wherein  does  this 
perfection  consist  ? If  a mind  existed  so  framed,  that 
vice  was  in  agreement  with  the  proper  nature,  why  should 
such  a mind  prefer  good  to  evil  ? If  God  makes  us  all 
that  we  are,  how  can  we  <(  go  astray  ® ? Can  rational  sub- 
stances depend  on  God  in  any  way  except  lifelessly? 
What  is  the  difference  between  a rational  being’s  depend- 
ence on  God,  and  an  irrational  being’s  ? If  we  have  no 
free  will,  are  not  our  actions  God’s  actions,  and  our  will 
God’s  will  ? I could  ask  several  more  questions,  but  do 
not  venture. 

P.S.  In  my  hurry  I forgot  to  insert  this  question: 
Whether  we  cannot  by  foresight  avert  what  would  other- 
wise happen  to  us  ? 


Dordrecht,  19  Feb.,  1665. 


LETTER  XXXVI.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


3Si 


LETTER  XXXVI.  (XXIII.) 

Spinoza  to  Blyenbergh. 

[Spinoza  replies,  that  there  is  a difference  between  the  theological 

and  the  philosophical  way  of  speaking  of  God  and  things  divine. 

He  proceeds  to  discuss  Blyenbergh’s  questions.] 

Voorburg,  13th  March,  1665. 

Friend  and  Sir, — I have  received  two  letters  from  you 
this  week;  the  second,  dated  9th  March,  only  served  to 
inform  me  of  the  first  written  on  February  19th,  and  sent 
to  me  at  Schiedam.  In  the  former  I see  that  you  com- 
plain of  my  saying,  that  <(  demonstration  carried  no  weight 
with  you,  * as  though  I had  spoken  of  my  own  arguments, 
which  had  failed  to  convince  you.  Such  was  far  from 
my  intention.  I was  referring  to  your  own  words,  which 
ran  as  follows : — (< And  if  after  long  investigation  it  comes 
to  pass,  that  my  natural  knowledge  appears  either  to  be 
at  variance  with  the  word  (of  Scripture),  or  not  suffi- 
ciently well,  etc. ; the  word  has  so  great  authority  with 
me,  that  I would  rather  doubt  of  the  conceptions,  which 
I think  I clearly  perceive, ® etc.  You  see  I merely  repeat 
in  brief  your  own  phrase,  so  that  I cannot  think  you 
have  any  cause  for  anger  against  me,  especially  as  I 
merely  quoted  in  order  to  show  the  great  difference 
between  our  standpoints. 

Again,  as  you  wrote  at  the  end  of  your  letter  that 
your  only  hope  and  wish  is  to  continue  in  faith  and 
hope,  and  that  all  else,  which  we  may  become  convinced 
of  through  our  natural  faculties,  is  indifferent  to  you;  I 
reflected,  as  I still  continue  to  do,  that  my  letters  could 
be  of  no  use  to  you,  and  that  I should  best  consult  my 
own  interests  by  ceasing  to  neglect  my  pursuits  (which 
I am  compelled  while  writing  to  you  to  interrupt)  for 
the  sake  of  things  which  could  bring  no  possible  benefit. 
Nor  is  this  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  my  former  letter, 
for  in  that  I looked  upon  you  as  simply  a philosopher, 
who  (like  not  a few  who  call  themselves  Christians) 


352 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXXVI. 


possesses  no  touchstone  of  truth  save  his  natural  under- 
standing, and  not  as  a theologian.  However,  you  have 
taught  me  to  know  better,  and  have  also  shown  me  that 
the  foundation,  on  which  I was  minded  to  build  up  our 
friendship,  has  not,  as  I imagined,  been  laid. 

As  for  the  rest,  such  are  the  general  accompaniments 
of  controversy,  so  that  I would  not  on  that  account 
transgress  the  limits  of  courtesy:  I will,  therefore,  pass 
over  in  your  second  letter,  and  in  this,  these  and 
similar  expressions,  as  though  they  had  never  been 
observed.  So  much  for  your  taking  offense;  to  show 
you  that  I have  given  you  no  just  cause,  and,  also, 
that  I am  quite  willing  to  brook  contradiction.  I now 
turn  a second  time  to  answering  your  objections. 

I maintain,  in  the  first  place,  that  God  is  absolutely 
and  really  the  cause  of  all  things  which  have  essence, 
whatsoever  they  may  be.  If  you  can  demonstrate  that 
evil,  error,  crime,  etc.,  have  any  positive  existence,  which 
expresses  essence,  I will  fully  grant  you  that  God  is  the 
cause  of  crime,  evil,  error,  etc.  I believe  myself  to  have 
sufficiently  shown,  that  that  which  constitutes  the  reality 
of  evil,  error,  crime,  etc.,  does  not  consist  in  anything, 
which  expresses  essence,  and  therefore  we  cannot  say 
that  God  is  its  cause.  For  instance,  Nero’s  matricide,  in 
so  far  as  it  comprehended  anything  positive,  was  not  a 
crime;  the  same  outward  act  was  perpetrated,  and  the 
same  matri cidal  intention  was  entertained  by  Orestes; 
who,  nevertheless,  is  not  blamed  — at  any  rate  not  so 
much  as  Nero.  Wherein,  then,  did  Nero’s  crime  consist? 
In  nothing  else,  but  that  by  his  deed  he  showed  himself 
to  be  ungrateful,  unmerciful,  and  disobedient.  Certainly 
none  of  these  qualities  express  aught  of  essence,  there- 
fore, God  was  not  the  cause  of  them,  though  he  was 
the  cause  of  Nero’s  act  and  intention. 

Further,  I would  have  you  observe,  that,  while  we 
speak  philosophically,  we  ought  not  to  employ  theolog- 
ical phrases.  For,  since  theology  frequently,  and  not  un- 
wisely, represents  God  as  a perfect  man,  it  is  often 
expedient  in  theology  to  say,  that  God  desires  a given 
thing,  that  he  is  angry  at  the  actions  of  the  wicked, 


LETTER  XXXVI.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


353 


and  delights  in  those  of  the  good.  But  in  philosophy, 
when  we  clearly  perceive  that  the  attributes  which  make 
men  perfect  can  as  ill  be  ascribed  and  assigned  to  God, 
as  the  attributes  which  go  to  make  perfect  the  elephant 
and  the  ass  can  be  ascribed  to  man;  here  I say  these 
and  similar  phrases  have  no  place,  nor  can  we  employ 
them  without  causing  extreme  confusion  in  our  concep- 
tions. Hence,  in  the  language  of  philosophy,  it  cannot 
be  said  that  God  desires  anything  of  any  man,  or  that 
anything  is  displeasing  or  pleasing  to  him:  all  these  are 
human  qualities  and  have  no  place  in  God. 

I would  have  it  observed,  that  although  the  actions  of 
the  good  (that  is,  of  those  who  have  a clear  idea  of  God, 
whereby  all  their  actions  and  their  thoughts  are  deter- 
mined) and  of  the  wicked  (that  is,  of  those  who  do  not 
possess  the  idea  of  God,  but  only  the  ideas  of  earthly 
things,  whereby  their  actions  and  thoughts  are  deter- 
mined), and,  in  fact,  of  all  things  that  are,  necessarily 
flow  from  God’s  eternal  laws  and  decrees;  yet  they  do 
not  differ  from  one  another  in  degree  only,  but  also  in 
essence.  A mouse  no  less  than  an  angel,  and  sorrow  no 
less  than  joy  depend  on  God;  yet  a mouse  is  not  a kind 
of  angel,  neither  is  sorrow  a kind  of  joy.  I think  I have 
thus  answered  your  objections,  if  I rightly  understand 
them,  for  I sometimes  doubt,  whether  the  conclusions 
which  you  deduce  are  not  foreign  to  the  proposition  you 
are  undertaking  to  prove. 

However,  this  will  appear  more  clearly,  if  I answer 
the  questions  you  proposed  on  these  principles.  First, 
Whether  murder  is  as  acceptable  to  God  as  almsgiving  ? 
Secondly,  Whether  stealing  is  as  good  in  relation  to  God 
as  honesty  ? Thirdly  and  lastly,  Whether  if  there  be  a 
mind  so  framed,  that  it  would  agree  with,  rather  than 
be  repugnant  to  its  proper  nature,  to  give  way  to  lust, 
and  to  commit  crimes,  whether,  I repeat,  there  can  be 
any  reason  given,  why  such  a mind  should  do  good  and 
eschew  evil  ? 

To  your  first  question,  I answer,  that  I do  not  know, 
speaking  as  a philosopher,  what  you  mean  by  the  words 
(<  acceptable  to  God.  ® If  you  ask,  whether  God  does 
23 


354 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XXXVI. 


not  hate  the  wicked  and  love  the  good  ? whether  God 
does  not  regard  the  former  with  dislike,  and  the  latter 
with  favor  ? I answer,  No.  If  the  meaning  of  your 
question  is:  Are  murderers  and  almsgivers  equally  good 
and  perfect  ? my  answer  is  again  in  the  negative.  To 
your  second  question,  I reply : If,  by  <(  good  in  relation 
to  God,®  you  mean  that  the  honest  man  confers  a favor 
on  God,  and  the  thief  does  him  an  injury,  I answer  that 
neither  the  honest  man  nor  the  thief  can  cause  God  any 
pleasure  or  displeasure.  If  you  mean  to  ask,  whether  the 
actions  of  each,  in  so  far  as  they  possess  reality,  and  are 
caused  by  God,  are  equally  perfect  ? I reply  that,  if  we 
merely  regard  the  actions  and  the  manner  of  their  execu- 
tion, both  may  be  equally  perfect.  If  you,  therefore, 
inquire  whether  the  thief  and  the  honest  man  are  equally 
perfect  and  blessed  ? I answer,  No.  For,  by  an  honest 
man,  I mean  one  who  always  desires  that  everyone 
should  possess  that  which  is  his.  This  desire,  as  I prove 
in  my  “Ethics®  (as  yet  unpublished ),  necessarily  derives 
its  origin  in  the  pious  from  the  clear  knowledge  which 
they  possess  of  God  and  of  themselves.  As  a thief  has 
no  desire  of  the  kind,  he  is  necessarily  without  the 
knowledge  of  God  and  of  himself  — in  other  words,  with- 
out the  chief  element  of  our  blessedness.  If  you  further 
ask,  What  causes  you  to  perform  a given  action,  which 
I call  virtuous,  rather  than  another  ? I reply,  that  I can- 
not know  which  method,  out  of  the  infinite  methods  at 
his  disposal,  God  employs  to  determine  you  to  the  said 
action.  It  may  be,  that  God  has  impressed  you  with  a 
clear  idea  of  himself,  so  that  you  forget  the  world  for 
love  of  him,  and  love  your  fellow-men  as  yourself;  it  is 
plain  that  such  a disposition  is  at  variance  with  those 
dispositions  which  are  called  bad,  and,  therefore,  could 
not  co-exist  with  them  in  the  same  man. 

However,  this  is  not  the  place  to  expound  all  the  foun- 
dations of  my  “ Ethics,  ® or  to  prove  all  that  I have  ad- 
vanced ; I am  now  only  concerned  in  answering  your 
questions,  and  defending  myself  against  them. 

Lastly,  as  to  your  third  question,  it  assumes  a con- 
tradiction, and  seems  to  me  to  be,  as  though  one  asked: 


LETTER  XXXVIII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


355 


If  it  agreed  better  with  a man’s  nature  that  he  should 
hang  himself,  could  any  reasons  be  given  for  his  not 
hanging  himself  ? Can  such  a nature  possibly  exist  ? If 
so,  I maintain  (whether  I do  or  do  not  grant  free  will), 
that  such  an  one,  if  he  sees  that  he  can  live  more  con- 
veniently on  the  gallows  than  sitting  at  his  own  table, 
would  act  most  foolishly,  if  he  did  not  hang  himself. 
So  anyone  who  clearly  saw  that,  by  committing  crimes, 
he  would  enjoy  a really  more  perfect  and  better  life  and 
existence,  than  he  could  attain  by  the  practice  of  virtue, 
would  be  foolish  if  he  did  not  act  on  his  convictions. 
For,  with  such  a perverse  human  nature  as  his,  crime 
would  become  virtue. 

As  to  the  other  question,  which  you  add  in  your  post- 
script, seeing  that  one  might  ask  a hundred  such  in  an 
hour,  without  arriving  at  a conclusion  about  any,  and 
seeing  that  you  yourself  do  not  press  for  an  answer,  I 
will  send  none. 

I will  now  only  subscribe  myself,  etc. 


LETTER  XXXVII.  (XXIV.) 

Blyenbergh  to  Spinoza. 

[Blyenbergh,  who  had  been  to  see  Spinoza,  asks  the  latter  to  send  him 
a report  of  their  conversation,  and  to  answer  five  fresh  questions. 
(Dordrecht,  27th  March,  1665.)] 

Omitted. 


LETTER  XXXVIII.  (XXVII.) 

Spinoza  to  Blyenbergh 

[Spinoza  declines  further  correspondence  with  Blyenbergh,  but  says  he 
will  give  explanations  of  certain  points  by  word  of  mouth.  (Voor- 
burg,  3d  June,  1665.)] 

Friend  and  Sir, — When  your  letter,  dated  27th  March, 
was  delivered  to  me,  I was  just  starting  for  Amsterdam. 


356 


SPINOZA’S  [LETTER  XXXIX. 


I,  therefore,  after  reading  half  of  it,  left  it  at  home,  to 
be  answered  on  my  return:  for  I thought  it  dealt  only 
with  questions  raised  in  our  first  controversy.  However, 
a second  perusal  showed  me,  that  it  embraced  a far 
wider  subject,  and  not  only  asked  me  for  proof  of  what, 
in  my  preface  to  <(  Principles  of  Cartesian  Philosophy,  ® 
I wrote  (with  the  object  of  merely  stating,  without  prov- 
ing or  urging  my  opinion),  but  also  requested  me  to 
impart  a great  portion  of  my  “Ethics,®  which,  as  every- 
one knows,  ought  to  be  based  on  physics  and  metaphysics. 
For  this  reason,  I have  been  unable  to  allow  myself  to 
satisfy  your  demands.  I wished  to  await  an  opportunity 
for  begging  you,  in  a most  friendly  way,  by  word  of 
mouth,  to  withdraw  your  request,  for  giving  you  my 
reasons  for  refusal,  and  for  showing  that  your  inquiries 
do  not  promote  the  solution  of  our  first  controversy,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  are  for  the  most  part  entirely  de- 
pendent on  its  previous  settlement.  So  far  are  they  not 
essential  to  the  understanding  of  my  doctrine  concerning 
necessity,  that  they  cannot  be  apprehended,  unless  the 
latter  question  is  understood  first.  However,  before  such 
an  opportunity  offered,  a second  letter  reached  me  this 
week,  appearing  to  convey  a certain  sense  of  displeasure 
at  my  delay.  Necessity,  therefore,  has  compelled  me  to 
write  you  these  few  words,  to  acquaint  you  more  fully 
with  my  proposal  and  decision.  I hope  that,  when  the 
facts  of  the  case  are  before  you,  you  will,  of  your  own 
accord,  desist  from  your  request,  and  will  still  remain 
kindly  disposed  toward  me.  I,  for  my  part,  will,  in  all 
things,  according  to  my  power,  prove  myself  your,  etc. 


LETTER  XXXIX. 

Spinoza  to  Christian  Huyghens. 

[Treating  of  the  Unity  of  God.] 

Distinguished  Sir, — The  demonstration  of  the  unity 
of  God  on  the  ground  that  his  nature  involves  necessary 


LETTER  XXXIX.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


357 


existence,  which  you  asked  for,  and  I took  note  of,  I have 
been  prevented  by  various  business  from  sending  to  you 
before.  In  order  to  accomplish  my  purpose,  I will  pre- 
mise : — 

I.  That  the  true  definition  of  anything  includes  noth- 
ing except  the  simple  nature  of  the  thing  defined.  From 
this  it  follows: — 

II  That  no  definition  can  involve  or  express  a multi- 
tude or  a given  number  of  individuals,  inasmuch  as  it 
involves  and  expresses  nothing  except  the  nature  of  the 
thing  as  it  is  in  itself.  For  instance,  the  definition  of  a 
triangle  includes  nothing  beyond  the  simple  nature  of  a 
triangle;  it  does  not  include  any  given  number  of  tri- 
angles. In  like  manner,  the  definition  of  the  mind  as  a 
thinking  thing,  or  the  definition  of  God  as  a perfect  being, 
includes  nothing  beyond  the  natures  of  the  mind  and  of 
God,  not  a given  number  of  minds  or  gods. 

III.  That  for  everything  that  exists  there  must  neces- 
sarily be  a positive  cause,  through  which  it  exists. 

IV.  This  cause  may  be  situate  either  in  the  nature 
and  definition  of  the  thing  itself  (to  wit  because  exist- 
ence belongs  to  its  nature  or  necessarily  includes  it),  or 
externally  to  the  thing. 

From  these  premises  it  follows,  that  if  any  given  num- 
ber of  individuals  exists  in  nature,  there  must  be  one  or 
more  causes,  which  have  been  able  to  produce  exactly 
that  number  of  individuals,  neither  more  nor  less.  If, 
for  instance,  there  existed  in  nature  twenty  men  ( in  order 
to  avoid  all  confusion,  I will  assume  that  these  all  exist 
together  as  primary  entities),  it  is  not  enough  to  investi- 
gate the  cause  of  human  nature  in  general,  in  order  to 
account  for  the  existence  of  these  twenty;  we  must  also 
inquire  into  the  reason,  why  there  exist  exactly  twenty 
men,  neither  more  nor  less.  For  ( by  our  third  hypothesis) 
for  each  man  a reason  and  a cause  must  be  forthcom- 
ing, why  he  should  exist.  But  this  cause  ( by  our  second 
and  third  hypotheses ) cannot  be  contained  in  the  nature 
of  man  himself;  for  the  true  definition  of  man  does  not 
involve  the  number  of  twenty  men.  Hence  (by  our 
fourth  hypothesis)  the  cause  for  the  existence  of  these 


358 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XL. 


twenty  men,  and  consequently  for  the  existence  of  each 
of  them,  must  exist  externally  to  them.  We  may  thus 
absolutely  conclude,  that  all  things,  which  are  conceived 
to  exist  in  the  plural  number,  must  necessarily  be  pro- 
duced by  external  causes  and  not  by  the  force  of  their 
own  nature.  But  since  (by  our  second  hypothesis)  neces- 
sary existence  appertains  to  the  nature  of  God,  his  true 
definition  must  necessarily  include  necessary  existence: 
therefore  from  his  true  definition  his  necessary  exist- 
ence must  be  inferred.  But  from  his  true  definition  (as 
I have  already  demonstrated  from  our  second  and  third 
hypotheses ) the  necessary  existence  of  many  gods  cannot 
be  inferred.  Therefore  there  only  follows  the  existence 
of  a single  God.  Which  was  to  be  proved. 

This,  distinguished  sir,  has  now  seemed  to  me  the  best 
method  for  demonstrating  the  proposition.  I have  also 
proved  it  differently  by  means  of  the  distinction  between 
essence  and  existence;  but  bearing  in  mind  the  object 
you  mentioned  to  me,  I have  preferred  to  send  you  the 
demonstration  given  above.  I hope  it  will  satisfy  you, 
and  I will  await  your  reply,  meanwhile  remaining,  etc. 

Voorburg,  7 Jan.  1666. 


LETTER  XL.  (XXXV.) 

Spinoza  to  Christian  Huyghens. 

( Further  arguments  for  the  unity  of  God. ) 

Distinguished  Sir: — In  your  last  letter,  written  on 
March  30th,  you  have  excellently  elucidated  the  point, 
which  was  somewhat  obscure  to  me  in  your  letter  of 
February  10th.  As  I now  know  your  opinion,  I will  set 
forth  the  state  of  the  question  as  you  conceive  it ; whether 
there  be  only  a single  being  who  subsists  by  his  own 
sufficiency  or  force  ? I not  only  affirm  this  to  be  so,  but 
also  undertake  to  prove  it  from  the  fact,  that  the  nature 
of  such  a being  necessarily  involves  existence;  perhaps 
it  may  also  be  readily  proved  from  the  understanding  of 


LETTER  XL.] 


CORRESPONDENCE 


359 


God  (as  I set  forth,  * Principles  of  Cartesian  Philosophy,® 

I.  Prop,  i.),  or  from  others  of  his  attributes.  Before 
treating  of  the  subject  I will  briefly  show,  as  prelimi- 
naries, what  properties  must  be  possessed  by  a being 
including  necessary  existence.  To  wit: 

I.  It  must  be  eternal.  For  if  a definite  duration  be 
assigned  to  it,  it  would  beyond  that  definite  duration  be 
conceived  as  non-existent,  or  as  not  involving  necessary 
existence,  which  would  be  contrary  to  its  definition. 

II.  It  must  be  simple,  not  made  up  of  parts.  For 
parts  must  in  nature  and  knowledge  be  prior  to  the 
whole  they  compose:  this  could  not  be  the  case  with 
regard  to  that  which  is  eternal. 

III.  It  cannot  be  conceived  as  determinate,  but  only 
as  infinite.  For,  if  the  nature  of  the  said  being  were 
determinate,  and  conceived  as  determinate,  that  nature 
would  beyond  the  said  limits  be  conceived  as  non-existent, 
which  again  is  contrary  to  its  definition. 

IV.  It  is  indivisible.  For  if  it  were  divisible,  it  could 
be  divided  into  parts,  either  of  the  same  or  of  different 
nature.  If  the  latter,  it  could  be  destroyed  and  so  not 
exist,  which  is  contrary  to  its  definition;  if  the  former, 
each  part  would  in  itself  include  necessary  existence,  and 
thus  one  part  could  exist  without  others,  and  consequently 
be  conceived  as  so  existing.  Hence  the  nature  of  the 
being  would  be  comprehended  as  finite,  which,  by  what 
has  been  said,  is  contrary  to  its  definition.  Thus  we  see 
that  in  attempting  to  ascribe  to  such  a being  any  im- 
perfection, we  straightway  fall  into  contradictions.  For, 
whether  the  imperfection  which  we  wish  to  assign  to  the 
said  being  be  situate  in  any  defect,  or  in  limitations  pos- 
sessed by  its  nature,  or  in  any  change  which  it  might, 
through  deficiency  of  power,  undergo  from  external 
causes,  we  are  always  brought  back  to  the  contradiction, 
that  a nature  which  involves  necessary  existence,  does  not 
exist,  or  does  not  necessarily  exist.  I conclude,  there- 
fore— 

V.  That  everything,  which  includes  necessary  existence, 
cannot  have  in  itself  any  imperfection,  but  must  express 
pure  perfection. 


360 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XLI. 


VI.  Further,  since  only  from  perfection  can  it  come 
about,  that  any  being  should  exist  by  its  own  suffi- 
ciency and  force,  it  follows  that,  if  we  assume  a being  to 
exist  by  its  own  nature,  but  not  to  express  all  per- 
fections, we  must  further  suppose  that  another  being 
exists,  which  does  comprehend  in  itself  all  perfec- 
tions. For,  if  the  less  powerful  being  exists  by  its  own 
sufficiency,  how  much  more  must  the  more  powerful  so 
exist  ? 

Lastly,  to  deal  with  the  question,  I affirm  that  there 
can  only  be  a single  being,  of  which  the  existence 
belongs  to  its  nature;  such  a being  which  possesses  in 
itself  all  perfections  I will  call  God.  If  there  be  any 
being  to  whose  nature  existence  belongs,  such  a being 
can  contain  in  itself  no  imperfection,  but  must  (by 
my  fifth  premise)  express  every  perfection;  therefore, 
the  nature  of  such  a being  seems  to  belong  to  God 
(whose  existence  we  are  bound  to  affirm  by  Premise  VI.), 
inasmuch  as  he  has  in  himself  all  perfections  and  no 
imperfections.  Nor  can  it  exist  externally  to  God.  For 
if,  externally  to  God,  there  existed  one  and  the  same 
nature  involving  necessary  existence,  such  nature  would 
be  twofold;  but  this,  by  what  we  have  just  shown,  is 
absurd.  Therefore  there  is  nothing  save  God,  but  there  is 
a single  God,  that  involves  necessary  existence,  which 
was  to  be  proved. 

Such,  distinguished  sir,  are  the  arguments  I can  now 
produce  for  demonstrating  this  question.  I hope  I may 
also  demonstrate  to  you,  that  I am,  etc. 

Voorburg,  10  April,  1666. 


LETTER  XLI.  (XXXVI.) 

Spinoza  to  Christian  Huyghens. 

[Further  discussion  concerning  the  unity  of  God.  Spinoza  asks 
for  advice  about  polishing  lenses.  (Voorburg,  May,  1666.)] 

Distinguished  Sir: — I have  been  by  one  means  or 
another  prevented  from  answering  sooner  your  letter, 


LETTER  XLI. 


CORRESPONDENCE 


36* 

dated  May  19th.  As  I gather  that  you  suspend  your 
judgment  with  regard  to  most  of  the  demonstration  I 
sent  you  (owing,  I believe,  to  the  obscurity  you  find  in 
it),  I will  here  endeavor  to  explain  its  meaning  more 
clearly. 

First,  I enumerated  four  properties,  which  a being 
existing  by  its  own  sufficiency  or  force  must  possess. 
These  four,  and  others  like  them,  I reduced  in  my  fifth 
observation  to  one.  Further,  in  order  to  deduce  all 
things  necessary  for  the  demonstration  from  a single 
premise,  I endeavored  in  my  sixth  observation  to  dem- 
onstrate the  existence  of  God  from  the  given  hypothesis; 
whence,  lastly,  taking  (as  you  know)  nothing  beyond 
the  ordinary  meaning  of  the  terms,  I drew  the  desired 
conclusion. 

Such,  in  brief,  was  my  purpose  and  such  my  aim. 
I will  now  explain  the  meaning  of  each  step  singly, 
and  will  first  start  with  the  aforesaid  four  proper- 
ties. 

In  the  first  you  find  no  difficulty,  nor  is  it  anything 
but,  as  in  the  case  of  the  second,  an  axiom.  By  simple 
I merely  mean  not  compound,  or  not  made  up  of  parts  dif- 
fering in  nature  or  other  parts  agreeing  in  nature.  This 
demonstration  is  assuredly  universal. 

The  sense  of  my  third  observation  (that  if  the  being 
be  thought,  it  cannot  be  conceived  as  limited  by  thought, 
but  only  as  infinite,  and  similarly,  if  it  be  extension,  it 
cannot  be  conceived  as  limited  by  extension)  you  have 
excellently  perceived,  though  you  say  you  do  not  per- 
ceive the  conclusion;  this  last  is  based  on  the  fact,  that 
a contradiction  is  involved  in  conceiving  under  the  cate- 
gory of  non-existence  anything,  whose  definition  in- 
cludes or  (what  is  the  same  thing)  affirms  existence. 
And  since  determination  implies  nothing  positive,  but 
only  a limitation  of  the  existence  of  the  nature  conceived 
as  determinate,  it  follows  - that,  that  of  which  the  defini- 
tion affirms  existence,  cannot  be  conceived  as  deter- 
minate. For  instance,  if  the  term  extension  included 
necessary  existence,  it  would  be  alike  impossible  to  con- 
ceive extension  without  existence  and  existence  without 


362 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XLI. 


extension.  If  this  were  established,  it  would  be  impos- 
sible to  conceive  determinate  extension.  For,  if  it  be 
conceived  as  determinate,  it  must  be  determined  by  its 
own  nature,  that  is  by  extension,  and  this  extension, 
whereby  it  is  determined,  must  be  conceived  under  the 
category  of  non-existence,  which  by  the  hypothesis  is 
obviously  a contradiction.  In  my  fourth  observation,  I 
merely  wished  to  show,  that  such  a being  could  neither 
be  divided  into  parts  of  the  same  nature  or  parts  of  a 
different  nature,  whether  those  of  a different  nature  im 
volve  necessary  existence  or  not.  If,  I said,  we  adopt 
the  second  view,  the  being  would  be  destroyed;  foi 
destruction  is  merely  the  resolution  of  a thing  into  parts 
so  that  none  of  them  expresses  the  nature  of  the  whole; 
if  we  adopt  the  first  view,  we  should  be  in  contradiction 
with  the  first  three  properties. 

In  my  fifth  observation,  I merely  asserted,  that  per- 
fection consists  in  being,  and  imperfection  in  the  priva- 
tion of  being.  I say  the  privation ; for  although  extension 
denies  of  itself  thought,  this  argues  no  imperfection  in 
it.  It  would  be  an  imperfection  in  it,  if  it  were  in 
any  degree  deprived  of  extension,  as  it  would  be,  if 
it  were  determinate ; or  again,  if  it  lacked  duration, 
position,  etc. 

My  sixth  observation  you  accept  absolutely,  and  yet  you 
say,  that  your  whole  difficulty  remains  (inasmuch  as 
there  may  be,  you  think,  several  self-existent  entities  of 
different  nature;  as  for  instance  thought  and  extension 
are  different  and  perhaps  subsist  by  their  own  sufficiency). 
I am,  therefore,  forced  to  believe,  that  you  attribute  to 
my  observation  a meaning  quite  different  from  the  one 
intended  by  me.  I think  I can  discern  your  interpreta- 
tion of  it ; however,  in  order  to  save  time,  I will  merely 
set  forth  my  own  meaning.  I say  then,  as  regards  my 
sixth  observation,  that  if  we  assert  that  anything,  which 
is  indeterminate  and  perfect  only  after  its  kind,  exists  by 
its  own  sufficiency,  we  must  also  grant  the  existence  of 
a Being  indeterminate  and  perfect  absolutely;  such  a 
Being  I will  call  God.  If,  for  example,  we  wish  to  assert 
that  extension  or  thought  (which  are  each  perfect  after 


LETTER  XLI]  CORRESPONDENCE 


363 


their  kind,  that  is,  in  a given  sphere  of  being)  exists  by 
its  own  sufficiency,  we  must  grant  also  the  existence  of 
God,  who  is  absolutely  perfect,  that  is,  of  a Being  abso- 
lutely indeterminate.  I would  here  direct  attention  to 
what  I have  just  said  with  regard  to  the  term  imperfec- 
tion ; namely,  that  it  signifies  that  a thing  is  deficient  in 
some  quality,  which,  nevertheless,  belongs  to  its  nature. 
For  instance,  extension  can  only  be  called  imperfect  in 
respect  of  duration,  position,  or  quantity:  that  is,  as  not 
enduring  longer,  as  not  retaining  its  position,  or  as  not 
being  greater.  It  can  never  be  called  imperfect,  because 
it  does  not  think,  inasmuch  as  its  nature  requires  nothing 
of  the  kind,  but  consists  solely  in  extension,  that  is  in  a 
certain  sphere  of  being.  Only  in  respect  to  its  own 
sphere  can  it  be  called  determinate  or  indeterminate,  per- 
fect or  imperfect.  Now,  since  the  nature  of  God  is  not 
confined  to  a certain  sphere  of  being,  but  exists  in  being, 
which  is  absolutely  indeterminate,  so  his  nature  also 
demands  everything  which  perfectly  expresses  being ; 
otherwise  his  nature  would  be  determinate  and  de- 
ficient. 

This  being  so,  it  follows  that  there  can  be  only  one 
Being,  namely  God,  who  exists  by  his  own  force.  If,  for 
the  sake  of  an  illustration,  we  assert,  that  extension 
involves  existence,  it  is,  therefore,  necessary  that  it  should 
be  eternal  and  indeterminate,  and  express  absolutely  no 
imperfection,  but  perfection.  Hence  extension  will  apper- 
tain to  God,  or  will  be  something  which  in  some  fashion 
expresses  the  nature  of  God,  since  God  is  a Being,  who 
not  only  in  a certain  respect  but  absolutely  is  in  essence 
indeterminate  and  omnipotent.  What  we  have  here  said 
by  way  of  illustration  regarding  extension  must  be  asserted 
of  all  that  we  ascribe  a similar  existence  to.  I,  therefore, 
conclude  as  in  my  former  letter,  that  there  is  nothing 
external  to  God,  but  that  God  alone  exists  by  his  own 
sufficiency.  I think  I have  said  enough  to  show  the 
meaning  of  my  former  letter;  however,  of  this  you  will 
be  the  best  judge. 

(The  rest  of  the  letter  is  occupied  with  details  about  the  polishing 
of  lenses.) 


364 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XLI.a. 


LETTER  XLI.a. 

Spinoza  to  . . . (May  or  June,  1665). 

[ Spinoza  urges  his  correspondent  to  be  diligent  in  studying  philosophy, 
promises  to  send  part  of  the  « Ethics,»  and  adds  some  personal 
details.  ] 

Dear  Friend, — I do  not  know  whether  you  have  quite 
forgotten  me;  but  there  are  many  circumstances  which 
lead  me  to  suspect  it.  First,  when  I was  setting  out  on 
my  journey,  I wished  to  bid  you  good-bye ; and,  after  your 
own  invitation,  thinking  I should  certainly  find  you  at 
home,  heard  that  you  had  gone  to  The  Hague.  I return 
to  Voorburg,  nothing  doubting  but  that  you  would  at 
least  have  visited  me  in  passing;  but  you,  forsooth,  with- 
out greeting  your  friend,  went  back  home.  Three  weeks 
have  I waited,  without  getting  sight  of  a letter  from  you. 
If  you  wish  this  opinion  of  mine  to  be  changed,  you  may 
easily  change  it  by  writing;  and  you  can  at  the  same 
time,  point  out  a means  of  entering  into  a correspond- 
ence, as  we  once  talked  of  doing  at  your  house. 

Meanwhile,  I should  like  to  ask  you,  nay  I do  beg  and 
entreat  you,  by  our  friendship,  to  apply  yourself  to  some 
serious  work  with  real  study,  and  to  devote  the  chief 
part  of  your  life  to  the  cultivation  of  your  understanding 
and  your  soul.  Now,  while  there  is  time,  and  before 
you  complain  of  having  let  time  and,  indeed,  your  own 
self  slip  by.  Further,  in  order  to  set  our  correspondence 
on  foot,  and  to  give  you  courage  to  write  to  me  more 
freely,  I would  have  you  know  that  I have  long  thought, 
and,  indeed,  been  almost  certain,  that  you  are  somewhat 
too  diffident  of  your  own  abilities,  and  that  you  are  afraid 
of  advancing  some  question  or  proposal  unworthy  of  a 
man  of  learning.  It  does  not  become  me  to  praise  you, 
and  expatiate  on  your  talents  to  your  face;  but,  if  you 
are  afraid  that  I shall  show  your  letters  to  others,  who 
will  laugh  at  you,  I give  you  my  word  of  honor,  that  I 
will  religiously  keep  them,  and  will  show  them  to  no 


LETTER  XLII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


36s 


mortal  without  your  leave.  On  these  conditions,  you  may 
enter  on  a correspondence,  unless  you  doubt  of  my  good 
faith,  which  I do  not  in  the  least  believe.  I want  to 
hear  your  opinion  on  this  in  your  first  letter;  and  you 
may,  at  the  same  time,  send  me  the  conserve  of  red 
roses,  though  I am  now  much  better. 

After  my  journey,  I was  once  bled;  but  the  fever  did 
not  cease,  though  I was  somewhat  more  active  than  be- 
fore the  bleeding,  owing,  I think,  to  the  change  of  air; 
but  I was  two  or  three  times  laid  up  with  a tertian. 
This,  however,  by  good  diet,  I have  at  length  driven 
away,  and  sent  about  its  business.  Where  it  has  gone, 
I know  not ; but  I am  taking  care  it  does  not  return  here. 

As  regards  the  third  part  of  my  philosophy,  I will 
shortly  send  it  you,  if  you  wish  to  be  its  transmitter,  or 
to  our  friend  De  Vries;  and,  although  I had  settled  not 
to  send  any  of  it,  till  it  was  finished,  yet  as  it  takes 
longer  than  I thought,  I am  unwilling  to  keep  you  wait- 
ing. I will  send  up  to  the  eightieth  proposition,  or 
thereabouts. 

Of  English  affairs  I hear  a good  deal,  but  nothing  for 
certain.  The  people  continue  to  be  apprehensive,  and 
can  see  no  reason,  why  the  fleet  should  not  be  despatched ; 
but  the  matter  does  not  yet  seem  to  be  set  on  foot.  I 
am  afraid  our  rulers  want  to  be  overwise  and  prudent; 
but  the  event  will  show  what  they  intend,  and  what  they 
will  attempt.  May  the  gods  turn  it  all  to  good.  I want 
to  know  what  our  people  think,  where  you  are,  and  what 
they  know  for  certain ; but,  above  all  things,  I want  you 
to  believe  me,  etc. 


LETTER  XLII.  (XXXVII.) 

Spinoza  to  I.  B. 

[Concerning  the  best  method,  by  which  we  may  safely  arrive  at  the 
knowledge  of  things.] 

Most  Learned  Sir  and  Dearest  Friend, — I have  not 
been  able  hitherto  to  answer  your  last  letter,  received 


366 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XLII. 


some  time  back.  I have  been  so  hindered  by  various 
occupations  and  calls  on  my  time,  that  I am  hardly  yet 
free  from  them.  However,  as  I have  a few  spare  mo- 
ments, I do  not  want  to  fall  short  of  my  duty,  but  take 
this  first  opportunity  of  heartily  thanking  you  for  your 
affection  and  kindness  toward  me,  which  you  have  often 
displayed  in  your  actions,  and  now  also  abundantly  prove 
by  your  letter. 

I pass  on  to  your  question,  which  runs  as  follows:  <( Is 
there,  or  can  there  be,  any  method  by  which  we  may, 
without  hindrance,  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  the  most 
excellent  things  ? or  are  our  minds,  like  our  bodies,  sub- 
ject to  the  vicissitudes  of  circumstance,  so  that  our  thoughts 
are  governed  rather  by  fortune  than  by  skill  ? » I think 
I shall  satisfy  you,  if  I show  that  there  must  necessarily 
be  a method,  whereby  we  are  able  to  direct  our  clear 
and  distinct  perceptions,  and  that  our  mind  is  not, 
like  our  body,  subject  to  the  vicissitudes  of  circum- 
stance. 

This  conclusion  may  be  based  simply  on  the  consider- 
ation that  one  clear  and  distinct  perception,  or  several 
such  together,  can  be  absolutely  the  cause  of  another 
clear  and  distinct  perception.  Now,  all  the  clear  and 
distinct  perceptions,  which  we  form,  can  only  arise  from 
other  clear  and  distinct  perceptions,  which  are  in  us; 
nor  do  they  acknowledge  any  cause  external  to  us.  Hence 
it  follows  that  the  clear  and  distinct  perceptions,  which 
we  form,  depend  solely  on  our  nature,  and  on  its  certain 
and  fixed  laws;  in  other  words,  on  our  absolute  power, 
not  on  fortune  — that  is,  not  on  causes  which,  although 
also  acting  by  certain  and  fixed  laws,  are  yet  unknown 
to  us,  and  alien  to  our  nature  and  power.  As  regards 
other  perceptions,  I confess  that  they  depend  chiefly  on 
fortune.  Hence  clearly  appears,  what  the  true  method 
ought  to  be  like,  and  what  it  ought  chiefly  to  consist  in 
— namely,  solely  in  the  knowledge  of  the  pure  under- 
standing, and  its  nature  and  laws.  In  order  that  such 
knowledge  may  be  acquired,  it  is  before  all  things  nec- 
essary to  distinguish  between  the  understanding  and  the 
imagination,  or  between  ideas  which  are  true  and  the 


LETTER  XL VI.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


367 


rest,  such  as  the  fictitious,  the  false,  the  doubtful,  and 
absolutely  all  which  depend  solely  on  the  memory.  For 
the  understanding-  of  these  matters,  as  far  as  the  method 
requires,  there  is  no  need  to  know  the  nature  of  the 
mind  through  its  first  cause;  it  is  sufficient  to  put  to- 
gether a short  history  of  the  mind,  or  of  perceptions,  in 
the  manner  taught  by  Verulam. 

I think  that  in  these  few  words  I have  explained  and 
demonstrated  the  true  method,  and  have,  at  the  same 
time,  pointed  out  the  way  of  acquiring  it.  It  only  remains 
to  remind  you,  that  all  these  questions  demand  assiduous 
study,  and  great  firmness  of  disposition  and  purpose.  In 
order  to  fulfil  these  conditions,  it  is  of  prime  necessity 
to  follow  a fixed  mode  and  plan  of  living,  and  to  set  be- 
fore one  some  definite  aim.  But  enough  of  this  for  the 
present,  etc. 

Voorburg,  10  June,  1666. 


LETTER  XLIII.  (XXXVIII.) 

Spinoza  to  I.  v.  M. 

[ Spinoza  solves  for  his  friend  an  arithmetical  problem  connected  with 
games  of  chance.  (Voorburg,  Oct.  1,  1666.)] 

Omitted. 


LETTERS  XLIV.,  XLV.,  XLVI.  (XXXIX.,  XL.,  XLI.) 
Spinoza  to  I.  I. 

XLIV.  [Remarks  on  Descartes’s  treatise  on  Optics.  ] 

XLV.  [Remarks  on  some  alchemistic  experiments,  on  the  third  and 
fourth  meditations  of  Descartes,  and  on  Optics.] 

XLVI.  [Remarks  on  Hydrostatics.] 


368 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XLVII. 


LETTER  XLVII.  (XLIV.) 

Spinoza  to  I.  I. 

[Spinoza  begs  his  friend  to  stop  the  printing  of  the  Dutch  version  of  the 
<(  Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus. » Some  remarks  on  a pernicious 
pamphlet,  <(  Homo  Politicus,»  and  on  Thales  of  Miletus.] 

Most  Courteous  Sir, — When  Professor  N.  N.  visited 
me  the  other  day,  he  told  me  that  my  (<  Theologico-Politi- 
cal  Treatise ” has  been  translated  into  Dutch,  and  that 
someone  whose  name  he  did  not  know,  was  about  print- 
ing it.  With  regard  to  this,  I earnestly  beg  you  to 
inquire  carefully  into  the  business,  and,  if  possible,  stop 
the  printing.  This  is  the  request  not  only  of  myself,  but 
of  many  of  my  friends  and  acquaintances,  who  would  be 
sorry  to  see  the  book  placed  under  an  interdict,  as  it 
undoubtedly  would  be,  if  published  in  Dutch.  I do  not 
doubt,  but  that  you  will  do  this  service  to  me  and  the 
cause. 

One  of  my  friends  sent  me  a short  time  since  a pam- 
phlet called  (<  Homo  Politicus,”  of  which  I had  heard 
much.  I have  read  it,  and  find  it  to  be  the  most  per- 
nicious work  which  man  could  devise  or  invent.  Rank 
and  riches  are  the  author’s  highest  good;  he  adapts  his 
doctrine  accordingly,  and  shows  the  means  to  acquire 
them;  to  wit,  by  inwardly  rejecting  all  religion,  and  out- 
wardly professing  whatever  best  serves  his  own  advance- 
ment, also  by  keeping  faith  with  no  one,  except  in  so  far 
as  he  himself  is  profited  thereby.  For  the  rest,  to  feign, 
to  make  promises  and  break  them,  to  lie,  to  swear  falsely, 
and  many  such  like  practices  call  forth  his  highest  praises. 
When  I had  finished  reading  the  book,  I debated  whether 
I should  write  a pamphlet  indirectly  aimed  against  its 
author,  wherein  I should  treat  of  the  highest  good  and 
show  the  troubled  and  wretched  condition  of  those  who 
are  covetous  of  rank  and  riches;  finally  proving  by  very 
plain  reasoning  and  many  examples,  that  the  insatiable 
desire  for  rank  and  riches  must  bring  and  has  brought 
ruin  to  states. 


LETTER  XLIX.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


369 


How  much  better  and  more  excellent  than  the  doc- 
trines of  the  aforesaid  writer  are  the  reflections  of  Thales 
of  Miletus,  appears  from  the  following:  All  the  goods 

of  friends,  he  says,  are  in  common;  wise  men  are  the 
friends  of  the  gods,  and  all  things  belong  to  the  gods; 
therefore  all  things  belong  to  the  wise.  Thus  in  a single 
sentence  this  wisest  of  men  accounts  himself  most  rich, 
rather  by  nobly  despising  riches  than  by  sordidly  seek- 
ing them.  In  other  passages  he  shows  that  the  wise  lack 
riches,  not  from  necessity,  but  from  choice.  For  when 
his  friends  reproached  him  with  his  poverty  he  answered, 
(<  Do  you  wish  me  to  show  you,  that  I could  acquire  what 
I deem  unworthy  of  my  labor,  but  you  so  diligently 
seek  ? w On  their  answering  in  the  affirmative,  he  hired 
every  oil-press  in  the  whole  of  Greece  (for  being  a dis- 
tinguished astrologer  he  knew  that  the  olive  harvest 
would  be  as  abundant  as  in  previous  years  it  had  been 
scanty),  and  sub-let  at  his  own  price  what  he  had  hired 
for  a very  small  sum,  thus  acquiring  in  a single  year  a 
large  fortune,  which  he  bestowed  liberally  as  he  had 
gained  it  industriously,  etc. 

The  Hague,  17  Feb.,  1671. 


LETTER  XLVIII. 

[Written  by  a physician,  Lambert  de  Velthuysen,  to  Isaac  Orobio,  and 
forwarded  by  the  latter  to  Spinoza.  It  contains  a detailed  attack  on 
the  «Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus. » Its  tenor  may  be  sufficiently 
seen  from  Spinoza’s  reply.  ( Written  at  Utrecht,  January  24th,  1671. ) 
Velthuysen  afterward  became  more  friendly  to  Spinoza,  as  appears 
from  Letter  LXXV.] 


LETTER  XLIX. 

Spinoza  to  Isaac  Orobio. 

[A  defense  of  the  «Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus.»  (The  Hague, 

1671.)] 

Most  Learned  Sir, — You  doubtless  wonder  why  I have 
kept  you  so  long  waiting.  I could  hardly  bring  myself 

24 


37° 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XLIX. 


to  reply  to  the  pamphlet  of  that  person,  which  you 
thought  fit  to  send  me ; indeed  I only  do  so  now  because 
of  my  promise.  However,  in  order  as  far  as  possible  to 
humor  my  feelings,  I will  fulfill  my  engagement  in  as 
few  words  as  I can,  and  will  briefly  show  how  perversely 
he  has  interpreted  my  meaning;  whether  through  malice 
or  through  ignorance  I cannot  readily  say.  But  to  the 
matter  in  hand. 

First  he  says,  a that  it  is  of  little  moment  to  know 

WHAT  NATION  I BELONG  TO,  OR  WHAT  SORT  OF  LIFE  I LEAD.  * 

Truly,  if  he  had  known,  he  would  not  so  easily  have 
persuaded  himself  that  I teach  Atheism.  For  Atheists 
are  wont  greedily  to  covet  rank  and  riches,  which  I have 
always  despised,  as  all  who  know  me  are  aware.  Again, 
in  order  to  smooth  his  path  to  the  object  he  has  in  view, 
he  says  that,  <(  I am  possessed  of  no  mean  talents,  » so 
that  he  may,  forsooth,  more  easily  convince  his  readers, 
that  I have  knowingly  and  cunningly  with  evil  intent 
argued  for  the  cause  of  the  deists,  in  order  to  discredit 
it.  This  contention  sufficiently  shows  that  he  has  not 
understood  my  reasons.  For  who  could  be  so  cunning 
and  clever,  as  to  be  able  to  advance  under  false  pre- 
tenses so  many  and  such  good  reasons  for  a doctrine 
which  he  did  not  believe  in  ? Who  will  pass  for  an 
honest  writer  in  the  eyes  of  a man,  that  thinks  one  may 
argue  as  soundly  for  fiction  as  for  truth  ? But  after  all 
I am  not  astonished.  Descartes  was  formerly  served  in 
the  same  way  by  Voet,  and  the  most  honorable  writers 
are  constantly  thus  treated. 

He  goes  on  to  say,  <(  In  order  to  shun  the  reproach 
of  superstition,  he  seems  to  me  to  have  thrown  off 
all  religion.  w What  this  writer  means  by  religion  and 
what  by  superstition,  I know  not.  But  I would  ask, 
whether  a man  throws  off  all  religion,  who  maintains 
that  God  must  be  acknowledged  as  the  highest  good,  and 
must,  as  such,  be  loved  with  a free  mind  ? or,  again,  that 
the  reward  of  virtue  is  virtue  itself,  while  the  punishment 
of  folly  and  weakness  is  folly  itself  ? or,  lastly,  that  every 
man  ought  to  love  his  neighbor,  and  to  obey  the  com- 
mands of  the  supreme  power  ? Such  doctrines  I have  not 


LETTER  XLIX.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


37» 


only  expressly  stated,  but  have  also  demonstrated  them 
by  very  solid  reasoning.  However,  I think  I see  the 
mud  wherein  this  person  sticks.  He  finds  nothing  in 
virtue  and  the  understanding  in  themselves  to  please 
him,  but  would  prefer  to  live  in  accordance  with  his  pas- 
sions, if  it  were  not  for  the  single  obstacle  that  he  fears 
punishment.  He  abstains  from  evil  actions,  and  obeys 
the  divine  commands  like  a slave,  with  unwillingness  and 
hesitation,  expecting  as  the  reward  of  his  bondage  to  be 
recompensed  by  God  with  gifts  far  more  pleasing  than 
divine  love,  and  greater  in  proportion  to  his  dislike  to 
goodness  and  consequent  unwillingness  to  practice  it. 
Hence  it  comes  to  pass,  that  he  believes  that  all,  who 
are  not  restrained  by  this  fear,  lead  a life  of  license  and 
throw  off  all  religion.  But  this  I pass  over,  and  proceed 
to  the  deduction,  whereby  he  wishes  to  show,  that  <(  with 

COVERT  AND  DISGUISED  ARGUMENTS  I TEACH  ATHEISM.  ® The 

foundation  of  his  reasoning  is,  that  he  thinks  I take  away 
freedom  from  God,  and  subject  him  to  fate.  This  is 
flatly  false.  For  I have  maintained,  that  all  things  fol- 
low by  inevitable  necessity  from  the  nature  of  God,  in 
the  same  way  as  all  maintain  that  it  follows  from  the 
nature  of  God,  that  he  understands  himself:  no  one  de- 
nies that  this  latter  consequence  follows  necessarily  from 
the  divine  nature,  yet  no  one  conceives  that  God  is 
constrained  by  any  fate ; they  believe  that  he  under- 
stands himself  with  entire  freedom,  though  necessarily.  I 
find  nothing  here,  that  cannot  be  perceived  by  every 
one;  if,  nevertheless,  my  adversary  thinks  that  these 
arguments  are  advanced  with  evil  intent,  what  does 
he  think  of  his  own  Descartes,  who  asserted  that  nothing 
is  done  by  us,  which  has  not  been  pre-ordained  by 
God,  nay,  that  we  are  newly  created  as  it  were  by 
God  every  moment,  though  none  the  less  we  act  ac- 
cording to  our  own  free  will  ? This,  as  Descartes  himself 
confesses,  no  one  can  understand. 

Further,  this  inevitable  necessity  in  things  destroys 
neither  divine  laws  nor  human.  For  moral  principles, 
whether  they  have  received  from  God  the  form  of  laws 
or  not,  are  nevertheless  divine  and  salutary.  Whether  we 


372 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XLIX. 


accept  the  good,  which  follows  from  virtue  and  the  divine 
love,  as  given  us  by  God  as  a judge,  or  as  emanating  from 
the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature,  it  is  not  in  either  case 
more  or  less  to  be  desired;  nor  are  the  evils  which  follow 
from  evil  actions  less  to  be  feared,  because  they  follow 
necessarily:  finally,  whether  we  act  under  necessity  or 
freedom,  we  are  in  either  case  led  by  hope  and  fear. 
Wherefore  the  assertion  is  false,  “ that  I maintain  that 

THERE  IS  NO  ROOM  LEFT  FOR  PRECEPTS  AND  COMMANDS.®  Or 

as  he  goes  on  to  say,  “that  there  is  no  expectation  of 

REWARD  OR  PUNISHMENT,  SINCE  ALL  THINGS  ARE  ASCRIBED  TO 
FATE,  AND  ARE  SAID  TO  FLOW  WITH  INEVITABLE  NECESSITY 

from  God.” 

I do  not  here  inquire,  why  it  is  the  same,  or  almost  the 
same  to  say  that  all  things  necessarily  flow  from  God,  as 
to  say  that  God  is  universal ; but  I would  have  you  observe 
the  insinuation  which  he  not  less  maliciously  subjoins, 

* THAT  I WISH  THAT  MEN  SHOULD  PRACTICE  VIRTUE,  NOT  BE- 
CAUSE OF  THE  PRECEPTS  AND  LAW  OF  GOD,  OR  THROUGH 
HOPE  OF  REWARD  AND  FEAR  OF  PUNISHMENT,  BUT,”  etc. 

Such  a sentiment  you  will  assuredly  not  find  anywhere  in 
my  treatise:  on  the  contrary,  I have  expressly  stated  in 
Chap.  IV.,  that  the  sum  of  the  divine  law  (which,  as  I 
have  said  in  Chap.  II.,  has  been  divinely  inscribed  on  our 
hearts),  and  its  chief  precept  is,  to  love  God  as  the  highest 
good:  not,  indeed,  from  the  fear  of  any  punishment,  for 
love  cannot  spring  from  fear;  nor  for  the  love  of  any- 
thing which  we  desire  for  our  own  delight,  for  then  we 
should  love  not  God,  but  the  object  of  our  desire. 

I have  shown  in  the  same  chapter,  that  God  revealed 
this  law  to  the  prophets,  so  that,  whether  it  received  from 
God  the  form  of  a command,  or  whether  we  conceive  it 
to  be  like  God’s  other  decrees,  which  involve  eternal 
necessity  and  truth,  it  will  in  either  case  remain  God’s 
decree  and  a salutary  principle.  Whether  I love  God  in 
freedom,  or  whether  I love  him  from  the  necessity  of  the 
divine  decree,  I shall  nevertheless  love  God,  and  shall  be 
in  a state  of  salvation.  Wherefore,  I can  now  declare 
here,  that  this  person  is  one  of  that  sort,  of  whom  I have 
said  at  the  end  of  my  preface,  that  I would  rather  that 


LETTER  XLIX.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


373 


they  utterly  neglected  my  book,  than  that  by  misinter- 
preting it  after  their  wont,  they  should  become  hostile, 
and  hinder  others  without  benefiting  themselves. 

Though  I think  I have  said  enough  to  prove  what  I 
intended,  I have  yet  thought  it  worth  while  to  add  a few 
observations  — namely,  that  this  person  falsely  thinks, 
that  I have  in  view  the  axiom  of  theologians,  which 
draws  a distinction  between  the  words  of  a prophet  when 
propounding  doctrine,  and  the  same  prophet  when  nar- 
rating an  event.  If  by  such  an  axiom  he  means  that 
which  in  Chap.  XV.  I attributed  to  a certain  R.  Jehuda 
Alpakhar,  how  could  he  think  that  I agree  with  it,  when 
in  that  very  chapter  I reject  it  as  false  ? If  he  does  not 
mean  this,  I confess  I am  as  yet  in  ignorance  as  to  what 
he  does  mean,  and,  therefore,  could  not  have  had  it  in 
view. 

Again,  I cannot  see  why  he  says,  that  all  will  adopt 
my  opinions,  who  deny  that  reason  and  philosophy  should 
be  the  interpreters  of  Scripture;  I have  refuted  the  doc- 
trine of  such  persons,  together  with  that  of  Maimonides. 

It  would  take  too  long  to  review  all  the  indications  he 
gives  of  not  having  judged  me  altogether  calmly.  I there- 
fore pass  on  to  his  conclusion  where  he  says,  ® that  I 

HAVE  NO  ARGUMENTS  LEFT  TO  PROVE,  THAT  MaHOMET  WAS 

not  a true  prophet.®  This  he  endeavors  to  show  from 
my  opinions,  whereas  from  them  it  clearly  follows,  that 
Mahomet  was  an  impostor,  inasmuch  as  he  utterly 
forbids  that  freedom,  which  the  Catholic  religion  revealed 
by  our  natural  faculties  and  by  the  prophets  grants,  and 
which  I have  shown  should  be  granted  in  its  complete- 
ness. Even  if  this  were  not  so,  am  I,  I should  like  to 
know,  bound  to  show  that  any  prophet  is  false  ? Surely 
the  burden  lies  with  the  prophets,  to  prove  that  they  are 
true.  But  if  he  retorts  that  Mahomet  also  taught  the 
divine  law,  and  gave  certain  signs  of  his  mission,  as  the 
rest  of  the  prophets  did,  there  is  surely  no  reason  why 
he  should  deny  that  Mahomet  also  was  a true  prophet. 

As  regards  the  Turks  and  other  non-Christian  nations; 
if  they  worship  God  by  the  practice  of  justice  and  char- 
ity toward  their  neighbor,  I believe  that  they  have  the 


374 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  L. 


spirit  of  Christ,  and  are  in  a state  of  salvation,  whatever 
they  may  ignorantly  hold  with  regard  to  Mahomet  and 
oracles. 

Thus  you  see,  my  friend,  how  far  this  man  has  strayed 
from  the  truth ; nevertheless,  I grant  that  he  has  in- 
flicted the  greatest  injury,  not  on  me,  but  on  himself,  in- 
asmuch as  he  has  not  been  ashamed  to  declare,  that 

(<  UNDER  DISGUISED  AND  COVERT  ARGUMENTS  I TEACH 
ATHEISM.  w 

I do  not  think,  that  you  will  find  any  expressions  I 
have  used  against  this  man  too  severe.  However,  if 
there  be  any  of  the  kind  which  offend  you,  I beg  you 
to  correct  them  as  you  shall  think  fit.  I have  no  dispo- 
sition to  irritate  him,  whoever  he  may  be,  and  to  raise 
up  by  my  labors  enemies  against  myself ; as  this  is  often 
the  result  of  disputes  like  the  present,  I could  scarcely 
prevail  on  myself  to  reply  — nor  should  I have  prevailed, 
if  I had  not  promised.  Farewell.  I commit  to  your  pru- 
dence this  letter,  and  myself,  who  am,  etc. 


LETTER  L.  (L.) 

Spinoza  to  Jarig  Jellis. 

[Of  the  difference  between  the  political  theories  of  Hobbes  and 
Spinoza,  of  the  Unity  of  God,  of  the  notion  of  figure,  of  the  book 
of  a Utrecht  professor  against  the  (<  Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus. »] 

Most  Courteous  Sir, — As  regards  political  theories, 
the  difference  which  you  inquire  about  between  Hobbes 
and  myself,  consists  in  this,  that  I always  preserve  natural 
right  intact,  and  only  allot  to  the  chief  magistrates  in 
every  state  a right  over  their  subjects  commensurate 
with  the  excess  of  their  power  over  the  power  of  the 
subjects.  This  is  what  always  takes  place  in  the  state 
of  nature. 

Again,  with  regard  to  the  demonstration  which  I estab- 
lish in  the  appendix  to  my  geometric  exposition  of  Car- 


LETTER  L.] 


CORRESPONDENCE 


37$ 


tesian  principles,  namely,  that  God  can  only  with  great 
impropriety  be  called  one  or  single,  I answer  that  a 
thing  can  only  be  called  one  or  single  in  respect  of  exist- 
ence, not  in  respect  of  essence.  For  we  do  not  conceive 
things  -under  the  category  of  numbers,  unless  they  have 
first  been  reduced  to  a common  genus.  For  example,  he 
who  holds  in  his  hand  a penny  and  a crownpiece  will 

not  think  of  the  twofold  number,  unless  he  can  call 

both  the  penny  and  the  crownpiece  by  one  and  the  same 
name,  to  wit,  coins  or  pieces  of  money.  In  the  latter 
case  he  can  say  that  he  holds  two  coins  or  pieces  of 
money,  inasmuch  as  he  calls  the  crown  as  well  as  the 
penny,  a coin,  or  piece  of  money.  Hence,  it  is  evident 
that  a thing  cannot  be  called  one  or  single,  unless  there 
be  afterward  another  thing  conceived,  which  ( as  has 
been  said)  agrees  with  it.  Now,  since  the  existence  of 

God  is  his  essence,  and  of  his  essence  we  can  form  no 

general  idea,  it  is  certain,  that  he  who  calls  God  one  or 
single  has  no  true  idea  of  God,  and  speaks  of  him  very 
improperly. 

As  to  the  doctrine  that  figure  is  negation  and  not  any- 
thing positive,  it  is  plain  that  the  whole  of  matter 
considered  indefinitely  can  have  no  figure,  and  that 
figure  can  only  exist  in  finite  and  determinate  bodies. 
For  he  who  says,  that  he  perceives  a figure,  merely  indi- 
cates thereby,  that  he  conceives  a determinate  thing, 
and  how  it  is  determinate.  This  determination,  there- 
fore, does  not  appertain  to  the  thing  according  to  its 
being,  but,  on  the  contrary,  is  its  non-being.  As  then 
figure  is  nothing  else  than  determination,  and  deter- 
mination is  negation,  figure,  as  has  been  said,  can  be 
nothing  but  negation. 

The  book,  which  a Utrecht  professor  wrote  against 
mine,  and  which  was  published  after  his  death,  I saw 
lying  in  a bookseller’s  window.  From  the  little  I then 
read  of  it,  I judged  it  unworthy  of  perusal,  still  less  of 
reply.  I,  therefore,  left  the  book,  and  its  author.  With 
an  inward  smile  I reflected,  that  the  most  ignorant  are 
ever  the  most  audacious  and  the  most  ready  to  rush  into 
print.  The  Christians  seem  to  me  to  expose  their  wares 


376 


SPINOZA'S 


[LETTER  LI. 


for  sale  like  hucksters,  who  always  show  first  that  which 
is  worst.  The  devil  is  said  to  be  very  cunning,  but  to 
my  thinking  the  tricks  of  these  people  are  in  cunning 
far  beyond  his.  Farewell. 

The  Hague,  2 June,  1674. 


LETTER  LI.  (XLV.) 

Godfrey  Leibnitz  to  Spinoza. 

Distinguished  Sir, — Among  your  other  merits  spread 
abroad  by  fame,  I understand  that  you  have  remarkable 
skill  in  optics.  I have,  therefore,  wished  to  forward  my 
essay,  such  as  it  is,  to  you,  as  I am  not  likely  to  find  a 
better  critic  in  this  branch  of  learning.  The  paper,  which 
I send  you,  and  which  I have  styled  <(  a note  on  advanced 
optics,”  has  been  published  with  a view  of  more  conven- 
iently making  known  my  ideas  to  my  friends  and  the 
curious  in  such  matters.  I hear  that  ...  is  very 
clever  in  the  same  subject,  doubtless  he  is  well  known 
to  you.  If  you  could  obtain  for  me  his  opinion  and 
kind  attention,  you  would  greatly  increase  my  obligation 
to  you.  The  paper  explains  itself. 

I believe  you  have  already  received  the  (<  Prodromo  * 
of  Francis  Lana  the  Jesuit,  written  in  Italian.  Some 
remarkable  observations  on  optics  are  contained  in  it. 
John  Oltius  too,  a young  Swiss  very  learned  in  these 
matters,  has  published  (<  Physico-Mechanical  Reflections 
Concerning  Vision”;  in  which  he  announces  a machine 
for  the  polishing  all  kinds  of  glasses,  very  simple  and 
of  universal  applicability,  and  also  declares  that  he  has 
discovered  a means  of  collecting  all  the  rays  coming 
from  different  points  of  an  object,  so  as  to  obtain  an 
equal  number  of  corresponding  points,  but  only  under 
conditions  of  a given  distance  and  form  of  object. 

My  proposal  is,  not  that  the  rays  from  all  points  should 
be  collected  and  rearranged  (this  is  with  any  object  or 


LETTER  LIL] 


CORRESPONDENCE 


377 


distance  impossible  at  the  present  stage  of  our  knowledge) ; 
the  result  I aim  at  is  the  equal  collection  of  rays  from 
points  outside  the  optic  axis  and  in  the  optic  axis,  so  that 
the  apertures  of  glasses  could  be  made  of  any  size  desired 
without  impairing  the  distinctness  of  vision.  But  this 
must  stand  according  to  your  skilled  verdict.  Farewell, 
and  believe  me,  distinguished  sir,  your  obedient  servant, 

Godfrey  Leibnitz, 

J.  U.  D.,  Councillor  of  the  Elector  of  Mainz. 

Frankfort,  5 Oct.,  1671  (new  style). 


LETTER  LII.  (XLVI.) 

Spinoza  to  Leibnitz. 

[Answer  to  the  foregoing  letter.] 

Most  Learned  and  Distinguished  Sir, — I have  read 
the  paper  you  were  kind  enough  to  send  me,  and  return 
you  many  thanks  for  the  communication.  I regret  that  I 
have  not  been  able  quite  to  follow  your  meaning,  though 
you  explain  it  sufficiently  clearly,  whether  you  think  that 
there  is  any  cause  for  making  the  apertures  of  the  glasses 
small,  except  that  the  rays  coming  from  a single  point  are 
not  collected  accurately  at  another  single  point,  but  in  a 
small  area  which  we  generally  call  the  mechanical  point, 
and  that  this  small  area  is  greater  or  less  in  proportion  to 
the  size  of  the  aperture.  Further,  I ask  whether  the 
lenses  which  you  call  * pandochae  ® correct  this  fault,  so 
that  the  mechanical  point  or  small  area,  on  which  the  rays 
coming  from  a single  point  are  after  refraction  collected, 
always  preserves  the  same  proportional  size,  whether  the 
aperture  be  small  or  large.  If  so,  one  may  enlarge  the 
aperture  as  much  as  one  likes,  and  consequently  these 
lenses  will  be  far  superior  to  those  of  any  other  shape 
known  to  me ; if  not,  I hardly  see  why  you  praise  them  so 


378 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LII. 


greatly  beyond  common  lenses.  For  circular  lenses  have 
everywhere  the  same  axis;  therefore,  when  we  employ 
them,  we  must  regard  all  the  points  of  an  object  as  placed 
in  the  optic  axis;  although  all  the  points  of  the  object  be 
not  at  the  same  distance,  the  difference  arising'  thence  will 
not  be  perceptible,  when  the  objects  are  very  remote;  be- 
cause then  the  rays  coming  from  a single  point  would,  as 
they  enter  the  glass,  be  regarded  as  parallel.  I think  your 
lenses  might  be  of  service  in  obtaining  a more  distinct 
representation  of  all  the  objects,  when  we  wish  to  include 
several  objects  in  one  view,  as  we  do,  when  we  employ  very 
large  convex  circular  lenses.  However,  I would  rather 
suspend  my  judgment  about  all  these  details,  till  you  have 
more  clearly  explained  your  meaning,  as  I heartily  beg 
you  to  do.  I have,  as  you  requested,  sent  the  other  copy 
of  your  paper  to  Mr.  . . . He  answers,  that  he  has 

at  present  no  time  to  study  it,  but  he  hopes  to  have  leisure 
in  a week  or  two. 

I have  not  yet  seen  the  <(  Prodromo  ” of  Francis  Lana, 
nor  the  (<  Physico- Mechanical  Reflections  ® of  John  Oltius. 
What  I more  regret  is,  that  your  (<  Physical  Hypothesis  * 
has  not  yet  come  to  my  hands,  nor  is  there  a copy  for 
sale  here  at  the  Hague.  The  gift,  therefore,  which  you 
so  liberally  promised  me  will  be  most  acceptable  to  me; 
if  I can  be  of  use  to  you  in  any  other  matter,  you  will 
always  find  me  most  ready.  I hope  you  will  not  think  it 
too  irksome  to  reply  to  this  short  note. 

Distinguished  Sir, 

Yours  sincerely, 

B.  de  Spinoza. 

The  Hague,  9 Nov.,  1671. 

P.S.  Mr.  Diemerbroech  does  not  live  here.  I am, 
therefore,  forced  to  intrust  this  to  an  ordinary  letter 
carrier.  I doubt  not  that  you  know  someone  at  the 
Hague,  who  would  take  charge  of  our  letters;  I should 
like  to  hear  of  such  a person,  that  our  correspondence 
might  be  more  conveniently  and  securely  taken  care  of. 
If  the  (<  Tractatus  Theologico- Politicus  ® has  not  yet  come 
to  your  hands,  I will,  unless  you  have  any  objection, 
send  you  a copy.  Farewell. 


LETTER  Lin.  ] CORRESPONDENCE 


379 


LETTER  LIII.  (XL VII.) 

Fabritius  to  Spinoza. 

[ Fabritius,  under  the  order  and  in  the  name  of  the  Elector  Palatine, 
offers  Spinoza  the  post  of  Professor  of  Philosophy  at  Heidelberg, 
under  very  liberal  conditions.] 

Most  Renowned  Sir, — His  Most  Serene  Highness  the 
Elector  Palatine,*  my  most  gracious  master,  commands 
me  to  write  to  you,  who  are,  as  yet,  unknown  to  me,  but 
most  favorably  regarded  by  his  Most  Serene  Highness, 
and  to  inquire  of  you,  whether  you  are  willing  to  accept 
an  ordinary  professorship  of  Philosophy  in  his  illustrious 
university.  An  annual  salary  would  be  paid  to  you, 
equal  to  that  enjoyed  at  present  by  the  ordinary  profes- 
sors. You  will  hardly  find  elsewhere  a prince  more 
favorable  to  distinguished  talents,  among  which  he  reck- 
ons yourself.  You  will  have  the  most  ample  freedom  in 
philosophical  teaching,  which  the  prince  is  confident  you 
will  not  misuse,  to  disturb  the  religion  publicly  estab- 
lished. I cannot  refrain  from  seconding  the  prince’s 
injunction.  I therefore  most  earnestly  beg  you  to  reply 
as  soon  as  possible,  and  to  address  your  answer  either 
under  cover  to  the  Most  Serene  Elector’s  resident  at 
the  Hague,  Mr.  Grotius,  or  to  Mr.  Gilles  Van  der  Hele, 
so  that  it  may  come  in  the  packet  of  letters  usually  sent 
to  the  court,  or  else  to  avail  yourself  of  some  other  con- 
venient opportunity  for  transmitting  it.  I will  only  add, 
that  if  you  come  here,  you  will  live  pleasantly  a life 
worthy  of  a philosopher,  unless  events  turn  out  quite 
contrary  to  our  expectation  and  hope.  So  farewell. 

I remain,  illustrious  Sir, 

Your  devoted  admirer, 

I.  Lewis  Fabritius. 

Professor  of  the  Academy  of  Heidelberg,  and 
Councillor  of  the  Elector  Palatine. 
Heidelberg,  16  Feb.,  1673. 

* Charles  Lewis,  Elector,  1632-1680. 


380 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  XLIV. 


LETTER  LIV.  (XLVIII.) 

Spinoza  to  Fabritius. 

[Spinoza  thanks  the  Elector  for  his  kind  offer,  but,  owing  to  his 
unwillingness  to  teach  in  public,  and  other  causes,  humbly  begs 
to  be  allowed  time  to  consider  it.] 

Distinguished  Sir, — If  I had  ever  desired  to  take  a 
professorship  in  any  faculty,  I could  not  have  wished  for 
any  other  than  that  which  is  offered  to  me,  through  you, 
by  His  Most  Serene  Highness  the  Elector  Palatine,  espe- 
cially because  of  that  freedom  in  philosophical  teaching, 
which  the  most  gracious  prince  is  kind  enough  to  grant, 
not  to  speak  of  the  desire  which  I have  long  entertained, 
to  live  under  the  rule  of  a prince,  whom  all  men  admire 
for  his  wisdom. 

But  since  it  has  never  been  my  wish  to  teach  in 
public,  I have  been  unable  to  induce  myself  to  accept 
this  splendid  opportunity,  though  I have  long  deliberated 
about  it.  I think  in  the  first  place,  that  I should  aban- 
don philosophical  research  if  I consented  to  find  time  for 
teaching  young  students.  I think,  in  the  second  place, 
that  I do  not  know  the  limits,  within  which  the  freedom 
of  my  philosophical  teaching  would  be  confined,  if  I am 
to  avoid  all  appearance  of  disturbing  the  publicly  estab- 
lished religion.  Religious  quarrels  do  not  arise  so  much 
from  ardent  zeal  for  religion,  as  from  men’s  various  dis- 
positions and  love  of  contradiction,  which  causes  them 
to  habitually  distort  and  condemn  everything,  however 
rightly  it  may  have  been  said.  I have  experienced  these 
results  in  my  private  and  secluded  station,  how  much 
more  should  I have  to  fear  them  after  my  elevation  to 
this  post  of  honor. 

Thus  you  see,  distinguished  Sir,  that  I am  not  holding 
back  in  the  hope  of  getting  something  better,  but  through 
my  love  of  quietness,  which  I think  I can  in  some 
measure  secure,  if  I keep  away  from  lecturing  in  public. 


LETTER  LV.] 


CORRESPONDENCE 


38i 

I therefore  most  earnestly  entreat  you  to  beg  of  the 
Most  Serene  Elector,  that  I may  be  allowed  to  consider 
further  about  this  matter,  and  I also  ask  you  to  concil- 
iate the  favor  of  the  most  gracious  prince  to  his  most 
devoted  admirer,  thus  increasing  the  obligations  of  your 
sincere  friend,  B.  de  S. 

The  Hague,  30  March,  1673. 


LETTER  LV.  (LI.) 

Hugo  Boxel  to  Spinoza. 

[A  friend  asks  Spinoza’s  opinion  about  ghosts.] 

Distinguished  Sir,  — My  reason  for  writing  to  you  is, 
that  I want  to  know  your  opinion  about  apparitions  and 
ghosts  or  spectres;  if  you  admit  their  existence,  what  do 
you  think  about  them,  and  how  long  does  their  life  last? 
For  some  hold  them  to  be  mortal,  others  immortal.  As 
I am  doubtful  whether  you  admit  their  existence,  I will 
proceed  no  further. 

Meanwhile,  it  is  certain,  that  the  ancients  believed  in 
them.  The  theologians  and  philosophers  of  to-day  are 
hitherto  agreed  as  to  the  existence  of  some  creatures 
of  the  kind  though  they  may  not  agree  as  to  the  nature  of 
their  essence.  Some  assert  that  they  are  composed  of 
very  thin  and  subtle  matter,  others  that  they  are  spiritual. 
But,  as  I was  saying  before,  we  are  quite  at  cross  pur- 
poses, inasmuch  as  I am  doubtful  whether  you  would 
grant  their  existence;  though  as  you  must  be  aware,  so 
many  instances  and  stories  of  them  are  found  through- 
out antiquity,  that  it  would  really  be  difficult  either  to 
deny  or  to  doubt  them.  It  is  clear  that,  even  if  you  con- 
fess that  they  exist,  you  do  not  believe  that  some  of  them 
are  the  souls  of  the  dead,  as  the  defenders  of  the  Romish 
faith  would  have  it.  I will  here  end,  and  will  say  noth- 


SPINOZA’S 


382 


[LETTER  LVI. 


ing  about  war  and  rumors,  inasmuch  as  our  lot  is  cast  in 
an  age,  etc.  Farewell. 

14  Sept , 1674. 


LETTER  LVI.  (LII.) 

Spinoza  to  Hugo  Boxel. 

[Spinoza  answers  that  he  does  not  know  what  ghosts  are,  and  can 

gain  no  information  from  antiquity.  (The  Hague,  Sept.,  1674.)] 

Dear  Sir, — Your  letter,  which  I received  yesterday, 
was  most  welcome  to  me,  both  because  I wanted  to  hear 
news  of  you,  and  also  because  it  shows  that  you  have 
not  utterly  forgotten  me.  Although  some  might  think 
it  a bad  omen,  that  ghosts  are  the  cause  of  your  writing 
to  me,  I,  on  the  contrary,  can  discern  a deeper  meaning 
in  the  circumstance;  I see  that  not  only  truths,  but  also 
things  trifling  and  imaginary  may  be  of  use  to  me. 

However,  let  us  defer  the  question,  whether  ghosts  are 
delusions  and  imaginary,  for  I see  that  not  only  denial  of 
them,  but  even  doubt  about  them  seems  very  singular  to 
you,  as  to  one  who  has  been  convinced  by  the  numerous 
histories  related  by  men  of  to-day  and  the  ancients.  The 
great  esteem  and  honor,  in  which  I have  always  held  and 
still  hold  you,  does  not  suffer  me  to  contradict  you,  still 
less  to  humor  you.  The  middle  course,  which  I shall 
adopt,  is  to  beg  you  to  be  kind  enough  to  select  from  the 
numerous  stories  which  you  have  read,  one  or  two  of 
those  least  open  to  doubt,  and  most  clearly  demonstra- 
ting the  existence  of  ghosts.  For  to  confess  the  truth,  I 
have  never  read  a trustworthy  author,  who  clearly  showed 
that  there  are  such  things.  Up  to  the  present  time  I do 
not  know  what  they  are,  and  no  one  has  ever  been  able 
to  tell  me.  Yet  it  is  evident,  that  in  the  case  of  a thing 
so  clearly  shown  by  experience  we  ought  to  know  what 
it  is;  otherwise  we  shall  have  great  difficulty  in  gather- 
ing from  histories  that  ghosts  exist.  We  only  gather  that 
something  exists  of  nature  unknown.  If  philosophers 
choose  to  call  things  which  we  do  not  know  “ghosts,®  I 


LETTER  L VII.  ] CORRESPONDENCE 


383 


shall  not  deny  the  existence  of  such,  for  there  are  an 
infinity  of  things,  which  I cannot  make  out. 

Pray  tell  me,  my  dear  Sir,  before  I explain  myself 
further  in  the  matter,  What  are  these  ghosts  or  spectres  ? 
Are  they  children,  or  fools,  or  madmen  ? For  all  that  I 
have  heard  of  them  seems  more  adapted  to  the  silly  than 
the  wise,  or,  to  say  the  best  we  can  of  it,  resembles  the 
pastimes  of  children  or  of  fools.  Before  I end,  I would 
submit  to  you  one  consideration,  namely,  that  the  desire 
which  most  men  have  to  narrate  things,  not  as  they  really 
happened,  but  as  they  wished  them  to  happen,  can  be 
illustrated  from  the  stories  of  ghosts  and  spectres  more 
easily  than  from  any  others.  The  principal  reason  for 
this  is,  I believe,  that  such  stories  are  only  attested  by 
the  narrators,  and  thus  a fabricator  can  add  or  suppress 
circumstances,  as  seems  most  convenient  to  him,  without 
fear  of  anyone  being  able  to  contradict  him.  He  com- 
poses them  to  suit  special  circumstances,  in  order  to 
justify  the  fear  he  feels  of  dreams  and  phantoms,  or  else 
to  confirm  his  courage,  his  credit,  or  his  opinion.  There 
are  other  reasons,  which  lead  me  to  doubt,  if  not  the 
actual  stories,  at  least  some  of  the  narrated  circumstances ; 
and  which  have  a close  bearing  on  the  conclusion  we  are 
endeavoring  to  derive  from  the  aforesaid  stories.  I will 
here  stop,  until  I have  learned  from  you  what  those  stories 
are,  which  have  so  completely  convinced  you,  that  you 
regard  all  doubt  about  them  as  absurd,  etc. 


LETTER  LVII.  (LIII.) 

Hugo  Boxel  to  Spinoza. 

Most  Sagacious  Sir, — You  have  sent  me  just  the  an- 
swer I expected  to  receive,  from  a friend  holding  an 
opinion  adverse  to  my  own.  But  no  matter.  Friends  may 
always  disagree  on  indifferent  subjects  without  injury  to 
their  friendship. 


384 


SPINOZA’S 


LETTER  LVII. 


You  ask  me,  before  you  gave  an  opinion  as  to  what 
these  spectres  or  spirits  are,  to  tell  you  whether  they  are 
children,  fools,  or  madmen,  and  you  add  that  everything 
you  have  heard  of  them  seems  to  have  proceeded  rather 
from  the  insane  than  the  sane.  It  is  a true  proverb, 
which  says  that  a preconceived  opinion  hinders  the  pur- 
suit of  truth. 

I,  then,  believe  that  ghosts  exist  for  the  following  rea- 
sons: first,  because  it  appertains  to  the  beauty  and  per- 
fection of  the  universe,  that  they  should;  secondly,  because 
it  is  probable  that  the  Creator  created  them,  as  being 
more  like  himself  than  are  embodied  creatures;  thirdly, 
because  as  body  exists  without  soul,  soul  exists  without 
body;  fourthly  and  lastly,  because  in  the  upper  air, 
region,  or  space,  I believe  there  is  no  obscure  body 
without  inhabitants  of  its  own;  consequently,  that  the 
measureless  space  between  us  and  the  stars  is  not  empty, 
but  thronged  with  spiritual  inhabitants.  Perhaps  the 
highest  and  most  remote  are  true  spirits,  whereas  the 
lowest  in  the  lowest  region  of  the  air  are  creatures  of 
very  thin  and  subtle  substance,  and  also  invisible.  Thus 
I think  there  are  spirits  of  all  sorts,  but,  perhaps,  none 
of  the  female  sex. 

This  reasoning  will  in  no  wise  convince  those  who 
rashly  believe  that  the  world  has  been  created  by  chance. 
Daily  experience,  if  these  reasons  be  dismissed,  shows 
that  there  are  spectres,  and  many  stories,  both  new  and 
old,  are  current  about  them.  Such  may  be  found  in 
Plutarch’s  book  (<  De  viris  illustribus,  ” and  in  his  other 
works ; in  Suetonius’s  (<  Lives  of  the  Caesars,  * also  in 
Wierus’s  and  Lavater’s  books  about  ghosts,  where  the 
subject  is  fully  treated  and  illustrated  from  writers  of  all 
kinds.  Cardano,  celebrated  for  his  learning,  also  speaks 
of  them  in  his  books  w De  Subtilitate,”  (<  De  Varietate,” 
and  in  his  (<  Life  ” ; showing,  by  experience,  that  they 
have  appeared  to  himself,  his  relations,  and  friends. 
Melancthon,  a wise  man  and  a lover  of  truth,  testifies  to 
his  experience  of  them,  as  also  do  many  others.  A cer- 
tain burgomaster,  learned  and  wise,  who  is  still  living, 
once  told  me  that  he  heard  by  night  the  noise  of  work- 


LETTER  LVII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


385 


ing  in  his  mother’s  brew-house,  going  on  just  as  it  does 
while  beer  is  being  brewed  in  the  day;  this  he  attested 
as  having  occurred  frequently.  The  same  sort  of  thing 
has  happened  to  me  and  will  never  fade  from  my  mem- 
ory; hence  I am  convinced  by  the  above-mentioned  expe- 
riences and  reasons  that  there  are  ghosts. 

As  for  evil  spirits  who  torture  wretched  men  in  this 
life  and  the  next,  and  who  work  spells,  I believe  the 
stories  of  them  to  be  fables.  In  treatises  about  spirits 
you  will  find  a host  of  details.  Besides  those  I have  cited, 
you  may  refer  to  Pliny  the  Younger,  bk.  vii.,  the  letter 
to  Sura;  Suetonius,  “Life  of  Julius  Caesar, B ch.  xxxii. ; 
Valerius  Maximus,  I.  viii. , § § 7,  8;  and  Alexander  ab  Alex- 
andro, (<  Dies  Geniales. ® I am  sure  these  books  are  access- 
ible to  you.  I say  nothing  of  monks  and  priests,  for  they 
relate  so  many  tales  of  souls  and  evil  spirits,  or  as  I 
should  rather  say  of  spectres,  that  the  reader  becomes 
wearied  with  their  abundance.  Thyraeus,  a Jesuit,  in  the 
book  about  the  apparition  of  spirits,  also  treats  of  the 
question.  But  these  last  named  discourse  on  such  sub- 
jects merely  for  the  sake  of  gain,  and  to  prove  that  pur- 
gatory is  not  so  bad  as  is  supposed,  thus  treating  the 
question  as  a mine,  from  which  they  dig  up  plenteous 
store  of  gold  and  silver.  But  the  same  cannot  be  said 
of  the  writers  mentioned  previously,  and  other  mod- 
erns, who  merit  greater  credit  from  their  absence  of 
bias. 

As  an  answer  to  the  passage  in  your  letter,  where  you 
speak  of  fools  and  madmen,  I subjoin  this  sentence  from 
the  learned  Lavater,  who  ends  with  it  his  first  book  on 
ghosts  or  spectres.  <(  He  who  is  bold  enough  to  gainsay 
so  many  witnesses,  both  ancient  and  modem,  seems  to 
me  unworthy  of  credit.  For  as  it  is  a mark  of  frivolity 
to  lend  incontinent  credence  to  everyone  who  says  he 
has  seen  a ghost ; so,  on  the  other  hand,  rashly  and  flatly 
to  contradict  so  many  trustworthy  historians,  Fathers,  and 
other  persons  placed  in  authority  would  argue  a remark- 
able shamelessness.® 

21  Sept.,  1674. 

25 


386 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LVIII. 


LETTER  LVIII.  (LIV.) 

Spinoza  to  Hugo  Boxel. 

[Spinoza  treats  of  the  necessary  creation  of  the  world — he  refutes 
his  friend’s  arguments  and  quotations.] 

Dear  Sir, — I will  rely  on  what  you  said  in  your  letter 
of  the  2 1 st  of  last  month,  that  friends  may  disagree  on 
indifferent  questions,  without  injury  to  their  friendship, 
and  will  frankly  tell  you  my  opinion  on  the  reasons  and 
stories,  whereon  you  base  your  conclusion,  that  there 

ARE  GHOSTS  OF  EVERY  KIND,  BUT  PERHAPS  NONE  OF  THE 

female  sex.  The  reason  for  my  not  replying  sooner  is 
that  the  books  you  quoted  are  not  at  hand,  in  fact  I have 
not  found  any  except  Pliny  and  Suetonius.  However, 
these  two  have  saved  me  the  trouble  of  consulting  any 
other,  for  I am  persuaded  that  they  all  talk  in  the  same 
strain  and  hanker  after  extraordinary  tales,  which  rouse 
men’s  astonishment  and  compel  their  wonder.  I confess 
that  I am  not  a little  amazed,  not  at  the  stories,  but  at 
those  who  narrate  them.  I wonder  that  men  of  talent 
and  judgment  should  so  employ  their  readiness  of  speech, 
and  abuse  it  in  endeavoring  to  convince  us  of  such  trifles. 

However,  let  us  dismiss  the  writers,  and  turn  to  the 
question  itself.  In  the  first  place,  we  will  reason  a little 
about  your  conclusion.  Let  us  see  whether  I,  who  deny 
that  there  are  spectres  or  spirits,  am  on  that  account  less 
able  to  understand  the  authors,  who  have  written  on  the 
subject;  or  whether  you,  who  assert  that  such  beings 
exist,  do  not  give  to  the  aforesaid  writers  more  credit 
than  they  deserve.  The  distinction  you  drew,  in  admit- 
ting without  hesitation  spirits  of  the  male  sex,  but  doubt- 
ing whether  any  female  spirits  exist,  seems  to  me  more 
like  a fancy  than  a genuine  doubt.  If  it  were  really  your 
opinion,  it  would  resemble  the  common  imagination  that 
God  is  masculine,  not  feminine.  I wonder  that  those, 
who  have  seen  naked  ghosts,  have  not  cast  their  eyes  on 


LETTER  LVIIL]  CORRESPONDENCE 


387 


those  parts  of  the  person,  which  would  remove  all  doubt ; 
perhaps  they  were  timid,  or  did  not  know  of  this  dis- 
tinction. You  would  say  that  this  is  ridicule,  not  reason- 
ing: and  hence  I see,  that  your  reasons  appear  to  you 
so  strong  and  well-founded,  that  no  one  can  (at  least  in 
your  judgment)  contradict  them,  unless  he  be  some  per- 
verse fellow,  who  thinks  the  world  has  been  made  by 
chance.  This  impels  me,  before  going  into  your  reasons, 
to  set  forth  briefly  my  opinion  on  the  question,  whether 
the  world  was  made  by  chance.  But  I answer,  that  as 
it  is  clear  that  chance  and  necessity  are  two  contraries, 
so  it  is  also  clear,  that  he,  who  asserts  the  world  to  be 
a necessary  effect  of  the  divine  nature,  must  utterly 
deny  that  the  world  has  been  made  by  chance ; whereas, 
he  who  affirms,  that  God  need  not  have  made  the  world, 
confirms,  though  in  different  language,  the  doctrine  that 
it  has  been  made  by  chance;  inasmuch  as  he  maintains 
that  it  proceeds  from  a wish,  which  might  never  have 
been  formed.  However,  as  this  opinion  and  theory  is  on 
the  face  of  it  absurd,  it  is  commonly  very  unanimously 
admitted,  that  God’s  will  is  eternal,  and  has  never  been  in- 
different ; hence  it  must  necessarily  be  also  admitted,  you 
will  observe,  that  the  world  is  a necessary  effect  of  the 
divine  nature.  Let  them  call  it  will,  understanding,  or 
any  name  they  like,  they  come  at  last  to  the  same  con- 
clusion, that  under  different  names  they  are  expressing 
one  and  the  same  thing.  If  you  ask  them,  whether  the 
divine  will  does  not  differ  from  the  human,  they  answer, 
that  the  former  has  nothing  in  common  with  the  latter 
except  its  name;  especially  as  they  generally  admit  that 
God’s  will,  understanding,  intellect,  essence,  and  nature 
are  all  identical ; so  I,  myself,  lest  I should  confound  the 
divine  nature  with  the  human,  do  not  assign  to  God 
human  attributes,  such  as  will,  understanding,  attention, 
hearing,  etc.  I therefore  say,  as  I have  said  already, 

that  THE  WORLD  IS  A NECESSARY  EFFECT  OF  THE  DIVINE 
NATURE,  AND  THAT  IT  HAS  NOT  BEEN  MADE  BY  CHANCE. 

I think  this  is  enough  to  persuade  you,  that  the  opinion 
of  those  (if  such  there  be),  who  say  that  the  world  has 
been  made  by  chance,  is  entirely  contrary  to  mine;  and, 


383 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LV111. 


relying  on  this  hypothesis,  I proceed  to  examine  those 
reasons  which  lead  you  to  infer  the  existence  of  all  kinds 
of  ghosts.  I should  like  to  say  of  these  reasons  gener- 
ally, that  they  seem  rather  conjectures  than  reasons,  and 
I can  with  difficulty  believe,  that  you  take  them  for 
guiding  reasons.  However,  be  they  conjectures  or  be 
they  reasons,  let  us  see  whether  we  can  take  them  for 
foundations. 

Your  first  reason  is,  that  the  existence  of  ghosts  is 
needful  for  the  beauty  and  perfection  of  the  universe. 
Beauty,  my  dear  sir,  is  not  so  much  a quality  of  the  ob- 
ject beheld,  as  an  effect  in  him  who  beholds  it.  If  our 
sight  were  longer  or  shorter,  or  if  our  constitution  were 
different,  what  now  appears  beautiful  to  us  would  seem 
misshapen,  and  what  we  now  think  misshapen  we  should 
regard  as  beautiful.  The  most  beautiful  hand  seen 
through  the  microscope  will  appear  horrible.  Some 
things  are  beautiful  at  a distance,  but  ugly  near;  thus 
things  regarded  in  themselves,  and  in  relation  to  God, 
are  neither  ugly  nor  beautiful.  Therefore,  he  who  says 
that  God  has  created  the  world,  so  that  it  might  be  beau- 
tiful, is  bound  to  adopt  one  of  the  two  alternatives, 
either  that  God  created  the  world  for  the  sake  of  men’s 
pleasure  and  eyesight,  or  else  that  he  created  men’s 
pleasure  and  eyesight  for  the  sake  of  the  world.  Now, 
whether  we  adopt  the  former  or  the  latter  of  these  views, 
how  God  could  have  furthered  his  object  by  the  creation 
of  ghosts,  I cannot  see.  Perfection  and  imperfection  are 
names,  which  do  not  differ  much  from  the  names  beauty 
and  ugliness.  I only  ask,  therefore  (not  to  be  tedious), 
which  would  contribute  most  to  the  perfect  adornment 
of  the  world,  ghosts,  or  a quantity  of  monsters,  such  as 
centaurs,  hydras,  harpies,  satyrs,  gryphons,  arguses,  and 
other  similar  inventions  ? Truly  the  world  would  be 
handsomely  bedecked,  if  God  had  adorned  and  embel- 
lished it,  in  obedience  to  our  fancy,  with  beings,  which 
any  one  may  readily  imagine  and  dream  of,  but  no  one 
can  understand. 

Your  second  reason  is,  that  because  spirits  express 
God’s  image  more  than  embodied  creatures,  it  is  probable 


LETTER  LVIII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


389 


that  he  has  created  them.  I frankly  confess,  that  I am 
as  yet  in  ignorance,  how  spirits  more  than  other  crea- 
tures express  God.  This  I know,  that  between  finite 
and  infinite  there  is  no  comparison;  so  that  the  differ- 
ence between  God  and  the  greatest  and  most  excellent 
created  thing  is  no  less  than  the  difference  between  God 
and  the  least  created  thing.  This  argument,  therefore, 
is  beside  the  mark.  If  I had  as  clear  an  idea  of  ghosts 
as  I have  of  a triangle  or  a circle,  I should  not  in  the 
least  hesitate  to  affirm  that  they  had  been  created  by 
God;  but  as  the  idea  I possess  of  them  is  just  like  the 
ideas,  which  my  imagination  forms  of  harpies,  gryphons, 
hydras,  etc.,  I cannot  consider  them  as  anything  but 
dreams,  which  differ  from  God  as  totally,  as  that  which 
is  not  differs  from  that  which  is. 

Your  third  reason  (that  as  body  exists  without  soul, 
so  soul  should  exist  without  body)  seems  to  me  equally 
absurd.  Pray  tell  me,  if  it  is  not  also  likely,  that  memory, 
hearing,  sight,  etc.,  exist  without  bodies,  because  bodies 
exist  without  memory,  hearing,  sight,  etc.,  or  that  a 
sphere  exists  without  a circle,  because  a circle  exists 
without  a sphere  ? 

Your  fourth,  and  last  reason,  is  the  same  as  your  first, 
and  I refer  you  to  my  answer  given  above.  I will  only 
observe  here,  that  I do  not  know  which  are  the  highest 
or  which  the  lowest  places,  which  you  conceive  as  exist- 
ing in  infinite  matter,  unless  you  take  the  earth  as  the 
centre  of  the  universe.  For  if  the  sun  or  Saturn  be  the 
centre  of  the  universe,  the  sun  or  Saturn,  not  the  earth, 
will  be  the  lowest. 

Thus,  passing  by  this  argument  and  what  remains,  I 
conclude,  that  these  and  similar  reasons  will  convince  no 
one  of  the  existence  of  all  kinds  of  ghosts  and  spectres, 
unless  it  be  those  persons,  who  shut  their  ears  to  the 
understanding,  and  allow  themselves  to  be  led  away  by 
superstition.  This  last  is  so  hostile  to  right  reason,  that 
she  lends  willing  credence  to  old  wives’  tales  for  the 
sake  of  discrediting  philosophers. 

As  regards  the  stories,  I have  already  said  in  my  first 
letter,  that  I do  not  deny  them  altogether,  but  only  the 


39° 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LIX. 


conclusion  drawn  from  them.  To  this  I may  add,  that 
I do  not  believe  them  so  thoroughly,  as  not  to  doubt 
many  of  the  details,  which  are  generally  added  rather 
for  ornament  than  for  bringing  out  the  truth  of  the  story 
or  the  conclusion  drawn  from  it.  I had  hoped,  that  out 
of  so  many  stories  you  would  at  least  have  produced  one 
or  two,  which  could  hardly  be  questioned,  and  which 
would  clearly  show  that  ghosts  or  spectres  exist.  The 
case  you  relate  of  the  burgomaster,  who  wanted  to  infer 
their  existence,  because  he  heard  spectral  brewers  work- 
ing in  his  mother’s  brew-house  by  night,  and  making  the 
same  noises  as  he  was  accustomed  to  hear  by  day,  seems 
to  me  laughable.  In  like  manner  it  would  be  tedious 
here  to  examine  all  the  stories  of  people,  who  have  written 
on  these  trifles.  To  be  brief,  I cite  the  instance  of  Julius 
Caesar,  who,  as  Suetonius  testifies,  laughed  at  such  things 
and  yet  was  happy,  if  we  may  trust  what  Suetonius  says 
in  the  59th  chapter  of  his  life  of  that  leader.  And  so 
should  all,  who  reflect  on  the  human  imagination,  and 
the  effects  of  the  emotions,  laugh  at  such  notions;  what- 
ever Lavater  and  others,  who  have  gone  dreaming  with 
him  in  the  matter,  may  produce  to  the  contrary. 


LETTER  LIX.  (LV.) 

Hugo  Boxel  to  Spinoza. 

[ A continuation  of  the  arguments  in  favor  of  ghosts,  which  may  be 
summarized  as  follows:  I say  a thing  is  done  by  chance,  when  it 
has  not  been  the  subject  of  will  on  the  part  of  the  doer ; not  when  it 
might  never  have  happened. — Necessity  and  freedom,  not  necessity 
and  chance,  are  contraries. — If  we  do  not  in  some  sense  attribute 
human  qualities  to  God,  what  meaning  can  we  attach  to  the  term  ? — 
You  ask  for  absolute  proof  of  the  existence  of  spirits;  such  proof  is 
not  obtainable  for  many  things,  which  are  yet  firmly  believed. — Some 
things  are  more  beautiful  intrinsically  than  others. — As  God  is  a 
spirit,  spirits  resemble  him  more  than  embodied  creatures  do. — A 
ghost  cannot  be  conceived  as  clearly  as  a triangle : can  you  say  that 
your  own  idea  of  God  is  as  clear  as  your  idea  of  a triangle  ? — As  a 
circle  exists  without  a sphere,  so  a sphere  exists  without  a circle. — 


LETTER  LX. 


CORRESPONDENCE 


391 


We  call  things  higher  or  lower  in  proportion  to  their  distance  from 
the  earth. — All  the  Stoics,  Pythagoreans,  and  Platonists,  Empedocles, 
Maximus  Tyrius,  Apuleius,  and  others,  bear  witness  to  ghosts ; and 
no  modem  denies  them.  It  is  presumption  to  sneer  at  such  a body 
of  testimony.  Caesar  did  not  ridicule  ghosts,  but  omens,  and  if  he 
had  listened  to  Spurina  he  would  not.  have  been  murdered.  ] 


LETTER  LX.  (LVI.) 

Spinoza  to  Hugo  Boxel. 

[Spinoza  again  answers  the  argument  in  favor  of  ghosts.  ( The  Hague, 

1674.)] 

Dear  Sir, — I hasten  to  answer  yonr  letter,  received 
yesterday,  for  if  I delay  my  reply,  I may  have  to  put  it 
off  longer  than  I should  like.  The  state  of  your  health 
would  have  made  me  anxious,  if  I did  not  understand 
that  you  are  better.  I hope  you  are  by  this  time  quite 
well  again. 

The  difficulties  experienced  by  two  people  following 
different  principles,  and  trying  to  agree  on  a matter, 
which  depends  on  many  other  questions,  might  be  shown 
from  this  discussion  alone,  if  there  were  no  reason  to 
prove  it  by.  Pray  tell  me,  whether  you  have  seen  or 
read  any  philosophers,  who  hold  that  the  world  has  been 
made  by  chance,  taking  chance  in  your  sense,  namely, 
that  God  had  some  design  in  making  the  world  and  yet 
has  not  kept  to  the  plan  he  had  formed.  I do  not  know, 
that  such  an  idea  has  ever  entered  anyone’s  mind.  I am 
likewise  at  a loss  for  the  reasons,  with  which  you  want 
to  make  me  believe,  that  chance  and  necessity  are  not 
contraries.  As  soon  as  I affirm  that  the  three  angles  of 
a triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles  necessarily,  I 
deny  that  they  are  thus  equal  by  chance.  As  soon  as  I 
affirm  that  heat  is  a necessary  effect  of  fire,  I deny  that 
it  is  a chance  effect.  To  say  that  necessary  and  free 
are  two  contrary  terms,  seems  to  me  no  less  absurd  and 
repugnant  to  reason.  For  no  one  can  deny,  that  God 
freely  knows  himself  and  all  else,  yet  all  with  one  voice 
grant  that  God  knows  himself  necessarily.  Hence  as  it 


392 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LX. 


seems  to  me,  you  draw  no  distinction  between  constraint 
or  force  and  necessity.  Man’s  wishes  to  live,  to  love,  etc., 
are  not  under  constraint,  but  nevertheless  are  necessary; 
much  more  is  it  necessary  that  God  wishes  to  be,  to 
know,  and  to  act.  If  you  will  also  reflect,  that  indiffer- 
ence is  only  another  name  for  ignorance  or  doubt,  and 
that  a will  always  constant  and  determined  in  all  things 
is  a necessary  property  of  the  understanding,  you  will 
see  that  my  words  are  in  complete  harmony  with  truth. 
If  we  affirm,  that  God  might  have  been  able  not  to  wish 
a given  event,  or  not  to  understand  it,  we  attribute  to 
God  two  different  freedoms,  one  necessary,  the  other  in- 
different; consequently  we  shall  conceive  God’s  will  as 
different  from  his  essence  and  understanding,  and  shall 
thus  fall  from  one  absurdity  into  another. 

The  attention,  which  I asked  for  in  my  former  letter, 
has  not  seemed  to  you  necessary.  This  has  been  the 
reason  why  you  have  not  directed  your  thoughts  to  the 
main  issue,  and  have  neglected  a point  which  is  very  im- 
portant. 

Further,  when  you  say  that  if  I deny,  that  the  opera- 
tions of  seeing,  hearing,  attending,  wishing,  etc.,  can  be 
ascribed  to  God,  or  that  they  exist  in  him  in  any  emi- 
nent fashion,  you  do  not  know  what  sort  of  God  mine  is; 
I suspect  that  you  believe  there  is  no  greater  perfection 
than  such  as  can  be  explained  by  the  aforesaid  attri- 
butes. I am  not  astonished;  for  I believe  that,  if  a 
triangle  could  speak,  it  would  say,  in  like  manner,  that 
God  is  eminently  triangular,  while  a circle  would  say 
that  the  divine  nature  is  eminently  circular.  Thus  each 
would  ascribe  to  God  its  own  attributes,  would  assume 
itself  to  be  like  God,  and  look  on  everything  else  as  ill- 
shaped. 

The  briefness  of  a letter  and  want  of  time  do  not  al- 
low me  to  enter  into  my  opinion  on  the  divine  nature, 
or  the  questions  you  have  propounded.  Besides,  sug- 
gesting difficulties  is  not  the  same  as  producing  reasons. 
That  we  do  many  things  in  the  world  from  conjecture 
is  true,  but  that  our  reflections  are  based  on  conjectures 
is  false.  In  practical  life  we  are  compelled  to  follow 


LETTER  LX.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


393 


what  is  most  probable;  in  speculative  thought  we  are 
compelled  to  follow  truth.  A man  would  perish  of  hun- 
ger and  thirst,  if  he  refused  to  eat  or  drink,  till  he  had 
obtained  positive  proof  that  food  and  drink  would  be 
good  for  him.  But  in  philosophic  reflection  this  is  not 
so.  On  the  contrary,  we  must  take  care  not  to  admit  as 
true  anything,  which  is  only  probable.  For  when  one 
falsity  has  been  let  in,  infinite  others  follow. 

Again,  we  cannot  infer  that  because  sciences  of  things 
divine  and  human  are  full  of  controversies  and  quar- 
rels, therefore  their  whole  subject-matter  is  uncertain; 
for  there  have  been  many  persons  so  enamored  of 
contradiction,  as  to  turn  into  ridicule  geometrical  axioms. 
Sextus  Empiricus  and  other  sceptics,  whom  you  quote, 
declare,  that  it  is  false  to  say  that  a whole  is  greater 
than  its  part,  and  pass  similar  judgments  on  other  axioms. 

However,  as  I pass  over  and  grant  that  in  default  of 
proof  we  must  be  content  with  probabilities,  I say  that  a 
probable  proof  ought  to  be  such  that,  though  we  may 
doubt  about  it,  we  cannot  maintain  its  contrary;  for 
that  which  can  be  contradicted  resembles  not  truth  but 
falsehood.  For  instance,  if  I say  that  Peter  is  alive, 
because  I saw  him  yesterday  in  good  health,  this  is  a 
probability,  in  so  far  as  no  one  can  maintain  the  con- 
trary ; but  if  anyone  says  that  he  saw  Peter  yesterday  in 
a swoon,  and  that  he  believed  Peter  to  have  departed 
this  life  to-day,  he  will  make  my  statement  seem  false. 
That  conjecture  about  ghosts  and  spectres  seems  false, 
and  not  even  probable,  I have  shown  so  clearly,  that  I 
can  find  nothing  worthy  of  answer  in  your  reply. 

To  your  question,  whether  I have  of  God  as  clear  an 
idea  as  I have  of  a triangle,  I reply  in  the  affirmative. 
But  if  you  ask  me,  whether  I have  as  clear  a mental 
image  of  God  as  I have  of  a triangle,  I reply  in  the 
negative.  For  we  are  not  able  to  imagine  God,  though 
we  can  understand  him.  You  must  also  here  observe, 
that  I do  not  assert  that  I thoroughly  know  God,  but 
that  I understand  some  of  his  attributes,  not  all  nor  the 
greater  part,  and  it  is  evident  that  my  ignorance  of  very 
many  does  not  hinder  the  knowledge  I have  of  some. 


394 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LX. 


When  I learned  Euclid’s  Elements,  I understood  that  the 
three  angles  of  a triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles, 
and  this  property  of  a triangle  I perceived  clearly, 
though  I might  be  ignorant  of  many  others. 

As  regards  spectres  or  ghosts,  I have  hitherto  heard 
attributed  to  them  no  intelligible  property:  they  seem 
like  phantoms,  which  no  one  can  understand.  When  you 
say  that  spectres,  or  ghosts,  in  these  lower  regions  (I 
adopt  your  phraseology,  though  I know  not  why  matter 
below  should  be  inferior  to  matter  above ) consist  in  a very 
thin  rarefied  and  subtle  substance,  you  seem  to  me  to  be 
speaking  of  spiders’  webs,  air,  or  vapors.  To  say,  that 
they  are  invisible,  seems  to  me  to  be  equivalent  to  say- 
ing that  they  do  not  exist,  not  to  stating  their  nature; 
unless,  perhaps,  you  wish  to  indicate,  that  they  render 
themselves  visible  or  invisible  at  will,  and  that  the 
imagination,  in  these  as  in  other  impossibilities,  will  find 
a difficulty. 

The  authority  of  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  Socrates,  does 
not  carry  much  weight  with  me.  I should  have  been 
astonished,  if  you  had  brought  forward  Epicurus,  Democ- 
ritus, Lucretius,  or  any  of  the  atomists,  or  upholders 
of  the  atomic  theory.  It  is  no  wonder  that  persons, 
who  have  invented  occult  qualities,  intentional  species, 
substantial  forms,  and  a thousand  other  trifles,  should 
have  also  devised  spectres  and  ghosts,  and  given  credence 
to  old  wives’  tales,  in  order  to  take  away  the  reputation 
of  Democritus,  whom  they  were  so  jealous  of,  that 
they  burned  all  the  books  which  he  had  published  amid 
so  much  eulogy.  If  you  are  inclined  to  believe  such 
witnesses,  what  reason  have  you  for  denying  the  miracles 
of  the  Blessed  Virgin,  and  all  the  Saints  ? These  have 
been  described  by  so  many  famous  philosophers, 
theologians,  and  historians,  that  I could  produce  at  least 
a hundred  such  authorities  for  every  one  of  the  former. 
But  I have  gone  further,  my  dear  Sir,  than  I intended: 
I do  not  desire  to  cause  any  further  annoyance  by 
doctrines  which  I know  you  will  not  grant.  For  the 
principles  which  you  follow  are  far  different  from 
my  own. 


LETTER  LXII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


395 


LETTER  LXI.  ( LVII. ) 

. . . to  Spinoza. 

[Philosophers  often  differ  through  using  words  in  different  senses. 
Thus  in  the  question  of  free  will  Descartes  means  by  free,  constrained 
by  no  cause.  You  mean  by  the  same,  undetermined  in  a particular 
way  by  a cause.  The  question  of  free  will  is  threefold : — I.  Have  we 
any  power  whatever  over  things  external  to  us  ? II.  Have  we 
absolute  power  over  the  intentional  movements  of  our  own  body  ? 
III.  Have  we  free  use  of  our  reason  ? Both  Descartes  and 
yourself  are  right  according  to  the  terms  employed  by  each 
(8th  October,  1674).] 


LETTER  LXII.  (LVIII.) 

Spinoza  to  . . . (The  Hague,  October  1674.) 

[Spinoza  gives  his  opinions  on  liberty  and  necessity.] 

Sir: — Our  friend,  J.  R.,  has  sent  me  the  letter  which 
you  have  been  kind  enough  to  write  to  me,  and  also  the 
judgment  of  your  friend  as  to  the  opinions  of  Descartes 
and  myself  regarding  free  will.  Both  inclosures  were 
very  welcome  to  me.  Though  I am,  at  present,  much 
occupied  with  other  matters,  not  to  mention  my  delicate 
health,  your  singular  courtesy,  or,  to  name  the  chief 
motive,  your  love  of  truth,  impels  me  to  satisfy  your 
inquiries,  as  far  as  my  poor  abilities  will  permit.  What 
your  friend  wishes  to  imply  by  his  remark  before  he 
appeals  to  experience,  I know  not.  What  he  adds,  that 

WHEN  ONE  OF  TWO  DISPUTANTS  AFFIRMS  SOMETHING  WHICH 
THE  OTHER  DENIES,  BOTH  MAY  BE  RIGHT,  is  true,  if  he 

means  that  the  two,  though  using  the  same  terms,  are 
thinking  of  different  things.  I once  sent  several  exam- 
ples of  this  to  our  friend  J.  R.,  and  am  now  writing  te 
tell  him  to  communicate  them  to  you. 


396 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LXII. 


I,  therefore,  pass  on  to  that  definition  of  liberty,  which 
he  says  is  my  own ; but  I know  not  whence  he  has  taken 
it.  I say  that  a thing  is  free,  which  exists  and  acts  solely 
by  the  necessity  of  its  own  nature.  Thus  also  God  under- 
stands himself  and  all  things  freely,  because  it  follows 
solely  from  the  necessity  of  his  nature,  that  he  should 
understand  all  things.  You  see  I do  not  place  freedom 
in  free  decision,  but  in  free  necessity.  However,  let 
us  descend  to  created  things,  which  are  all  determined 
by  external  causes  to  exist  and  operate  in  a given  deter- 
minate manner.  In  order  that  this  may  be  clearly  under- 
stood, let  us  conceive  a very  simple  thing.  For  instance, 
a stone  receives  from  the  impulsion  of  an  external  cause, 
a certain  quantity  of  motion,  by  virtue  of  which  it  con- 
tinues to  move  after  the  impulsion  given  by  the  external 
cause  has  ceased.  The  permanence  of  the  stone’s  motion 
is  constrained,  not  necessarily,  because  it  must  be  defined 
by  the  impulsion  of  an  external  cause.  What  is  true  of 
the  stone  is  true  of  any  individual,  however  complicated 
its  nature,  or  varied  its  functions,  inasmuch  as  every 
individual  thing  is  necessarily  determined  by  some  exter- 
nal cause  to  exist  and  operate  in  a fixed  and  determinate 
manner. 

Further  conceive,  I beg,  that  a stone,  while  continuing 
in  motion,  should  be  capable  of  thinking  and  knowing, 
that  it  is  endeavoring,  as  far  as  it  can,  to  continue  to 
move.  Such  a stone,  being  conscious  merely  of  its  own 
endeavor  and  not  at  all  indifferent,  would  believe  itself 
to  be  completely  free,  and  would  think  that  it  continued 
in  motion  solely  because  of  its  own  wish.  This  is  that 
human  freedom,  which  all  boast  that  they  possess,  and 
which  consists  solely  in  the  fact,  that  men  are  conscious 
of  their  own  desire,  but  are  ignorant  of  the  causes 
whereby  that  desire  has  been  determined.  Thus  an  in- 
fant believes  that  it  desires  milk  freely;  an  angry  child 
thinks  he  wishes  freely  for  vengeance,  a timid  child 
thinks  he  wishes  freely  to  run  away.  Again,  a drunken 
man  thinks,  that  from  the  free  decision  of  his  mind  he 
speaks  words,  which  afterward,  when  sober,  he  would 
like  to  have  left  unsaid.  So  the  delirious,  the  garrulous, 


LETTER  LXII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


397 


and  others  of  the  same  sort  think  that  they  act  from 
the  free  decision  of  their  mind,  not  that  they  are  car- 
ried away  by  impulse.  As  this  misconception  is  innate 
in  all  men,  it  is  not  easily  conquered.  For,  although 
experience  abundantly  shows,  that  men  can  do  anything 
rather  than  check  their  desires,  and  that  very  often, 
when  a prey  to  conflicting  emotions,  they  see  the  better 
course  and  follow  the  worse,  they  yet  believe  themselves 
to  be  free;  because  in  some  cases  their  desire  for  a 
thing  is  slight,  and  can  easily  be  overruled  by  the  re- 
collection of  something  else,  which  is  frequently  present 
in  the  mind. 

I have  thus,  if  I mistake  not,  sufficiently  explained  my 
opinion  regarding  free  and  constrained  necessity,  and  also 
regarding  so-called  human  freedom:  from  what  I have 
said  you  will  easily  be  able  to  reply  to  your  friend’s  objec- 
tions. For  when  he  says,  with, Descartes,  that  he  who  is 
constrained  by  no  external  cause  is  free,  if  by  being  con- 
strained he  means  acting  against  one’s  will,  I grant  that 
we  are  in  some  cases  quite  unrestrained,  and  in  this  respect 
possess  free  will.  But  if  by  constrained  he  means  acting 
necessarily,  although  not  against  one’s  will  (as  I have  ex- 
plained above),  I deny  that  we  are  in  any  instance 
free. 

But  your  friend,  on  the  contrary,  asserts  that  we  may 

EMPLOY  OUR  REASON  ABSOLUTELY,  THAT  IS,  IN  COMPLETE 

freedom;  and  is,  I think,  a little  too  confident  on  the 
point.  For  who,  he  says,  could  deny,  without  contra- 
dicting HIS  OWN  CONSCIOUSNESS,  THAT  I CAN  THINK  WITH 
MY  THOUGHTS,  THAT  I WISH  OR  DO  NOT  WISH  TO  WRITE  ? 

I should  like  to  know  what  consciousness  he  is  talking  of, 
over  and  above  that  which  I have  illustrated  by  the  exam- 
ple of  the  stone. 

As  a matter  of  fact  I,  without,  I hope,  contradicting  my 
consciousness,  that  is  my  reason  and  experience,  and  with- 
out cherishing  ignorance  and  misconception,  deny  that  I 
can  by  any  absolute  power  of  thought  think,  that  I wish 
or  do  not  wish  to  write.  I appeal  to  the  consciousness, 
which  he  has  doubtless  experienced,  that  in  dreams  he 
has  not  the  power  of  thinking  that  he  wishes,  or  does  not 


398 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LXII. 


wish  to  write;  and  that,  when  he  dreams  that  he  wishes 
to  write,  he  has  not  the  power  not  to  dream  that  he 
wishes  to  write.  I think  he  must  also  have  experienced, 
that  the  mind  is  not  always  equally  capable  of  thinking 
of  the  same  object,  but  according  as  the  body  is  more 
capable  for  the  image  of  this  or  that  object  being  excited 
in  it,  so  is  the  mind  more  capable  of  thinking  of  the 
same  object. 

When  he  further  adds,  that  the  causes  for  his  applying 
his  mind  to  writing  have  led  him,  but  not  constrained 
him  to  write,  he  merely  means  (if  he  will  look  at  the 
question  impartially),  that  his  disposition  was  then  in  a 
state,  in  which  it  could  easily  be  acted  on  by  causes, 
which  would  have  been  powerless  under  other  circum- 
stances, as  for  instance,  when  he  was  under  a violent 
emotion.  That  is,  causes,  which  at  other  times  would  not 
have  constrained  him,  have  constrained  him,  in  this  case, 
not  to  write  against  his  will,  but  necessarily  to  wish  to 
write. 

As  for  his  statement,  that  if  we  were  constrained  by 

EXTERNAL  CAUSES,  NO  ONE  COULD  ACQUIRE  THE  HABIT  OF 

virtue,  I know  not  what  is  his  authority  for  saying,  that 
firmness  and  constancy  of  disposition  cannot  arise  from 
predestined  necessity,  but  only  from  free  will. 

What  he  finally  adds,  that  if  this  were  granted,  all 
wickedness  would  be  excusable,  I meet  with  the  ques- 
tion, What  then  ? Wicked  men  are  not  less  to  be  feared, 
and  are  not  less  harmful,  when  they  are  wicked  from 
necessity.  However,  on  this  point  I would  ask  you  to 
refer  to  my  (<  Principles  of  Cartesian  Philosophy,  * Part 
II.,  chap.  viii. 

In  a word,  I should  like  your  friend,  who  makes  these 
objections,  to  tell  me,  how  he  reconciles  the  human  virtue, 
which  he  says  arises  from  the  free  decision  of  the  mind, 
with  God’s  pre-ordainment  of  the  universe.  If,  with  Des- 
cartes, he  confesses  his  inability  to  do  so,  he  is  endeavor- 
ing to  direct  against  me  the  weapon  which  has  already 
pierced  himself.  But  in  vain.  For  if  you  examine  my 
opinion  attentively,  you  will  see  that  it  is  quite  consist- 
ent, etc. 


LETTER  LXIII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


399 


LETTER  LXIII.  (LIX.) 

. . to  Spinoza. 

[The  writer  exhorts  Spinoza  to  publish  the  treatises  on  <(  Ethics  ® and  on 
the  «Improvement  of  the  Understanding.»  Remarks  on  the  definition 
of  motion.  On  the  difference  between  a true  and  an  adequate 
idea.] 

Most  Excellent  Sir, — When  shall  we  have  your 
method  of  rightly  directing  the  reason  in  the  acquisition 
of  unknown  truths,  and  your  general  treatise  on  physics  ? 
I know  you  have  already  proceeded  far  with  them.  The 
first  has  already  come  to  my  knowledge,  and  the  second  I 
have  become  aware  of  from  the  Lemmas  added  to  the  sec- 
ond part  of  the  (<  Ethics  * ; whereby  many  difficulties  in 
physics  are  readily  solved.  If  time  and  opportunity  per- 
mit, I humbly  beg  from  you  a true  definition  of  motion 
and  its  explanation;  also  to  know  how,  seeing  that  ex- 
tension in  so  far  as  it  is  conceived  in  itself  is  indivisible, 
immutable,  etc.,  we  can  infer  h priori , that  there  can 
arise  so  many  varieties  of  it,  and  consequently  the  exist- 
ence of  figure  in  the  particles  of  any  given  body,  which 
are,  nevertheless,  in  every  body  various,  and  distinct 
from  the  figures  of  the  parts,  which  compose  the  reality 
of  any  other  body.  You  have  already,  by  word  of  mouth, 
pointed  out  to  me  a method,  which  you  employ  in  the 
search  for  truths  as  yet  unknown.  I find  this  method  to 
be  very  excellent,  and  at  the  same  time  very  easy,  in  so 
far  as  I have  formed  an  opinion  on  it,  and  I can  assert 
that  from  this  single  discovery  I have  made  great  prog- 
ress in  mathematics.  I wish,  therefore,  that  you  would 
give  me  a true  definition  of  an  adequate,  a true,  a false, 
a fictitious,  and  a doubtful  idea.  I have  been  in  search 
of  the  difference  between  a true  and  an  adequate  idea. 
Hitherto,  however,  I can  ascertain  nothing  except  after 
inquiring  into  a thing,  and  forming  a certain  con- 
cept or  idea  of  it.  I then  (in  order  to  elicit  whether  this 
true  idea  is  also  an  adequate  idea  of  its  object)  inquire, 
what  is  the  cause  of  this  idea  or  concept-  when  this  is 


4oo 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LXIII. 


ascertained,  I again  ask,  What  is  the  cause  of  this  prior 
concept  ? and  so  I go  on  always  inquiring  for  the  causes 
of  the  causes  of  ideas,  until  I find  a cause  of  such  a kind, 
that  I cannot  find  any  cause  for  it,  except  that  among 
all  the  ideas  which  I can  command  this  alone  exists.  If, 
for  instance,  we  inquire  the  true  origin  of  our  errors, 
Descartes  will  answer,  that  it  consists  in  our  giving  assent 
to  things  not  yet  clearly  perceived.  But  supposing  this 
to  be  the  true  idea  of  the  thing,  I nevertheless  shall  not 
yet  be  able  to  determine  all  things  necessary  to  be  known 
concerning  it,  unless  I have  also  an  adequate  idea  of 
the  thing  in  question ; in  order  to  obtain  such,  therefore, 
I inquire  into  the  cause  of  this  concept,  how  it  happens 
that  we  give  assent  to  things  not  clearly  understood  — 
and  I answer,  that  it  arises  from  defective  knowledge. 
But  here  I cannot  inquire  further,  and  ask  what  is  the 
cause,  that  we  are  ignorant  of  certain  things;  hence  I 
see  that  I have  detected  an  adequate  idea  of  the  origin 
of  our  errors.  Here,  meanwhile,  I ask  you,  whether,  see- 
ing that  many  things  expressed  in  infinite  modes  have  an 
adequate  idea  of  themselves,  and  that  from  every  ade- 
quate idea  all  that  can  be  known  of  its  object  can  be 
inferred,  though  more  readily  from  some  ideas  than  others, 
whether,  I say,  this  may  be  the  means  of  knowing  which 
idea  is  to  be  preferred  ? For  instance,  one  adequate  idea 
of  a circle  consists  in  the  equality  of  its  radii;  another 
adequate  idea  consists  in  the  infinite  right  angles  equal 
to  one  another,  made  by  the  intersection  of  two  lines,  etc., 
and  thus  we  have  infinite  expressions,  each  giving  the 
adequate  nature  of  a circle.  Now,  though  all  the  proper- 
ties of  a circle  may  be  inferred  from  every  one  of  them, 
they  may  be  deduced  much  more  easily  from  some  than 
from  others.  So  also  he,  who  considers  lines  applied  to 
curves,  will  be  able  to  draw  many  conclusions  as  to  the 
measurement  of  curves,  but  will  do  so  more  readily  from 
the  consideration  of  tangents,  etc.  Thus  I have  wished 
to  indicate  how  far  I have  progressed  in  this  study;  I 
await  perfection  in  it,  or,  if  I am  wrong  on  any  point, 
correction;  also  the  definition  I asked  for.  Farewell. 

5 Jan.,  1675. 


LETTER  LXIV.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


401 


LETTER  LXIV.  (LX.) 

Spinoza  to  . . 

[The  difference  between  a true  and  an  adequate  idea  is  merely 
extrinsic,  etc.  The  Hague,  Jan.,  1675.] 

Honored  Sir.  — Between  a true  and  an  adequate  idea, 
I recognize  no  difference,  except  that  the  epithet  true  only 
has  regard  to  the  agreement  between  the  idea  and  its 
object,  whereas  the  epithet  adequate  has  regard  to  the 
nature  of  the  idea  in  itself ; so  that  in  reality  there  is  no 
difference  between  a true  and  an  adequate  idea  beyond 
this  extrinsic  relation.  However,  in  order  that  I may 
know,  from  which  idea  out  of  many  all  the  properties  of 
its  object  may  be  deduced,  I pay  attention  to  one  point 
only,  namely,  that  the  idea  or  definition  should  express 
the  efficient  cause  of  its  object.  For  instance,  in  inquiring 
into  the  properties  of  a circle,  I ask,  whether  from  the  idea 
of  a circle,  that  it  consists  of  infinite  right  angles,  I can 
deduce  all  its  properties.  I ask,  I repeat,  whether  this 
idea  involves  the  efficient  cause  of  a circle.  If  it  does 
not,  I look  for  another,  namely,  that  a circle  is  the  space 
described  by  a line,  of  which  one  point  is  fixed,  and  the 
other  movable.  As  this  definition  explains  the  efficient 
cause,  I know  that  I can  deduce  from  it  all  the  properties 
of  a circle.  So,  also,  when  I define  God  as  a supremely 
perfect  Being,  then,  since  that  definition  does  not  express 
the  efficient  cause  (I  mean  the  efficient  cause  internal  as 
well  as  external ) I shall  not  be  able  to  infer  therefrom  all 
the  properties  of  God;  as  I can,  when  I define  God  as  a 
Being,  etc.  (see  “Ethics,®  I.  Def.  vi.).  As  for  your  other 
inquiries,  namely,  that  concerning  motion,  and  those  per- 
taining to  method,  my  observations  on  them  are  not  yet 
written  out  in  due  order,  so  I will  reserve  them  for  another 
occasion. 

As  regards  your  remark,  that  he  “who  considers  lines 
applied  to  curves  makes  many  deductions  with  regard  to 
26 


402 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LXV. 


the  measurement  of  curves,  but  does  so  with  greater 
facility  from  the  consideration  of  tangents,”  etc.,  I think 
that  from  the  consideration  of  tangents  many  deductions 
will  be  made  with  more  difficulty,  than  from  the  consid- 
eration of  lines  applied  in  succession;  and  I assert  abso- 
lutely, that  from  certain  properties  of  any  particular  thing 
( whatever  idea  be  given ) some  things  may  be  discovered 
more  readily,  others  with  more  difficulty,  though  all  are 
concerned  with  the  nature  of  the  thing.  I think  it  need 
only  be  observed,  that  an  idea  should  be  sought  for  of 
such  a kind,  that  all  properties  may  be  inferred,  as  has 
been  said  above.  He  who  is  about  to  deduce  all  the 
properties  of  a particular  thing,  knows  that  the  ultimate 
properties  will  necessarily  be  the  most  difficult  to  dis- 
cover, etc. 


LETTER  LXV.  (LXIII.) 

G.  H.  SCHALLER  TO  SPINOZA. 

[Schaller  asks  for  answers  to  four  questions  of  his  friend  Tschirn- 
hausen  on  the  attributes  of  God,  and  mentions  that  Tschimhausen 
has  removed  the  unfavorable  opinion  of  Spinoza  lately  conceived 
by  Boyle  and  Oldenburg.] 

Most  Distinguished  and  Excellent  Sir, — I should 
blush  for  my  silence,  which  has  lasted  so  long,  and  has 
laid  me  open  to  the  charge  of  ingratitude  for  your  kind- 
ness extended  to  me  beyond  my  merits,  if  I did  not  reflect 
that  your  generous  courtesy  inclines  rather  to  excuse  than 
to  accuse,  and  also  know  that  you  devote  your  leisure,  for 
the  common  good  of  your  friends,  to  serious  studies,  which 
it  would  be  harmful  and  injurious  to  disturb  without  due 
cause.  For  this  reason  I have  been  silent,  and  have  mean- 
while been  content  to  hear  from  friends  of  your  good 
health:  I send  you  this  letter  to  inform  you,  that  our  noble 
friend  von  Tschimhausen  is  enjoying  the  same  in  England, 
and  has  three  times  in  the  letters  he  has  sent  me  bidden 


LETTER  LXV.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


4°3 


me  convey  his  kindest  regards  to  the  master,  again  bidding 
me  request  from  you  the  solution  of  the  following  ques- 
tions, and  forward  to  him  your  hoped-for  answer:  would 
the  master  be  pleased  to  convince  him  by  positive  proof, 
not  by  a reduction  to  the  impossible,  that  we  cannot  know 
any  attributes  of  God,  save  thought  and  extension  ? 
Further,  whether  it  follows  that  creatures  constituted  under 
other  attributes  can  form  no  idea  of  extension  ? If  so,  it 
would  follow  that  there  must  be  as  many  worlds  as  there 
are  attributes  of  God.  For  instance,  there  would  be  as 
much  room  for  extension  in  worlds  affected  by  other 
attributes,  as  there  actually  exists  of  extension  in  our 
world.  But  as  we  perceive  nothing  save  thought  besides 
extension,  so  creatures  in  the  other  world  would  perceive 
nothing  besides  the  attributes  of  that  world  and  thought. 

Secondly,  as  the  understanding  of  God  differs  from  our 
understanding  as  much  in  essence  as  in  existence,  it  has, 
therefore,  nothing  in  common  with  it;  therefore  (by 
« Ethics,”  I.  iii. ),  God’s  understanding  cannot  be  the  cause 
of  our  own. 

Thirdly  (in  «Ethics,”  I.  x.  note),  you  say,  that  nothing 

IN  NATURE  IS  CLEARER  THAN  THAT  EVERY  ENTITY  MUST  BE 
CONCEIVED  UNDER  SOME  ATTRIBUTE  (this  I thoroughly 

understand),  and  that  the  more  it  has  of  reality  or 

BEING,  THE  MORE  ATTRIBUTES  APPERTAIN  TO  IT.  It  Seems 

to  follow  from  this,  that  there  are  entities  possessing 
three,  four,  or  more  attributes  (though  we  gather  from 
what  has  been  demonstrated  that  every  being  consists 
only  of  two  attributes,  namely,  a certain  attribute  of 
God  and  the  idea  of  that  attribute). 

Fourthly,  I should  like  to  have  examples  of  those 
things  which  are  immediately  produced  by  God,  and 
those  which  are  produced  through  the  means  of  some  in- 
finite modification.  Thought  and  extension  seem  to  be 
of  the  former  kind;  understanding  in  thought  and  mo- 
tion in  extension  seem  to  be  of  the  latter. 

And  these  are  the  points  which  our  said  friend  von 
Tschirnhausen  joins  with  me  in  wishing  to  have  ex- 
plained by  your  excellence,  if  perchance  your  spare  time 
allows  it.  He  further  relates,  that  Mr.  Boyle  and  Old- 


404 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LXVI. 


enburg  had  formed  a strange  idea  of  your  personal  char- 
acter, but  that  he  has  not  only  removed  it,  but  also  given 
reasons,  which  have  not  only  led  them  back  to  a most 
worthy  and  favorable  opinion  thereof,  but  also  made  them 
value  most  highly  the  “ Theologico- Political  Treatise.”  Of 
this  I have  not  ventured  to  inform  you,  because  of  your 
health.  Be  assured  that  I am,  and  live, 

Most  noble  sir, 

for  every  good  office  your  most  devoted  servant, 

G.  H.  ScHALLER. 

Amsterdam,  25  July,  1675. 

Mr.  h Gent  and  J.  Rieuwerts  dutifully  greet  you. 


LETTER  LXVI.  (LXIV.) 

Spinoza  to  . . . 

[Spinoza  answers  by  reference  to  the  first  three  books  of  the 
«Ethics.»] 

Dear  Sir, — I am  glad  that  you  have  at  last  had  occa- 
sion to  refresh  me  with  one  of  your  letters,  always  most 
welcome  to  me.  I heartily  beg  that  you  will  frequently 
repeat  the  favor,  etc. 

I proceed  to  consider  your  doubts : to  the  first  I answer, 
that  the  human  mind  can  only  acquire  knowledge  of 
those  things  which  the  idea  of  a body  actually  existing 
involves,  or  of  what  can  be  inferred  from  such  an  idea. 
For  the  power  of  anything  is  defined  solely  by  its  essence 
(“Ethics,”  III.  vii.);  the  essence  of  the  mind  (“Ethics,” 
II.  xiii.)  consists  solely  in  this,  that  it  is  the  idea  of 
body  actually  existing;  therefore,  the  mind’s  power  of 
understanding  only  extends  to  things,  which  this  idea  of 
body  contains  in  itself,  or  which  follow  therefrom.  Now 
this  idea  of  body  does  not  involve  or  express  any  of 
God’s  attributes,  save  extension  and  thought.  For  its 
object  ( ideatum ),  namely,  body  (by  “Ethics,”  II.  vi.)  has 


LETTER  LXVI.  ] CORRESPONDENCE 


405 


God  for  its  cause,  in  so  far  as  he  is  regarded  under  the 
attribute  of  extension,  and  not  in  so  far  as  he  is  re- 
garded under  any  other;  therefore  ("Ethics,®  I.  Ax.  vi.), 
this  idea  of  the  body  involves  the  knowledge  of  God, 
only  in  so  far  as  he  is  regarded  under  the  attribute  of 
extension.  Further,  this  idea,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a mode 
of  thinking,  has  also  (by  the  same  proposition)  God  for 
its  cause,  in  so  far  as  he  is  regarded  as  a thinking 
thing,  and  not  in  so  far  as  he  is  regarded  under  any 
other  attribute.  Hence  (by  the  same  axiom)  the  idea 
of  this  idea  involves  the  knowledge  of  God,  in  so  far 
as  he  is  regarded  under  the  attribute  of  thought,  and 
not  in  so  far  as  he  is  regarded  under  any  attribute.  It 
is  therefore  plain,  that  the  human  mind,  or  the  idea  of 
the  human  body  neither  involves  nor  expresses  any  at- 
tributes to  God  save  these  two.  Now  from  these  two 
attributes,  or  their  modifications,  no  other  attribute  of  God 
can  ("  Ethics,”  I.  x.)  be  inferred  or  conceived.  I therefore 
conclude  that  the  human  mind  cannot  attain  knowledge 
of  any  attribute  of  God  besides  these,  which  is  the  propo- 
sition you  inquire  about.  With  regard  to  your  question, 
whether  there  must  be  as  many  worlds  as  there  are  at- 
tributes, I refer  you  to  "Ethics,”  II.  vii.  note. 

Moreover,  this  proposition  might  be  proved  more  readily 
by  a reduction  to  the  absurd;  I am  accustomed,  when 
the  proposition  is  negative,  to  employ  this  mode  of 
demonstration  as  more  in  character.  However,  as  the 
question  you  ask  is  positive,  I make  use  of  the  positive 
method,  and  ask,  whether  one  thing  can  be  produced 
from  another,  from  which  it  differs  both  in  essence  and 
existence;  for  things  which  differ  to  this  extent  seem  to 
have  nothing  in  common.  But  since  all  particular  things, 
except  those  which  are  produced  from  things  similar  to 
themselves,  differ  from  their  causes  both  in  essence  and 
existence,  I see  here  no  reason  for  doubt. 

The  sense  in  which  I mean  that  God  is  the  efficient 
cause  of  things,  no  less  of  their  essence  than  of  their  ex- 
istence, I think  has  been  sufficiently  explained  in  " Ethics  ” 
I.  xxv.  note  and  corollary.  The  axiom  in  the  note  to 
"Ethics®  I.  x.,  as  I hinted  at  the  end  of  the  said  note,  is 


4o6 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LXVII. 


based  on  the  idea  which  we  have  of  a Being  absolutely 
infinite,  not  on  the  fact,  that  there  are  or  may  be  beings 
possessing  three,  four  or  more  attributes. 

Lastly,  the  examples  you  ask  for  of  the  first  kind  are, 
in  thought,  absolutely  infinite  understanding;  in  exten- 
sion, motion  and  rest;  an  example  of  the  second  kind  is 
the  sum  of  the  whole  extended  universe  ( facies  totius 
universi ),  which,  though  it  varies  in  infinite  modes,  yet 
remains  always  the  same.  Cf.  (<  Ethics  * II.  note  to 
Lemma  vii.  before  Prop.  xiv. 

Thus,  most  excellent  Sir,  I have  answered,  as  I think, 
the  objections  of  yourself  and  your  friend.  If  you  think 
any  uncertainty  remains,  I hope  you  will  not  neglect  to 
tell  me,  so  that  I may,  if  possible,  remove  it. 

The  Hague,  29  July,  1675. 


LETTER  LXVII.  (LXV.) 

. . . to  Spinoza. 

[A  fresh  inquiry  as  to  whether  there  are  two  or  more  attributes 

of  God.  ] 

Distinguished  Sir, — I should  like  a demonstration  of 
what  you  say:  namely,  that  the  soul  cannot  perceive  any 
attributes  of  God,  except  extension  and  thought.  Though 
this  might  appear  evident  to  me,  it  seems  possible  that 
the  contrary  might  be  deduced  from  <{  Ethics  B II.  vii.  note; 
perhaps  because  I do  not  rightly  grasp  the  meaning  of 
that  passage.  I have  therefore  resolved,  distinguished 
Sir,  to  show  you  how  I make  the  deduction,  earnestly 
begging  you  to  aid  me  with  your  usual  courtesy,  wher- 
ever I do  not  rightly  represent  your  meaning.  I reason 
as  follows:  — Though  I gather  that  the  universe  is  one, 
it  is  not  less  clear  from  the  passage  referred  to,  that  it 
is  expressed  in  infinite  modes,  and  therefore  that  every 
individual  thing  is  expressed  in  infinite  modes.  Hence 
it  seems  to  follow,  that  the  modification  constituting  my 


LETTER  LX VIII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


407 


mind,  and  the  modification  constituting  my  body,  though 
one  and  the  same  modification,  is  yet  expressed  in  infi- 
nite ways  — first,  through  thought;  secondly,  through  ex- 
tension ; thirdly,  through  some  attribute  of  God  unknown 
to  me,  and  so  on  to  infinity,  seeing  that  there  are  in  God 
infinite  attributes,  and  the  order  and  connection  of  the 
modifications  seem  to  be  the  same  in  all.  Hence  arises 
the  question:  Why  the  mind,  which  represents  a cer- 
tain modification,  the  same  modification  being  expressed 
not  only  in  extension,  but  in  infinite  other  ways, — why, 
I repeat,  does  the  mind  perceive  that  modification  only 
as  expressed  through  extension,  to  wit,  the  human  body, 
and  not  as  expressed  through  any  other  attributes  ? Time 
does  not  allow  me  to  pursue  the  subject  further; 
perhaps  my  difficulties  will  be  removed  by  further  re- 
flection. 

London,  12  Aug.,  1675. 


LETTER  LXVIII.  (LXVI.) 

Spinoza  to  . . . 

[In  this  fragment  of  a letter  Spinoza  refers  his  friend  to  «Ethics,» 
I.  x.  and  II.  vii.  note.] 

Distinguished  Sir, — . . . But  in  answer  to  your 

objection  I say,  that  although  each  particular  thing  be 
expressed  in  infinite  ways  in  the  infinite  understanding 
of  God,  yet  those  infinite  ideas,  whereby  it  is  expressed, 
cannot  constitute  one  and  the  same  mind  of  a particular 
thing,  but  infinite  minds;  seeing  that  each  of  these  in- 
finite ideas  has  no  connection  with  the  rest,  as  I have 
explained  in  the  same  note  to  (<  Ethics,  * II.  vii. , and  as  is 
also  evident  from  I.  x.  If  you  will  reflect  on  these 


408  SPINOZA’S  [LETTER  LXVIII.a. 

passages  a little,  you  will  see  that  all  difficulty  vanishes, 
etc. 

The  Hague,  18  August,  1675. 


LETTER  LXVIII.a. 

G.  H.  SCHALLER  TO  SPINOZA. 

[ Schaller  relates  to  Spinoza  Tschirnhausen’s  doings  in  France,  and 
letter  to  him,  and  makes  known  to  Spinoza  the  answers  contained 
in  that  letter  to  Spinoza’s  objections  in  Letter  LXVIII.  and  the 
request  of  Leibnitz  to  see  Spinoza’s  unpublished  writings.] 

Amsterdam,  14  Nov.,  1675. 

Most  Learned  and  Excellent  Master,  my  Most 
Venerable  Patron, — I hope  that  you  duly  receive  my 

letter  with  ’s  method,*  and  likewise,  that  you  are  up 

to  the  present  time  in  good  health,  as  I am. 

But  for  three  months  I had  no  letter  from  our  friend 
von  Tschirnhausen,  whence  I formed  sad  conjectures  that 
he  had  made  a fatal  journey,  when  he  left  England  for 
France.  Now  that  I have  received  a letter,  in  my  full- 
ness of  joy  I felt  bound,  according  to  his  request,  to 
communicate  it  to  the  master,  and  to  let  you  know,  with 
his  most  dutiful  greeting,  that  he  has  arrived  safely  in 
Paris,  and  found  there  Mr.  Huygens,  as  we  had  told  him, 
and  consequently  has  in  every  way  sought  to  please  him, 
and  is  thus  highly  esteemed  by  him.  He  mentioned, 
that  the  master  had  recommended  to  him  Huygens’s  con- 
versation, and  made  very  much  of  him  personally.  This 
greatly  pleased  Huygens;  so  he  answered  that  he  like- 
wise greatly  esteemed  you  personally,  and  he  has  now 
received  from  you  a copy  of  the  <(  Theologico-Political 
Treatise,”  which  is  esteemed  by  many  there,  and  it  is 
eagerly  inquired,  whether  there  are  extant  any  more  of 
the  same  writer’s  works.  To  this  Mr.  von  Tschirnhausen 


# See  the  next  letter. 


LETTER  LXVIILa.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


409 


replied  that  he  knew  of  none  but  the  Demonstrations  in 
the  first  and  second  parts  of  the  « Cartesian  Principles.  ® 
But  he  mentioned  nothing  about  the  master,  but  what  I 
have  said,  and  so  he  hopes  that  he  has  not  displeased 
you  herein. 

4«  ♦ >1«  * ♦ ♦ 

To  the  objection  that  you  last  made  he  replies,  that 
those  few  words  which  I wrote  at  the  master’s  dicta- 
tion, * explained  to  him  your  meaning  more  thoroughly, 
and  that  he  has  favorably  entertained  the  said  reasonings 
(for  by  these  two  methods  f they  best  admit  of  explana- 
tion). But  two  reasons  have  obliged  him  to  continue  in 
the  opinion  implied  in  his  recent  objection.  Of  these 
the  first  is,  that  otherwise  there  appears  to  be  a contra- 
diction between  the  fifth  and  seventh  propositions  of  the 
second  book.  For  in  the  former  of  these  it  is  laid  down, 
that  the  objects  of  ideas  are  the  efficient  causes  of  the 
ideas,  which  yet  seems  to  be  refuted  by  the  quotation, 
in  the  proof  of  the  latter,  of  the  fourth  axiom  of  Part  I. 

Or,  as  I rather  think,  I do  not  make  the  right  applica- 
tion of  this  axiom  according  to  the  author’s  intention, 
which  I would  most  willingly  be  told  by  him,  if  his 
leisure  permits  it.  The  second  cause  which  prevented 
me  from  following  the  explanation  he  gives  was, 
that  thereby  the  attribute  of  thought  is  pronounced  to 
extend  much  more  widely  than  other  attributes.  But 
since  every  one  of  the  attributes  contributes  to  make  up 
the  essence  of  God,  I do  not  quite  see  how  this  fact 
does  not  contradict  the  opinion  just  stated.  I will  say 
just  this  more,  that  if  I may  judge  the  minds  of  others 
by  my  own,  there  will  be  great  difficulty  in  understand- 
ing the  seventh  and  eighth  propositions  of  Book  II.,  and 
this  for  no  other  reason  than  that  the  author  has  been 
pleased  (doubtless  because  they  seemed  so  plain  to  him) 
to  accompany  the  demonstrations  annexed  to  them  with 
such  short  and  laconic  explanations.” 

* Letter  LXVIII. 

t That  is,  I think,  hearing  from  the  author  criticized  what  his  precise 
meaning  is,  and  attending  carefully  to  his  arguments  in  favor  of  the 
opinion  thus  precisely  ascertained.  — [ Tr.] 


4io 


SPINOZA’S  [LETTER  LXVIII.a. 


He  further  mentions,  that  he  has  found  at  Paris  a man 
called  Leibnitz,  remarkably  learned,  and  most  skilled  in 
various  sciences,  as  also  free  from  the  vulgar  prejudices 
of  theology.  With  him  he  has  formed  an  intimate 
acquaintance,  founded  on  the  fact  that  Leibnitz  labors 
with  him  to  pursue  the  perfection  of  the  intellect,  and 
in  fact,  reckons  nothing  better  or  more  useful.  Von 
Tschirnhausen  says,  that  he  is  most  practiced  in  ethics, 
and  speaks  without  any  stimulus  of  the  passions  by  the 
sole  dictate  of  reason.  He  adds,  that  he  is  most  skilled 
in  physics,  and  also  in  metaphysical  studies  concerning 
God  and  the  soul.  Finally,  he  concludes  that  he  is  most 
worthy  of  having  communicated  to  him  the  master's 
writings,  if  you  will  first  give  your  permission,  for  he 
believes  that  the  author  will  thence  gain  a great  advant- 
age, as  he  promises  to  show  at  length,  if  the  master  be 
so  pleased.  But  if  not,  do  not  doubt,  in  the  least,  that 
he  will  honorably  keep  them  concealed  as  he  has  prom- 
ised, as  in  fact  he  has  not  made  the  slightest  mention  of 
them.  Leibnitz  also  highly  values  the  (<  Theologico-Polit- 
ical  Treatise,®  on  the  subject  of  which  he  once  wrote  the 
master  a letter,  if  he  is  not  mistaken.  And  therefore  I 
would  beg  my  master,  that,  unless  there  is  some  reason 
against  him,  you  will  not  refuse  your  permission  in 
accordance  with  your  gracious  kindness,  but  will,  if  pos- 
sible, open  your  mind  to  me,  as  soon  as  may  be,  for  after 
receiving  your  answers  I shall  be  able  to  reply  to  our 
friend  von  Tschirnhausen,  which  I would  gladly  do  on 
Tuesday  evening,  unless  important  hindrances  cause  my 
master  to  delay. 

Mr.  Bresser,  on  his  return  from  Cleves,  has  sent  here  a 
large  quantity  of  the  beer  of  that  country;  I suggested  to 
him  that  he  should  make  a present  to  the  master  of  half 
a ton,  which  he  promised  to  do,  and  added  a most  friendly 
greeting. 

Finally,  excuse  my  unpracticed  style  and  hurried  writ- 
ing, and  give  me  your  orders,  that  I may  have  a real 
occasion  of  proving  myself,  most  excellent  sir, 

Your  most  ready  servant, 

G.  H.  SCHALLER. 


LETTER  LXVIII.b.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


411 


LETTER  LXVIII.b. 

Spinoza  to  Schaller. 

[Spinoza  answers  all  the  points  in  Schaller’s  letter,  and  hesitates  to 
intrust  his  writings  to  Leibnitz.] 

Most  Experienced  Sir,  and  Valued  Friend, — I was 
much  pleased  to  learn  from  your  letter,  received  to-day, 
that  you  are  well,  and  that  our  friend  von  Tschirnhausen 
has  happily  accomplished  his  journey  to  France.  In  the 
conversation  which  he  had  about  me  with  Mr.  Huygens, 
he  behaved,  at  least  in  my  opinion,  very  judiciously;  and 
besides,  I am  very  glad  that  he  has  found  so  convenient 
an  opportunity  for  the  purpose  which  he  intended.  But 
what  it  is  he  has  found  in  the  fourth  axiom  of  Part  I. 
that  seems  to  contradict  Proposition  v.  of  Part  II.  I do 
not  see.  For  in  that  proposition  it  is  affirmed,  that  the 
essence  of  every  idea  has  for  its  cause  God,  in  so  far  as 
he  is  considered  as  a thinking  thing;  but  in  that  axiom, 
that  the  knowledge  or  idea  of  a cause  depends  on  the 
knowledge  or  idea  of  an  effect.  But,  to  tell  the  truth, 
I do  not  quite  follow,  in  this  matter,  the  meaning  of  your 
letter,  and  suspect  that  either  in  it,  or  in  his  copy  of  the 
book,  there  is  a slip  of  the  pen.  For  you  write,  that  it 
is  affirmed  in  Proposition  v.  that  the  objects  of  ideas  are 
the  efficient  causes  of  the  ideas,  whereas  this  is  exactly 
what  is  expressly  denied  in  that  proposition,  and  I now 
think  that  this  is  the  cause  of  the  whole  confusion.  Ac- 
cordingly it  would  be  useless  for  me  at  present  to  try  to 
write  at  greater  length  on  this  subject,  but  I must  wait 
till  you  explain  to  me  his  mind  more  clearly,  and  till  I 
know  whether  he  has  a correct  copy.  I believe  that  I 
have  an  epistolary  acquaintance  with  the  Leibnitz  he 
mentions.  But  why  he,  who  was  a counselor  at  Frank- 
fort, has  gone  to  France,  I do  not  know.  As  far  as  I 
could  conjecture  from  his  letters,  he  seemed  to  me  a man 
of  liberal  mind,  and  versed  in  every  science.  But  yet  I 
think  it  imprudent  so  soon  to  intrust  my  writings  to 


412 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LXIX. 


him.  I should  like  first  to  know  what  is  his  business  in 
France,  and  the  judgment  of  our  friend  von  Tschirn- 
hausen,  when  he  has  been  longer  in  his  company,  and 
knows  his  character  more  intimately.  However,  greet 
that  friend  of  ours  in  my  name,  and  let  him  command 
me  what  he  pleases,  if  in  anything  I can  be  of  service 
to  him,  and  he  will  find  me  most  ready  to  obey  him  in 
everything. 

I congratulate  my  most  worthy  friend  Mr.  Bresser  on 
his  arrival  or  return,  and  also  thank  him  heartily  for  the 
promised  beer,  and  will  requite  him,  too,  in  anyway 
that  I can.  Lastly,  I have  not  yet  tried  to  find  out  your 
relation’s  method,  nor  do  I think  that  I shall  be  able  to 
apply  my  mind  to  trying  it.  For  the  more  I think  over 
the  thing  in  itself,  the  more  I am  persuaded  that  you  have 
not  made  gold,  but  had  not  sufficiently  eliminated  that 
which  was  hidden  in  the  antimony.  But  more  of  this 
another  time : at  present  I am  prevented  by  want  of  leisure. 
In  the  meanwhile,  if  in  anything  I can  assist  you,  you  will 
always  find  me,  most  excellent  sir,  your  friend  and  de- 
voted servant, 

B.  de  Spinoza. 

The  Hague,  18  Nov.,  1675. 


LETTER  LXIX.  ( LXXX.) 

. . . to  Spinoza. 

[ The  writer  asks  for  explanations  of  some  passages  in  the  letter 
about  the  infinite  (XXIX.).] 

Distinguished  Sir, — In  the  first  place  I can  with  great 
difficulty  conceive,  how  it  can  be  proved,  a priori , that 
bodies  exist  having  motion  and  figure,  seeing  that,  in 
extension  considered  absolutely  in  itself,  nothing  of  the 
kind  is  met  with.  Secondly,  I should  like  to  learn  from 
you,  how  this  passage  in  your  letter  on  the  infinite  is  to 
be  understood:  (<  They  do  not  hence  infer  that  such 

THINGS  ELUDE  NUMBER  BY  THE  MULTITUDE  OF  THEIR  COM- 


LETTER  LXX.] 


CORRESPONDENCE 


413 


ponent  parts.  ® For,  as  a matter  of  fact,  all  mathema- 
ticians seem  to  me  always  to  demonstrate,  with  regard  to 
such  infinities,  that  the  number  of  the  parts  is  so  great, 
as  to  elude  all  expression  in  terms  of  number.  And  in 
the  example  you  give  of  the  two  circles,  you  do  not  ap- 
pear to  prove  this  statement,  which  was  yet  what  you 
had  undertaken  to  do.  For  in  this  second  passage  you 
only  show  that  they  do  not  draw  this  conclusion  from 
“the  excessive  size  of  the  intervening  space,”  or  from 
the  fact  that  <(  we  do  not  know  the  maximum  and  the 
minimum  of  the  said  space”;  but  you  do  not  demonstrate, 
as  you  intended,  that  the  conclusion  is  not  based  on  the 
multitude  of  parts,  etc. 

2 May,  1676. 


LETTER  LXX.  (LXXXI.) 

Spinoza  to  . . . 

[Spinoza  explains  his  view  of  the  infinite.] 

Distinguished  Sir, — My  statement  concerning  the  in- 
finite, that  an  infinity  of  parts  cannot  be  inferred  from  a 
multitude  of  parts,  is  plain  when  we  consider  that  if 
such  a •conclusion  could  be  drawn  from  a multitude  of 
parts,  we  should  not  be  able  to  imagine  a greater  multi- 
tude of  parts ; the  first-named  multitude,  whatever  it  was, 
would  have  to  be  the  greater,  which  is  contrary  to  fact. 
For  in  the  whole  space  between  two  non-concentric  cir- 
cles we  conceive  a greater  multitude  of  parts  than  in  half 
that  space,  yet  the  number  of  parts  in  the  half,  as  in  the 
whole  of  the  space,  exceeds  any  assignable  number. 
Again,  from  extension,  as  Descartes  conceives  it,  to  wit, 
a quiescent  mass,  it  is  not  only  difficult,  as  you  say,  but 
absolutely  impossible,  to  prove  the  existence  of  bodies. 
For  matter  at  rest,  as  it  is  in  itself,  will  continue  at  rest, 
and  will  only  be  determined  to  motion  by  some  more  pow- 
erful external  cause;  for  this  reason  I have  not  hesitated 


414 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LXXI. 


on  a former  occasion  to  affirm,  that  the  Cartesian  princi- 
ples of  natural  things  are  useless,  not  to  say  absurd. 

The  Hague,  5 May,  1676. 


LETTER  LXXI.  (LXXXII.) 

. . . to  Spinoza. 

[How  can  the  variety  of  the  universe  be  shown  a priori  from  the  Spino- 
zistic  conception  of  extension  ?] 

Most  Learned  Sir, — I wish  you  would  gratify  me  in 
this  matter  by  pointing  out  how,  from  the  conception  of 
extension,  as  you  give  it,  the  variety  of  the  universe  can 
be  shown  a priori.  You  recall  the  opinion  of  Descartes, 
wherein  he  asserts,  that  this  variety  can  only  be  deduced 
from  extension,  by  supposing  that,  when  motion  was 
started  by  God,  it  caused  this  effect  in  extension.  Now 
it  appears  to  me,  that  he  does  not  deduce  the  existence 
of  bodies  from  matter  at  rest,  unless,  perhaps,  you  count 
as  nothing  the  assumption  of  God  as  a motive  power; 
you  have  not  shown  how  such  an  effect  must,  a priori , 
necessarily  follow  from  the  nature  of  God.  A difficulty 
which  Descartes  professed  himself  unable  to  solve  as 
being  beyond  human  understanding.  I therefore  ask  you 
the  question,  knowing  that  you  have  other  thoughts  on 
the  matter,  unless  perhaps  there  be  some  weighty  cause 
for  your  unwillingness  hitherto  to  disclose  your  opinion. 
If  this,  as  I suppose,  be  not  expedient,  give  me  some 
hint  of  your  meaning.  You  may  rest  assured,  that 
whether  you  speak  openly  with  me,  or  whether  you  em- 
ploy reserve,  my  regard  for  you  will  remain  unchanged. 

My  special  reasons  for  making  the  requests  are  as  fol- 
lows: I have  always  observed  in  mathematics,  that  from 
a given  thing  considered  in  itself,  that  is,  from  the  defi- 
nition of  a given  thing,  we  can  only  deduce  a single 
property;  if,  however,  we  require  to  find  several  proper- 


LETTER  LXXII.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


4IS 

ties,  we  are  obliged  to  place  the  thing  defined  in  rela- 
tion to  other  things.  Then  from  the  conjunction  of  the 
definitions  of  these  things  new  properties  result.  For 
instance,  if  I regard  the  circumference  of  a circle  by 
itself,  I can  only  infer  that  it  is  everywhere  alike  or 
uniform,  in  which  property  it  differs  essentially  from  all 
other  curves;  I shall  never  be  able  to  infer  any  other 
properties.  But  if  I place  it  in  relation  with  other 
things,  such  as  the  radii  drawn  from  the  centre,  two  in- 
tersecting lines,  or  many  others,  I shall  be  able  hence 
to  deduce  many  properties ; this  seems  to  be  in 
opposition  to  Prop.  xvi.  of  your  (<  Ethics,  ® almost  the  princi- 
pal proposition  of  the  first  book  of  your  treatise.  For  it 
is  there  assumed  as  known,  that  from  the  given  defini- 
tion of  anything  several  properties  can  be  deduced.  This 
seems  to  me  impossible,  unless  we  bring  the  thing  de- 
fined into  relation  with  other  things;  and,  further,  I am 
for  this  reason  unable  to  see,  how  from  any  attribute 
regarded  singly,  for  instance,  infinite  extension,  a variety 
of  bodies  can  result;  if  you  think  that  this  conclusion 
cannot  be  drawn  from  one  attribute  considered  by  itself, 
but  from  all  taken  together,  I should  like  to  be  instructed 
by  you  on  the  point,  and  shown  how  it  should  be  con- 
ceived. Farewell,  etc. 

Paris,  23  June,  1676. 


LETTER  LXXII.  (LXXXIII.) 

Spinoza  to  . . . 

[Spinoza  gives  the  required  explanation.  Mentions  the  treatise  of 

Huet,  etc.] 

Distinguished  Sir, — With  regard  to  your  question  as 
to  whether  the  variety  of  the  universe  can  be  deduced 
a priori  from  the  conception  of  extension  only,  I believe  I 
have  shown  clearly  enough  already  that  it  cannot;  and 


416 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LXXIII. 


that,  therefore,  matter  has  been  ill-defined  by  Descartes  as 
extension;  it  must  necessarily  be  explained  through  an 
attribute,  which  expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essence. 
But  perhaps,  some  day,  if  my  life  be  prolonged,  I may 
discuss  the  subject  with  you  more  clearly.  For  hitherto 
I have  not  been  able  to  put  any  of  these  matters  into  due 
order. 

As  to  what  you  add;  namely,  that  from  the  definition 
of  a given  thing  considered  in  itself  we  can  only  deduce 
a single  property,  this  is,  perhaps,  true  in  the  case  of 
very  simple  things  (among  which  I count  figures),  but 
not  in  realities.  For,  from  the  fact  alone,  that  I define 
God  as  a being  to  whose  essence  belongs  existence,  I 
infer  several  of  his  properties;  namely,  that  he  neces- 
sarily exists,  that  he  is  one,  unchangeable,  infinite,  etc. 
I could  adduce  several  other  examples,  which,  for  the 
present,  I pass  over. 

In  conclusion,  I ask  you  to  inquire,  whether  Huet’s 
treatise  (against  the  <(  Tractatus  Theologico- Politicus  ®), 
about  which  I wrote  to  you  before,  has  yet  been  published, 
and  whether  you  could  send  me  a copy.  Also,  whether 
you  yet  know,  what  are  the  new  discoveries  about  refrac- 
tion. And  so  farewell,  dear  sir,  and  continue  to  regard 
yours,  etc. 

The  Hague,  15  July,  1676. 


LETTER  LXXIII.  (LXVII.) 

Albert  Burgh  to  Spinoza. 

[Albert  Burgh  announces  his  reception  into  the  Romish  Church,  and 
exhorts  Spinoza  to  follow  his  example.] 

I promised  to  write  to  you  on  leaving  my  country,  if 
anything  noteworthy  occurred  on  the  journey.  I take  the 
opportunity  which  offers  of  an  event  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance, to  redeem  my  engagement,  by  informing  you 


LETTER  LXXIII.  ] CORRESPONDENCE 


417 


that  I have,  by  God’s  infinite  mercy,  been  received  into 
the  Catholic  Church  and  made  a member  of  the  same. 
You  may  learn  the  particulars  of  the  step  from  a letter 
which  I have  sent  to  the  distinguished  and  accomplished 
Professor  Craanen  of  Leyden.  I will  here  subjoin  a few 
remarks  for  your  special  benefit. 

Even  as  formerly  I admired  you  for  the  subtlety  and 
keenness  of  your  natural  gifts,  so  now  do  I bewail  and 
deplore  you ; inasmuch  as  being  by  nature  most  talented, 
and  adorned  by  God  with  extraordinary  gifts;  being  a 
lover,  nay,  a coveter  of  the  truth,  you  yet  allow  yourself 
to  be  ensnared  and  deceived  by  that  most  wretched  and 
most  proud  of  beings,  the  prince  of  evil  spirits.  As  for 
all  your  philosophy,  what  is  it  but  a mere  illusion  and 
chimera?  Yet  to  it  you  intrust  not  only  your  peace  of 
mind  in  this  life,  but  the  salvation  of  your  soul  for 
eternity.  See  on  what  a wretched  foundation  all  your 
doctrines  rest.  You  assume  that  you  have  at  length  dis- 
covered the  true  philosophy.  How  do  you  know  that  your 
philosophy  is  the  best  of  all  that  ever  have  been  taught  in 
the  world,  are  now  being  taught,  or  ever  shall  be  taught  ? 
Passing  over  what  may  be  devised  in  the  future,  have  you 
examined  all  the  philosophies,  ancient  as  well  as  modern, 
which  are  taught  here,  and  in  India,  and  everywhere 
throughout  the  whole  world  ? Even  if  you  have  duly 
examined  them,  how  do  you  know  that  you  have  chosen 
the  best?  You  will  say:  <(  My  philosophy  is  in  harmony 
with  right  reason;  other  philosophies  are  not.”  But  all 
other  philosophers  except  your  own  followers  disagree 
with  you,  and  with  equal  right  say  of  their  philosophy 
what  you  say  of  yours,  accusing  you,  as  you  do  them,  of 
falsity  and  error.  It  is,  therefore,  plain,  that  before  the 
truth  of  your  philosophy  can  come  to  light,  reasons  must 
be  advanced,  which  are  not  common  to  other  philosophies, 
but  apply  solely  to  your  own;  or  else  you  must  admit 
that  your  philosophy  is  as  uncertain  and  nugatory  as 
the  rest. 

However,  restricting  myself  for  the  present  to  that 
book  of  yours  with  an  impious  title,*  and  mingling  your 

* «Tractatus  Theologico- Politicus.» 

27 


4i  8 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LXXIII. 


philosophy  with  your  theology,  as  in  reality  you  mingle 
them  yourself,  though  with  diabolic  cunning  you  endeavor 
to  maintain,  that  each  is  separate  from  the  other,  and 
has  different  principles,  I thus  proceed. 

Perhaps  you  will  say:  <( Others  have  not  read  Holy 
Scripture  so  often  as  I have;  and  it  is  from  Holy  Scrip- 
ture, the  acknowledgment  of  which  distinguishes  Chris- 
tians from  the  rest  of  the  world,  that  I prove  my 
doctrines.  But  how  ? By  comparing  the  clear  passages 
with  the  more  obscure  I explain  Holy  Scripture,  and  out 
of  my  interpretations  I frame  dogmas,  or  else  confirm 
those  which  are  already  concocted  in  my  brain.  ® But,  I 
adjure  you,  reflect  seriously  on  what  you  say.  How  do 
you  know  that  you  have  made  a right  application  of 
your  method,  or  again  that  your  method  is  sufficient  for 
the  interpretation  of  Scripture,  and  that  you  are  thus 
interpreting  Scripture  aright,  especially  as  the  Catholics 
say,  and  most  truly,  that  the  universal  Word  of  God  is  not 
handed  down  to  us  in  writing,  hence  that  Holy  Scripture 
cannot  be  explained  through  itself,  I will  not  say  by  one 
man,  but  by  the  Church  herself,  who  is  the  sole  author- 
ized interpreter  ? The  Apostolic  traditions  must  likewise 
be  consulted,  as  is  proved  by  the  testimony  of  Holy 
Scripture  and  the  Holy  Fathers,  and  as  reason  and  ex- 
perience suggest.  Thus,  as  your  first  principles  are  most 
false  and  lead  to  destruction,  what  will  become  of  all 
your  doctrine,  built  up  and  supported  on  so  rotten  a 
foundation  ? 

Wherefore,  if  you  believe  in  Christ  crucified,  acknowl- 
edge your  pestilent  heresy,  reflect  on  the  perverseness  of 
your  nature,  and  be  reconciled  with  the  Church. 

How  do  your  proofs  differ  from  those  of  all  heretics, 
who  ever  have  left,  are  now  leaving,  or  shall  in  future 
leave  God’s  Church  ? All,  like  yourself,  make  use  of  the 
same  principle,  to  wit,  Holy  Scripture  taken  by  itself, 
for  the  concoction  and  establishment  of  their  doctrines. 

Do  not  flatter  yourself  with  the  thought,  that  neither 
the  Calvinists,  it  may  be,  nor  the  so-called  Reformed 
Church,  nor  the  Lutherans,  nor  the  Mennonites,  nor  the 
Socinians,  etc.,  can  refute  your  doctrines.  All  these,  as 


LETTER  LXXIII.J  CORRESPONDENCE 


419 


I have  said,  are  as  wretched  as  yourself  and  like  you  are 
dwelling  in  the  shadow  of  death. 

If  you  do  not  believe  in  Christ,  you  are  more  wretched 
than  I can  express.  Yet  the  remedy  is  easy.  Turn  away 
from  your  sins,  and  consider  the  deadly  arrogance  of 
your  wretched  and  insane  reasoning.  You  do  not 
believe  in  Christ.  Why?  You  will  say:  * Because  the 
teaching  and  the  life  of  Christ,  and  also  the  Christian 
teaching  concerning  Christ  are  not  at  all  in  harmony 
with  my  teaching.®  But  again,  I say,  then  you  dare  to 
think  yourself  greater  than  all  those  who  have  ever 
risen  up  in  the  State  or  Church  of  God,  patriarchs, 
prophets,  apostles,  martyrs,  doctors,  confessors,  and  holy 
virgins  innumerable,  yea,  in  your  blasphemy,  than 
Christ  himself.  Do  you  alone  surpass  all  these  in  doctrine, 
in  manner  of  life,  in  every  respect  ? Will  you,  wretched 
pigmy,  vile  worm  of  the  earth,  yea,  ashes,  food  of 
worms,  will  you  in  your  unspeakable  blasphemy,  dare  to 
put  yourself  before  the  incarnate,  infinite  wisdom  of  the 
Eternal  Father  ? Will  you,  alone,  consider  yourself 
wiser  and  greater  than  all  those,  who  from  the  begin- 
ning of  the  world  have  been  in  the  Church  of  God,  and 
have  believed,  or  believe  still,  that  Christ  would  come  or 
has  already  come  ? On  what  do  you  base  this  rash,  insane, 
deplorable,  and  inexcusable  arrogance  ? 

******* 

If  you  cannot  pronounce  on  what  I have  just  been 
enumerating  (dividing  rods,  alchemy,  etc.),  why, 
wretched  man,  are  you  so  puffed  up  with  diabolical  pride, 
as  to  pass  rash  judgment  on  the  awful  mysteries  of 
Christ’s  life  and  passion,  which  the  Catholics  themselves 
in  their  teaching  declare  to  be  incomprehensible  ? Why 
do  you  commit  the  further  insanity  of  silly  and  futile 
carping  at  the  numberless  miracles  and  signs,  which 
have  been  wrought  through  the  virtue  of  Almighty  God 
by  the  apostles  and  disciples  of  Christ,  and  afterward 
by  so  many  thousand  saints,  in  testimony  to,  and  con- 
firmation of  the  truth  of  the  Catholic  faith;  yea,  which 
are  being  wrought  in  our  own  time  in  cases  without 
number  throughout  the  world,  by  God’s  almighty  good- 


420 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LXXIII. 


ness  and  mercy  ? If  you  cannot  gainsay  these,  and 
surely  you  cannot,  why  stand  aloof  any  longer  ? Join 
hands  of  fellowship,  and  repent  from  your  sins:  put  on 
humility,  and  be  bom  again. 

[ Albert  Burgh  requests  Spinoza  to  consider:  (i.)  The  large  number 
of  believers  in  the  Romish  faith,  (ii.)  The  uninterrupted  succession 
of  the  Church,  (iii. ) The  fact  that  a few  unlearned  men  converted 
the  world  to  Christianity,  (iv.)  The  antiquity,  the  immutability,  the 
infallibility,  the  incorruption,  the  unity,  and  the  vast  extent  of  the 
Catholic  Religion ; also  the  fact  that  secession  from  it  involves  damna- 
tion, and  that  it  will  itself  endure  as  long  as  the  world,  (v.)  The 
admirable  organization  of  the  Romish  Church,  (vi.)  The  superior 
morality  of  Catholics,  (vii.)  The  frequent  cases  of  recantation  of 
opinions  among  heretics,  (viii. ) The  miserable  life  led  by  atheists, 
whatever  their  outward  demeanor  may  be.]  . . . 

I have  written  this  letter  to  you  with  intentions  truly 
Christian;  first,  in  order  to  show  the  love  I bear  to  you, 
though  you  are  a heathen ; secondly,  in  order  to  beg  you 
not  to  persist  in  converting  others. 

I therefore  will  thus  conclude : God  is  willing  to  snatch 
your  soul  from  eternal  damnation,  if  you  will  allow  him. 
Do  not  doubt  that  the  Master  who  has  called  you  so 
often  through  others,  is  now  calling  you  for  the  last 
time  through  me,  who  having  obtained  grace  from  the 
ineffable  mercy  of  God  himself,  beg  the  same  for  you 
with  my  whole  heart.  Do  not  deny  me.  For  if  you  do 
not  now  give  ear  to  God  who  calls  you,  the  wrath  of 
the  Lord  will  be  kindled  against  you,  and  there  is  a dan- 
ger of  your  being  abandoned  by  his  infinite  mercy,  and 
becoming  a wretched  victim  of  the  Divine  Justice,  which 
consumes  all  things  in  wrath.  Such  a fate  may  Almighty 
God  avert  for  the  greater  glory  of  his  name,  and  for 
the  salvation  of  your  soul,  also  for  a salutary  example 
for  the  imitation  of  your  most  unfortunate  and  idolatrous 
followers,  through  our  Lord  and  Savior,  Jesus  Christ, 
who  with  the  Eternal  Father,  liveth  and  reigneth  in 
the  Unity  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  God  for  all  Eternity. 
Amen. 


Florence,  Sept.  3,  1675. 


LETTER  LXXIV.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


421 


LETTER  LXXIV.  (LXXVI.) 

Spinoza  t©  Albert  Burgh. 

[Spinoza  laments  the  step  taken  by  his  pupil  and  answers  his  argu- 
ments. The  Hague,  end  of  1675.] 

That,  which  I could  scarcely  believe  when  told  me  by 
others,  I learn  at  last  from  your  own  letter ; not  only  have 
you  been  made  a member  of  the  Romish  Church,  but  you 
are  become  a very  keen  champion  of  the  same,  and  have 
already  learned  wantonly  to  insult  and  rail  against  your 
opponents. 

At  first  I resolved  to  leave  your  letter  unanswered, 
thinking  that  time  and  experience  will  assuredly  be  of 
more  avail  than  reasoning,  to  restore  you  to  yourself  and 
your  friends;  not  to  mention  other  arguments,  which  won 
your  approval  formerly,  when  we  were  discussing  the  case 
of  Steno,*  in  whose  steps  you  are  now  following.  But 
some  of  my  friends,  who,  like  myself  had  formed  great 
hopes  from  your  superior  talents,  strenuously  urge  me  not 
to  fail  in  the  offices  of  a friend,  but  to  consider  what  you 
lately  were,  rather  than  what  you  are,  with  other  arguments 
of  the  like  nature.  I have  thus  been  induced  to  write 
you  this  short  reply,  which  I earnestly  beg  you  will  think 
worthy  of  calm  perusal. 

I will  not  imitate  those  adversaries  of  Romanism,  who 
would  set  forth  the  vices  of  priests  and  popes  with  a view 
to  kindling  your  aversion.  Such  considerations  are  often 
put  forward  from  evil  and  unworthy  motives,  and  tend 
rather  to  irritate  than  to  instruct.  I will  even  admit, 
that  more  men  of  learning  and  of  blameless  life  are 
found  in  the  Romish  Church  than  in  any  other  Christian 
body;  for,  as  it  contains  more  members,  so  will  every 
type  of  character  be  more  largely  represented  in  it.  You 
cannot  possibly  deny,  unless  you  have  lost  your  memory 
as  well  as  your  reason,  that  in  every  church  there  are 

* A Danish  anatomist,  who  renounced  Lutheranism  for  Catholicism 
at  Florence  in  1669. 


422 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LXX1V. 


thoroughly  honorable  men,  who  worship  God  with  justice 
and  charity.  We  have  known  many  such  among  the 
Lutherans,  the  Reformed  Church,  the  Mennonites,  and  the 
Enthusiasts.  Not  to  go  further,  you  knew  your  own  rela- 
tions, who  in  the  time  of  the  Duke  of  Alva  suffered  every 
kind  of  torture  bravely  and  willingly  for  the  sake  of  their 
religion.  In  fact,  you  must  admit,  that  personal  holiness 
is  not  peculiar  to  the  Romish  Church,  but  common  to 
all  churches. 

As  it  is  by  this,  that  we  know  (<  that  we  dwell  in  God 
and  he  in  us”  (i  Ep.  John,  iv.  13),  it  follows,  that  what 
distinguishes  the  Roman  Church  from  others  must  be 
something  entirely  superfluous,  and  therefore  founded 
solely  on  superstition.  For,  as  John  says,  justice  and 
charity  are  the  one  sure  sign  of  the  true  Catholic  faith, 
and  the  true  fruits  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Wherever  they 
are  found,  there  in  truth  is  Christ;  wherever  they  are 
absent,  Christ  is  absent  also.  For  only  by  the  spirit  of 
Christ  can  we  be  led  to  the  love  of  justice  and  charity. 
Had  you  been  willing  to  reflect  on  these  points,  you 
would  not  have  ruined  yourself,  nor  have  brought  deep 
affliction  on  your  relations,  who  are  now  sorrowfully  be- 
wailing your  evil  case. 

But  I return  to  your  letter,  which  you  begin,  by  lament- 
ing that  I allow  myself  to  be  ensnared  by  the  prince  of 
evil  spirits.  Pray  take  heart  and  recollect  yourself. 
When  you  had  the  use  of  your  faculties,  you  were  wont, 
if  I mistake  not,  to  worship  an  infinite  God,  by  whose 
efficacy  all  things  absolutely  come  to  pass  and  are  pre- 
served; now  you  dream  of  a prince,  God’s  enemy,  who 
against  God’s  will  ensnares  and  deceives  very  many  men 
(rarely  good  ones,  to  be  sure),  whom  God  thereupon 
hands  over  to  this  master  of  wickedness  to  be  tortured 
eternally.  The  Divine  justice  therefore  allows  the  devil 
to  deceive  men  and  remain  unpunished;  but  it  by  no 
means  allows  to  remain  unpunished  the  men,  who  have 
been  by  that  self-same  devil  miserably  deceived  and 
ensnared. 

These  absurdities  might  so  far  be  tolerated,  if  you 
worshipped  a God  infinite  and  eternal;  not  one  whom 


LETTER  LXXIV.  ] CORRESPONDENCE 


423 


Chastillon  in  the  town  which  the  Dutch  call  Tienen,  gave 
with  impunity  to  horses  to  be  eaten.  And,  poor  wretch, 
you  bewail  me  ? My  philosophy,  which  you  never  beheld, 
you  style  a chimera  ? O youth,  deprived  of  understanding, 
who  has  bewitched  you  into  believing,  that  the  supreme 
and  eternal  is  eaten  by  you,  and  held  in  your  intestines  ? 

Yet  you  seem  to  wish  to  employ  reason,  and  ask  me, 

* HOW  I KNOW  THAT  MY  PHILOSOPHY  IS  THE  BEST  AMONG 
ALL  THAT  HAVE  EVER  BEEN  TAUGHT  IN  THE  WORLD,  OR  ARE 
BEING  TAUGHT,  OR  EVER  WILL  BE  TAUGHT  ? * SL  question 

which  I might  with  much  greater  right  ask  you ; for  I do 
not  presume  that  I have  found  the  best  philosophy,  I 
know  that  I understand  the  true  philosophy.  If  you  ask 
in  what  way  I know  it,  I answer:  In  the  same  way  as 
you  know  that  the  three  angles  of  a triangle  are  equal 
to  two  right  angles:  that  this  is  sufficient,  will  be  denied 
by  no  one  whose  brain  is  sound,  and  who  does  not  go 
dreaming  of  evil  spirits  inspiring  us  with  false  ideas  like 
the  true.  For  the  truth  is  the  index  of  itself  and  of  what 
is  false. 

But  you,  who  presume  that  you  have  at  last  found  the 
best  religion,  or  rather  the  best  men,  on  whom  you  have 
pinned  your  credulity,  you,  <(  who  know  that  they  are 

THE  BEST  AMONG  ALL  WHO  HAVE  TAUGHT,  DO  NOW  TEACH, 
OR  SHALL  IN  FUTURE  TEACH  OTHER  RELIGIONS.  HAVE  YOU 
EXAMINED  ALL  RELIGIONS,  ANCIENT  AS  WELL  AS  MODERN, 
TAUGHT  HERE  AND  IN  INDIA  AND  EVERYWHERE  THROUGHOUT 
THE  WORLD  ? And,  IF  YOU  HAVE  DULY  EXAMINED  THEM, 
HOW  DO  YOU  KNOW  THAT  YOU  HAVE  CHOSEN  THE  BEST,  * 

since  you  can  give  no  reason  for  the  faith  that  is  in  you  ? 
But  you  will  say,  that  you  acquiesce  in  the  inward  testi- 
mony of  the  spirit  of  God,  while  the  rest  of  mankind  are 
ensnared  and  deceived  by  the  prince  of  evil  spirits.  But 
all  those  outside  the  pale  of  the  Romish  Church  can  with 
equal  right  proclaim  of  their  own  creed  what  you  pro- 
claim of  yours. 

As  to  what  you  add  of  the  common  consent  of  myriads 
of  men  and  the  uninterrupted  ecclesiastical  succession, 
this  is  the  very  catch-word  of  the  Pharisees.  They  with 
no  less  confidence  than  the  devotees  of  Rome  bring  for- 


424 


SPINOZA'S 


[LETTER  LXXIV. 


ward  their  myriad  witnesses,  who  as  pertinaciouly  as  the 
Roman  witnesses  repeat  what  they  have  heard,  as  though 
it  were  their  personal  experience.  Further,  they  carry 
back  their  line  to  Adam.  They  boast  with  equal  arro- 
gance, that  their  Church  has  continued  to  this  day  un- 
moved and  unimpaired  in  spite  of  the  hatred  of  Chris- 
tians and  heathen.  They  more  than  any  other  sect  are 
supported  by  antiquity.  They  exclaim  with  one  voice, 
that  they  have  received  their  traditions  from  God  him- 
self, and  that  they  alone  preserve  the  Word  of  God  both 
written  and  unwritten.  That  all  heresies  have  issued 
from  them,  and  that  they  have  remained  constant 
through  thousands  of  years  under  no  constraint  of  tem- 
poral dominion,  but  by  the  sole  efficacy  of  their  super- 
stition, no  one  can  deny.  The  miracles  they  tell  of 
would  tire  a thousand  tongues.  But  their  chief  boast  is, 
that  they  count  a far  greater  number  of  martyrs  than 
any  other  nation,  a number  which  is  daily  increased  by 
those  who  suffer  with  singular  constancy  for  the  faith 
they  profess;  nor  is  their  boasting  false.  I myself  knew 
among  others  of  a certain  Judah  called  the  faithful,* 
who  in  the  midst  of  the  flames,  when  he  was  already 
thought  to  be  dead,  lifted  his  voice  to  sing  the  hymn  be- 
ginning, “To  Thee,  O God,  I offer  up  my  soul,®  and  so 
singing,  perished. 

The  organization  of  the  Roman  Church,  which  you  so 
greatly  praise,  I confess  to  be  politic,  and  to  many  lucra- 
tive. I should  believe  that  there  was  no  other  more 
convenient  for  deceiving  the  people  and  keeping  men’s 
minds  in  check,  if  it  were  not  for  the  organization  of  the 
Mahometan  Church,  which  far  surpasses  it.  For  from  the 
time  when  this  superstition  arose,  there  has  been  no 
schism  in  its  church. 

If,  therefore,  you  had  rightly  judged,  you  would  have 
seen  that  only  your  third  point  tells  in  favor  of  the 
Christians,  namely,  that  unlearned  and  common  men 

* « Don  Lope  de  Vera  y Alarcon  de  San  Clemente,  a Spanish  noble- 
man who  was  converted  to  Judaism  through  the  study  of  Hebrew,  and 
was  burnt  at  Valladolid  on  the  25th  July,  1644. ® — Pollock’s  «Spinoza® 
chap.  ii. , last  note. 


LETTER  LXXIV.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


425 


should  have  been  able  to  convert  nearly  the  whole  world 
to  a belief  in  Christ.  But  this  reason  militates  not  only 
for  the  Romish  Church,  but  for  all  those  who  profess  the 
name  of  Christ. 

But  assume  that  all  the  reasons  you  bring  forward  tell 
in  favor  solely  of  the  Romish  Church.  Do  you  think 
that  you  can  thereby  prove  mathematically  the  authority 
of  that  Church?  As  the  case  is  far  otherwise,  why  do 
you  wish  me  to  believe  that  my  demonstrations  are  in- 
spired by  the  prince  of  evil  spirits,  while  your  own  are 
inspired  by  God,  especially  as  I see,  and  as  your  letter 
clearly  shows,  that  you  have  been  led  to  become  a devotee 
of  this  Church  not  by  your  love  of  God,  but  by  your 
fear  of  hell,  the  single  cause  of  superstition  ? Is  this 
your  humility,  that  you  trust  nothing  to  yourself,  but 
everything  to  others,  who  are  condemned  by  many 
of  their  fellow  men  ? Do  you  set  it  down  to  pride  and 
arrogance,  that  I employ  reason  and  acquiesce  in  this 
true  Word  of  God,  which  is  in  the  mind  and  can  never 
be  depraved  or  corrupted  ? Cast  away  this  deadly  super- 
stition, acknowledge  the  reason  which  God  has  given 
you,  and  follow  that,  unless  you  would  be  numbered  with 
the  brutes.  Cease,  I say,  to  call  ridiculous  errors  myster- 
ies, and  do  not  basely  confound  those  things  which  are 
unknown  to  us,  or  have  not  yet  been  discovered,  with 
what  is  proved  to  be  absurd,  like  the  horrible  secrets  of 
this  Church  of  yours,  which,  in  proportion  as  they  are 
repugnant  to  right  reason,  you  believe  to  transcend  the 
understanding. 

But  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  (<  Tractatus  Theo- 
logico-Politicus,®  that  Scripture  should  only  be  expounded 
through  Scripture,  which  you  so  wantonly  without  any 
reason  proclaim  to  be  false,  is  not  merely  assumed,  but 
categorically  proved  to  be  true  or  sound;  especially  in 
chapter  vii.,  where  also  the  opinions  of  adversaries  are 
confuted;  see  also  what  is  proved  at  the  end  of  chapter 
xv.  If  you  will  reflect  on  these  things,  and  also  examine 
the  history  of  the  Church  (of  which  I see  you  are  com- 
pletely ignorant),  in  order  to  see  how  false,  in  many 
respects,  is  Papal  tradition,  and  by  what  course  of  events 


426 


SPINOZA’S 


[LETTER  LXXV. 


and  with  what  cunning  the  Pope  of  Rome  six  hundred 
years  after  Christ  obtained  supremacy  over  the  Church,  I 
do  not  doubt  that  you  will  eventually  return  to  your 
senses.  That  this  result  may  come  to  pass  I,  for  your 
sake,  heartily  wish.  Farewell,  etc. 


LETTER  LXXV.  (LXIX.) 

Spinoza  to  Lambert  van  Velthuysen 
(Doctor  of  Medicine  at  Utrecht). 

[Of  the  proposed  annotation  of  the  (<  Tractatus  Theologico- Politicus.»] 

Most  Excellent  and  Distinguished  Sir, — I wonder  at 
our  friend  Neustadt  having  said,  that  I am  meditating 
the  refutation  of  the  various  writings  circulated  against 
my  book,*  and  that  among  the  works  for  me  to  refute 
he  places  your  MS.  For  I certainly  have  never  enter- 
tained the  intention  of  refuting  any  of  my  adversaries: 
they  all  seem  to  me  utterly  unworthy  of  being  answered. 
I do  not  remember  to  have  said  to  Mr.  Neustadt  any- 
thing more,  than  that  I proposed  to  illustrate  some  of  the 
obscurer  passages  in  the  treatise  with  notes,  and  that  I 
should  add  to  these  your  MS.,  and  my  answer,  if  your 
consent  could  be  gained,  on  which  last  point  I begged 
him  to  speak  to  you,  adding,  that  if  you  refused  per- 
mission on  the  ground  that  some  of  the  observations  in 
my  answer  were  too  harshly  put,  you  should  be  given 
full  power  to  modify  or  expunge  them.  In  the  mean- 
while, I am  by  no  means  angry  with  Mr.  Neustadt,  but 
I wanted  to  put  the  matter  before  you  as  it  stands,  that 
if  your  permission  be  not  granted,  I might  show  you 
that  I have  no  wish  to  publish  your  MS.  against  your 
will.  Though  I think  it  might  be  issued  without  endan- 
gering your  reputation,  if  it  appears  without  your  name, 
I will  take  no  steps  in  the  matter,  unless  you  give  me 
leave.  But,  to  tell  the  truth,  you  would  do  me  a far 
*The  «Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus.» 


LETTER  LXXV.]  CORRESPONDENCE 


427 


greater  kindness,  if  you  would  put  in  writing  the  argu- 
ments with  which  you  think  you  can  impugn  my  treatise, 
and  add  them  to  your  MS.  I most  earnestly  beg  you  to 
do  this.  For  there  is  no  one  whose  arguments  I would 
more  willingly  consider;  knowing,  as  I do,  that  you  are 
bound  solely  by  your  zeal  for  truth,  and  that  your  mind 
is  singularly  candid.  I therefore  beg  you  again  and 
again,  not  to  shrink  from  undertaking  this  task,  and  to 
believe  me,  Yours  most  obediently, 

B.  de  Spinoza. 


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